It is sometimes reassuring to hear that you're not the only one confused about the appropriate response to a situation -- such as the current financial crisis. The American Banker (available only by subscription) reports on a meeting of Nobel Laureates discussing this issue, and coming to varying conclusions:
Lindau, Germany — Some of the world's brightest economic minds agree the current financial crisis exposed major flaws in the system, but disagree about the role regulators should play in preventing a repeat.
At an annual gathering Thursday of economic Nobel laureates on a tiny, medieval island in southern Germany, three winners of the Nobel Prize in economics and one Peace Prize winner lamented the excessive risk-taking, lax management and impenetrable complexity at the heart of the financial system's current turmoil.
Many of the laureates' criticisms focused on the notion that banking has drifted from its fundamental purpose. Amid a rush to profit, "what's been lost is the idea that a banker has some responsibility to protect the client's interest," said Daniel McFadden, who won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 2000 for research focused on modeling individuals' decision-making processes.
While a market in which homeowners' mortgages can be packaged into securities sold to banks across the globe might be efficient, Mr. McFadden said, "the most efficient way to organize economic activity may also prove to be the most brittle. Congress needs to consider the costs of volatility and instability."
But a rush to regulation could have dire consequences, warned fellow laureate Myron Scholes, who took a Nobel Prize in 1997 for a method of valuing derivatives, which are financial instruments whose price changes based on the value of related assets. Ticking off the financial systems' basic functions — including financing large-scale projects, facilitating saving and assigning prices to assets — Mr. Scholes attributed decades of economic growth to innovations that let institutions "perform these functions more efficiently."
Mr. Scholes, who also co-founded Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that collapsed amid the East Asian and Russian financial crises of the late 1990s, said, "Sometimes, the cost of regulation might be far greater than its benefits." One example, Mr. Scholes said, are the Sarbanes-Oxley accounting rules implemented after Enron Corp.'s collapse earlier this decade. The rules have been criticized as undercutting the U.S.'s attractiveness as a base for investment.
Joseph Stiglitz, a professor of economics at Columbia University who won the Nobel in 2001, suggested misguided innovation itself caused the current turmoil. Noting that homeowners' most important risk assessment is the likelihood that they can retain their home amid market volatility, Mr. Stiglitz said, "These are the problems [financial markets] should have created products to match. But they created risks, and now we're bearing the consequences of this so-called innovation."
There were some areas of agreement. The standards that gauge how much capital banks should hold — called Basel II for the Swiss city in which they were developed — focus too tightly on managing daily risk and not enough on handling crises. "What happens most of the time is not important," said Mr. Scholes, noting the current financial turmoil comes on the heels of the dot-com bubble's bursting and the Asian financial crisis of the early 1990s. "We have to learn how to handle the shocks when they occur."
One idea that might prevent a repeat of the turmoil: a commission that would vet financial products before their release, akin to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's evaluation of drugs before they are released to the market. Mr. McFadden said, "We may need a financial-instrument administration that tests the robustness of financial instruments and approves only the uses where they can do no harm."
But tinkering with a fundamentally flawed system may not be enough, said Muhammad Yunus, whose success in lending small amounts of money to people too poor for ordinary credit led him and his Grameen Bank to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.
"Our banking is sub sub sub sub prime," said Mr. Yunus, noting his model requires no collateral, offers no insurance, and boasts "no lawyers." The upshot: "Our repayment rate is very high. Like 98 or 99%."
I have been looking recently at the arguments being made by disability rights activists firmly committed to protecting a woman's legal right to abortion, who nonetheless feel that selective abortions based on a prenatal diagnosis of a disability are morally problematic. Some of them have been articulating what is coming to be called the "expressivist argument" against such selective abortions. Adrienne Asch, for example, argues that "What differentiates abortion after prenatal diagnosis (and abortions for sex selection) from all other abortions is that abortion is a response to characteristics of the fetus and would-be child and not to the situation of the woman." Selective abortion, she argues, "expresses negative or discriminatory attitudes not merely about a disabling trait, but about those who carry it." This message, she explains, is that "a single trait stands in for the whole, the trait obliterates the whole . . . The tests send the message that there's no need to find out about the rest." She makes an "any/particular distinction," arguing that it is not morally problematic for a woman to abort because she does not want any child at this time; however, it is morally problematic for a woman to abort because she does not want this particular child, based on one trait identified in a prenatal test. The latter decision, she argues, "disparages the lives of existing and future disabled people", hinders the wider social acceptance of people with disabilities, and thus concretely affects society's willingness to support the lives of those with disabilities.
Dov Fox and Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., both students at Yale Law School, I believe, have been trying to test some of the components of that argument empirically. They just posted on SSRN a fascinating article reporting some of their conclusions: "The Collateral Impact of the ADA on Disability-Selective Abortion." Here's the abstract:
This Article examines the unexpected impact that law can have on social behavior that the law was not intended to regulate. We explore this phenomenon by considering the relation between a federal antidiscrimination statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the practice of abortion following fetal diagnosis for Down syndrome. Our empirical study of U.S. natality data suggests that the ADA served to prevent the existence of people among the very class the Act was designed to protect. Using regression analysis, we control for social, economic, demographic, and technological confounds and find that the birthrate of children with Down syndrome significantly decreased after the ADA's passage. We explain this paradox by showing how media coverage of the ADA and Down syndrome reinforced negative understandings and expectations among prospective parents about what it means to give birth to a child with a genetic disability. We discuss the implications of these findings for reproduction and antidiscrimination law.
Fox and Griffin analyze two possible hypotheses about the "expressive externalities that the ADA could have generated with respect to the practice of disability-selective abortion." The "uplifting" message of the ADA could be that "the ADA's affirmation of social equality and disability rights discourages disability-selective abortion by tempering negative attitudes toward people with disabilities. According to this hypothesis, the ADA, by barring employment discrimination and assuring access to public serivces and accommodations, conveyed to parents the promise that prospective children with disabilities could lead happy and productive lives." In contrast, the "disappointing" message of the ADA could be that "the ADA, by requiring sometimes onerous workplace adjustments for persons with disabilities, led to a media backlash driven by commercial employers. On this account, disapproving stories about people with disabilities, covered widely by print and television sources, combined with detailed news reports on selective abortion procedures, to convince parents that children with disabilities would not be accepted into the world as social equals."
When they subjected both hypotheses to econometric analysis, they found support for the latter hypothesis. The data is too rich and complex, and my understanding of statistical analysis is so rudimentary, that I think the best I can do in this post is to quote from their conclusion:
The econometric analysis . . . showed that Down syndrome birthrates decreased significantly and steadily from 1993 to 1998. The decline of 13 to 18 Down syndrome births per 100,000 was robust to inclusion of demographic and health-related control variables and against the backdrop of highly stable prenatal screening rates. We did not find supportive evidence for a similar effect among infants with spina bifida and cleft palate. [Note from Lisa Schiltz: This is significant for their argument because these are "two well-known disabilities for which prospective parents do not routinely screen." ] Part V [of the Article] confirmed our argument about the expressivist effects of the ADA on Down-selective abortion by explaining away other immeasurable confounding variables related to technology, law, and medicine."
It seems to me that Asch and Fox & Griffen are attacking (from two entirely opposite directions) the same basic insight about our contemporary society: there is a fundamental dissonance between, on the one hand, our assertions that persons with disabilities possess the same full measure of human dignity as those without disabilities, and, on the other hand, our actions when faced with the concrete reality of assuming the responsibility of caring for those with disabilities.
Related to my earlier post on the movie "Tropic Thunder," I just got this e-mail from the advocacy group The Arc. Special Olympics, the Down Sydrome Association of America, and the National Down Syndrome Congress are among the others joining this call for a boycott. The "Blueberryshoes" 60-second video is powerful (and short).
Arc members and friends,
The movie "Tropic Thunder" opens nationwide this week and reportedly contains many offensive uses of the word "retard" and a negative portrayal of a character with an intellectual disability named "Simple Jack." You may have received other e-mails and links about this.
Being called "retarded" is painful to persons with intellectual disabilities. Language matters; it can cut human beings down or build them up. Here's what we’d like people to do:
Boycott the movie and if you can, donate the dollars you would have spent to a disability organization you support.
Instead of seeing the movie, take a minute to watch this short :60 second public service announcement made for the Arc of Northern Virginia. www.blueberryshoes.com There is much more power in this "R" word. Send this link to everyone you know!
Take time to talk with others about why language matters. You can use the "Hate Speech" flyer prepared by The Arc of the U.S. [here].
Thank you!
UPDATE: The legitimacy of this boycott has been the matter of intense debate within my own household, with about an even split between those who think that it's a perfectly legitimate occasion to take a public stand on behalf of the most vulnerable population in our society today, and others who think that the film seems to be making fun of the vanity and shallowness of actors, rather than people with disabilities. Those in the latter camp argue you can't judge without seeing the movie. But that defeats the whole purpose of the boycott. It's a quandary.......
I haven't read it all yet, but the introduction sets forth her concern about the current feminist discourse about how to "help" Muslim women. In this discourse, she writes
. . . there is an expectation that Muslims, particularly women, will eventually value the same rights and social orderings as those of their benefactors in the West. Yet when Muslim women consistently articulate a different vision for themselves, it is a source of concern and puzzlement that can only be resolved through judgments about the 'progress' of thier consciousness, education, and/or experience relative to 'Western' women. This article seeks to challenge those judgments. To do so, I examine the Liberal theoretical underpinnings of these scholarly and activist projects to reveal how they advance a particular idea of human flourishing that seeks to ultimately 'reform' or extinguish those life forms (including traditional Islam) which do not comport with it.
In the first section of the article, I examine how Liberalism's justification for colonialism has been sublimated in Liberal (legal) feminism which subconsciously continues traditional Liberal political theory's judgments about the "East." I suggest that most Liberal feminists also have a specific idea of women's flourishing that prevents it from fully comprehending Muslim women who choose to adhere to Islam, which is, in their view, a hopelessly patriarchal and gender oppressive religions. Liberal notions of flourishing require progress towards a Liberal society. As such, "reform" is used to further this vision. I argue that Liberal feminism also shares this 'narrative progress' that reduces non-Liberal societies to "developing" and, consequently, global southern women to victims.
Yet, many women in the global south reject this characterization of their existence. In the second part of the article, I offer some examples of Muslim women's visions of flourishing that show both overlap with Liberal values and, more importantly, divergence. I propose that Muslim women's adherence to religion must be accepted as legitimate expressions of flourishing even if we, as Western feminists, are skeptical about the freedom of their choice. I urge feminists who have continued to be extremely incredulous about Muslim women's choices to live according to Islam, to re-evaluate and see these women as exerting power in their own lives.
It struck me reading this that Choudhury is engaged in precisely the type of work that Pope Benedict is challenging us all to engage in -- broadening the discussion about how to engage modernity from the largely Western concerns about secular vs. Christian viewpoints to include the rest of the world. That was certainly one of the major thrusts of his Regensburg address. He also urged that same larger focus in one of the most interesting books I read the past year, the dialogue between Jurgen Habermas and then-Cardinal Ratzinger, reprinted in Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion. In that book, Ratzinger wrote:
. . . although the two great cultures of the West, that is, the culture of the Christian faith and that of secular rationality, are an important contributory factor (each in its own way) throughout the world and in all cultures, nevertheless they are de facto not universal. This means that the question put by Jurgen Habermas' colleague in Teheran seems to be not devoid of significance -- namely, the question of whether a comparative study of cultures and the sociology of religion suggest that Europan secularization is an exceptional development and one that needs to be corrected. . . .
At any rate, it is a fact that our secular rationality may seem very obvious to our reason, which has been formed in the West; but qua rationality, it comes up against its limitations when it attempts to demonstrate itself. The proof for it is in reality linked to specific cultural contexts, and it must acknowledge that it cannot as such be reproduced in the whole of mankind. This also means that it cannot be completely operative in the whole of mankind. In other words, the rational or ethical or religious formula that would embrace the whole world and unite all persons does not exist; or, at least, it is unattainable at the present moment. This is why the so-called 'world ethos' remains an abstraction.
And, yes, this does mean that Ratzinger has to conclude, as he does in this same talk:
The natural law has remained (especially in the Catholic Church) the key issue in dialogues with the secular society and with other communities of faith in order to appeal to the reason we share in common and to seek the basis for a consensus about the ethical principles of law in a secular, pluralistic society. Unfortunately, this instrument has become blunt.
Interesting challenges. It's very exciting to see them being approached from the non-Christian perspective.
Timothy Shriver has a great op ed piece in the Washington Post about the portrayal of people with intellectual disabilities in the film due out this week, "Tropic Thunder." This film has been vaguely on my radar screen as containing potentially offensive racial characterizations, but what sounds like some truly offensive characterizations of people with intellectual disabilities doesn't appear to be raising much objection. Shriver's piece includes this heart-breakingly realistic description of the continuing systemic discrimination against people with intellectual disabilities in our society:
People with intellectual disabilities are routinely abused, neglected, insulted, institutionalized and even killed around the world. Their parents are told to give up, that their children are worthless. Schools turn them away. Doctors refuse to treat them. Employers won't hire them. None of this is funny.
For centuries, they have been the exception to the most basic spiritual principle: that we are each equal in spirit, capable of reflecting the goodness of the divine, carriers of love. But not people with intellectual disabilities. What's a word commonly applied to them? Hopeless.
Let's consider where we are in 2008. Our politics are about overcoming division, our social movements are about ending intolerance, our great philanthropists promote ending poverty and disease among the world's poor. Are people with intellectual disabilities included in the mainstream of these movements? For the most part, no.
Why? Because they're different. Their joy doesn't fit on magazine covers. Their spirituality doesn't come in self-help television. Their kind of wealth doesn't command political attention. (The best of the spirit never does.)
The Polack in me finds this act of resistance to the imperative of modern science rather touching. Sometimes, "because we can" or "because we're curious" isn't a good enough reason to do something.
WARSAW, Poland - Like a religious relic, the heart of composer Frederic Chopin rests in a Warsaw church, untouched since it was preserved in alcohol after his death in 1849 at age 39. And that's how the Polish government wants to keep it.
Scientists want to remove the heart for DNA tests to see if Chopin actually died from cystic fibrosis and not tuberculosis as his death certificate stated. But the government says that's not a good reason to disturb the remains of a revered native son.
The heart lies in a jar sealed inside a pillar at Warsaw's Holy Cross Church — and the only time it has been removed was for safekeeping during World War II.
Before it was returned in 1951, a doctor examined the heart and found it perfectly preserved in an alcohol that many think is cognac. Chopin died in France, where his body is buried, but he asked that his heart be sent to his homeland.
. . .
A spokeswoman for the Culture Ministry, Iwona Radziszewska, told The Associated Press on Thursday that ministry officials consulted experts and decided that "this was neither the time to give approval, nor was it justified by the potential knowledge to be gained."
One of the experts consulted . . . said the "dominant view" of Chopin experts "is that the proposed research is going to serve first and foremost to satisfy the curiosity of the project's authors," while offering no "new knowledge that would have a meaningful impact on the assessment of the figure and work of Chopin."
There are some situations in which the involvement of the legal system can only mean that something has gone terribly wrong on the level of fundamental human relations. A paradigm of such a situation has to be the dispute leading to the Church of St. Joseph in Bertha, MN, obtaining a restraining order against a parish family, barring them from bringing their autistic 13-year-old son to Mass. We can pray that the mediation scheduled to start this week will resolve this in a way that is consonant with our understanding of the Church as a gathering of the people of God. (See, e.g., Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Called to Communion: Understanding the Church Today (Ignatius Press 1996), at 29: ". . . the Eucharist, seen as the permanent origin and center of the Church, joins all of the 'many', who are now made a people, to the one Lord and to his one and only body.")
The mother who was barred from her church has set up a web-site to encourage people to reserve pews in their local churches for families who might need a positive indication from their churches that they are welcome, even if their loved ones sometimes engage in unconventional behavior. Her project is called "Project Adam's Pew." As I have mentioned before, I think the lack of welcome often felt by parents of kids with disabilities with respect to the community life of Catholic parishes is a real problem, and I am glad that this unfortunate episode might at least be raising awareness of the problem.
Speaking of the communion of saints, two people I most look forward to welcoming into the fold of officially recognized saints are John Henry Newman (whose beatification was recently approved), and Dorothy Day. Today's Zenit has an interesting interview with Robert Ellsberg, the editor of a newly-released collection of Dorothy Day's diaries, "The Duty of Delight". Here's an excerpt:
Q: Why have you chosen to title her diaries, "The Duty of Delight"?
Ellsberg: This was a line that recurred frequently in her diaries. She herself contemplated using it as the title for one of her books.
Often, after a recital of drudgery and disappointment, she would simply write, "The duty of delight."
I think it was a reminder to seek God in all things. That is really the theme of her diary, which is a chronicle of her efforts to perform all the chores and duties of her daily life with love and joy.
And here's a description of a more obscure saint that I was delighted to see recently in Magnificat. Maybe he should be resurrected in the public eye as a patron for those victimized by predatory lenders? Or the patron of lawyers struggling to find good witnesses for their cases?
Saint Severus of Naples, Bishop (c. 409). Severus served as bishop of Naples, Italy, enriching his dioceses with the erection of numerous churches. He is said to have defended in a most remarkable manner a widow victimized by a greedy creditor. The latter was owed the tiny sum of one egg by the woman's husband, who had forgotten to pay the debt before dying. Seizing the opportunity to profit from the man's death, the creditor made a false claim that the deceased had owed him a considerable sum. As the widow was too poor to pay the amount, the judge ordered the woman and her children to be sold into slavery. In desperation, the widow fled to the bishop, begging him to intervene. Severus summoned the people of Naples to the deceased man's tomb. After praying that God would make known the truth of the case, Severus called upon the dead man to speak from the grave as to what he really owed. The corpse replied, "I owe but one egg."
Congress just passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. The vote was unanimous in the Senate, and 414 to 1 in the House. It will make most forms of discrimination based on genetic testing illegal. Except, of course, killing based on prenatal diagnosis of genetic conditions..... Some things about this world in which we live just make no sense to me.
