Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, September 4, 2007

More on the Foundation of Human Rights

Jonathon Watson responds to our continuing discussion here and here on the foundation of human rights with this:

"[A]ll base desires we have as Created beings are good,and as Christians, we believe that those desires are placed there by a Creator to lead to certain ends. The desire for justice is very powerful - indeed, so much so that Christ warned against allowing this desire to shade into vengeance. But following Christ carries with it even greater demands. Not only must we not exact vengeance, but we must work always to avoid even the desire for vengeance. Thinking about desires rightly ordered, it seems to me, is one of the developments of Christian legal theory - what the law must do is warn not only what act might not be taken externally, but to show that such an act is always and everywhere evil, and that to contemplate such an act shows in and of itself a disordered desire.

    Christianity seeks nothing less than the perfection of the person in Christ. The Christian is aware that he / she cannot achieve such a thing on his or her own volition, but must always resort to Grace, in the end, to attempt such a feat - in other words, to rightly order every desire to it's proper end in God. And this, in the end, is the debate not only of Christian legal theory, but of any Christian discussion - how shall the desire I feel for x or y be rightly ordered - what is the end it serves? Is it God, or mammon? To paraphrase C.S. Lewis, every choice we make to order these desires is in one direction or another - to something which if we saw it now, we would strongly be tempted to worship, or a horror which we would never have seen, even in our darkest nightmare. We do indeed argue about the contents of such rights, but we have before us the examples of Christ's words, and the development of Tradition of the Church (as again noted by Prof. Reid), and almost always agree that there are certain boundaries which may not be crossed. (We have the example of early Christians, and Romans who encountered them, noting that the practice of infanticide was nearly nil among them.)
    And this, then, is the trouble the athiest faces. Not only must the athiest define desires and why we have them, but must also place them in a heirarchy, the framework mentioned, and show the end to which they lead. There must be an end - a reason for the desire - for human rights is a project, a series of laws ever changing, and if the athiest denies that there is an end to human rights - a reason for their existence - he or she must also deny that they have a direction, an idea of how the law ought to change and why, if at all to lead to greater human rights."

Friday, August 31, 2007

Framework for the Human Rights Debate

In response to Fr. Araujo's post, Rob asks "[h]ow does a belief in God provide a framework for women's rights that is more capable of authoritatively and accessibly settling disputes over content than than the framework built by the atheist?"  He asks this question because of the elusiveness of answers within Christianity to human rights questions.

I offer two responses.  First, scripture, Tradition, the Magisterium, and natural law frame the debate for the Catholic because within the Catholic worldview these sources provide us access (as limited as it may be) to the Truthmaker who reveals to us by way of faith and reason that all human beings - woman included - possess inherent dignity by the very nature of their being.  From the materialist's viewpoint, there is no external truthmaker framing the debate.  In the adsence of a Truthmaker (in the absence of a purposeful and rational Universe), does the materialist have (can the materialist develop) a robust framework for the idea of inherent human dignity?  If so, what is it?  I can't say that I have followed every post in this thread here or on Balkinization, but so far, I haven't seen anyone attempt to build the case for a robust materialistic foundation for human rights.  Instead, what I have seen are attempts to deflate the theistic founadation.  To quote Chris Green, here, does the materialistic worldview have "any entities that could possibly provide ontological support for human rights and genuine morality"?  Is so, lets hear it.

Second, part of the problem, something I see at least implicitly in Rob's post, is the messiness of this whole business.  If a theistic worldview provides an objective basis upon which to build a human rights regime then why is it so difficult to know clearly the answers to specific human rights questions say, for example, with human rights for women? (Another problem is with our will - our ability to live by those answers once known, but I don't sense that this prompted Rob's question).  It seems to be part of the human condition that answers emerge only within history as we are confronted with new questions and new situations and that much disputation and confrontation is required to enlighten our minds and sharpen our thinking.  How often in the annals of history did a conquering culture step back, reflect on, and argue about the humanity and dignity of those conquered?  The fact that Spanish philosophers and theologians did so with respect the humanity and dignity of American Indians is amazing to me.  But, they could do so because they had a common philosophical and theological framework for the debate.  In We Hold These Truths, John Courtney Murray says that we can argue because we have a common foundation - we agree about the foundational issues.  Without a framework, without a robust foundation, we talk past each other and the framework for human rights is a matter of power and not truth.  In short, I wouldn't take the slowness or the messiness of operating within the framework as a reason to discredit the framework or question it vitality.

Thursday, August 30, 2007

More on the Crisis at Ave Maria

Ave Watch has posted more information on Dean Dobranski's efforts to revoke Prof. Steve Safranek's tenure.  The Dean's characterization of a complaint against Safranek greatly undermines the Dean's credibility.

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

The Medieval Foundations of Modern Human Rights

In light of Jack Balkin's assertion that modern theistically motivated human rights thinking grows out of the Enlightenment and my own inadequate response to Jack, I asked a couple of medievalists to comment on the medieval foundation of modern human rights.  I am thankful that law professor Charles Reid responded with this thougthtful post:

"One of the most basic features of theistic rights thought is a respect for the integrity of the human person.  I would submit that the modern vocabulary of natural rights/human rights has its origins in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  And standing behind this development is a sense of the person as capable of seeking for himself the goods of salvation.  Allow me to make the point indirectly, first, and then more directly:

My indirect argument would focus on the linguistic universe that came to surround rights in the thirteenth century.  The medieval canon lawyers began to list synonyms for the word “right” (ius).  These synonyms included:  Libertas (liberty); Potestas (power); Facultas (faculty or capacity); Immunitas (immunity or privilege).  These are the main synonyms although there were a few others also.  What the use of these synonyms allowed for was the development of a concept of the human person that was capable of self-direction.  This self-direction was capable of manifesting itself in a variety of contexts.  Some contexts would be quite mundane.  Take medieval elections:  The Church used elections to resolve an enormous number of problems – bishops were elected by cathedral chapters; cathedral chapters retained the power to vote on important decisions; guilds and sodalities voted on all sorts of business matters; and so on.  There is a vast number of papal decretals indicating that medieval elections were hotly contested.  The presupposition behind these elections, however, was constant:  that the person was capable of governing his own affairs in community with others.

Other acts of self-direction were quite profound.  The new rights vocabulary also allowed the canonists to speak of the right to make basic choices on how best to seek the spiritual development required to achieve salvation.  One had the liberty to seek a vocation to the priesthood (one did not have the right to compel a bishop to ordain one a priest, of course, only the right not to be impeded in this vocation by third parties).  The life of Thomas Aquinas contains a wonderful illustration of this:  Thomas’s family opposed his desire to become a Dominican friar; he was actually imprisoned by the family for a while.  But because he had a basic right to seek his vocation, his family eventually had to cease and desist in their efforts to impede his quest.

Not only in the area of religious vocation, but in the decision to marry, freedom became the constitutive element.  To marry, one had to exchange freely given consent.  Free consent became the foundational element of marriage.  Family coercion could and did serve to invalidate marital decisions.

These developments open the door to my “direct” argument:  in the schools of philosophy beginning in the latter twelfth century we see important parallel developments:  first, the human personality comes to be conceived of as possessing a basic volitional capacity.  The personality has the power of choice; and the power to be bound by those choices.  And, related to this, the human soul comes to be conceived of in highly individualized terms.  An early medieval writer like Dionysius the Areopagite understood the soul upon death to become absorbed into a larger divine “godhead.”  Now, however, beginning in the twelfth century, we see a highly developed notion of individualized survival after death.  Not that it was not present before.  But it is much more highly developed beginning in the twelfth century.

And, this, then, allows lawyers and philosophers to take the final step:  to argue for the integrity of the person based on the possession of these rights.  Maxims of law were developed specifically for his purpose, most especially the maxim, that no one should be deprived of his right “sine culpa” – without fault.  And when we get this notion of due process, we stand at the door of modern conceptions of right.  And this notion of due process was firmly in place by the middle thirteenth century."

Tuesday, August 28, 2007

Ontology, Epistemology, and the Foundation of Human Rights

Ole Miss law professor Chris Green’s lively exchange in the comments to a post on Steve Bainbridge’s blog prompted me to write him to clarify my own thinking about how we present the theistic foundation for human rights in light of the Brian Tamanaha’s critique of Michael Perry's argument. (Rob Vischer's post, which started the discussion on MOJ, is here.)  Here is Chris’ response:

“Tamanaha's complaint is an epistemic one, and I think he's understanding the argument in those terms (understandably enough, since he's responding to Perry, who put the point in terms of a rational basis for human rights).  But I don't think we need our interlocutors to know things about God before we can point out problems for a materialistic worldview.  It's a legitimate point to say, hey, your worldview doesn't have any entities that could possibly provide ontological support for human rights and genuine morality, but mine does.  This might, indeed, be a reason to adopt a theistic worldview.

It's also possible that knowledge about God & the imago Dei & such would be a better route to knowledge about human rights and the content of morality.  But I think that even on a Christian view of things, the atheist has plenty of access to that sort of knowledge--the individual human conscience still testifies that certain behaviors are right or wrong, a la Romans 2:14-15, even though people suppress the truth about God, a la Romans 1:20-21.  For that reason, I wouldn't put the point as an epistemic one.  Of course, if I'm right that the ontology of materialism isn't rich enough to provide a basis for moral claims that are true in every possible world, then an atheist who accepts that ontology can't have as full a knowledge of the foundations for human rights as the theist can. But that lack of knowledge for the atheist or materialist is really parasitic on the poverty of his ontology, I think; it's not anything particularly related to knowledge.”

Monday, August 27, 2007

Law From a Catholic Lens

On the occasion of the publication of Recovering Self-Evident Truths:  Catholic Perspectives on American Law, Zenit interviewed Kevin Lee, MOJ friend and contributor to the book, on “Law From a Catholic Lens.”  What follows is a large excerpt of the interview.  For the full interview click here.

Q: Why is it necessary to ground an understanding of a legal system in a distinctively Christian anthropology?

Lee: It is not "necessary," in the sense that it is possible to create a legal system rooted in some other anthropology.

Much of contemporary American legal theory, for example, can scarcely be considered compatible with a Christian anthropology.

But I think Catholic anthropology has a contribution to make. It offers a unique understanding of the irreducible dignity of the person and the giftedness of the community.

Catholic thought affirms that human beings are creatures with particular natures, capacities and limitations.

We all have dignity as bearers of the "imago Dei," but we are also sinful and prone to weaknesses. We form communities naturally, through small acts of love and kindness, but that does not mean that we are not capable of meanness and selfishness.

The Anglo-American legal system could simply abandon its Christian roots as archaic or nonsensical, but doing that would mean abandoning our tradition and denying that tradition has anything to offer.

Anyone who would advocate that position would bear a heavy burden of proof.

Q: A number of scholars are rediscovering the Catholic influence on the formation of Western legal systems -- an influence that lasted well into the last century. Does the Catholic conception of reciprocal rights and duties, so long a part of Anglo-American law, continue to govern our legal system, or have individualistic and modern liberal theories such as those of John Rawls transformed American law?

Lee: There is no doubt that the contemporary Anglo-American legal system has been massively influenced by modern liberal democratic theories.

But, I don't think that Catholic thought is in total opposition to either modernity or liberalism. It is much more complex than that.

Modern liberals, like Catholics, are concerned with rights and justice.

For example, Pope John Paul II's passion for individual freedom against totalitarian rule found support among liberals.

The critique is more nuanced than a simple rejection of modernity and liberalism.

Q: What role does natural law play in Catholic legal theory? Is the natural law the "self-evident truths" that the American founders asserted governed political life?

Lee: Natural law is based on the belief that nature has rational purposes. It seeks to read moral precepts from such purposes as they are visible in nature.

Citing St. Paul's letter to the Romans, Christian natural law theorists have held that these precepts are based on self-evident foundational principles. But, it is a theory that is no longer widely accepted.

Modern science opposes the idea that there is any purpose to nature, moral or otherwise.

Contemporary secular philosophy largely denies moral truth altogether, and even contemporary Christian ethicists tend to look to virtue rather than law when speaking about morality.

Nonetheless, natural law theory still offers many insights and poses interesting questions.

For Christians, natural law theory has to be worked out in relation to the creation stories of Genesis. There are of course two antithetical natures for human beings in Genesis: one of eternal innocence and integrity, and the other of the fall and fragmentation.

The fall suggests a limit to our ability to gain moral knowledge from examining nature. It is possible to read the signs of nature correctly only if we understand the realities to which the signs refer.

But the fall impedes our capacity to know the ultimate reality because we no longer read the signs correctly. So a complete reading of the natural law will always elude our fallen, temporal selves.

Catholics typically have been more optimistic than Protestants in assessing the depth of our fallen nature. They have tended to argue that even the fall calls us to salvation because we can remember something of our pre-fallen state.

Protestants are more likely to see the fall as a complete forgetfulness of God that can only be healed by God's initiative. Nonetheless, Catholics and Protestants agree that we are deeply marked by the fall, and reason alone does not secure our ability to "read the signs" that tell of the purposes of nature.

That is why reason alone offers no sure guide to moral life. Benedict XVI has referred to the "pathologies of reason" to suggest this danger.

Christian moral theory must always be sensitive to excessive claims about the role that nature and natural reason can play in the moral life.

God's gifts of grace -- or example what St. Thomas called the infused virtues: faith, hope and charity -- are essential to the moral life, but they are typically discounted in natural law theories because they suggest limits to natural reason, and therefore moral knowledge is not self-evident.

Sunday, August 26, 2007

Theism's Reasonableness and the Foundation of Human Rights

Robby George recommmends Grisez's in God? A Philosophical Preface to Faith for those interested in studying a compelling argument for the reasonableness of belief in God. 

In light of Brian Tamanaha August 21 post on Balkinization and in light of the comment made by Charles to a post on Steve Bainbridge's blog, I'll further clarify what I said in an ealier post, arguing that theists have a sturdier foundation for human rights than a-theists.

Is there a strong rational basis for human rights?  If so, what is it?

I agree with Brian T. that atheistic and materialistic foundations for human rights are tenuous.  How can there be a rational basis for inherent human dignity in an irrational universe?  There can't!

But, as Brian recognizes, there is a rational basis for inherent human dignity (which is the basis for universal human rights) if we were created by a certain type of God.  But, here is the stumbling block for Brian.  God's existence has not been proven.  From this he concludes, if I understand him correctly, that the theist's foundation for human rights is equally tenuous.  But, I think he requires too high a burden of proof - "a beyond a shadow of a doubt standard" - for God's existence.

If belief in God is reasonable, then theism (even by Brian's own logic, I think?) supplies a rational basis for human rights where atheism does not.  But, what if it is more reasonable (perhaps substantially more reasonable) to affirm God's existence than to deny it?  See Grisez.  Then it seems to me that the theist's foundation for human rights is sturdier still.

Now to Brian T's question of why does it matter?  Why do theists (like us at MOJ) risk alienating good, moral, human rights desiring atheists by insisting that theism provides a sturdier foundation for human dignity and rights than atheistic foundations?  First, we don't (or I don't) want to alienate any person of good will, theist or atheist.  We (I) desire and welcome fellow travelers from all walks of life and with all belief systems.  But, we (or at least I) do not think that a tenuous non-theistic (closed to special revelation and closed to general revelation - natural law) basis for human rights can protect the dignity of persons long term in the face of all the evil, selfishness, and unbridled desire for power and control in the world.  History has shown that even the sturdier (reasonable) theistic foundation has a hard time taming our disordered desire to treat other human beings as objects for our use and gratification.  An a-theistic foundation will have, I concluded, an even harder time and will ultimately fail because it cannot give a strong account of why a particular type of matter (the material that makes up a human being) ought to be respected in a solely materialistic universe. 

Saturday, August 25, 2007

Pre-Enlightenment Jewish and Christian Foundations to Human Rights

Its not quite “later in the day,” but I am finally getting back to Rob’s response to Jack Balkin's post regarding the development of human rights.  Jack says:  For religion to ground universal human rights in the very attractive way that the previous discussion has assumed, that religion must be of a very special sort, and, I would suggest, it must be of a form that arises most commonly following the Enlightenment.”

I would like to suggest that history shows that the foundations for modern human rights were laid (both directly and indirectly) long before the Enlightenment. 

In the Old Testament, we see the idea planted that those outside the community and the marginalized within the community are to be treated with respect.  The duty toward the alien among them, the duty to leave some crop in the field to be gleaned by the poor, and the concept of a jubilee year where the economic playing field was leveled are all evidence that Israel had started to think about human rights in a way that transcended old boundaries (citizenship and class).

In the New Testament, we see this idea advanced through Christ who came for all human kind.  In Him there is no Jew or Greek, no woman or man.  The NT is full of references to the universal nature of human dignity.  One that sticks out and is particularly appropriate for lawyers is the dialogue between Jesus and a lawyer who asks Jesus who is this neighbor that must be loved like oneself.  In the story of the Good Samaritan, we see that the neighbor is one who is “other;” in fact, one who is an enemy of Israel.  Again, the seeds are their in the Gospels and the rest of the NT for the development of universal human rights.

Much of the rest of my remarks will come from Thomas Woods’ How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization.  This is a book accessible by popular audiences but with good notes for those with an academic interest.  Some of it also comes from Harold Berman’s Law and Revolution.  What follows are just a few of Christianity’s contributions to human rights pre-Enlightenment.

  • The Investiture crisis a millennium ago, established two important principles that are necessary for the development of universal human rights:  1) a rejection of the totalitarian state and 2) the idea of separation of powers (here between state and Church).

  • I would suspect that the modern legal system provides a structure in which human rights can be protected.  Within the Church, with the development of canon law in the 12th century, our modern legal system began to take shape. 

    • A part of this development included introducing certain concepts of equality between men and women – for instance, a valid marriage required the free consent of both the male and the female and both could be punished for adultery.
    • Quoting Kenneth Pennington, Woods says “by 1300, European jurists ‘had developed a sturdy language of rights derived from natural law.  During the period from 1150 to 1300, they defined the rights of property, self-defense, non-Christians, marriage, and procedure as being rooted in natural, not positive, law.  By placing these rights squarely within the framework of natural law, the jurists could and did argue that these rights could not be taken away by human prince.’”

  • I would suspect that the university, with its commitment to learning, debate, reasoning, and inquiry, is a vital albeit indirect necessity for the development of universal human rights (and much else we hold dear today).  Universities grew out of the cathedral schools.  Woods says that “[e]ighty-one universities had been established by the time of the Reformation.”  53 of these had a papal charter.

  • Spanish conquest of the New World and the mistreatment of the native population led to great debate among theologians, philosophers, and others about the status of the native populations individually and as peoples, leading to de las Casas “Defense of the Indians” among other arguments for the humanity and dignity of that population. 

  • The emergence of international law and the rights of all grew out of or were deepened by these debates occasioned by the mistreatment of natives of the New World.  Vitoria, de Molina, and Domingo de Soto played important roles in developing this thinking.  Woods quotes de Soto:  “Those who are in the grace of God are not a whit better off than the sinner or the pagan in what concerns natural rights.”

This is just a taste of the development of human rights prior to the Enlightenment.  MOJ reader, Jonathan Watson, has suggested that those interested in further study look to “the scholarship of Kenneth Pennington, here - his website is a collection of very valuable thoughts / materials regarding human rights and procedural norms from the Middle Ages and Christendom - this and this might be good starting points” and to “Stephan Kuttner, Mario Bellomo, Brian Tierney, Charles Donahue, and Richard Helmholz.”  And, there is also Charles Reid at St. Thomas in Minnesota.

The idea of universal human rights did not appear out of no-where and into the heads of the Enlightenment intellectuals.  It was by and large an outgrowth of Judaic-Christian theology and philosophy.

A large question remains.  If the idea of human rights grew out of the church then why have Christians (and others) had such a bad track in recognizing and granting these rights?  The theological answer is “original sin.”  Our reason is fallible and this truth of “love your neighbor as yourself” has to be thought through and debated as new situations (the New World for instance) stretch our imagination.  And, our reason is often sacrificed at the altar of the passions.  We know what is right but our self-interest prevents us from doing what is right.  In speaking of slavery, Thomas Jefferson said, “I shudder to think God just.”  In other words, Jefferson knew slavery was wrong but he couldn’t bring himself to free his own slaves in his lifetime.

The Foundation of Human Rights

Before returning to Rob’s response to Jack Balkin, I want to return to an earlier part of this thread.  (Rick has linked to the relevant posts).  I agree with Brian Tamanaha that it is the existence of God not one’s belief in God that supports the theists claim that his foundation for human rights is stronger than the atheist’s foundation.  If God is a mere figment of the imagination – a delusion – then the theist’s foundation for human rights collapses for two reasons. First, the reasons the theist gave for human rights would be false.  Second, if there is no God – if there is no design or purpose to the world or human life – then the theist and the non-theist are on similar footing facing the fact that all human rights regimes are merely human creations, none very sturdy because as a mere human creation it has no power to bind anyone else.

But, if God exists (or at least a particular type of God exists), then the theist has a sturdier foundation for human rights because God, as the Author of life, supplies external criteria from which we can perceive the inherent dignity of the human creature and begin to build a human rights regime fitting that creature.  Both special revelation (the Bible) and general revelation (through the natural law) – both faith and reason – can form, independently and together, the building blocks for human rights.  Since the inherent dignity of the human person is knowable by reason apart from special revelation even those who do no believe in God but who are open to the mystery of life and are not avowed materialists can subscribe to this foundation for human rights.

Brian T. raises an important objection:  The existence of God cannot (or at least has not) be proven.  Here is my tentative response to this objection.  I would agree that the materialist, because he has faith in a purposeless “creation,” will not find the theistic foundation of human rights convincing.  But, only a small percentage of the population faithfully adhere to this creed.  The hypothesis that God exists is a reasonable one.  In fact the hypothesis that the Jewish and Christian God exists is a reasonable one.  And, the vast majority of the people of the United States believe that this hypothesis is true.

Despite the fact that God’s existence has not been scientifically proven (it can’t because this is beyond the realm of science) or philosophically proven beyond a shadow of a doubt, the theistic foundation can and does provide a sturdier foundation for human rights although the materialist will not see it this way.

I look forward to receiving your comments on this.

Thursday, August 23, 2007

Balkin and Vischer on God and Human Rights

Jack Balkin is right, I think, that "several centuries of modernity, secularism, and religious skepticism" coupled with the Church's loss of direct temporal power have aided religioius thinking about universal human rights.  And, with Jack, I assume that God is chuckling at the irony.  But, I think Rob's response is far too timid.  I think we can  1) successfully argue from history that Jewish and Christian belief pre-Enlightenment provided the foundation for modern universal human rights thinking, 2) argue from reason that for any benefits gained from the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment periods, that those projects ultimately undermine universal human rights (this has yet to be fully worked out in history), and 3) we can offer an explanatory hypothesis as to why human beings (religious and non-religioius alike) set themselves up for failure by articulating moral codes that are unachievable by most people, institutions, and societies. 

I am not a historian, but I hope later today to at least offer a few more thoughts on 1) and possibly 3).  My thoughts on 2) will have to wait for a another day.