Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, March 29, 2004

More on Kerry and the Catholic Church

Following up on our earlier discussion about the prospect of a politician who dissents from fundamental church teachings on public protection of human life becoming the most prominent Catholic in America, Time magazine has just published an article titled, A Test of Kerry's Faith, which can be found here.

Among various items of note in the article, here are two: First, with respect to concerns about scandal to the faithful that were mentioned earlier, the article quotes a leader in Vatican as saying: "People in Rome are becoming more and more aware that there's a problem with John Kerry, and a potential scandal with his apparent profession of his Catholic faith and some of his stances, particularly abortion."

Second, as was reported in our last discussion, the Archbishop of St. Louis had directed that John Kerry should not present himself for communion in that diocese. Interestingly, the article says that Kerry was expected to campaign in St. Louis last Sunday and that he declared he intends to take Mass while there. Although no reports of what occurred have been received, this raised the prospect of the most prominent Catholic in America being publicly denied communion or affirmatively disobeying the directive of a bishop in his own diocese.

Obviously this story will continue to be played-out over the long (very long) political season ahead.

Tuesday, March 23, 2004

Church Scandal Revisited: The Lawyer's Proper Role as Moral Catalyst

One of our readers, attorney and judicial clerk John Doe, writes with appreciation for our the Mirror of Justice and our ongoing discussion about the shameful role of lawyers in what Richard John Neuhaus has described as our Church’s “Long Lent” since the priest sex abuse scandal seized public attention. While agreeing that lawyers should not neglect the moral counseling aspect of our role, Mr. Doe remarks that, in the specific context of this Catholic Church scandal, this might have been a “tall order.” He quite rightly points out that it might be rather presumptuous for a lawyer, even a Catholic lawyer, to act as a moral advisor to a bishop or other high church leader. Mr. Doe thoughtfully asks whether the lawyer, at least in this particular context, is really qualified or justified in offering moral advice to the client.

I do regard it as fundamentally important for the lawyer to begin every attorney-client relationship by asking the client a basic question: “Who are you?” The lawyer should not presume the answer, but neither should the lawyer allow the representation to stumble along unguided and without insisting upon the client’s answer to this question. By framing the inquiry in a manner that invites the client to draw upon the client’s own values, the lawyer assists the client to be true to the client’s own best self.

In other words, what I mean to encourage here is the initiation between the lawyer and the client of a moral conversation. This should not be a lecture by the lawyer nor serve as the vehicle by which the lawyer arrogates the position of moral dictator. Rather, this should be a cooperative process in which the lawyer and the client work together to achieve the best outcome for the client, including a humane outcome that is consistent with the client’s own moral compass. The lawyer thus would serve a catalytic role, encouraging the client to think more deeply about what the client should do, both legally and morally.

Would it have been presumptuous for an attorney to instruct the princes of the Church on morality? Perhaps, especially if the lawyer was not also trained in theology or canon law. But would it have been presumptuous for the lawyer to inquire whether the Church’s nature and mission demanded a different approach to this problem? Would it have been inappropriate to ask pointed questions that forced Church leaders to confront the possible disconnect between the mission of Christ’s Church and the legal tactics employed to deflect embarrassing disclosure of priestly failures? I don’t think so.

As Rob Vischer writes in his recent post here, the legal profession tends to elevate client autonomy to an absolute, regarding lawyers as amoral technicians who simply implement in legal terms the client’s stated objectives. Even worse, I want to emphasize here, most lawyers assume that their clients have no ideals, no values, no moral calling that would be relevant to the legal task. As Rob says, lawyers too often fail “even to suggest that a client reflect meaningfully on those objectives.” In so doing, the lawyer encourages the client to regard the world of legal affairs as devoid of values. In this way, the legal profession makes those who enter into this world comfortable with amoral attitudes and ethical neglect, thereby lowering the quality of moral discourse and interaction in society.

In sum, if we as lawyers fail to provoke the client to consider the moral implications of legal problems, we encourage the client to divorce the essential moral dimension of the client’s identity from the client’s responses to legal problems. The legal profession for too long has told clients, at least implicitly, to leave their values at the door when entering the lawyer’s office. Not surprisingly, that way lies disaster. And that danger inherent in amoral legalisms were tragicly realized in the role played by lawyers in the Church sex abuse scandal.

Greg Sisk

Friday, March 19, 2004

Church Scandal Revisited: Reminding the Client of Its Mission

In terms of the continuing discussion of how our legal profession generally failed to serve a positive role in the context of the priest sexual abuse scandal, Randy J. Heinig kindly cites to our discussion here at the Mirror of Justice and then offers the following thoughtful summation:

“Lawyers can be analyzed to MSG (salt is, by and large, a little too flattering for us as a class) -- they more or less accentuate what's already there. But we do bring a distinctive way of viewing things to the table that can, by and large, be good for the client to hear. In this case, it clearly wasn't. The lawyers at issue appeared to understand the law (its language, its strictures, the way it functions -- too much so) in counseling the client, but had missed the essential purposes of the client. While this is rare, sometimes the lawyers need to remind the client of its own purposes. In this case, the lawyers forgot to do that and forgot, therefore, to ultimately and truly serve the client's interests. They lost sight of their larger tasks and became to pre-occuppied with their own limited professional discourse to provide real counsel.”

(You can read the entire message at: http://www.news-sheet.net/archives/000201.html.)

Using Mr. Heinig’s point as a spring-board to continue this discussion, I’d suggest that the “need to remind the client of its own purposes” ought not to be so rare. Indeed, by making the lawyer’s appreciation of the unique purpose or mission of every client a centerpiece of legal practice, we might revitalize the role of the attorney as an adviser, that is, as a true professional and not merely a legal handyman. If such a conversation between lawyers and clients were to become a standard part of the initial retention arrangement, the opportunity for the lawyer and client to work together toward a mutually fulfilling moral as well as a legal end would be greatly enhanced, and many misunderstandings might be avoided as well.

Let me propose this, as a plan of action or at least a subject of further dialogue: We as lawyers ought to put the “mission” question on the table upfront, asking the client who he, she, or it really is; what is the client’s mission,that is, its reason for being; what are the long-term goals as well as the short-term ends of the client; if we were to look back in twenty years, what legacy would the client wish to leave behind; how may the client reach its goals in a manner that strengthens the clients attachment to others and to society; etc. By being purposeful about the mission of the client or the moral terms of the retention from the very inception of the attorney-client relationship, the lawyer then can shape the nature and content of that relationship throughout its duration.

Consider the example at hand: had every lawyer retained by every Catholic bishop confronted by a suit against a diocese for improper conduct by a priest with a minor paused to inquire whether the Church deserved a different kind of legal advising, before plunging in to provide an ordinary legal defense according to the letter of the law, isn’t it likely that the results would have been different on at least some occasions? To be sure, some bishops might still have insisted upon treating the sex abuse problem as a legal distraction and demanded a zealous and legalistic response thereto. But isn’t it likely that some Church leaders, when encouraged by their own legal counsel to do so, would have been moved to reconsider their approach, rediscover the true nature or role of the Church in society and in relationship with others, and reorient the trajectory?

In fact, given the disastrous consequences that often attended the representation of the Church by its lawyers in the sex abuse scandals, might not one argue that the failure to raise questions of mission and the proper contextual role of legal counse for that client was itself a failure of competence? In conclusion, then, could it not be that extending an invitation to the client to engage in moral reasoning together is not merely advisable but the essence of professional responsibility?

I’ll close this posting with these words from Gerald J. Postema, which seem to me particularly pertinent here:

“[C]ut off from sound moral judgment, the lawyer’s ability to do his job well—to determine the applicable law and effectively advise his clients—is likely to be seriously affected. . . . [T]he lawyer who must detach professional judgment from his own moral judgment is deprived of the resources from which arguments regarding his client’s legal rights and duties can be fashioned. In effect, the ideal of neutrality and detachment wars against its companion ideal of zealous pursuit of the client interests.”

Wednesday, March 17, 2004

More Thoughts on Blogging

Amy Uelmen’s “thoughts about blogging” should serve both as a reminder to readers of the inherent limitations of this unique medium, and as a catalyst for those of us participating here to consider again what we would hope to accomplish through the particular venue of the Mirror of Justice.

First, every reader of this blog would do well do begin by reading Amy Uelmen’s message, as it should an essential part of a virtual FAQ for the Mirror of Justice. Readers must appreciate that this weblog is a peculiar type of forum, in which the ideas expressed often are preliminary, tentative, and designed to advance discussion and raise questions both among ourselves and for the larger society. These postings are not the equivalent of a polished and carefully considered expression of firm views as as in a published journal article. This is not to say that any of us should be negligent in posting to the Mirror of Justice, that is, none of us should be careless or casual, because as Amy notes the words we speak do (potentially at any rate) have a broader reach to a larger segment of the population than an idle thought expressed in a coffee shop or faculty lounge. But at the same time, our readers should realize that not every word posted here reflects a fixed and determined point of view nor should the authors be held forever responsible for every provocative point offered or sincere query explored.

Thus, I regard the Mirror of Justice weblog as a conversation among friends and fellow disciples of Christ. Amy certainly is correct that it does not have the same features as a direct and personal connection made through a face-to-face contact. That is one of the limitations of this medium and can result in an artificiality to the conversation. Moreover, it is a conversation that unfolds before an audience. But in many respects, and here I turn to my second point, that is a very good thing.

By holding such a public conversation, we members of the Mirror of Justice attempt to model for others how people of diverse views sharing a common faith can interact with each other and seek common ground. By my reading of the blog postings thus far, we are accomplishing that purpose. In contrast with some listservs to which I belong (and these academic listservs are quite restrained in debating style compared to the deliberate heat generated by cable news and talk radio), the tremendous respect and desire to appreciate the other reflected in the posts thus far is most gratifying and also enlightening.

Moreover, the audience we are likely to attract (if the Mirror of Justice is successful in attracting any audience at all) will include many who will never attend an academic symposium and will never read what we submit as a finished publication product to a law review or other journal. The appeal of weblogs to an internet audience lies in their feel as an open dialogue unfolding almost in real-time. Thus, through the internet, and precisely because of the nature of the blog medium, we will have an opportunity to reach people we would not otherwise encounter with the message that Christ's Church has something to say about how we structure our legal system, make legal decisions, and use the law in society. By contrast, if we share our thoughts only through an academic journal article, or through a direct conversation with colleagues—valuable though those are (and the proper focus of most of our scholarly attention)—we will miss many of those nameless people. And some may searching and questioning and would value the chance to lurk on the sidelines of the debate, never revealing themselves but learning from the discussion.

Thus, I see the Mirror of Justice weblog as, yes, a good conversation among friends in the faith, but also as having the potential to be a missionary calling. Time will tell.

Saturday, March 13, 2004

The Shameful Role of Lawyers in the Church Sex Abuse Scandal

Last weekend, we here at the University of St. Thomas sponsored a symposium on “Understanding the Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics,” in which, among many others, our co-blogger Stephen Bainbridge made an important contribution and all presentations of which will be published in the University of St. Thomas Law Review.

During the course of that event, in which many of the speakers addressed the various scandals arising in the business world – the Savings & Loan crisis of several years ago, Enron, Martha Stewart, etc. – in which lawyers failed in their role as moral counselor, I could not help but be disturbed by the painful parallel with the recent scandals of the American Catholic Church, Inc. Of course, the Catholic Church is not, or at least should not be, a business enterprise. And indeed a large part of the priest abuse problem was that the Church often conceived of itself as such. As Ralph McInerny says, some “bishops acted like CEOs rather than shepherds.”

Given the nature of the UST symposium, which looked not only to business ethics but also to the ethics of lawyers advising businesses, my more immediate focus was on the behavior of those lawyers retained by the Church either as general counsel or to represent it with respect to lawsuits alleging sexual abuse of minors by priests. Given the nature of this weblog on Catholic Social Thought and the law, the proper role of lawyers as Catholics, that is, people of faith who are in the legal profession, in proper counseling is directly pertinent.

The report of the National Review Board appointed by the bishops issued just a couple of weeks ago. It includes a section titled “Reliance on Attorneys,” a title that is meant to indicate not something salutary but rather delineate yet another of the multiple errors made by the bishops. In other words, when the bishops sought the advice of members of our profession, they went astray. Ouch.

Consider the details of the grievous errors outlined in the National Review Board report, which, while levied against the bishops in the first instance, encompass their lawyers as well: Attorneys used “tactics [that] often were inappropriate for the Church, and which tended to compound the effects of the abuse that already had been inflicted.” These tactics included defenses that “could be construed as blaming the victim,” arguing that the Church had no responsibility for priests by claiming they were “independent contractors,” and “in general adopting an overly adversarial approach.”

Moreover, the report says that “certain lawyers recommended, and certain bishops insisted, that the victims sign confidentiality agreements, which stifled their ability to discuss their experiences openly and thwarted awareness by the laity of the problem.” In addition, lawyers counseled Church leaders not to meet with or apologize to victims, even when the abuse was clearly substantiated. Not only does the report correctly say that this approach undermined the primary pastoral mission of the bishops, but it suggests that it ultimately led to greater legal liability as many victims said they would not have filed suit had someone heard their complaints and apologized.

The report says this problem was caused by “disastrous pastoral decisions” in selecting lawyers based on “friendship [with bishops] and a misguided perception of the lawyers’ loyalty to the Church.” As a consequence, the lawyers chosen “failed to adapt their tactics to account for the unique role and responsibilities of the Church.”

To be sure, as another part of that report states, “[t]he first role of a bishop or any Church leader must be to act as a pastor to the Catholic faithful.” Thus, the bishops have primary responsibility here, and cannot avoid that responsibility by alluding to the advice of counsel. Or as the report puts it, “the Church should not hide behind its lawyers.” That much is a given.

Nonetheless, is it not sad that counsel from their lawyers is cited as a problem, rather than as one of the means toward a solution? Is it not a scandal to us in the legal profession that, rather than assisting Church leaders in finding a morally superior means of responding to the sex abuse problem, Church lawyers are said to have exacerbated it? Now I am sure there were exceptions to this sorry pattern and perhaps we may hear at some point encouraging stories about individual lawyers who were part of the solution rather than the problem. And perhaps many of these lawyers did in fact provide moral counseling but because of confidentiality expectations have not been able to so reveal it publicly (although the bishops presumably waived any such confidentiality when cooperating with the investigation by the national review board). Nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that, on the whole, the involvement of lawyers made this serious problem a greater disaster.

What can we learn from this about our role as lawyers? To begin with, the growing revival in professional responsibility scholarship and education of attention to the foundational role of lawyers as moral as well as legal counselors needs to be heard and emphasized just as much among the Church’s lawyers as the rest of profession. One would have thought that the Church’s own legal representatives, with the full encouragement of their clients the bishops, would have been at the forefront of the movement to enhance ethical lawyering and moral counseling. Instead, the National Review Board report suggests they were among the last to get the message. How can we help ensure that this never happens again? As the bishops now seek to restore confidence in the Church among the faithful, how can we restore confidence in lawyers of faith as committed to partnership with Church leaders in providing legal advice that serves a greater moral purpose?

Wednesday, March 3, 2004

Kerry, the Catholic Public Servant, and Catholic Teaching

After Super Tuesday, John Kerry has completed a near sweep of primaries and caucuses and will be the Democratic Party nominee for President; indeed by the polls of the moment (ever changeable thought they are), he is the frontrunner to be the next Chief Executive of the nation. It seems an appropriate time to cautiously and in the context of an appropriately thoughtful, faith-based, and intellectual forum raise a question or two about what this may mean for the Catholic Church in America, for Church teaching as it relates to public obligations and public policy, and for the reception of Church teaching by the faithful. Although little public attention has been drawn to his affiliation thus far, I suspect that John Kerry soon will be recognized, at least for a time, the most prominent Catholic in the country. As several of my fellow bloggers know, from off-blog discussions, I have been hesitant to raise these questions previously, for fear that it might be perceived as a partisan attack or understandably cause some of the diverse participants in this blog to bristle. (And in the interests of candor, I will confess at the outset that I will not be casting my vote for John Kerry in November). But knowing most of the participants on this blog, I am convinced that we can discuss it here in a non-partisan manner, while at the same time forthrightly addressing the potentially far-reaching implications for Catholic teaching and values as a meaningful influence within the American public square.

Forty-four years ago, another Roman Catholic was a candidate, successfully, for the nation’s highest office. In the course of the 1960 campaign, John F. Kennedy told the Greater Houston Ministerial Association: “I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute -- where no Catholic prelate would tell the president (should he be Catholic) how to act.” He later quipped that the Pope wouldn’t seek his advice on religion, and he wouldn’t seek the Pope’s advice on politics. As many have discussed in many contexts, scholarly and otherwise, Kennedy thereby effectively promised that his Catholic faith would be irrelevant to his public life. As Father George Rutler has described it, people may “think that Kennedy made it possible for a Catholic to become president, when he only made it possible for a Catholic who behaves like a modern Episcopalian to become president.”

John Kerry, at first, might appear to fall into the same mold as Kennedy, but in actuality, Kerry bring the matter to the next level further by actively opposing, not simply ignoring, fundamental Catholic teaching and values and by coming into direct conflict with Church leaders. In language parallel to Kennedy’s, Kerry has told the Boston Herald: "It is important not to have the church instructing politicians. That is an inappropriate crossing of the line for this country.” That Kennedyesque viewpoint is troubling enough.

But while Catholic teaching may have been irrelevant to Kennedy, Kennedy was not publicly on record in firm opposition to Catholic teaching nor was Kennedy ever refused the sacraments by the Church. Kerry, however, has been a visible proponent of the abortion license to the most radical extreme, not even willing to draw the line at partial-birth abortion, supporting public funding of abortion, insisting that he will impose a litmus test for Supreme Court justice to preclude the possibility that any state in the future may ever provide protection to unborn human life. On same-sex marriage, his position has been more ambiguous, saying that he opposes it while supporting homosexual civil unions and standing squarely against any meaningful effort to defend traditional marriage (not only by opposing any federal constitutional amendment but also being among the tiny minority of federal legislators that opposed the Defense Against Marriage Act signed by President Clinton).

Kerry’s own bishop in Boston has asked pro-abortion elected officials to voluntarily refrain from taking Communion. (While stopping short of actually banning priests from conferring the sacrament upon pro-abortion politicians, Archbishop O’Malley’s words have been most forceful: “These politicians should know that if they're not voting correctly on these life issues that they shouldn't dare come to Communion.”) When Kerry was campaigning in the Missouri primary last month, the archbishop of St. Louis went a step further and told the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that Kerry would not be permitted to take Communion in that diocese. Kerry’s response in an interview in St. Louis was that “what I believe personally as a Catholic as an article of faith is an article of faith,” but that he would refuse to legislate his “personal religious beliefs for the rest of the country.” (Despite this indirect suggestion that he might accept Church teaching on abortion as a matter of personal faith, I have never heard John Kerry express any public qualm about abortion, much less condemning it as immoral, or offer any encouragement for various non-political movements to discourage abortion and offer alternatives to women, while instead he has eagerly sought out the acclaim of and regularly associated himself with the most pro-abortion elements of the pro-choice movement in the country; if I am wrong in this understanding, I hope I will be corrected.)

Let me interject here by acknowledging that the other major party candidate, President George W. Bush, is perceived by many as holding views contrary to Catholic teaching as well. That might be a great subject for discussion on the blog as well, that is, which of the candidates as a package of viewpoints is most or least compatible with Catholic social and moral teaching. But it is a different subject from the topic that I am introducing here, which has to do with the particular implications flowing from a Catholic public leader who departs from the Church and the Church’s responsibilities thereto. In other words, from a CST perspective, Bush may not be orthodox either, but then again Bush is not a Catholic, Bush has not presented himself to the public as a person of the Catholic faith, Bush is not making claims about what it means and does not mean to be a Catholic who is also a civil servant, and Bush’s position will not be portrayed as a direct challenge to Church teaching.

Herewith the questions: How much harm to the Church’s moral witness on abortion and other matters might result from such a high-profile Catholic emphatically rejecting the Church’s teaching? What obligation do the bishops and faithful Catholics have to contravene such a concerted and visible effort to divorce social and moral teaching from public policy? In other words, if a Catholic public official openly rejects the obligation of every faithful Catholic on certain fundamental public-regarding matters, should it have any public consequence? Does the responsibility of the Church and its leaders to make a public statement or take firm action become greater if the politician in question were actually to succeed in attaining election to the nation’s highest office? In the least, if a politician who has separated him or herself from the Church by public deed were then nonetheless to present him or herself to the public as a practicing Catholic (thus attempting to obtain political advantage from an affiliation with the Church), would not the Church then be obliged as a matter of integrity to dissociate itself from that politician? And, as a pragmatic matter, how can the Church and its faithful people respond in a manner that is not in either in substance or in reasonable perception partisan in nature?