Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, September 28, 2006

Response on Point One: Abortion as a Moral Tragedy

I’d like to continue (one point at a time) the conversation with Robert George on possible points of agreement between pro-life democrats and pro-life republicans. On my first point, he writes: "Regarding point one, I do not think it captures the key point of agreement to describe abortion as a ‘moral tragedy for all the people directly involved and for society as a whole.’"

I’d like to explain why I emphasize as a separate point of agreement that both see abortion as a moral tragedy for this reason: it is exactly on this point that there’s a tendency to talk past each other. At times the democrats’ struggle over the question of whether abortion should or should not be legal is characterized as an indication that they take the problem lightly, or that they see abortion itself as a good thing for society. I will not hesitate to admit that in some cases that may be true. But I would like to see if we can reach agreement on this point: when pro-life democrats focus intensely on the prudential dimensions of practical political solutions, including the limits of legal regulation, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they don’t believe that abortion is a moral tragedy. Can we agree that pro-life democrats and pro-life republicans are on the same page in seeing abortion as a moral tragedy even if they may disagree about the prudential and political dimensions of the role and limits of legal regulation?

Robert George's Response to Points of Agreement

Robert George offers the following response to my earlier post:

I'm writing in reply to your Mirror of Justice posting on points of agreement between pro-life Democrats and what you characterize as "the republican party line." I agree that identifying points of agreement between pro-lifers in the two parties would be helpful and constructive. Thanks for initiating the discussion.

May I raise a question or two and make some proposals for revising the three possible points of agreement you suggested?

Regarding point one, I do not think it captures the key point of agreement to describe abortion as a "moral tragedy for all the people directly involved and for society as a whole." The problem is that this leaves out of the description the grave injustice of directly killing an unborn child, as well as the sin against fundamental equality involved in denying to embryonic and fetal members of the human family elementary legal protections afforded to everyone else. Many self-identified "pro-choice" people regard abortion as a tragedy-even a "moral" tragedy. Their difference with "pro-life" people is that they do not regard the deliberate taking of fetal life, or the failure to protect the developing child against the abortionist's lethal assault, as an injustice-a violation of the child's right to life. Therefore, I think a proper formulation of this point of agreement between pro-life democrats and republicans would focus on the thing that defines them as pro-life (and distinguishes them from those who are not), namely, the belief that deliberate feticide and its legal permission are profoundly unjust.

On point two, much depends on what you mean by "principal" in the claim that most pro-life people agree that the criminal law is "too blunt" to be the "principal" instrument for the regulation of abortion. Is the suggestion that most pro-lifers oppose criminal prohibitions of abortion? If so, I'm sure this is incorrect. My Princeton colleague Russell Nieli has carefully studied polling on abortion going back to Roe v. Wade. Of course, the results of individual polls come out differently depending on how the survey questions are framed, but he reported in a lecture here that a stable consensus exists in the United States that most abortions should be illegal. I don't recall the exact estimates he reported, but it was something along the lines of 55-60% of Americans believe that 80-90% of abortions that actually occur ought to be prohibited by law. Of course, the percentages would be still higher if the samples were restricted to self-identified pro-life citizens, rather than to the adult population as a whole. (Majorities exist for legal abortion in the "hard cases," but these account for only a fraction of the abortions in the United States.. It also seems to be the case that many Americans have an exaggerated impression of the frequency of medical indications for abortion. They think that abortion is medically "necessary" far more often than it is.)

On point three, I agree that most pro-lifers think that legally prohibiting abortion is only part of what needs to be done. Sound policies would not merely declare abortions to be illegal; they would effectively deter illegal ("underground") abortions. Such policies would rely on vigorous law enforcement against illegal abortionists and at the same time seek to depress the demand for their services by providing support and alternatives for expecting mothers whose circumstances might drive them to contemplate abortion as a solution to problems that pregnancy presents for them. Pro-life Democrats emphasize the need to bring care and compassion to mother and child alike, and this is a point on which Republicans (including the vast number who, like myself, are former Democrats who shifted their allegiance primarily because of the Democratic Party's decision to embrace the cause of legal abortion) can enthusaistically agree.

Wednesday, September 27, 2006

Points of Agreement?

Regarding the debate on abortion, I wonder if we could make a list of the points of agreement between the position of "pro-life" democrats and the republican party line. This might help us to map out exactly how much divergence there is. Here's a stab, I'd love to hear other suggestions:

1) Both agree that abortion is moral tragedy for all of the people directly involved and for society as a whole.

2) Many (perhaps not all, but the bulk) agree (either explicitly or tacitly) that the criminal law is too blunt to be the principal instrument for regulation of this complex social problem.

3) When considering various regulatory paths, many (again, perhaps not all, but the bulk) agree that practical solutions should weigh very heavily the host of public health problems that would arise if abortion is driven underground.

Friday, September 22, 2006

Vischer on Lawyers, Judges and Conscience

Last evening here at Fordham we were fortunate to have MOJ’s own Rob Vischer as the featured speaker for the first in this year’s Catholic Lawyer’s Program lecture series, Faithful Citizenship, which explored “When Conscience Clashes with State Law & Policy: The Distinctions Between Lawyers and Judges.”  We were treated to a wonderful in-depth analysis which is part of Rob’s larger project on the role of conscience and prudence in the legal system as a whole. 

The thrust of Rob’s argument (who can correct me if I got it wrong) was that there should be much wider latitude for attorneys to bring their conscience to bear on professional decisions, because for the most part the market allows clients to seek a variety of avenues for representation.  Judges, in contrast, are not market actors, and so outside areas where discretion would normally be brought to bear, exercise of one’s personal and perhaps idiosyncratic conscience may threaten the rule of law, fairness, predictability, and other values of the legal system.  For the purposes of our project, one especially interesting aspect of the presentation was its groudning in principles of CST: subsidiarity, solidarity, reciprocity, and the common good.

The response by my colleague Bruce Green then initiated a terrific open discussion with the participating attorneys.

I look forward to seeing his paper posted soon – there’s much to chew on.

Torture and the Ticking Time Bomb

Now that Rob has taught me about these fancy links... Here's the online version of a brief essay I did for the Focolare's monthly magazine, Torture and the Ticking Time Bomb.  Part of the analysis aims to make accessible for a grass-roots audience David Luban's argument on the same subject.  My essay appeared together with a excellent piece by Gerald Russello, "Catholic Teaching and Torture." (but sorry, that's not on line). 

Monday, September 18, 2006

Benedict and Islam: a few more thoughts

I don’t have any insights on Tom’s theological question, but I’ll throw a few more musings into the pot. 

Here at Fordham on Saturday the Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer’s Work had the privilege of co-sponsoring / providing hospitality for the Muslim Bar Association of New York event, “Five Years Later: Protecting Civil Liberties and National Security After 9/11.”  The president of the organization is a close friend, and so as we were setting up for the program (including the construction with room dividers of a space for prayer) we had the chance to chat a bit about Benedict’s remarks and the reaction.  When I reflected, “this is not a sound-bite Pope,” she understood profoundly what I meant, and commiserated about how many misunderstandings about the Muslim community have been generated by a sound-bite culture. 

I’m not saying that a global leader such as the Pope should not flank himself with skilled PR folks to anticipate how a sound-bit culture will react, and I think the apology was in and of itself a wonderful example of the readiness to live up to the demands of dialogue. 

But I do wonder if part of our task—as academics, and as people of faith—is to help people move beyond the sound-bites, to a deeper capacity to listen and welcome the complexity of what the other is trying to say, and how they might be struggling with some of the tensions inherent in their own texts and traditions. 

It seems to me that one of the best ways to engage at this level is to take a breath from head to head conceptual debate in order to create spaces in which we can simply get to know each other, listen to each other, and take in, in a more profound way, the other’s perspective.  And often the best way to create this kind of space is through the concreteness of loving hospitality: a meal together, water to wash, space to pray, listening and reacting to another’s article or talk, or simply just being completely present without worrying about a list of things to do.

(And to respond to Rick’s request, this is, in a very small nutshell, the core of my Scarpa conference paper—it is possible to reconcile evangelization and dialogue when, like Jesus, we “empty ourselves” out of love, and this kind of love in and of itself communicates an evangelical message.  I’ll try to get the full paper into decent enough shape to post soon!)

Amy

Tuesday, September 12, 2006

Budapest 1956-2006 – Another revolution

OK, behind the scenes Rob has been coaching me on how to add in a link using the fancy icons that always scare me.  So in gratitude for his help, and most of all his demonstration of the virtue of hope, here goes.  In 1956, Pius XII reacted with the Hungarian Uprising with a cry for "volunteers of God" who would commit themselves to working for the transformation of society.  For the Focolare Movement this event became the initial seed of the "volunteers of God," people who are commited to living the Gospel's "revolution" in the many dimensions of social and cultural life.  To mark the 50th anniversary this Saturday September 16 over 11,000 people from 92 countries will gather in Budapest for an international event to celebrate and strengthen this commitment.

The event will be transmitted in four languages, Italian, English, Spanish, and Portuguese and can be viewed live on through this link.  And here's the press release.  I hope it works, but if not you can blame Rob.

Subsidiarity and the EU

MOJ friend Gerald Russello thought folks might enjoy this article on Subsidiarity and the European Union

http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=755

Friday, August 11, 2006

Response to CLT Critics

Below is a response to Rick's post on critiques of the CLT mission from MOJ friend Gerald Russello:

1. The criticism that adding the modifier "Catholic" does not add anything to the range of positions would be applicable to any of the "critical X" approaches to law. Feminist legal theory, for example, at its best exposes the law's sometimes unwarranted presumptions of maleness where a female perspective should be included. CLT introduces the same element of critique: first, to show that legal doctrines may/may not be compatible with Catholic understandings; and also to show how they could be changed to so be compatible. The obvious objection is that some may not wish for doctrines to be changed, but that is a policy or legislative argument, not an argument against a body of scholarly inquiry.

2. Some of the critics seem to think that the Catholic tradition to external to that, say, of the common law. That is not so, and insofar as that syatem - with its assumptions about the indicvidual, the family, and the nature of obligations or promises, for example - remain constitutive parts of the legal system, reflections on the Catholic contribution to them can be helpful.

3. CLT is just a part of a broader social tradition. If law schools want to educate the whole person as a new professional, immersion in a comprehensive tradition would seem to be an appropriate mission for a Catholic law school. Does this mean that Catholic scholars/lawyers will advocate for positions seemingly at odds with majority understandings? Sure. But I don't see how that detracts from the mission of a Catholic law school qua law school. I don't hear many CLT scholars arguing against the federal rules of civil procedure or a standard first-year curriculum.

Wednesday, August 2, 2006

Women's Ordination: 2 Qs

Two questions: First, I'm not aware of the theological background which defines the priesthood as representing "the ultimate sacred" or holding "ultimate power" in a way that is distinct (or to the exclusion of) the royal priesthood in which all the baptized participate.  If anyone has background on that I'd love to see it.  Second, if there is such background, would a vision of the priesthood as representing "the ultimate sacred" or holding "ultimate power" in a way that is distinct from the royal priesthood in which all the baptized participate be in sync with the vision of the priesthood that emerged from the Second Vatican Council?  Amy