Rob, I am shocked, shocked, that the NYT neglected to give a complete and fair presentation the richness of the Church’s position on its concerns about the mechanization of reproduction in its story on harvesting embryonic stem cells. Next thing you know, there will be gambling going on in the back rooms at the NYT.
It’s easy to see where the Advanced Cell Technology researchers are going with this argument, though, and it is scary. They’re trying to characterize the harvesting of embryonic stem cells, without destroying the embryo, as essentially the same as donating blood. At a very early stage in embryonic development, when the embryo is two days old and consists of 8 cells, you can just snip off one of those cells and cultivate stem cells from that cell. The other 7 cells can be implanted in mother’s womb and grow into a healthy baby. The harvested embryonic stem cells can then be cultivated and used to develop cures for Alzheimer’s, cancer, obesity, near-sightedness, arrogance, etc., etc. How could anyone possibly object to such a self-less, harmless little procedure that will facilitate miraculous scientific advances?
I know there are other MOJ-ers who can (and have already) articulate much more sophisticated arguments about stem cell research than I, but here are two counterarguments that leap to my mind.
First, even on their terms (ie, this is just the same as donating blood -- no harm, no foul to the developing embryo), this procedure ought to be at least subject to the same kinds of issues about safety and informed consent that apply to blood donation or organ donation. With respect to safety, the NYT article itself hedges about whether harvesting the one cell is safe for the embryo. It says: “Many such embryos have grown into apparently healthy babies over the 10 years or so the diagnostic tests have been used.” Hardly sounds like an utterly risk-free procedure. With respect to informed consent, I really don’t know much about this areas of law, especially as applied to parents giving consent for their children, but there must be some limits to a person’s ability to consent to such procedures on behalf of others. It would be interesting to hear more about how that analysis would apply to this situation.
Here in the Twin Cities, our local science museum just extended its run of the Body Worlds exhibit, which local Star Tribune described as an “The exhibit of skinless cadavers frozen in plastinated poses [that] has drawn more than 433,000 visitors, already making it the most popular exhibit in the museum's history.” Using the bodies of people who have already died in exhibits like this seems to raise all sorts of complicated ethical issues involving consent. At the very least, using the cells of these embryos ought to be subject to the same ethical screens.
Second, the argument this method “would seem to remove the principal objection to” embryonic stem cell research because the embryos can be implanted after the cell is harvested is simply absurd. Isn’t the principal objection to embryonic stem cell research concern about the destruction of embryos involved? If the researchers at Advanced Cell Technology were willing to limit themselves to harvesting their cells from embryos whose parents were committed to implantation after harvesting, they might have a valid argument. But that obviously not the kind of situation in which this technique would be used. The NYT article makes that clear in its description of the technique: “The embryo, now with seven cells, can be implanted in the woman if no defect is found.” This new technique for harvesting embryonic stem cells is an application of the preimplantation genetic diagnosis technique I’ve discussed elsewhere. It’s used to weed out embryos with genetic defects, precisely so they will NOT be implanted.
Significantly, the NYT article cites Dr. Irving Weissman, a stem cell expert at Stanford, for the point that “the new method, if confined to blastomeres derived from preimplantation genetic testing, would not provide a highly desired type of cell, those derived from patients with a specific disease. Many scientists have come to regard this use of the cells, to explore the basic mechanisms of the disease, as more likely to provide new therapies than direct use of the cells themselves.” So it appears much of the scientific value of stem cell research comes from cells that have the disease or defects that the scientists are hoping to cure. Presumably, the researchers at Advanced Cell Technology share those interests. So now they are proposing to use preimplantation genetic testing to identify embryos with those diseases and conditions that they want to study and cure, to harvest one cell from those embryos to use for their research, and assure us that this is O.K. because these embryos will all find loving homes in the wombs of the mothers engaging in this kind of testing??????? I’m sure there must be a more sophisticated legal way to articulate my reaction, and maybe I’ll work that out after I finish getting ready for all the students coming back on Monday, but for now all I can say is … give me a break!!!
Lisa
Tuesday, August 22, 2006
Of possible interest to some MOJ readers, I'm scheduled as a guest Dr. Albert Mohler's radio show this afternoon, at 5:19 EST, "for approximately 10 minutes", to discuss my recent Business Week essay, "Confessions of a Genetic Outlaw." You can listen to the show live on-line. Dr. Mohler blogged about my essay today. Dr. Mohler is President of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. He was labelled by Time.com as "the reigning intellectual of the evangelical movement in the U.S."
Lisa
Sunday, August 20, 2006
I found today's Angelus meditation by Pope Benedict XVI particularly timely, as I hurtle towards the beginning of a new semester. You can find the entire address at the ZENIT site (Reference ZE06082002).
Among the saints of the day, the calendar mentions today St. Bernard of Clairvaux, great doctor of the Church, who lived between the 11th and 12th centuries (1091-1153). His example and teachings appear particularly useful also in our time.
Having left the world after a period of intense interior turmoil, he was elected abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux at 25 years of age, remaining at its head for 38 years, until his death.
His dedication to silence and contemplation did not prevent him from carrying out an intense apostolic activity. He was also exemplary in his commitment to overcome his impetuous temperament, as well as in his humility in being able to acknowledge his limitations and faults.
. . .
It is necessary to pay attention to the dangers of excessive activity, regardless of one's condition and occupation, observes the saint, because -- as he said to the Pope of that time, and to all Popes and to all of us -- numerous occupations often lead to "hardness of heart," "they are no more than suffering for the spirit, loss of intelligence and dispersion of grace" (II, 3).
This admonition is valid for all kinds of occupations, including those inherent to the governance of the Church. The message that, in this connection, Bernard addresses to the Pontiff, who had been his disciple at Clairvaux, is provocative: "See where these accursed occupations can lead you, if you continue to lose yourself in them -- without leaving anything of yourself for yourself" (ibid).
How useful for us also is this call to the primacy of prayer! May St. Bernard, who was able to harmonize the monk's aspiration for solitude and the tranquility of the cloister with the urgency of important and complex missions in the service of the Church, help us to concretize it in our lives, in our circumstances and possibilities.
We entrust this difficult desire to find a balance between interiority and necessary work to the intercession of the Virgin, whom he loved from his childhood with tender and filial devotion, to the point of meriting the title of "Marian Doctor."
Lisa
Friday, August 18, 2006
My post about the dependency-based theory of justice project prompted the following message from an MOJ reader who used to direct a drop-in homeless shelter, speculating about the theory’s possible application to the obligations of care-givers in that context. He puts his finger right on the thorniest problem in the project – finding the balance between, on the one hand, acknowledging some state of dependency that justifies some special protection and, on the other hand, empowering people in various states of dependency to assert their autonomy. Philosopher Anita Silvers has criticized Alisdair MacIntyre’s project as it relates to disability rights on those very grounds. (Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy 13, 138 (1998).
This reader’s post begins with a brief discussion of how he found MOJ, which is also interesting. It's related to the good, old-fashioned, Esmeralda-in-Notre-Dame-Cathedral-type sanctuary situation taking place right now in Chicago. He wrote:
I originally googled 'sanctuary,' as a result of the present situation in Chicago where a woman who may be deported has sought sanctuary within a church. That led me to the Mirror of Justice web-site and this post.
I'm interested in the subject since as an advocate for the homeless, and a former faith-based homeless shelter founder and manager, I was confronted with situations where guests had broken the law and the question of what responsibilities, morals and ethics are involved when a shelter must make decisions as to continue services, contact the police, etc., come to the fore. I sought clerical input but perhaps because there may be some liability on their part in view of their peripheral involvement, I wasn't able to obtain any definitive answers. (It was interesting to see in newspaper articles about the Chicago situation, that 'U.S. courts have definitely rejected any notion of sanctuary within the church - local law enforcement officials are more held back only by the prospect of damaging public relations if they are portrayed fairly or unfairly as 'jackboots.')
The reader continues with the following comments about the application of the dependency theory of justice to the situations he saw in his work at the shelter.
Our guests live on the street and in the woods. We can see them wearing out to the point where we know death is imminent. In the absence of family, we are as near to the meaning of the term 'caregivers,' as any other persons. For some of our folks, an involuntary commitment to a psychiatric clinic or hospital may save their life for a while longer - they can detox and receive medications to alleviate physical and mental conditions. In Virginia, however, where we are located, there is a 72-hour limit on the time of any involuntary confinement, and there is no requirement at all in the area of discharge plans. They are frequently placed in a taxi and driven to the door of the shelter in the wee hours of the morning.
Perhaps, I was thinking, where the article states, "the dependency theory of justice might be applied to two concrete areas of law - disability rights and consumer protection," it might also be applied, somehow, to the jobs of caregivers like homeless shelter managers who in the course of their duties, may from time to time, actually know what's best for their guest, even if that guest resists? Perhaps mine represents the opposite viewpoint of those who advocate for the freedoms of the disabled to make their own decisions all the time. In our world, however, in reality, it grants our guests the freedom to die faster than what we usually and tragically term the 'slow suicides,' of many of our guests.
Lisa
Thursday, August 17, 2006
There's a really interesting perspective on abortion in today's Wall Street Journal, Petitioning for Life, by Julia Gorin. It's a personal meditation on the psychological effects of the former Soviet Union's acceptance of routine abortions as a form of birth control. It begins:
The Web site of Ms. Magazine--yes, it still exists--is calling on readers to sign a petition: "I have had an abortion. I publicly join the millions of women in the United States who have had an abortion in demanding a repeal of laws that restrict women's reproductive freedom."
Well, so much for the right to privacy. If Ms. readers hadn't had so many abortions, there might be more Ms. readers. As for the rest of us, here's a petition we could all sign: "I wasn't aborted."
Having narrowly escaped being aborted, I'd be the first in line.
Like most Soviet-era fetuses conceived in Russia by couples who were already parents, I was scheduled for abortion as a matter of course. In a society where abortion was the only form of birth control, it wasn't uncommon to meet women who had double-digit abortion counts. Often a couple would schedule the appointment before they even stopped to remember that they wanted a second child.
Lisa
Wednesday, August 16, 2006
I've posted a paper that I presented at this past spring's St. John's conference on The Jurisprudential Legacy of John Paul II. The paper is called "West, MacIntyre and Wojtyla: Pope John Paul II's Contribution to the Development of a Dependency-Based Theory of Justice." The abstract follows. I'd be grateful for any comments or suggestions on any aspect of the paper, since I hope to explore how this theory might apply to substantive areas of law such as disability and consumer law.
In recent decades, proponents of a strand of feminist theory variously referred to as care feminism, cultural feminism, or relational feminism have been arguing for a social re-evaluation of what has traditionally been regarded as women's work - the care of dependents, such as children and elderly or disabled family members. As part of that project, a number of feminists have suggested that the traditional liberal theory of justice, based on the ideal of autonomous, independent actors, should be rejected, or at least revised, to reflect the reality of dependency in the life of every individual.
A number of writers have begun to explore the application of a dependency-based theory of justice in other contexts. In her recent book, Re-Imagining Justice (2001), legal scholar Robin West placed the dependency-based theory into a more general theory of justice with applications that extend beyond the concerns of women engaging in caregiving. The philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre, in Dependent Rational Animals (1999), after acknowledging his debt to the feminist writers, went on to apply their insight to general systems of moral philosophy. He argued that a recognition of the inevitability of periods of dependency in all human lives necessitates political and social structures that protect all members of society unable to advocate for themselves due to various conditions of dependency - children, people with disabilities, and the aged.
I have argued elsewhere that the writings of Pope John Paul II on women are in many significant ways compatible with much of this emerging strand of feminist theory. In this article, I explore the extent to which his writings support a general dependency-based theory of justice, such as those being developed by West and MacIntyre.
I conclude that the writings of John Paul not only support, but significantly advance, the project of articulating a general dependency-based theory of justice, with applications beyond the context of supporting motherhood. Even proponents of a dependency-based theory of justice who are not comfortable with the vocabulary of faith used by John Paul might borrow from him certain concepts that could be translated into secular vocabulary that would strengthen their arguments: acceptance of gender-based distinctions in gifts and perspectives that support arguments to restructure the workplace to allow fuller participation of women; a recognition of the full spectrum of human dependency conditions entitled to protection under this theory; and acknowledgment that the human condition of dependency might justify a right of dependents to receive care, as well as a right of care givers to provide care. At the same time, proponents of a dependency-based theory of justice who are motivated by faith convictions must acknowledge the persuasive power of many of the arguments presented by dependency-based theorists in purely secular terms such as those of West and MacIntyre.
I end the article with some preliminary thoughts about how the dependency based theory of justice might be applied to two concrete areas of law - disability rights and consumer protection.
Lisa
Two thoughts on justifying the CLT project:
1. As someone who has spent her entire academic career teaching at Catholic law schools (Notre Dame and U of St. Thomas Minneapolis), I don't spend much time worrying about whether effort spent on exploring the contours of a Catholic legal theory is a waste of time. I simply consider it to be part of my job. Isn't that what Ex Corde Ecclesiae demands of us? Some excerpts:
31. Through teaching and research, a Catholic University offers an indispensable contribution to the Church. In fact, it prepares men and women who, inspired by Christian principles and helped to live their Christian vocation in a mature and responsible manner, will be able to assume positions of responsibility in the Church. Moreover, by offering the results of its scientific research, a Catholic University will be able to help the Church respond to the problems and needs of this age.
32. A Catholic University, as any University, is immersed in human society; as an extension of its service to the Church, and always within its proper competence, it is called on to become an ever more effective instrument of cultural progress for individuals as well as for society. Included among its research activities, therefore, will be a study of serious contemporary problems in areas such as the dignity of human life, the promotion of justice for all, the quality of personal and family life, the protection of nature, the search for peace and political stability, a more just sharing in the world's resources, and a new economic and political order that will better serve the human community at a national and international level. University research will seek to discover the roots and causes of the serious problems of our time, paying special attention to their ethical and religious dimensions.
If need be, a Catholic University must have the courage to speak uncomfortable truths which do not please public opinion, but which are necessary to safeguard the authentic good of society.
33. A specific priority is the need to examine and evaluate the predominant values and norms of modern society and culture in a Christian perspective, and the responsibility to try to communicate to society those ethical and religious principles which give full meaning to human life. In this way a University can contribute further to the development of a true Christian anthropology, founded on the person of Christ, which will bring the dynamism of the creation and redemption to bear on reality and on the correct solution to the problems of life.
I realize this might not be of much comfort to those who are not teaching at Catholic universities, but I think an argument could be made that Catholics teaching at non-Catholic universities share these responsibilities to some degree.
2. One aspect of the CLT project that hasn't been mentioned yet in this debate is the extent to which it is aimed at helping the Church figure out the appropriate responses to some of the difficult issues debated in the posts of MOJ (compare paragraph 31 of the Ex corde excerpt above with para. 32 & 33). In addition to trying to persuade the World to shape itself according to Catholic principles, aren't we, as lay people with, theoretically at least, some particular expertise in legal theory, supposed to be helping the Church think through new developments? Aren't we "where the Church does its thinking"? It seems to me that this aspect of the Project needs no defense against criticisms such as the one that started this discussion.
It does, however, raise some other questions for us. Such as: Is "the Church" listening to us? And, even more interesting, to me, (again quoting Paragraph 31 of Ex corde) exactly who are the "women who, inspired by Christian principles and helped to live their Christian vocation in a mature and responsible manner, will be able to assume positions of responsibility in the Church" (emphasis added)?
Lisa
