Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

The Catechism, the Death Penalty, and the United States

Can one who accepts the Roman Catholic Catechism's position on the death penalty plausibly conclude that imposition of the death penalty is, or can be, morally legitimate in the United States?  For a negative answer, see this article  from the November 1st issue of AMERICA, titled No to the Death Penalty:  The Requirements the Catholic Catechism Sets for Use of the Death Penalty Are Not Met in the United States.  If the author is right, there is no room for a "prudential" judgment that (1) accepts the Catechism's position but (2) concludes that imposition of the death penalty is, or can be, morally legitimate in the United States.  What do you think?

Michael P.

More from Martin Marty

[When I taught at Northwestern University Law School, I was, for a while, a member of a reading group at the University of Chicago Divinity School that included Martin Marty, David Tracy, and Robin Lovin.  What a privilege!  I often find that I want to share Martin Marty's reflections with others.  Hence, this posting.]

Sightings  11/8/04

Iraq Costs
-- Martin E. Marty

Monday Sightings chose to do little sighting of religious issues in the campaign this year.  But not for lack of topics.  Commentators tell us that citizens lined up "faith-basedly" in the recent election to vote their "values and morals" -- mainly the anti-gay marriage ones, they concluded.  Other citizens, in both parties, sputtered in frustration, trying to get some motion going on issues of war, peace, and justice.

Now realism will begin to soak in, as it would have also for the supporters of the losing candidate.  He would have inherited the burden of the Iraq war, with little vision of how to lift it.  Realists mention the deaths of an estimated 100,000 Iraqi people and over 1,100 sacrificed American lives.  Many are making use of data served up by the National Priorities Project (NPP) website, www.costofwar.com.  The National Priorities Project feeds figures that, according to critics of the way the war began and is being prosecuted, should fit somewhere into the nation's "values and morals" calculus.  Exit-pollers say it evidently did not rate highly.

Consult the running clock and the spinning adding machine that appear on the NPP web site and you will find this column to now be out of date.  When I wrote it Saturday, the war had cost $143,785,479,679.00.  Now cut that figure down to bite size.  My little town of Riverside has 8,895 people.  Our share of the war cost thus far is $6,550,556.36.

Suppose our "faith-based values and morals" had led us to put such funds to work in other areas.  Pre-school?  The U.S. could have allotted 19,044,076 for children to attend a year of Head Start.  Health care is a religious justice issue.  For the cost of the war so far, we could have insured 86,047,783 children nationwide for a year.  That would translate to 3,225 tots in Riverside (if we had that many children here).

For the current cost of the war, the U.S. could have hired 2,490,336 new teachers and paid them for a year.  This would give my little Illinois suburb a super-abundance of 113 new teachers next year, and, we presume, roughly the same amount for each year of this war, which has no end in sight. 

We might also like to make higher education available for more Americans.  Had we not entered the war in Iraq, we'd have been able to send 6,970,423 people to four-year colleges and paid for all four years.  There'd be 1,123 such scholarships in my burg.  Or we could have built 1,294,697 new housing units, 59 of them in Riverside.

Looking globally, as churches are called to do, the cost of the war could have funded all global anti-hunger efforts for five years, or all AIDS programs on the African continent for 14 years, or we could have immunized every child in the world for 47 years. 

Admittedly, national security is an urgent issue and demands plenty of "investing," and there were and are "values and morals" issues on the Iraqi scene.  But when it comes to all "investing," we have to ask which values-and-morals causes must suffer at the expense of those we choose and support with our votes.  We are likely to have to do that asking of ourselves for the years of the Iraqi war to come.

The NPP dollars-clock says that by now the cost of the Iraq war to each American household has been $2043.00.  Our great grandchildren can take care of that, while we vote on issues more urgent than war.

Martin E. Marty's biography, current projects, upcoming events, publications, and contact information can be found at www.illuminos.com.

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Sightings comes from the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

Saturday, November 6, 2004

The Morality of Stem Cell Research

Rob Vischer writes, in his posting today, that "[i]t is no answer to say that these embryos will be destroyed eventually anyway ..."  But it is a fundamental mistake, I think, to deny the moral relevance of the fact that "these embryos will be destroyed anyway ..."  Why?  Let Gene Outka explain.  (Outka is Dwight Professor of Philosophy and Christian Ethics, Yale University.)  What follows are excerpts from Outka's paper.  (Click here to read Outka's paper in its entirety.)

[Beginning of excerpts.]

I commend as a normative point of departure the conviction that ... "the human individual, called into existence by God and made in the divine image and likeness, ... must always be treated as an end in himself or herself, not merely as a means to other ends."  ...  To regard each person for his or her own sake, as one who is irreducibly valuable, authorizes a sphere of inviolability ...  And it heightens sensitivity to multiple ways we may go wrong, e.g., when we dominate, manipulate, and self-aggrandize.  To affirm inviolability and to abjure domination capture deeply important commitments.  They direct moral attention along lines I take to be permanently valid.

...

I propose to invoke and extend the nothing is lost principle.  I first learned of this principle from Paul Ramsey.  While he was committed to an absolute prohibition against murder as the intentional killing of innocent life, he was prepared to attach two exempting conditions to it.  One may directly kill when two conditions obtain:  (a) the innocent will die in any case; and (b) other innocent life will be saved. These two conditions stipulate what nothing is lost means.  They originally extend to parity-conflicts, where one physical life collides directly and immediately with another physical life, and we cannot save both....  I will argue that it is correct to view embryos in reproductive clinics who are bound either to be discarded or frozen in perpetuity as innocent lives who will die in any case, and those third parties with Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, et. al., as other innocent life who will be saved by virtue of research on such embryos.

I grant that this extension at best stretches the nothing is lost principle nearly to the breaking point. For I defend the extension (and perhaps the original principle) as a move to the effect that (a) nothing more is lost, and (b) less is lost, or at least, someone is saved. One reason it is worth considering is because we face a particular instance of a general phenomenon, namely, that novel developments arise, for which no clear precedents suffice to guide us. We should seek both to extend traditional moral commitments and incorporate new developments as cogently as we can. To labor the obvious: some of the controversies we are examining only make sense after the age of in vitro fertilization dawned. It stands behind them, amplifying questions about "end" and "means" that our forebears could not foresee. Unless we are prepared to repudiate in vitro fertilization as such, so that we sympathize with infertile couples but refuse them a right to overcome their condition by any means that science and their financial resources make available, we must take the moral measure of these new possibilities.

...

[R]ightly or wrongly, "excess" embryos are a tenacious datum, for they are a result of the practice as it currently exists.  I welcome the day when such necessity vanishes, and welcome in the meantime "adopting" mothers willing to implant embryos, when the genetic couple consents.  Not to welcome these things belies the claim that embryos as well as fetuses are irreducibly valuable. Nevertheless, it looks as if embryos in appreciable numbers will continue to be discarded or frozen in perpetuity.  They will die, unimplanted, in any case. (Nothing more will be lost by their becoming subjects of research.)  Again, it is the absence of prospects of these innocents that partly extends the first exempting condition.  It is the enhancement of prospects to other innocent life that partly extends the second exempting condition.  (Less will be lost, or at least, someone may benefit.)  These judgments taken together summarize the case I wish to make.

...

My extension goes so far, and no further.  It includes embryos conceived to enhance fertility, but who will never be implanted.  It excludes embryos created exclusively for research, where we intentionally create them, in order to disaggregate them....  The circumstance of in vitro fertilization includes a recognition that "excess" embryos are endemic to the procedure to date.  At a minimum, we foresee this.  Still, we intend in the procedure to alleviate infertility, not to create embryos for research.  Thus a significant continuity holds, despite this difference.

...

How much remains of the injunction to treat persons as ends in themselves when we allow research on frozen and eventually-to-be-discarded embryos?  I reply that the normative force of the injunction diminishes significantly when we take to heart their prospects.  It diminishes for everyone, and not only for those who allow research.  Some seek to witness to the dignity of embryos by refusing to do anything to them other than to freeze them.  They adhere to the norm I mentioned when canvassing conservative views, that we do best to consider first what we do and forbear, and not simply what will happen.  While this norm counts for me across a range of other circumstances, I find in the present circumstance that such a witness threatens to idle in relation to what the injunction paradigmatically summons us to undertake.  It is difficult to specify what interests we protect and promote, for example, when freezing and discarding are all that we can seriously envisage.  To honor potentiality, where there is no hope of implantation, is to honor perpetual potentiality.  It diminishes action-guiding content, either present or future, from the injunction to treat as an end.  It even affects what we say in the theological context to which I alluded earlier concerning providence and our corresponding love.  For we cannot precisely equate the affirmation that our love should start before recipients become self-aware with an affirmation that we should love recipients who will never become self-aware.  To deny equation is emphatically not to disbelieve in providence in both cases.  And it is not to withhold corrsponding love in both cases.  It aims only to acknowledge that our room for exercising fidelity in action over time may differ.  What we can and cannot do in treating persons as ends will be affected by their prospects.  Our love for an anencephalic infant destined to live a few days without self-awareness and our love for an embryo who will live at most in a perpetually frozen state without self-awareness, has less prospective room than our love for a fetus who is a power underway and who will acquire self-awareness by virtue of his or her self-development.  What we can envisage and do, now and later, has greater scope in the latter instance, which is why termination obliterates a future that the fetus now has in prospect, a future that an embryo frozen in perpetuity itself still lacks.

...

I object to an ironic alliance that those on the "right" and "left" sometimes form, to the effect that we confront a single either/or:  We should forbid all embryonic stem cell research or we should permit it all.  There is, I believe, a more nuanced possibility, where we may distinguish creating for research and only employing for research.  The latter allows us to consider the tangled aftermath of in vitro fertilization as a practice in our culture.  Employment for research connects with the datum of discarded embryos, where the original creation of embryos possesses a non-instrumentalist rationale, namely, the promotion of fertility, so that what we intend does not exhaustively concern benefit to third parties, yet the aftermath allows us to pursue benefits to third parties when we may do so without from the start creating in order to disaggregate.  These differences lead me to argue that the nothing is lost principle illumines a morally significant distinction between creation for research and employment for research.

...

Some may worry that the principle may also allow the general "harvesting" of organs or tissues from the living who are, e.g., terminally ill, or comatose, or condemned to die by authorities of the state as criminals.  The specter of Nazi doctors may well appear before us:  If certain people were slated for death anyway, why not experiment on them to the point of ending their lives to acquire knowledge?  These possible extensions differ from the one I propose here because the embryos in question are in physical limbo, without history or prospects....  It is impermissible to destroy any entity for body parts who has an agential history even if he or she does not now have any considerable future, entities for instance whose maturity (their "potentiality" has long since been realized) deprives their genetic parents of authority to end their existence or to elect to donate them for research.  But the "perpetual potentiality" of the embryos in question distinguishes them markedly enough from these other entities.  "Perpetual potentiality," assuming the claims I made about the two-sidedness of potentiality as we focus on embryos and fetuses, leads us intelligibly to find more affinities than differences between fetal cadavers and the embryos in question.  Whatever other extensions nothing is lost may warrant then, in cases of tragic forced choices (I have not considered these at any length), the extension I offer here pertains to a peculiar case by virtue of what the embryos in question currently are and are not.  John Reeder observes in quoting Baruch Brody that "the basic point of nothing is lost is that, as Brody puts it, the one to be killed does not 'suffer any significant losses...in unrealized potential.'"  I claim that "unrealized potential" carries for the embryos in question distinctive finality that resists generalization.

[End of excerpts.]

I find Outka's argument compelling.  But, of course, I may be misguided.  (Wouldn't be the first time--or the last.)  So, let me ask this question--of Rob Vischer, of Steve Bainbridge, of anyone who rejects Outka's argument:

Where, in your judgment, does Outka's argument misfire?

Michael P.

The Stem Cell Controversy

The following piece appeared in my hometown newspaper--the Atlanta Journal-Constitution--this morning.  The argument that the author makes is substantially the same argument that the distinguished Christian ethicist Gene Outka (Yale University) has made.  I posted Outka's paper several months ago--but no one seemed to read it.  At least, there were no comments in response to it.  Any thoughts in response to the piece below?  Surely this is a discussion worth having ...

The stem cell dilemma:  Proceed with research, but cautiously
Lalor Cadley - For the Journal-Constitution
Saturday, November 6, 2004

This week's re-election of President Bush and California voters' approval of $3 billion for research demonstrate how divided Americans are on the procedure.

Nothing about this issue is easy --- let me say that right upfront. The science of stem cell research is extraordinarily complex. And when we talk about embryonic stem cell research, the issue moves beyond science into ethics and religion, and the field becomes even more highly charged.

I am neither a scientist nor an ethicist, but a woman of faith trying to make an informed decision, one that is morally and intellectually sound.

Scientists are asking for federal funding to do embryonic stem cell research, which they believe holds great promise for curing devastating illnesses such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, diabetes, spinal cord injuries and multiple sclerosis. (Stem cells are the basic building blocks for human tissues and organs.) Cures are not imminent, but over the next decade real progress may be made. Adult stem cells are available, used for blood disorders, but they do not have the broad potentialities of embryonic stem cells, many of the researchers say.

President Bush has refused to allow National Institutes of Health funding to create new embryonic stem cell lines. Destroying embryos is off-limits, he maintains, no matter how worthwhile the venture may prove to be.

Experimentation is continuing with existing stem cell lines established before 2001, but the president's decision forbids the creation of new lines with federal money. About 70 lines were estimated to be available --- but fewer than 20, it turned out, were in good enough shape to use in research.

Those who support Bush's decision argue that, even though the embryos in question are "leftovers" --- embryos that will never be implanted in a woman's uterus (and this is important to remember) --- the very fact that they are life "in potentia" means we cannot tamper with them.

Opponents of this ban, and I am one of them, believe that because the embryos will be disposed of anyway, it is wrong not to use them in an effort to alleviate real human suffering. In the hands of researchers, the embryos would be used to give life --- life to living people who suffer with crippling diseases.

Between those who would bar the door, terminate all debate, condemn as murderers those who oppose the restrictions, and those at the other extreme, who would fling the doors wide open with no restrictions, no restraints, no reverence for the sacredness of the work or the implications of what they do, are people like me --- and perhaps you --- struggling to deal with the complexities and come to a decision that reflects not only the knowledge in our minds but also the wisdom of our hearts and souls.

We should and must proceed with embryonic stem cell research, taking our lead from people of science and medical ethicists, not government legislators or ideologues. But we must do so with caution and reverence for the work and with a firm commitment never to misuse the process or the knowledge we gain --- for we are on holy ground.

Jesus was healer

Some opponents of this research have the mistaken notion that scientists will harvest these stem cells from aborted fetuses. That is not the case. The cells come from fertility clinics. They are donated by couples who no longer have need of them, and who choose to donate their surplus embryos to science. There are more than 400,000 frozen human embryos. More than 11,000 of them are available for research. Unless the ban on federal funding is lifted, they eventually may be discarded and with them the life-giving secrets they may contain.

This to me seems morally wrong and frankly senseless --- not a preservation of life but a denial of it. I don't want to claim that God is on my side (there's far too much of that going around these days), but I do believe that Jesus was a man who stood firmly on the side of life. In fact he came to Earth that we might have life and have it abundantly (John 10). His entire ministry was devoted to healing --- the crippled, the blind, the leprous, the women bent and bleeding. They came to him and he healed them. He even brought to life people who had died. When laws got in the way, he broke them --- healing a suffering woman on the Sabbath to the chagrin of the religious authorities. Human suffering grieved him, and he did all he could to ease it.

The Hebrew Scriptures also show God as deeply merciful. Skimming through my book of Psalms, I find this: "When the just cry, the Most High hears and delivers them from their troubles. God is close to the brokenhearted. . . . Many are the afflictions of the just; they will be delivered from them all. God will keep guard over all their bones, not one of them shall be broken." And this: "O God, you deliver them in the day of trouble; you guard them and give them life; . . . you sustain them on their sickbeds; you heal them of all their infirmities."

Even Orrin Hatch, the conservative Republican senator from Utah, was persuaded to support embryonic stem cell research. In a letter to the secretary of health and human services, he said: "I am proud of my strong pro-life record. . . . I conclude that this research is consistent with pro-life values [and] should proceed."

God gave us the brilliance of scientists, the wonders of technology. Is it not also possible that this good God gave us these living cells, designated for destruction? Isn't it possible he gave them to us as another source of revelation --- a pathway to miraculous discoveries that will turn mourning into dancing, give life back to innocent people who are crippled, blind, in unrelenting pain?

In our effort to protect life, we must be careful not to idolize the embryo, enshrining it like a sacred cow. We mustn't let the fear of doing something wrong keep us from doing what is right.

Insisting that undifferentiated cells must be preserved only to be destroyed --- at the very least it makes no sense; at most it may be turning our backs on grace.

Lalor Cadley is a spiritual director, adult educator and freelance writer with an office in Decatur.

More on the Election and "Moral Values"

[Conservative columnist David Brooks has some things to say in today's New York Times that may be of interest to MOJ readers:]

November 6, 2004

OP-ED COLUMNIST

The Values-Vote Myth

By DAVID BROOKS

Every election year, we in the commentariat come up with a story line to explain the result, and the story line has to have two features. First, it has to be completely wrong. Second, it has to reassure liberals that they are morally superior to the people who just defeated them.

In past years, the story line has involved Angry White Males, or Willie Horton-bashing racists. This year, the official story is that throngs of homophobic, Red America values-voters surged to the polls to put George Bush over the top.

This theory certainly flatters liberals, and it is certainly wrong.

Here are the facts. As Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research Center points out, there was no disproportionate surge in the evangelical vote this year. Evangelicals made up the same share of the electorate this year as they did in 2000. There was no increase in the percentage of voters who are pro-life. Sixteen percent of voters said abortions should be illegal in all circumstances. There was no increase in the percentage of voters who say they pray daily.

It's true that Bush did get a few more evangelicals to vote Republican, but Kohut, whose final poll nailed the election result dead-on, reminds us that public opinion on gay issues over all has been moving leftward over the years. Majorities oppose gay marriage, but in the exit polls Tuesday, 25 percent of the voters supported gay marriage and 35 percent of voters supported civil unions. There is a big middle on gay rights issues, as there is on most social issues.

Much of the misinterpretation of this election derives from a poorly worded question in the exit polls. When asked about the issue that most influenced their vote, voters were given the option of saying "moral values." But that phrase can mean anything - or nothing. Who doesn't vote on moral values? If you ask an inept question, you get a misleading result.

The reality is that this was a broad victory for the president. Bush did better this year than he did in 2000 in 45 out of the 50 states. He did better in New York, Connecticut and, amazingly, Massachusetts. That's hardly the Bible Belt. Bush, on the other hand, did not gain significantly in the 11 states with gay marriage referendums.

He won because 53 percent of voters approved of his performance as president. Fifty-eight percent of them trust Bush to fight terrorism. They had roughly equal confidence in Bush and Kerry to handle the economy. Most approved of the decision to go to war in Iraq. Most see it as part of the war on terror.

The fact is that if you think we are safer now, you probably voted for Bush. If you think we are less safe, you probably voted for Kerry. That's policy, not fundamentalism. The upsurge in voters was an upsurge of people with conservative policy views, whether they are religious or not.

The red and blue maps that have been popping up in the papers again this week are certainly striking, but they conceal as much as they reveal. I've spent the past four years traveling to 36 states and writing millions of words trying to understand this values divide, and I can tell you there is no one explanation. It's ridiculous to say, as some liberals have this week, that we are perpetually refighting the Scopes trial, with the metro forces of enlightenment and reason arrayed against the retro forces of dogma and reaction.

In the first place, there is an immense diversity of opinion within regions, towns and families. Second, the values divide is a complex layering of conflicting views about faith, leadership, individualism, American exceptionalism, suburbia, Wal-Mart, decorum, economic opportunity, natural law, manliness, bourgeois virtues and a zillion other issues.

But the same insularity that caused many liberals to lose touch with the rest of the country now causes them to simplify, misunderstand and condescend to the people who voted for Bush. If you want to understand why Democrats keep losing elections, just listen to some coastal and university town liberals talk about how conformist and intolerant people in Red America are. It makes you wonder: why is it that people who are completely closed-minded talk endlessly about how open-minded they are?

What we are seeing is a diverse but stable Republican coalition gradually eclipsing a diverse and stable Democratic coalition. Social issues are important, but they don't come close to telling the whole story. Some of the liberal reaction reminds me of a phrase I came across recently: The rage of the drowning man.

The Election and "Moral Values"

[Catholic Peter Steinfels has some interesting reflections in his "Beliefs" column in today's New York Times.  Thought that some readers of this blog would be interested:]

BELIEFS

The 'Moral Values' Issue

By PETER STEINFELS

The election of George W. Bush, it seems, turned on moral values.

It seems.

Hardly had the exit polls shown that 22 percent of the voters named "moral values" as the issue mattering most in their choice for president when Andrew Kohut, the president of the Pew Research Center, called that conclusion misleading. On the Wednesday edition of "The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer," Mr. Kohut rightly pointed out that moral values may have ranked ahead of jobs or terrorism because it was an ambiguous, appealing and catchall phrase.

It is true that if the exit polls had constructed an equivalent catchall economic category adding concern about health care and taxes to that about jobs and growth, it would have been the top concern of 33 percent of the voters. If the poll findings had combined concern about terrorism with concern about Iraq, as apparently many voters did, the resulting category would have ranked first with 34 percent of the voters.

To underscore the ambiguity of moral values, consider three of the issues often subsumed under that umbrella. Stem cell research is immensely popular. Gay marriage is not. Legal access to abortion falls somewhere in between.

And surely concern about moral values mixes revulsion at the offerings of Hollywood, cable television, the popular music industry and pornographic Web sites with defense of displaying the Ten Commandments in courthouses and of reciting "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance - and who knows what else.

Furthermore, many of these concerns are stimulated and shaped artificially and emotionally by the high commands and local shock troops in the culture wars.

So level-headed observers like Mr. Kohut are wise to warn that no one quite knows what reality lies behind the moral values catchphrase. But isn't it important to find out? The fact that 80 percent of the voters listing moral values uppermost in their minds voted for Mr. Bush suggests that there is some unifying, underlying reality there. Anyone seeking to understand American political culture should be more than a little bit curious, to say nothing of Democrats contemplating the future of their party.

There are, however, several surefire ways to short-circuit such an inquiry.

Comparing the so-called values voters with jihad-driven Muslim terrorists, an equation ventured by not a few post-election analysts, will do nicely, for starters. Loosely tossing around terms like fundamentalism and theocracy is similarly effective at anesthetizing the thought processes. Then there is the leap that fretting about moral values is merely a disguise for ignorance, irrationality and intolerance.

These caricatures cast millions of citizens as ominous Others, alien invaders not from another planet but at least from another era, probably the benighted Middle Ages or the nearly as dark 1950's. Nevermind the evidence of writers and scholars as different as David Brooks, Alan Wolfe and Morris P. Fiorina that Americans are not really as deeply divided as either the metaphor of a culture war or the electoral-vote map of the red and blue states suggests.

Barack Obama, the newly elected senator from Illinois, memorably challenged the red-state, blue-state dichotomy at the Democratic convention. "We worship an awesome God in the blue states," Mr. Obama said, and "have gay friends in the red states." Perhaps he could have added something about finding supporters of the ban on so-called partial-birth abortions in blue states and conservative Christian defenders of church-state separation in the red states.

Fanaticism exists, of course, and stupidity, too. Wild claims and aggressive demands have been made in the name of moral values, often enough by figures competing for public attention. Latching upon these is an easy and tempting way to deaden the kind of empathy and imagination necessary to comprehend another perspective.

A condescending incredulity offers a slightly more sophisticated way to derail any inquiry into the moral values issues. Just treat one's own views as so established and self-evident that any questioning of them can only be a puzzling and pathological "backlash." Are there really still people out there opposed to abortion rights? How incomprehensible!

Whatever one may think of same-sex marriage, for example, it takes a real stretch to pretend that it is not a noteworthy departure from existing social and legal norms. It would also be a long shot to deny that it was the Massachusetts Supreme Court along with local officials around the nation challenging current laws by officiating at same-sex weddings who placed this on the national agenda rather than the religious right or President Bush.

Voters' emphasis on moral values has prompted talk that the culture is undergoing a sharp conservative shift. A better case can be made that the cultural shifts of recent years have almost entirely continued in a liberal direction. On Nov. 2 a significant part of the nation balked. Gay marriage has proved, at least for now, unacceptable. Meanwhile civil unions, which stirred shock and fury in Vermont only a few years ago, have almost reached the edge of being mainstream.

A final way of skirting any exploration of the moral values so many Americans say determined their presidential choice actually has considerable legitimacy. One can challenge the very idea reflected in the exit polls that moral values constitute some distinct category of public concerns.

Are not moral values also at stake in decisions about war, in drawing lines against torture, in addressing poverty or in providing desperately needed housing and health care? It has become commonplace to note that for every injunction in the Bible regarding homosexuality there are hundreds, maybe thousands regarding care for the poor. All of a nation's common life, not just sexual matters or personal behavior, is shot through with moral and ethical issues.

These points are absolutely true. But those who make them should remember that enlarging the framework of the discussion is one thing, trying to change the subject is another. Whatever this large chunk of voters may have in mind by moral values, those things need to be identified and addressed, not simply steamrolled over by pointing to other issues that may be equally moral and equally or even more important.

Suppose that these barriers to pursuing the question of moral values can be overcome. What then? The endgame should not be some expedient concession or cosmetic exercise to garner votes next time around. The endgame should be an honest discussion of the moral stances dividing Americans, each side (and there may be more than two) addressing the contending arguments at their best and not at their worst. It is not unthinkable that a few minds might be changed, and a great many people feel less alienated.

Tuesday, November 2, 2004

Garry Wills on Just War

[Thought this would be of interest. mp]

The New York Review of Books
November 18, 2004

What Is a Just War?
By Garry Wills

Click here for full article. Abstract follows:

The traditional theory of the just war covers three main topics--the
cause of war, the conduct of war, and the consequences of war. Or, in
the Scholastic tags: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum.
But most attention is given now to the middle term, the conduct of
war. That is where clear offenses are most easily identified, though
only occasionally reported and even more rarely punished. The two main
rules of jus in bello have to do with discrimination between
combatants and noncombatants, the latter to be spared as far as
possible, and proportionality, so that violence is calibrated to its
need for attaining the war's end. The claims of morality here are
recognized with difficulty in actual combat, and disputed when
recognized. Why should that be?

Monday, November 1, 2004

Martin Marty on "flip flopping"

Sightings 11/1/04

Campaign Yearbook
-- Martin E. Marty

Having done little Monday-morning sighting of the 2004 campaign, at its end, we should, at least, look at the "flip-flops" or "changed places" among religious groups.

First, Catholics: The May 17 Sightings ("Catholic Elections") commented on how the Vatican and American bishops in 1960 assured U.S. citizens that bishops' (fatefully futile) intrusion in Puerto Rican politics (declaring it sinful for any Catholic to vote for the pro-birth control PPD) would never find a counterpart here. That first intervention under an American flag reflected only the "practical and special condition of the island," they said. It can't happen here. But it did in 2004. Many flip-flopped. Had the old anti-Catholic Protestants been rightfully wary back when they warned about Catholic power in American politics?

Second, conservative Protestants: The World Book Yearbook of 1965, for which I wrote the "Protestantism" round-up (and still do), covered the 1964 campaigns. That entry sets us up to observe more flip-flopping, role-reversals, and changes of place. Until that year, most evangelical-fundamentalist-pentecostal-conservative-Protestant groups had shunned formal involvement with politics. The first "flip" against that historic understanding occurred when "many of the more conservative Protestants" were attracted to candidate Barry Goldwater. Since then, they have gone ever further against their tradition and now have established a new one: moving from most passive and invisible to become the most active, visible, and forceful religious force of all.

Third, mainline Protestants: As for what is now called the "Protestant mainstream," a poll of denominational editors in 1964 revealed a preference for candidate Lyndon Johnson, and "the great majority of prominent church periodicals that did endorse a candidate gave their support to the President." Now for another flip-flop: from then until now, such mainline Protestants have backed away from endorsement and, certainly, from "denominational" involvement. Were there endorsements of either party among any of them in the current campaign? Mainline action today is mainly in local spheres and does not consist in national partisan endorsements.

Fourth, black churches: African-American issues received much treatment in 1964/65, but Martin Marty was too dumb to sight activity among black churches back then. Here there has been the most continuity: the civil rights movement was being organized by, and the Great Society legislation was receiving open and explicit support among, African-American churches. Today's social issues still receive such support from this faction, and candidates trek to these churches.

Fifth, Jewish groups: The 1965 World Book Yearbook article on Jews did not connect them with the campaign story, but Jews went overwhelmingly for Johnson. Nearly 80 percent voted Democratic in 2000. Now some pundits are predicting a decline in Arab-American support for Republicans and Jewish support for Democrats.

Of most "flip-flop" interest on the Jewish front is the coalition between some "evangelicals," often with apocalyptic Christian Zionist and pro-Israel views, and many Jews. In the mid-sixties, sociologists were still associating "orthodox Protestantism" with "anti-Semitism," though liberal Protestants were more often "anti-Zionist." Today, Republicans are counting on conservative evangelicals to boost Jewish votes for Republicans. And the same evangelicals who, forty years ago, often spoke of the Pope as the Anti-Christ are now in coalition with the Pope and with Catholics.

What would a Rip Van Winkle who retired in 1964 make of the altered religious-political landscape of 2004? He'd probably flip.

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Sightings comes from the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

Friday, October 29, 2004

Cathy Kaveny's Response to Greg Sisk

Dear all,

This has to be my last guest-post. But I'd like to say, first, that I find the
tone taken by Russ Hittinger to be much more productive of discussion than the
rhetoric of Greg Sisk. But here goes:

1. I believe I said that I recognized the intersection of assessment of a
candidate's character and assessment of issues is intertwined. I grant that
Catholics have assessed character in terms of the candidate's stand on
abortion--but it seems almost exclusively in terms of a candidate's stand on
abortion--as Greg's response does almost exclusively. What I was pointing to
was the failure to address broader questions of character in terms of
possession of the political virtues, such as prudentia, and its subvirtues. I
frankly don't see how this wasn't apparent from reading my response, and its
invocation of Aquinas's Treatise on Prudence and Justice.

2. I agree Kerry's stand on abortion is extreme. But despite the difference
in Democratic and Republican platform positions on abortion, I don't think it
will make much difference in the legal structure anytime soon. As I think I
said, I don't believe that there is any chance that the Supreme Court will be
so constituted as to overrule Roe anytime soon. I think the only confirmable
people will be like O'Connor and Kennedy--both Republican nominees, and both
unwilling to overrule Roe. I think that on balance, in the reall world, a
Democratic administration is likely to result in fewer abortions.

3. I'm just not an apologist for Kerry as Greg Sisk describes me--I certainly
don't think my position --described as "holding my nose and voting for Kerry"
counts as apologetics.

4. I have to say that I'm a bit discouraged with this conversation--I thought
my post provided a) a moral analysis of the act of voting; b) a set of criteria
according to which candidates could be assessed, which partly drew upon the
Catholic tradition in virtue theory, as applied to the virtue of politics; c) a
way of morally accounting for a vote that will further, unintentionally but
foreseeably, unjust policies rooted in Catholic casuistry (i.e., the concept of
cooperaton), d) a defense of why I thought I had proportionate reason to vote
for Kerry here, given my beliefs about Bush and my background belief that I
have a moral obligation to vote; and e) a few reflections on the puzzling
question of what solidarity consists in. Greg didn't engage any of that. And
as I read his well, screed, it simply says to me, "YOU IDIOT DON'T YOU SEE THAT
KERRY IS EVIL EVIL EVIL ?"

So , honestly, I just don't see this conversation as having any future point.
I'm happy to talk with Russ off-line (on the meaning of solidarity), but I
guess I'll exit this discussion where I began: worrying about the state of
the rhetoric in the Church.

Best wishes,

Cathy Kaveny

More from Russ Hittinger

Dear Cathy:

I meant by solidarity (as you correctly perceived) making the plight of
those excluded from the protection of law something “first” in one’s
public actions. I spoke of actions, not just symbols. I cannot
quarrel with your suggestion that “solidarity” with an excluded class
of human persons can be maintained at levels besides acts of voting,
legislating, and creating public laws and policies. Indeed, we have to
do this all of time, even with regard to persons who are not, strictly
speaking, excluded from the protections of law. Decent people reorder
their priorities and resources to succor needy neighbors, and they do
so without waiting for the state to act or even to recognize the
problem. Sometimes, these private acts of justice and social charity
turn out to be more efficacious than what can be furnished by law. But
I was trying to throw light on the public dimension, consisting of the
choices we make as citizens (by voting, legislating, etc.) – choices
that have a distinct kind of causality. At this level, the moral
question is not merely how to deploy forces to fix a problem, but
whether those who suffer the injustice have a claim upon the public
sphere. For me, this is not an abstract issue, although, to be sure,
it is tricky.

You and I agree that unborn human persons have a legitimate claim on us
at other levels. I am insisting that the deadly sin of the political
order is not merely its contingent inability or slowness in correcting
an injustice, but rather the use of law to rule out the claim of the
victims, to deny it access to public consideration and remedy, and to
cast the class of unprotected human persons into a status of being
merely private neighbors. Now, it could happen that once these persons
are thrown beyond the pale of law their lives will turn out okay. I am
dubious. Given all of the other things that warrant your dubiety (the
practical wisdom of the candidates, the war policies of the Bush
administration, the belligerent rationalism that overestimates what is
amenable to legal and political remedy), you should at least be dubious
about the prospect of justice when the equal protection principle is
set aside. I was disappointed that your Augustinian sensibilities,
which I share, seem to evaporate once we get to the problem of the
powerful consigning the weak to the contingencies of cultural
persuasion. On my view, this sounds too much like free-marketeers who
find every solution to distributive and legal justice in the
spontaneous hand of the market.

I contend that one ought not to vote for a candidate who, as a matter
of principle, would create or maintain the exclusion of unborn persons
from the protection of law; indeed who would go further, by using the
powers of his or her office not only to prevent a constitutional
solution, but to knock down ordinary legislation protecting some unborn
human persons. The net result of Kerry’s position is that there can be
no public prudence about this issue. It is the severity and totality
of the principle that alert us to the fact that we are not dealing with
tough issues of prudence. Rather, we are dealing with a canceling-out
of the principle that makes prudence possible, at least in this
particular case. I agree that there are other issues of justice that
demand our attention, including the torture and abuse of prisoners,
derogation from the international law of war, the poverty of families,
just for starters. The point that I am making is that these kinds of
injustice are not excluded from the common law of our society. Each
one can be addressed and remedied on the basis our corporate moral and
legal order. We might disagree about the facts, but no one believes
that we are not entitled to deliver judgment in these matters that
binds everyone.

Perhaps you and I are considering two very different examples of how a
problem of justice gets opened-up or closed-off. You are worried about
the long-range pattern of social legislation, which, if prudently
framed and pursued would tend to ameliorate the situation of the weak
and vulnerable. As you can see, I have emphasized the use of the most
public of things, equal rights under law, to insure that rightful
claims can be heard and that public business can be conducted on the
matter. Anyone who holds the latter should hold the former.
International instruments and covenants of human rights hold both
principles. They belong together. In moral logic there is an order of
priority between the two. I won’t insist on this entailment right
here, because I am willing to admit that in working for certain good
consequences one can find himself implicitly affirming the suppressed
principle.

Yet, I keep waiting to hear from the party of long-term amelioration
some recognition (let it be highly coded, and let it be a velleity
aimed at the future) that the well-being of unborn persons is truly a
matter of public business – just for who they are, and not merely as
potential, if not anonymous, beneficiaries of social policy designed
for other people. After all, what it means to be in a community of
justice is not just bringing about good external consequences, but also
affirming the good of the persons to whom these other things accrue.
So, I look for the party of amelioration to make a more generous
gesture in the direction of the personal good of the unborn and their
equality before the law, and to show that the social policies are not
reinforcing the position that one class of human persons are only
incidentally factored into the justice of the city. Once the principle
is admitted, then we can debate time-tables and the plethora of issues
that legitimately fall to the order of prudence.

Concerning all of the other issues you raise about Bush versus Kerry, I
think you are right about some and not so right about others. But I am
not entirely sure.

Your friend,
Russ H.