Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, December 8, 2008

"Abortion Politics Didn't Doom the G.O.P."

Ross Douthat has an op-ed by this title in today's N.Y. Times. Here is a sample:

"the question isn’t whether the anti-abortion movement can change, adapt and compromise. It’s already done that. The question is whether it can afford to compromise on the national issue that keeps serious pro-lifers in the Republican fold, and requires an abortion litmus test for Republican presidential nominees — namely, the composition of the courts. And here the pro-life movement is essentially trapped — not by its own inflexibility, but by the inflexibility of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence."

Friday, December 5, 2008

Naming the Source of Dignity: A Fifth Response

My student Steven Albright responds to the question:

The student who said that the responses come from not wanting to think about finals is very much correct.  Today it was much more agreeable to me to think about dignity than to study for finals (or finish that final reflection paper on the course. whoops!)

 

As Fr. Araujo correctly points out, this dignity can be discovered through reason.  The imago Dei reasoning might not be persuasive to all individuals but we can still get to the answer as a logical extension of the natural law.  Through the natural law we can generally discover how to treat others correctly.  The question of “to whom” naturally follows “how.”

 

I'm not sure that this question about who merits dignity is the result of a “modern philosophical shift” as another student put it.(although that shift has certainly exacerbated the problem)  The concept of the “other” has been used throughout history as an easy method of rationalizing evil acts.  The evil ceases to be wrong in the mind of the actor when we strip the dignity from the target of that evil.  Looking back to the Bible, the Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) presents a similar situation.  After asking what he must do to inherit eternal life, part of which is to love his neighbor as himself, the lawyer asks those familiar words “And who is my neighbor?”  Understanding how he is required to act, the lawyer attempts to weasel out of that requirement. (“[b]ut because he wished to justify himself...”v29)

 

Regarding the more modern approaches to deciding who is deserving of dignity, I see them as simply more sophisticated versions of the same argument.  These other flawed definitions, however, are extremely dangerous because they seem to be logical unless we stop and consider their implications. 

 

As the student in the fourth response suggests with the discussion of nominalism, we are approaching the question from the wrong angle if we try to define who is deserving instead of presuming that everyone is worthy and from there make attempts to justify the potential exclusion of anyone.  From that perspective it becomes much more difficult to deny that dignity to an individual.

Thursday, December 4, 2008

Faith and Justice

This is today's Gospel reading:

Gospel
Mt 7:21, 24-27

Jesus said to his disciples:
“Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’
will enter the Kingdom of heaven,
but only the one who does the will of my Father in heaven.

“Everyone who listens to these words of mine and acts on them
will be like a wise man who built his house on rock.
The rain fell, the floods came,
and the winds blew and buffeted the house.
But it did not collapse; it had been set solidly on rock.
And everyone who listens to these words of mine
but does not act on them
will be like a fool who built his house on sand.
The rain fell, the floods came,
and the winds blew and buffeted the house.
And it collapsed and was completely ruined.”

At mass this evening, our pastor reminded us that faith and justice are intertwined.  Unless we act with God's merciful justice, ...

"Sodomy and Civil Rights"

It is a day for law student responses.  Oklahoma law student, Nicholas Bender responds David Weiss' "Sodomy and Civil Rights" posted here:

"David Weiss defines sodomy this way: "Sodomy happens when any group uses their majority or their power to abuse and marginalize another group." He says this is what happened when people in California and other states voted to ban legal recognition of same-sex marriage.

To me, his argument seems faulty on several levels. First, he makes a huge leap in logic. He reasons that if people voted "yes" on Proposition 8, then they were using "their majority power to abuse and marginalize another group." It seems to me that voters could have been motivated by factors other than a desire to abuse and marginalize. For example, voters could have reasoned that the marriage relationship between a man and a woman is an institution that society has deemed valuable for many reasons, including for its ability to form the intimate mini-community on which society is built: the family. Amongst the many relationships in our society that might arguably contend for privileged status, the traditional marriage relationship has been selected as most worthy of promotion. Same-sex couples are, therefore, arguing not to be treated like the rest of the varied societal relationships that exist, but to be given the exceptional status that has traditionally been extended to opposite-sex couples. While certain rights can be granted to relationships that differ in form and function from the traditional marriage relationship, voters may have concluded that only marriage in the traditional sense should be incentivized to a degree greater than all other relationships because of the return to society on the investment. Now, whether one agrees or disagrees that families headed by wedded, opposite-sex couples provide the optimal basic conditions for a successful family is another issue. But certainly, voters could have drawn that conclusion, without notions of abuse or marginalization motivating their decision.

Second, Mr. Weiss' argument seems to attack the democratic project itself. Using Mr. Weiss' sweeping reasoning, one could argue that anytime the majority expresses it's will on a particular subject, then it is abusing and marginalizing another group (i.e. the minority). A democracy necessarily includes winners and losers. Voting decisions based on one's beliefs (even those grounded in religion) are not, and should not be, precluded in a properly functioning democracy. I guess I would ask Mr. Weiss to further define "abuse" and "marginalization."

Naming the Source of Dignity: A Third Response

George Mason law student Mattias Caro weighs in the question

"I was intrigued by the Glendon quote you put up, in part because I spent a good deal of the summer working with Glendon's book on Eleanor Rosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Glendon does a masterful job in her book of laying out how individuals from so many different parts of the world could actually come together and approximate a common understanding of the values and truths that must necessarily undergird human society. Taking aside the utility of rights talk itself, which Glendon has also impressively criticized, the Universal Declaration was a moment for humanity in expressing a necessary natural law underpinning to any human, social enterprise. The problem lays here I think: in 1776 our Founding Fathers expressed their natural law theory in one simple phrase "self-evident truths that all men are created equal and endowed with certain unalienable rights which among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In 1948, it took the world well over 40 separate points to flesh out the same truth.


Rather than indicate a deeper understanding and appreciation for the natural law, I think it expresses exactly the opposite. The natural law is most operative in the people when its principles are ingrained within custom, habit, and social structure. What's changed? Glendon is right: the competing views of human nature offered by Kant and Rouseau has left political theory profoundly confused: can man have a telos? Is he fundamentally a good creature and evil exits outside of him? Competing in this framework, the imago dei stands no chance because it both asserts that man indeed has an extrinsic, intelligible end (contra Kant) and that indeed man's free choice can be the source of evil (contra Rouseau). But in reading Glendon, I don't think she's making a fideistic argument that faith is the necessary ingredient for belief in the imago dei. I simply think the way things have shaken out in intellectual history, if a person does not have some sort of theistic background, they'll look for other grounds (i.e. enlightenment thinker rationalizations) to confirm their beliefs on human nature. But I'm not so sure a pre-Christian natural law thinker (such as say Cicero) would 100% object to the terms Glendon uses.

So the conversation certainly isn't one about believers vs. non-believers. But there is a lot of intellectual ground to catch up on to even begin to have a conversation on the imago dei."

Naming the Source of Human Dignity: Another Response

This post, by Alabama law student Abe Delnore, responds to this post, which is also discussed here and here:

"I wonder if Rick Garnett's former student--the Bob Jones alumnus--suggests an answer to your student's question.  That is, divine creation not so long ago was considered by some the basis for denying the dignity of some humans.  So while Kant and Rousseau may seem to leave gaping loopholes, it is a historical fact that the divine account has been perverted--and it may be again. 

The alarming implications Glendon reaches from Kant and Rousseau are not conclusions those philosophers reached themselves.  Her characterization of Rousseau's empathy kind of bothers me, actually; his empathy is not a transient emotion.  If Glendon's quarrel is with imaginary Kant-lite (Peter Singer) and Rousseau-lite (?), then she has to deal with the use of Christianity to justify slavery and racism, the Church's centuries of failure to realize the implications of human dignity, etc.  Maybe she does; I haven't read this essay of Glendon's.

I also don't see why she believes we must choose among accounts of human dignity's origin.  Surely if God did create humans with inherent dignity, then what Kant and Rousseau noticed is also true.  Kant and Rousseau made powerful arguments one should not abandon lightly."

Naming the Source of Dignity: A Response

A student posed a question here and Fr. Araujo responded here.  This is a response from Richmond law student John O'Herron:

"Your most recent post and the question it poses are fascinating.  I am a law student at UR so my thoughts on this may be of little more value than your other students.  I did take a good deal of philosophy in college though (Christendom) so I am somewhat familiar with the issue presented.
 
The question obviously has massive implications for life issues: abortion, stem-cell, etc. One cannot claim that human stem-cells and unborn children have human rights (like the right to not be destroyed) if you accept Kant's reading of it.  So, Kant is out the door.  But I don't think the only alternative is faith-based.  Surely it is true that we have human dignity because we are made by God and in His image.  But I think its the case that we also have human dignity because of something distinct, yet related: our souls.
 
To understand the soul in a non-religious way (i.e., it isn't just the thing that shows we are made in God's image) is necessary. If we understand the human soul to be the life-animating thing that gives us our intellect and will, we see that humans alone have this "thing."  It is the very thing that makes us unique and the nature of that capacity make it something to be protected (sacred if you will, though not in the religious sense).  It is the soul that gives us those gifts.  However, not all people with souls have those gifts (the disabled etc.).  But those people still have that "thing" that makes humans special and unique.
 
It is the existence of the thing, and not necessarily the gifts that it imparts, that gives humans their dignity.  Therefore, those people so disabled as to not be able to exercise their intellect or will still retain their human dignity-they still have the very thing that makes them human, their soul. 
 
This isn't a fully developed argument, which would also require a foundation for what the soul is.  But I think that the general answer to your students question is that we can use the human soul as the basis for discussion and the basis for human rights.  We can make this argument to non-believers as well.  They too can (stress can) see that humans have an intellect and will that no other creature has.  Unless they are willing to say that disabled people have a different soul entirely (a different kind of thing that only gives life but not intellect and will), they must recognize that all people have this animating "thing.''  This conclusion has obvious implications for abortion as well (which is why the secular and philosophical argument for life works). 
 
I hope some of this made sense.  At a minimum, perhaps MOJers can discuss how we can discuss human rights in terms of the human soul without arguing faith.

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

Naming the source of human dignity: A student's question

Today we concluded a very satisfying (from my perspective anyway) seminar on Catholic Perspectives on American Law.  One of our readings was Ambassador Mary Ann Glendon's chapter, "International Law:  Foundation of Human Rights - The Unfinished Business." One of my students was interested in our thoughts to the following: 

"Glendon writes:

The shift from nature to dignity in modern thinking about the foundations of human rights thus entails a host of difficulties. The common secular understandings are that human beings have dignity because they are autonomous beings capable of making choices (Kant), or because of the sense of empathy that most human beings feel for other sentient creatures (Rouseau). But the former understanding has alarming implications for persons of diminished capacity, and the latter places all morality on the fragile basis of transient feeling. Most believers, for their part, would say that dignity is grounded in the fact that human beings are made in the image and likeness of God, but that proposition is unintelligible to nonbelievers.

According to Glendon, then, Kant and Rouseau present incomplete explanations of the source of human dignity because some people lack the very characteristics that, by definition, qualify them for such. Believers, on the other hand, attribute human dignity to the Creator. Since all human beings are children of a loving God, all have dignity regardless of condition or circumstance. Glendon recognizes, however, that this conception of human dignity is not readily accessible to nonbelievers.

This discussion seems to necessarily require determining which of the choices is better: an arguably incomplete human anthropology (like Kant’s, for example, based on autonomous choice) or a correct conception of human dignity that is “unintelligible to nonbelievers.”

I’m interested to hear the thoughts of others."

 

BTW, the Catholic Perspectives on American Law book, linked above, would make a great Christmas present for the lawyer or law student in your life.

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

Confessions of a Tortured Soul

I have a confession to make.  I cannot seem to get over the election.  No, not the one held in early November, but the one made public this past Sunday afternoon.  Oklahoma jumped past Texas in the BCS poll (although there is a rumor of stolen percentage points) this past week despite Texas thumping Oklahoma 45-35 earlier in the season.  The Big 12 title game this coming Saturday can appropriately be referred to as the Big 12 JV Championship or the Big 12 Consolation Championship since Texas beat the two contestants (Oklahoma and Missouri) by a combined total of 35 points. 

To any voters in the Coach's poll or the Harris poll who happen to read our blog (I have it on good authority that there are many), I hope that you vote Texas ahead of OU next week unless OU beats Missouri by more than the 35 point margin of victory by which Texas vanquished OU and Missouri. 

Beyond Politics: Greg Wolfe Responds

At my behest, Greg Wolfe has kindly responded to my posts here, here, here, here, and here:

I am grateful to Michael Scaperlanda for engaging my reflections on the culture wars and politicization so thoughtfully.

 

It's true that legal thought has a natural tie to politics -- but law also relates to culture in important ways. An extension of my thesis would be that legal scholars should think more about how culture shapes law.

 

(I happily acknowledge that politics and law can shape culture, but I also happen to believe that too much stress has been placed on that directionality.)

 

Politics and law help to adjudicate competing visions -- visions that are shaped by story and symbol, which well up from the culture.

 

In particular, legal studies would be enriched by a study of narrative -- by the way narratives that give meaning to our lives.

 

Think of the way that abortion has been depicted in film -- for example, "Vera Drake," "The Cider House Rules," and others.

 

These stories shape what we think of when we hear a word like "choice."

 

My argument, in short, is that we've spent too little time and resources on transforming the culture through narrative and beyond.

 

At any rate, thanks to Michael for his generous response to my work. I'm grateful to know about your blog and the good work you are doing.

 

If I can leave with parting advertisement, you can learn more about my work at the IMAGE journal website:

http://imagejournal.org/

 

We too have a daily blog, "Good Letters," which is available on our home page or as an RSS feed. Our mission is to publish narratives, poems, paintings, etc. that are animated by the Judeo-Christian tradition of faith.

 

Cordially,

 

Greg Wolfe