Steve asks whether we gain anything by viewing legal questions through the lens of Catholic social thought given that the range of resulting perspectives often seems to mirror the views held by those who do not bother with the CST lens in the first place. In other words, does the "Catholic legal theory" label simply provide a noble cover slogan for debates that, at their essence, can be found throughout the surrounding legal culture?
With this past election cycle still fresh in our minds, it is difficult to deny that CST sometimes seems uniquely malleable, especially when it comes to economic issues (unlike abortion, for example). I do think that, even in the economic realm, CST has a substantive spine that separates it from at least some of its competing worldviews. The key is to distinguish between means and ends. CST does not prescribe a single economic path for the modern world, but it does assert unmistakably that any chosen path must be aimed at an economic reality in which the dignity of the human person is honored. One obvious implication of this assertion is the preferential option for the poor. If someone is serious about integrating CST with economic theory, the plight of the poor must be front and center. Does this mean that the Bainbridge-Novak-Sirico approach to economics is out of step with CST? No, but it means that they must show how their approach benefits the poor, not as an afterthought, but as a primary determinant of the approach's compatibility with the Church's teaching. The same holds, of course, for those who favor a welfare state approach.
This may be an obvious attribute of CST, but I think we lose track of how distinctive it is. It also helps explain why there traditionally has tended to be resistance among proponents of CST to an economic theory grounded in tax cuts. I've never heard Reagan or Bush II lead off a tax cut speech with "We're cutting taxes to help the poor!" They might insist that the poor will benefit, but tax cuts are defended as essential to helping the taxpayer. Their impact on the poor is of secondary concern. I'm not saying that tax cuts will never help the poor -- certainly there's a case to be made, especially if the cuts trigger job creation, etc. My only point is that the impact on the poor must be central to economic policy if the vision laid out by CST is to be taken seriously. The means by which the poor can best be helped should be debated with vigor, but the plight of the poor as a foundational concern of economic policy is non-negotiable.
So if we focus only on the "how," then perhaps CST does not add much to our legal debates, as the Church does not claim to have a monopoly on technique. But if we keep in mind the "why," then we will enter the debates of our time from an entirely different angle, and Catholic legal thought will develop in a way that is counter-cultural, even revolutionary.
We've previously noted how recent scientific developments have impacted the abortion debate (at least in the U.K.) by expanding our knowledge of the fetus. It now seems that scientific developments stand to enrich the debate over euthanasia, given the results of this study:
Thousands of brain-damaged people who are treated as if they are almost completely unaware may in fact hear and register what is going on around them but be unable to respond, a new brain-imaging study suggests.
Apparently the College Republicans at Marquette have fully embraced the notion of the Iraq invasion as a just war.
Rob
UPDATE: Reader Conor Dugan insists that my post "begs the further question: What should our stance be toward our soldiers in this war? If this is an unjust war -- and I must admit I've never been fully satisfied of its justice (nor incidentally fully convinced of its injustice) -- what should our posture be towards our troops?"
For the record, I agree that we must support our troops fully. What I object to is the seemingly celebratory stance toward the human suffering caused by war. (In exchange for a donation to buy equipment for American snipers, the Marquette College Republicans were handing out bracelets that read, "One Shot One Kill No Remorse I decide.") Alas, Marquette's decision that these bracelets are not consistent with the school's mission is dismissed by at least one commentator as emanating more from political correctness than from the school's Catholic identity.
Today's New York Times has a must-read article on pro-life groups' emerging reliance on sonogram and ultrasound technology as part of their efforts to persuade pregnant women not to have abortions. The article profiles a woman who decided to have her baby after hearing the heartbeat. Even though the woman had willingly chosen to visit a crisis pregnancy center (after being informed that the center did not perform abortions), not everyone approves of such "pressure tactics":
Groups that favor abortion rights, however, see the technique as a pressure tactic. Nancy Keenan, president of Naral Pro-Choice America, said that while ultrasounds were legitimate medical care for pregnant women, "they shouldn't be misused to badger or coerce women by these so-called crisis pregnancy centers."
"With or without ultrasound," Ms. Keenan said, "women understand the moral dimensions of their choices."
Apparently Naral Pro-Choice America opposes the use of medical technology to give pregnant women more information about what's happening inside their bodies before they decide to have an abortion. So in Naral's world, medical technology is good, as long as it leads to more efficient abortions, and providing maximum information to pregnant women is good, as long as the information pertains to the availability of abortion.
How exactly can this group be considered "pro-choice?"
Andrew Sullivan asks, "Why not an anti-abortion amendment?":
The Senate Republicans have vowed to push their anti-gay marriage amendment, even though it won't stand a chance of getting the necessary 67 votes. The point is political and rhetorical. They are trying to build momentum, raise money, and keep the cause of banning same-sex unions alive. So why not push an anti-abortion amendment instead? They have one such amendment on hand. Both proposed amendments are allegedly against judicial meddling. Both will fail. But one deals with a much graver issue, by the religious right's reckoning - an immense loss of human life, rather than the grave evil of two human beings committing to one another for life. So why this priority? Surely, abortion is a more important matter than same-sex marriage - even for the religious right. Or is it?
Reader Jeff Drocco has forwarded an article by Michael Baxter, CSC to serve as a contrast with the James Turner Johnson article discussed earlier. Drocco is concerned by:
Johnson's peculiar assertion that there are actually two distinct (and manifestly incompatible) Catholic just war ethics: one for religious life that deals with "ultimates" and another for secular life that deals with "historical realities." This resonates with Baxter's claim that modern just war theorists are often led astray by an "ideal/real antinomy" that leads to a prevailing philosophy of pragmatism.
Steve at Southern Appeal has weighed in our just war discussion, taking issue with my objection to the "imperialist" potential of an expanded just war understanding:
Maybe I am missing something here, but it seems to me that there is nothing at all improper or immoral about embracing such imperialism. Indeed, IMHO, [such a] view is wholly consistent with the Church's "just war" teaching. I suspect that Professor Vischer's concern that Professor Garnett's defense of the Iraq War under the Just War doctrine would justify a "whole range of imperialist motives for warfare" is grounded in a false premise--i.e., that all cultures or civilizations are to be afforded some amount of diplomatic deference, no matter how morally bankrupt they may be. I say this because Vischer posits in his most recent post that "[i]f we substitute our conception (noble as it is) of the citizenry's well-being as a basis for invasion, haven't we fundamentally altered the just war inquiry?"
I think not.
Whatever flaws the American Republic may have as a result of straying from its Judeo-Christian principles and those articulated in our founding documents, the fact remains that these principles are more than just "noble," they are grounded in truth (as is the Church's "just war" teaching).
Read the entire post here. There are also some interesting comments over at Open Book regarding our discussion.
Reader Matthew Festa looks to an article on just war in a recent First Things, in which James Turner Johnson argues that
Of course, the sovereign has the right to authorize resort to the sword in defense against attack under way or immediately offered; even private persons have such a right. But Aquinas does not build up a conception of defense as just cause on the basis of the private right of self-defense; rather, he builds down from his overall conception of the sovereign’s responsibility for the good of the political community. Insofar as the need for defense provides just cause for public use of the sword, it comes from the responsibility of government to protect order, justice, and peace, not simply from the right to respond to an attacker in kind.
With this understanding in mind, Festa lays out the evidence:
We are working under the assumption that Saddam had no weapons but posed a significant threat to the US. Well, let's look what David Kay said ex post facto concluding that a) there were no WMD but that b) he posed a threat:
1. Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.
2. In the delivery systems area there were already well advanced, but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF had not intervened, would have resulted in the production of missiles with ranges at least up to 1000 km, well in excess of the UN permitted range of 150 km. These missile activities were supported by a serious clandestine procurement program about which we have much still to learn.
3. In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going research and development activities that were embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn about the exact work programs and capabilities of these activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.
The man was a wacko with intentions to jump start his WMD programs again. Containing him impoverished the country and outraged Muslims. I do not think you could protect justice, order, and peace leaving this situation as it was. The man needed to go. . . .
So I guess it depends on what type of "just war" you're into. If you believe -- pace Johnson -- that the classical conception is better, then yes. If you believe[in] the enlightenment just war theory, then probably not.
It still seems to me that a just war conception constrained only by the broad terms of "justice, order and peace" is not much of a constraint at all. We can't simply rely on the fact that Saddam was an evil force, can we? The whole point of the just war tradition is to provide categorical limits on war so that we don't rely simply on our own conception of how much better off the world would be if we engaged in a particular war. What are the categorical limits (not the Saddam-specific justifications) of this "justice, order and peace" just war tradition?
