Several readers responded to my (and Rick's) questions regarding Catholic legal theory's take on growing income disparity (sparked by this Paul Krugman column). Jonathan Watson writes of the particularly nefarious aspects of today's class-driven system:
My first thought runs along the historical analysis performed by Christopher Lasch in several of his books, notably "Revolt of the Elites" and "The True and Only Heaven." . . . He notes with care that the idea of meritocracy is quite modern, having begun its appearance in the early-mid 1900s. Prior to that era, there were indeed massive disparities in income between the middle class and the elite (i.e., the Carnegies), but that those elite subscribed to a theory of noblisse oblige of sorts, thus requiring them to give large amounts of money to improving communities through libraries, schools, and other sustaining institutions. True, this class was an aristocracy of sorts, but this requirement redeemed their capitalistic ethic by helping to sustain communities, by providing common places of learning and discussion. Thus did wealth sustain middle class existence, providing a base for a well-informed populace. . . . Lasch's argument is that the nouveau wealthy, who now rarely make contributions to the community that sustain and encourage all classes to a common discussion and exchange of ideas, have instead locked themselves away in suburbs where they rarely face problems which dominate other classes, and provide the conspicuous consumption that Professor Garnett observes. Other classes, encouraged by this example, seek to reach this status, thus causing the drain referenced. This meritocracy seemingly becomes self-sustaining in time. I paint with a broad brush here, where reading Lasch's works in themselves provides a better and more in-depth discussion.
Another thought which I had is that often Catholic Social Theory is obsessed (not often in a negative way) with ensuring that those in the lowest classes are paid a just wage for their work. Yet, is it possible that those in upper classes or wealthy classes may be paid unjustly too much? And if so, what is the measure of too much? Is it the acquisition of material possessions beyond what is necessary to survive? If so, much of those who inhabit the middle classes are equally damned by this measure. Is it consumption of so much wealth and material that it is a sinful measure, and are these last the equivalent? Finally, once money has gone beyond the sphere of the market in influence (thus affecting education, politics, and other areanas where a level playing field would be more desired), who could limit its influence? I would hazard to say that unjustly high wages are more damaging to a society than unjustly low wages. The problem is, of course, once money affects politics and prevents those without money from entrance into the political field of discussion, how would one who desires to change this situation or affect unjustly high wages do so? The vast sums spent on a presidential race (or any political race), reveal in some ways the difficulty.
Jason Samuel asserts that:
the "working families, " who "have seen little if any progress over the past 30 years," are not the same families [as] thirty years ago. I would suggest though, that the "working families" of which Krugman speaks are indeed the same class of families. To assert that working family "A" of thirty years ago is in the same predicament, having made no progress, is one I do not believe he's making, nor can he. Working family "A," has most probably progressed upwards by their investments, or their offspring's' investments, in education and the free-market. . . . while we should be concerned when the income disparity among classes grows, we must first recognize that since human persons--with free will--are involved, a class structure should well be expected. To want to eradicate what I have made out as inherent differences means to want to strike out the thing that makes for those differences: free will.
Finally, Matt Festa concedes that although "there is a decent amount of income movement from the "bottom" ladder to "upper" ladders," he thinks that Krugman "is right that this movement has slowed down over the past few decades." Festa offers a few potential explanations for this:
1) Education: Jobs in the past 20-30 years have become increasingly specialized (Law, medicine, business) requiring not only bachelors degrees but often masters, phd's, law and medical degrees. this can increase income disparity b/c
a) people can't afford the higher level degrees....in economics lingo, they face borrowing constraints.
b) they don't want to get the degrees, because the degrees are hard and they are not interested
Now for the economics of it: if education is important pushing up its demand, while the supply either falls or does not rise as fast, this pushes wages for those with the degrees up. For people w/o these higher degrees, they face a lower demand and more competition and thus lower wages (although I cannot find credible evidence that there wages have fallen, they just haven't risen as fast).
2) Family structure-not only because wealthier families beget wealthier children, but also because families seem to provide strong incentives to their children to work hard and get an eduction. Single families seem to incentivize the exact opposite.
3) Culture-Thomas Sowell has written about this. Certain cultures seem pre-disposed to devalue the value of an education while others do...this probably has an effect on inner cities (where drug use and single family households seem to prevail)
But note, income disparity is not per se a bad thing. Paul [Krugman] seems to push us to choose the 1960's over today's generation. But exactly how does he expect to move back to these days. Or to put it bluntly, he seems to want to blame the whole thing on Reagan, which seems pathetically simple and naive in my opinion.
In addition, I don't see the complete breakdown in welfare that he sees. In fact, I think the general consensus of people who actually work in these areas is that many of these reforms have brought about a good amount of economic gain. Deregulation and tax simplification have incentivized work (which admittedly probably widens income distribution, but it speeds up economic growth, giving us new products and goods). But also changes such as welfare reform, which have put people back to work.
If I was emperor, I would try to open a national discussion on how to provide better education for Americans, which is admittedly hard but the right way to tackle this problem. If you read between the lines, Paul wants something like the European solution. But the European model has given the region slow growth and high unemployment. They aren't the solution.
I appreciate these responses, though I'm woefully ill-equipped to engage anyone on economic terms. Here's my direct response to Rick's question about why Catholic legal theory views growing income disparity as a problem: We know the poor will always be with us (Matthew 26:11), even though being poor in America today usually means a lack of health care or decent education, rather than starvation. Let's assume that the "rising tide" has lifted all boats, and that greater wealth among the upper classes has helped put food on the tables of the poor. But that's not enough, is it? If we want to take the preferential option for the poor seriously, don't we have to be able to say more than "Well, the rich may now have three luxury homes instead of two, but the poor are better off too, as they have three loaves instead of two." If they still lack the fundamental tools needed for human flourishing, isn't the further enrichment of the wealthy (i.e., becoming even more wealthy relative to the poor than they were before) scandalous from the perspective of Catholic legal theory? (Again, I'm not suggesting that Catholic legal theory prescribes a particular remedy, I'm just seeking to reach consensus that Catholic legal theory views growing income disparity as a problem.)
Rob
What happens when an Amish woman has an affair with her non-Amish employer, producing a child whom both want to raise as their own? The answer's unclear, but here's the story (registration req'd). Shared custody won't help much, as the father's rights will preclude the all-encompassing community experience at the core of Amish identity. One disturbing item from the article is the suggestion by the father's attorney that the custody determination should be driven by the harm accompanying an Amish upbringing -- i.e., the child's best interests lie with the non-backward folks. I'm not sure how effective that strategy will prove with the courts; apparently the attorney has never read Justice Rehnquist's glowing descriptions of the Amish in Yoder. In any event, it's a sad case, however it turns out.
Rob
Friday, June 10, 2005
Here is an excerpt from today's NYT column by Paul Krugman:
Working families have seen little if any progress over the past 30 years. Adjusted for inflation, the income of the median family doubled between 1947 and 1973. But it rose only 22 percent from 1973 to 2003, and much of that gain was the result of wives' entering the paid labor force or working longer hours, not rising wages.
Meanwhile, economic security is a thing of the past: year-to-year fluctuations in the incomes of working families are far larger than they were a generation ago. All it takes is a bit of bad luck in employment or health to plunge a family that seems solidly middle-class into poverty.
But the wealthy have done very well indeed. Since 1973 the average income of the top 1 percent of Americans has doubled, and the income of the top 0.1 percent has tripled.
I assume that there is plenty of disagreement among us about how best to remedy the growing income disparity in the United States, but is there any disagreement among us that, from the perspective of Catholic legal theory, this is a real problem?
Rob
Thursday, June 9, 2005
Much of our conversation on MoJ explores the Gospel's power to transform culture. What happens if the focus on culture means that the individual never experiences that transformative power? In other words, are there gaps in the current practice of Catholicism that warrant Protestant evangelism efforts geared specifically toward Catholics? Here are recent comments by the Southern Baptist Mission Board President:
Rankin added that nearly 1,200 Southern Baptist missionaries continue to serve in 65 predominately Roman Catholic countries where 852 million people live.
“Why would we invest such efforts in Catholic countries? The answer is quite simple: It is because they are lost,” Rankin said. “The people may be identified as cultural Christians since that is their socio-religious profile, but most of them do not have a personal relationship with Jesus Christ.... They, too, deserve an opportunity to hear, understand and respond to the life-changing message of the Gospel. They cannot be ignored in our commitment that all peoples would know our Lord Jesus Christ.”
The debate is raging over at Open Book. (See here, here and here, along with the voluminous reader comments.) In Amy Welborn's view:
North American Catholics can be easy pickings for evangelical Protestants for a number of reasons, and the reasons cited for leaving vary, but one of the big ones, aside from marriage and kids' programs, is the centrality of Christ. Is Christ preached in your parish? Is the life you and your fellow parishioners live now, in 2005, being actively engaged and enlightened by the Gospels and the richness and wisdom of 2000 years of tradition and, in the end, drawn to the reality of Christ in the Eucharist, here and now? Is Christ being preached as your savior, as the way, as the One to strengthen and guide you out of a place in which you are lost? Not in my parish, not in many parishes I've been in.
In my view, this is a context where the marketplace of religious experience has some value; if Catholics find the transformative power of the Gospel best embodied in the megachurch down the street, the burden should be on the local Catholic parish to recommit to constructing an authentic caring community, focusing especially on vibrant spiritual formation among adults; the burden should not be on the megachurches to keep their hands off Catholics.
Rob
Tuesday, June 7, 2005
Below Rick posts Ian Ayres's suggestion that members of churches that discriminate against gays in the marriage rite sign a statement acknowledging that they "choose to associate with a church that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation." I have two reactions:
First, this strikes me as an insightful reflection of a Protestant mindset. In a free market of religious options, perhaps the consumer should be made to reckon with the content of the beliefs chosen. Indeed, many Protestant churches with which I'm familiar make their "statement of faith" readily accessible to potential members to facilitate this choice. It's more of a stretch, though, to assert that Catholics "choose to associate" with an organization espousing x, y, or z belief. It's akin to admitting that, "As an American, I choose to live in a country where materialism is rampant." Sure we could uproot our existences and identities and move to another country as a protest against a given social ill, but can our failure to do so be termed a deliberate choice along the lines of joining the local country club? Perhaps Catholicism would benefit if Catholics reframed their religious identities more in terms of choice, but it seems to me that many Catholics have always been, and will always be, Catholics with little or no deliberate reflection on that affiliation. And for those who have deliberately chosen Catholicism, that choice may stem more from the circumstances and implications of the Church's founding than from any specific belief or practice. In other words, if one is led to the Church by a conviction that it was established and blessed by Christ, choosing an offshoot of that Church, "non-discriminatory" or otherwise, may not even be a viable option. In Protestant churches, by contrast, the characteristics of the church tend to drive membership decisions. (Of course, there are lifelong Baptists, Methodists, etc. who have never thought twice about their religious identities, but in my experience they are relatively rare.)
Second, Professor Ayres's proposal implicitly equates discriminatory policies of a church with those of any voluntary organization. Religions founded on divine commands do not have unlimited policy-making discretion. If they did, they could not claim to be founded on divine commands. We can debate the proper interpretation of scriptural language about same-sex relationships, but a church that chooses to maintain the traditional interpretation is not on par with a secular club writing its membership by-laws on a blank slate. This does not mean that church members should never be held accountable for church positions, but that we should recognize the religious foundation of a particular position before we condemn it in the same language we would apply to the Augusta National Golf Club.
Rob
