I've discussed some of the issues underlying preimplantation genetic interventions on MOJ before. Coincidentally, my SSRN e-mails this morning contained two new postings discussing different aspects of this kind of technology with some interesting perspectives.
"Making Mommies: Law, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, and the Complications of Pre-Motherhood" by Kimberly Mutcherson of Rutgers School of Law-Camden, is unfortunately only an abstract -- the whole article isn't posted yet. Although I can't tell from the abstract exactly where her reasoning is leading her, this description of part of her article is intriguing:
The article begins by describing the medical landscape relevant to modern pregnancies in the United States. I then discuss the myriad ways in which existing law impacts procreative and parental decision-making and the ways in which the public nature of procreation and pregnancy make it a time ripe for regulation that is deeper and more intimate than is often the case when the law regulates non-pregnant bodies. The article describes motherhood, unlike fatherhood, as deeply contested territory in which many women struggle to conform to their own definitions of good motherhood and avoid the dreaded label of bad mother. It also describes how the law participates in a process of naming some women as bad mothers and questioning and at times denying their right to parent.
The second article, "Insult to Injury: A Disability-Sensitive Response to Professor Smolensky's Call for Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions", by Alicia R. Ouillette at Alabany Law School, is a response to another article discussed in her abstract:
In her article Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, Professor Kirsten Rabe Smolensky argues that children who were subject to preimplantation genetic manipulation should have the ability to sue their parents for damages when the parents "directly intervene in the child's DNA and consequently cause that child to suffer a disability which limits the child's right to an open future." This paper addresses the implications for people with disabilities of that argument. Specifically, it argues that limiting damages to cases in which a child is born with a disability unnecessarily and inaccurately devalues life with disability and leaves unprotected children whose DNA is shaped for traits other than disability at the request of their parents. It then suggests a disability-sensitive approach for delineating cognizable injury under which genetic modifications for disability are treated like other genetic modifications that shape a future child for cultural, aesthetic, or social reasons.
I don't see explicit references to Catholic teachings in either article, nor am I sure either author's ultimate conclusions concur with Catholic teachings. But it is encouraging to see little glimpses of arguments that must, surely, be written on all our hearts poking through in secular scholarship on some of these areas on the frontiers of bioethics.