Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, December 6, 2004

A Helpful Message from a Nurse

[I received this e-mail message today.]

I am a nurse.  [Until about a year ago,] I worked on a general medical floor, and inevitably there will be some people dying there of conditions which cause pain, especially but not exclusively cancer. So I have been close to this situation myself. I wrote the following as part of a post on this subject on Amy Welborn's blog:

"There may come a point when the amount of medication needed to alleviate
obvious pain can be anticipated as possibly hastening the baby's death. This
is the same situation as we have with people with terminal cancers and other
painful terminal conditions. We never attempt to hasten death, but we do
relieve pain. I have myself in these situations given a morphine shot that I
thought might lead to a patient's death, because the patient either appeared
to me to be in pain, or the family sitting by the patient's bed observed an
increase in restlessness which they felt meant the patient was in pain. (All
of the times I have been in this position the patient has lived through a few
more shifts.) All of the nurses I worked with understood this distinction and
would not deliberately try to hasten a patient's death, even when doctors
ordered enough medication on an "as needed" basis to do so. (In one case a
doctor made comments indicating that he thought we should, but no nurse would do it.)

So there may well be babies so severely deformed that their condition is
incompatible with life, and they may possibly be in pain, but with just a
little more patience, one could make them comfortable during the dying
process without deliberately killing them.

I don't know if this is what these people are doing, but they don't understand
the distinction, or if they really just intend to kill, or if they are
actually also killing babies who would not have died but might have been
severely disabled. "

Further on DDE and the Groningen Protocol

Thanks to Steve for his post yesterday.  It does seem to be the case, as Steve and his correspondent suggest, that the point of the Groningen Protocol is to authorize doctors--in conjunction with parents, I'm still assuming--to take action with the intent to end a life and not merely to reduce unbearable pain.   In my hypothetical, by contrast, the intent was not to end a life but to reduce unbearable pain, albeit with foresight that the painkiller (e.g., morphine) would end a life.  I am utterly incompetent to address the issue whether to reduce the kind of pain under discussion it is ever necessary, finally, to administer a painkiller in what one foresees will be, or may well be, a lethal dose--though I have been led by some things I have read to believe that there are such situations.  In any event, thanks for the discussion.

Michael P.

Sunday, December 5, 2004

Reply to Steve Bainbridge

Steve, I have a question for you--and for anyone else who may be able to answer.  The question ("Am I missing something?") is near the end of this post.

This is the language that Steve calls to our attention in his post yesterday:

A parent's role is limited under the protocol.  While experts and critics familiar with the policy said a parent's wishes to let a child live or die naturally most likely would be considered, they note that the decision must be professional, so rests with doctors.

When I read this language, I assumed it meant that the law should not be construed to require the doctors to honor the parents' wishes that their terminally ill child be sedated out of his or her unbearable misery.  The doctors may, after their own deliberation, refuse to honor the parents' wishes that they--the doctors-- do so.

Steve suggests that according to the law, the doctors may decide to sedate the terminally ill child out of his/her unbearable misery even if the parents object to the doctors' doing so.  If Steve is right about this, then I agree that the law is outrageous for that reason alone, whether or not it is outrageous for any other reason.  But is Steve right about this?  I would appreciate any relevant information.

In any event ...

Let's assume, for the sake of discussion, that a law makes it clear that doctors may, if after appropriate deliberation they decide to do so,  cooperate with parents in the scenario I suggested in my post.  If I'm right about the implications of the the Doctrine of Double Effect, then the parents' decision is morally permissible--that is, morally permissible according to orthodox Roman Catholic moral theology.  (Steve:  Nothing in Evangelium Vitae or in the Catechism calls into question the DDE.)  And if their decision is morally permissible, then there is no reason doubt that the doctors' cooperation with the parents is morally permissible too.

So:  Am I right about the implications of the DDE?

Here is what I said in my earlier post:

Wouldn't the Doctrine of Double Effect permit parents to authorize the administration of a sedative (e.g., morphine) to their child in order to relieve the child's unbearable pain--even, if necessary to relieve the pain, to the point where the child's respiratory system is depressed and the child dies . . . so long as the parents do not intend the death of the child but only the relief of the child's unbearable pain?  Of course, the proportionality test (which is the second part of the DDE) would not be met if the child's condition were not terminal.  But if the child's condition is terminal--if the child will die within the week--then wouldn't the proportionality test be met?

Again:  Am I missing something?  I would appreciate any comments you might have about this situation.  Steve?  Anyone?

One more thing, Steve:  A reader of your blog, where you X-posted your December 4th post, might think that I am trying to justify infant euthanasia.  I am not.  To administer the sedative with the intent to kill would be engage in an act of euthanasia.  I am not trying to justify any parent's doing that.  Crucial to my application of the DDE is that the parents are NOT acting with the intent to kill their child.  (Moreover, I am seeking feedback about WHETHER my application of the DDE is correct.  I thought this blog was in part about discussion.)

Since I may want to run for the presidency of the United State some day, I hope you will make it clear to your blog's readers that I am an apologist neither for infant euthanasia nor for Nazi doctors!

Friday, December 3, 2004

About the Netherlands ...

I followed the link in Steve Bainbridge's posting this morning--the link to the Hewitt piece.  According to a passage Hewitt quotes, this is what the the Groningen Protocol does:

Under the Groningen protocol, if doctors at the hospital think a child is suffering unbearably from a terminal condition, they have the authority to end the child's life. The protocol is likely to be used primarily for newborns, but it covers any child up to age 12.

The hospital, beyond confirming the protocol in general terms, refused to discuss its details.

"It is for very sad cases," said a hospital spokesman, who declined to be identified. "After years of discussions, we made our own protocol to cover the small number of infants born with such severe disabilities that doctors can see they have extreme pain and no hope for life. Our estimate is that it will not be used but 10 to 15 times a year."

Wouldn't the Doctrine of Double Effect permit parents to authorize the administration of a sedative (e.g., morphine) to their child in order to relieve the child's unbearable pain--even, if necessary to relieve the pain, to the point where the child's respiratory system is depressed and the child dies . . . so long as the parents do not intend the death of the child but only the relief of the child's unbearable pain?  Of course, the proportionality test (which is the second part of the DDE) would not be met if the child's condition were not terminal.  But if the child's condition is terminal--if the child will die within the week--then wouldn't the proportionality test be met?

Am I missing something?  I would appreciate any comments you might have about this situation.  Let's think this through together before we start talking about Nazi doctors (even if, after we think it through, we want to start talking about Nazi doctors).

Michael P.

More on "Theory" v. "theory"

Little "t" theory must also be attentive to human experience--present as well as past.  Otherwise it becomes "Theory" in the sense of a self-contained, impregnable, and ultimately sterile system so out of touch with human reality as to be useless.  Consider this passage from Jesuit scholar John Mahoney's magisterial book The Making of Moral Theology:  A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford, 1987):

At any stage in history all that is available to the Church is its continual meditation on the Word of God in the light of contemporary experience and of the knowledge and insights into reality which it possesses at the time.  To be faithful to that set of circumstances . . . is the charge and challenge which Christ has given to his Church.  But if there is a historical shift, through improvement in scholarship or knowledge, or through an entry of society into a significantly different age, then what that same fidelity requires of the Church is that it respond to the historical shift, such that it might be not only mistaken but also unfaithful in declining to do so. (Page 327.)

I wonder whether much religious-moral opposition to same-sex unions--including that of the magisterium of the Church--doesn't partake much more of Theory than of theory.  I have pursued this matter elsewhere--in chapter 4 of my book Under God?, which is titled "Christians, the Bible, and Same-Sex Unions".

Michael P.

Thursday, December 2, 2004

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

[Thought this piece would be of interest.  I've reprinted the whole essay because, alas, one can't access it online unless one is a subscriber.  Stephen Pope (Boston College, Theology) is responding to an essay by Robert Sokolowski (Catholic U, Philosophy).]

AMERICA:  The National Catholic Weekly

December 6, 2004

Same-Sex Marriage:  Threat or Aspiration?

Stephen J. Pope

The debate over legalizing same-sex marriage has become a worldwide issue. On Sept. 4 Pope John Paul II denounced the notion to the new Canadian ambassador to the Holy See, Donald Smith. The issue also has been the subject of court decisions and legislative actions throughout the United States and was taken up by both presidential candidates in their campaigns. The way of addressing the issue often seems to be more a matter of political maneuvering and power struggles than moral dialogue or ethical analysis, yet occasionally one does find clear arguments advanced by careful thinkers. One such contribution was offered in the June 7, 2004, issue of America in an article by Msgr. Robert Sokolowski entitled “The Threat of Same-Sex Marriage.”

Sokolowski’s essay has the virtues of clarity and consistency. Readers know where he stands, and why, on recent proposals to give legal recognition to same-sex marriages. His central claims can be summarized as follows:

1. Recognition of same-sex marriages would mean that marriage will be defined by the “exchange of sex.” This is a redefinition of marriage that breaks with the traditional notion according to which procreation “specifies” what a marriage is.

2. If marriage is a contract that brings benefits and protections to adults who are simply friends rather than procreative couples, then it would have to be extended to all groups of people who wish to be friends. If marriage is defined more specifically, as a contract that gives legal status to consenting adults engaged in a specifically sexual relationship, then it would have to include multiple partners rather than just couples. Restricting the contract to two adults would be arbitrary from the point of view of those who would like to have legal status granted to polygamous or other multiple-partner sexual relationships.

3. The desire to detach procreation from marriage reflects the modern rejection of teleology, the ancient principle that the “nature” of things determines their good and proper functioning. The modern commitment to the “mastery of nature” by technology explains why many contemporary people find it possible to believe that marriage and sex do not have inherent purposes rooted in their natures.

4. Sex is “defined as the power to procreate,” and the first and defining characteristic of marriage is the “physical procreation” of children. Mutual love is not “on a par” with procreation, though the marital relationship ought to be informed by love or “mutual benevolence.” Anyone who separates sexuality from procreation lives an “illusion” and “lies” about the matter, and these vices lead in turn to a host of other moral problems. “The most obvious truths become obscured.”

These four claims capture the essential points, if not all the details, of the ethical argument put forth by Sokolowski against the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. His argument is straightforward, and his moral logic articulates a way of viewing this matter that is expressed by some members of the magisterium and their intellectual collaborators.

The argument contains a number of different kinds of claims. The first is based on a general vision of the place of sex within marriage; the second concerns the extension of marriage to the general category of friendship (i.e., one that is neutral with regard to procreation), joined to a “slippery-slope” argument that begins with an ethic justified by the decisions of consenting adults; the third laments the modern abandonment of final causality as the key point in a cultural context that makes proposals for legal recognition of same-sex marriage plausible to significant proportions of American society; and the fourth claim argues for the return to the traditional belief that marriage is for the sake of procreation.

It is important to note that his argument is based on reason, especially common sense observations of human behavior shaped by a Thomistic view of human nature and its intrinsic “ends.” There is little doubt that the modern fascination with the “mastery of nature” has had some destructive effects on society, on the natural world and on social institutions. It connects, in complex ways and in tandem with other cultural and economic factors, to a variety of problems related to sexual ethics: the reduction of sex to a tool for entertainment and recreation and its detachment from love as well as procreation; the legitimation of sexual behavior solely by the choices of consenting adults; and the threat to human dignity, particularly the dignity of unborn life, by the emergence of barely restrained reproductive technology. This having been said, other features of this argument suffer from significant defects.

The first claim, the heart of the argument, maintains that same-sex marriage would “re-define” marriage as the “exchange of sex.” Yet those gay people who wish to marry profess to do so because they love each other and want therefore to pledge themselves to each other in a permanent commitment. Many gay people, like many straight people, already “exchange sex” without desiring any such commitment. The argument thus fails to acknowledge the aspirations and ideals that motivate gay people who want to marry. From the point of view of authors like Andrew Sullivan, the civil law ought to extend to gay couples the same legal protection and social support that is already granted to married heterosexual couples. Marriage in this view is not simply about an “exchange of sex”—language that sounds a bit like the old manualist “conjugal debt”—but about intimate, caring, interpersonal love. Sokolowski’s emphasis on the primacy of procreation actually represents a reversion to an earlier preconciliar ethic that represents a substantial departure from the more personalist theology of marriage developed by Pope John Paul II.

More Than Friendship

It is also important to recognize that marriage is not only about friendship in any very broad sense of the term. It is about a romantic and sexual relationship that joins two people in a lifelong and exclusive bond. The template for this bond is heterosexual—a union of complementary opposites, as John Paul II has described in his many talks. The monogamous and exclusive nature of this love is said to be a reflection of its depth and profundity; it is not the kind of love that a person can share with more than one beloved. Considerations of interpersonal love as well as of justice (and particularly equality) militate against polygamy or other forms of multiple-partner marriage (“polyamory”). Having more than one partner in a marriage necessarily creates an imbalance of power and leaves the relationship structurally open to the destabilizing force of sexual jealousy.

Another plank in the argument holds that the separation of sex and marriage is due to the modern rejection of the inherent ends of marriage and sex. While some readers will doubt that most couples using birth control are avid readers of Bacon and Descartes, Sokolowski is right to point to broad cultural patterns that feed into a pervasive ethos that looks to technology to provide the clearest and best answers to serious moral problems. This desire to dominate nature and humanity is evident not only in the domains of sex and reproduction but also in our military adventures and environmental policies.

Yet it also has to be acknowledged that some advocates of same-sex marriage argue on the basis of natural human ends and not against them. They maintain that the natural ends of sexuality and sexual behavior include love as well as procreation. Primatologists like Francis de Waal of Emory University and Richard Wrangham of Harvard have shown in considerable detail how sexual behavior in our closest primate relatives, the chimpanzees, naturally functions to create social bonds, soothe fractured relationships, provide comfort in times of stress and promote other pro-social goods. Humans are not chimps, obviously, but there are scientific as well as moral reasons for holding that human sexual behavior functions to enhance the emotional and affective bond between lovers. This claim can be read as a claim that endorses rather than repudiates the age-old notion that human nature inclines to certain ends, the achievement of which contributes to human flourishing. Some advocates argue that, though it may not lead to “physical procreation,” same-sex marriage provides conditions that satisfy what Pope Paul VI called the “unitive” purpose of sex. Hence arguments against same-sex marriage need to address this “essentialist” rationale—i.e., one based on an account of natural ends—if they are going to be reasonably comprehensive.

Non-Procreative Sex

Sexual intercourse is the natural way in which humans engage in “physical procreation”; but, as just noted, there are reasons for thinking that procreation is not the primary (let alone exclusive) natural end of sex. Human beings across cultures engage in an enormous amount of nonprocreative sex. Unlike species in which females go into heat and give clear signals to potential mates, the human species is one of the few in which females manifest constant sexual receptivity (when they are already pregnant, for example, or even postmenopausal).

Nor is it obvious that procreation is the dominant end of marriage. Marriage, after all, is a social and cultural institution whose meaning varies in important ways across historical and cultural boundaries. In the past, marriage in most of its forms has been related to child-bearing and child-rearing. Marriage is the context in which procreation has more often than not taken place, and in general it provides a more nurturing, reliable framework for raising children than do the alternatives. Yet this does not mean that the “first and defining character of marriage” is the “physical procreation” of children. The latter phrase sounds as if human beings are like fish, whose main “investment” (as the biologists like to say) is to make sure that the female’s eggs are fertilized by the male in the right riverbed before they depart. The vast majority of human procreative energy is expended not in “physical procreation,” if by that is meant simple biological reproduction—fertilization, gestation and birth—but in providing children with the proper emotional, moral, social and spiritual upbringing.

This is the broader and more noble sense in which Pope Paul VI spoke about “procreation” in Humanae Vitae. The extended period of adult child-rearing, preceded by a profound infantile and childhood dependence, is one of the traits that are uniquely human. Yet this level of child care does not mean that childless married couples are any less married than procreative married couples. Marriage has its own integrity, which does not require validation by procreation. This message is important today, when married couples living into their mid-80’s spend the major portion of their life together having nothing to do with procreation.

Furthermore, we are now in a society that gives social recognition to a great variety of relationships outside of marriage. Children are being raised outside of marriage at a higher rate. Middle-class married couples are increasingly delaying childbearing, even into their early 40’s.

The Real World

Some gay couples are adopting and in this way function as “procreative units,” at least in the broad sense of the term that embraces child-rearing and education. This development provides great benefits for children who would otherwise go without loving homes. The desire to return to a “golden age” when marriage “meant” procreation (if it ever really did) is more nostalgic than realistic. Ethical analysis of current proposals to give legal recognition to same-sex marriage thus needs to begin with an acknowledgment of the “real world” status of the social situation in which we find ourselves—and of the real benefits as well as costs that are at stake in it.

Critics of same-sex marriage have a number of valid concerns, of a broad social nature, that need to be subjected to further examination and discussion. But this further discussion needs to be informed by a perspective that acknowledges that love and commitment are at the center of marriage. If observers want to understand the desire to extend marriage to same-sex couples, they ought to consider the point of view of those couples. The absence of this “sympathetic understanding” leads to significant flaws in some ways of viewing same-sex marriage. This is not to say that “sympathetic understanding” provides all the answers, only that it offers a helpful context for conversation. If polemics and political maneuvers have often undermined the possibility of genuine conversation, perhaps Catholics have a duty to examine the issues freshly and without the rancor that so often mars public debate in this country.

RELIGION IN POLITICS, PART 2

On November 19, Rick Garnett called to our attention a piece on religion/politics by Peter Beinart, in The New Republic.  In the piece, Beinart wrote:

[W]hen you make public arguments, you have to ground them--as much as possible--in reason and evidence, things that are accessible to people of different religions, or no religion at all.  Otherwise, you can't persuade other people, and they can't persuade you.  In a diverse democracy, there must be a common political language, and that language can't be theological.

I don't know exactly what Beinart means by "a common political language", but I do know that if there were such an animal, I don't know why it couldn't be "theological".  Is Lincoln's theological language in the Second Inaugural too sectarian for Beinart's taste?  Or MLK's language in his many speeches?  That a language is too sectarian for someone's taste doesn't mean that it isn't a common language among most citizens of a particular polity.  Beinart talks, in the passage above, about "persuading other people".  Isnt it clear, even to secular liberals like Beinart, that with respect to many issues (e.g., war and peace), a theological language--I said "theological", not "fundamentalist"--may have much greater resonance and persuasive appeal for more Americans than any nontheological language?

Maybe Beinart is simply recycling the now discredited position that public political discourse should be "neutral" in some sense.  If any of you reading this posting has any doubts about whether that position, in all its variations, has been discredited, pick up a copy of this book and read it:  Christiopher J. Eberle, Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002).  (Eberle is a philosopher and, nonetheless, a very nice guy.)  Eberle's book comes as close to achieving closure on the issue as is humanly possible.  For my money, Eberle *has* achieved closure.  (You're skeptical?  Put your finger on a point where, in your judgment, Eberle's argument misfires.)

On November 22 (a day that will always have a special resonance for me; I was a senior in high school when it happened), I reproduced two entries from Eugene Volokh's blog and a response from a blog titled "Ciceronian Review".  I had thought about posting some commentary here on what Volokh and his critic say.  (I am in substantial agreement with Volokh's critic about Volokh's impoverished moral epistemology, and also in agreement with the critic that "[t]he debate should not be about the nature of value theory or about moral epistemology.")  But I've decided that it would be otiose of me to do so.  (It's a shame that neither Volokh nor his critic took the time to bring himself up to speed--that neither took a break, sat down, and assimiliated at least some of the relevant literature--before opining to their readers.)  Why otiose?  Because, again, Eberle's book is there for all who are interested in the religion/politics controversy to read.  So is my book:  Under God:  Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Eberle, in his book, ariculates and defends, for citizens of a liberal democracy like ours, an ideal:  "the ideal of conscientious engagement".  Eberle's argument in support of the ideal is directed both to secular liberals (many of whom think that citizens should not participate in politics on the basis of religious reasons at all; or, like Volokh's critic, they think that citizens should not do so in the absence adequate, motivating secular reasons), and to religious believers (many of whom think that they need not bother with secular reasons at all, unless they choose to do so as a matter of political strategy).  Here is Eberle's articulation of the ideal.  I hope that if you're interested in the religion/politics controversy, you'll make an effort to track down Eberle's book and read his elegant and compelling defense of the ideal.

[J]ustificatory liberals are correct that reflection on the norm of respect indicates constraints on the manner in which a citizen may support her favored coercive laws.  In fact, I believe that a citizen who adheres to the norm of respect will abide by at least six constraints on the reasons she employs in political decision making and advocay.

(1) She will pursue a high degree of rational justififation for the claim that a favored coercive policy is morally appropriate.

(2) She will withhold support from a given coercive policy is she can't acquire a sufficiently high degree of rational justification for the claim that that policy is morally appropriate.

(3) She will attempt to communicate to her compatriots her reasons for coercing them.

(4) She will pursue public justification for her favored coercive policies.

(5) She will listen to her compatriots' evaluation of her reasons for her favored coercive policies with the intention of learning from them about the moral (im)propriety of those policies.

(6) She will not support any policy on the basis of a rationale that denies the dignity of her compatriots.

Now, notice that the ideal of conscientious engagement does not forbid--because, as Eberle explains, the underlying norm of "respect" does not forbid--a citizen to rely on a "nonpublic" justification ... even if, after a good faith effort to do so, the citizen has failed to discern any public justification.  See Eberle's chapter 5:  "What Respect Does Not Require".

Got to run.

MUST READING ... FROM THIS WEEK'S COMMONWEAL

I am eager to learn how Richard Neuhaus and George Weigel respond to this important essay.  I have posted just the opening paragraphs of the essay below.  For the whole essay, click on this URL:

http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/article.php?id_article=1032

Commonweal, December 3, 2004

THE WAR IN IRAQ:

HOW CATHOLIC CONSERVATIVES GOT IT WRONG

Peter Dula

H. Richard Niebuhr once wrote that the first question of ethics is not “What should I do?” but “What is going on?” The Baghdad version of that principle might be, “What the hell is going on?” It is a question that comes to me when I wake up to a car bomb or fall asleep to the sound of mortar fire. I was asking it when a Kurdish colleague took me to see the memorial at Halabja, where Saddam gassed five thousand villagers. I asked it again last March when 223 Shi’a pilgrims died in Karbala. And again when, in the late afternoon of August 1, there were two loud thuds and the hotel shook and I saw the plumes of smoke rising over the buildings north of my balcony, buildings occupied by people I work with. I was asking it the next morning when I discovered that two more car bombs had exploded next to a Christian seminary, killing ten, leaving professors and students shaking and looking in vain for loved ones, and burnt car parts spotting the lawn.

Perhaps my confusion and fear were something like what Tolstoy’s Count Bezukhov was feeling in War and Peace when he surveyed the carnage at the battlefield of Borodino. I don’t know. Maybe it is more like the terror felt by a nine-year-old Iraqi friend who for weeks spent the nights crouched by her window, waiting for the U.S. soldiers to come again, heavy metal blasting from their Humvees, blowing up doors to drag her brothers from their beds and take them off to Abu Ghraib.

Bezukhov at Borodino is on my mind because it is the image that introduces an essay, “Moral Clarity in a Time of War,” published in January 2003, in what the mainstream media like to call “the obscure but influential” journal First Things. Of course, in the theological community, both Protestant and Catholic, First Things is hardly obscure. Its founder and editor in chief is Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, author of The Naked Public Square (1984) and dozens of other books. Neuhaus, a former Lutheran pastor, is a Catholic convert, a vigorous champion and personal friend of John Paul II, and a powerful figure in neoconservative circles. He moves easily within the increasingly pietistic Republican Party, and is even credited with helping to teach President George W. Bush how to “speak Catholic.”

“Moral Clarity in a Time of War” was written by Catholic theologian George Weigel, a member of the editorial board of First Things (along with fellow neoconservative Catholics Michael Novak and Mary Ann Glendon)-and perhaps best known for his biography of Pope John Paul II (Witness to Hope). Weigel’s essay declared that “the fog of war” must not be allowed to “suggest that warfare takes place beyond the reach of moral reason.” Weigel argued that the sort of preemptive war Bush was threatening against Iraq could be justified by traditional just-war standards. Those who thought otherwise were derided as milquetoasts or as unwilling to rise to the defense of freedom and democracy in a dangerous world.

War and Peace is full of examples of moral clarity about war. Sometimes it is a delirium-induced clarity that comes after the battle, but most often the clarity is in the run-up to war, precisely the sort of clarity Weigel provided in his essay, and that the First Things editors articulated in an earlier essay “In a Time of War” (December 2001). It was a clarity provided by arguably two of the most influential conservative Catholics in the United States, intellectuals who have the ear of influential American bishops and the Vatican. If they have been wrong, especially if they have been theologically wrong about the justice of this war, it should matter to those who share Weigel and Neuhaus’s belief that religion should play a major role in the public square.

Nothing is easier than moral clarity before a war. It is now, when any day in Baghdad can make one feel like Bezukhov at Borodino, that moral clarity is hard. Weigel, I presume, still believes what he wrote in January 2003: “the proper role of religious leaders and public intellectuals is to do everything possible to clarify the moral issues at stake in a time of war.” I agree. Weigel has spent much of his career doing just that. He has written on the role of the churches in the collapse of communism, and at great length on the just-war tradition in Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace (1987). Like much of his writing, Tranquillitas Ordinis is highly polemical, alleging that liberal Catholic theologians and ethicists, under the influence of an “anti-anti-Communist” ideology and a naive pacifism, abandoned a proper understanding of the just-war tradition. Writing in Commonweal (“The Heritage Abandoned?” September 11, 1987), Peter Steinfels, an advocate of the just-war tradition, welcomed Weigel’s attempt to reinvigorate the Catholic debate about the moral necessity of using force. Steinfels also judged “disingenuous” Weigel’s claims to political disinterestedness. “The reader who approaches Tranquillitas Ordinis suspecting a strong political spin on its theological argument will not be mistaken,” he wrote. “Weigel is doing precisely what he accuses, with some justification, many peace activists of doing: using Catholic teaching to support specific prudential judgments that rest not on the teaching alone but on ‘political’ readings of fact and history.”

[End of excerpt.  Again:  Fore the whole essay, click on the URL above.]

Wednesday, December 1, 2004

RELIGION, POLITICS, AND ITALY

New York Times
December 1, 2004

LETTER FROM EUROPE

Italy's Church and State: A Mostly Happy Union

By IAN FISHER

ROME, Nov. 30 - In a recent poll, just 32 percent of Italians surveyed said it was right for religion to have an influence on the laws of the state. Yet crucifixes hang in public schools.

Abortion is legal here and not much debated anymore. Yet religious sentiment runs deep enough that Friday night comes in Italy with the adventures of Don Matteo, handsome crime-solving priest. One study, in fact, showed that 27 percent of all protagonists on public television are priests, nuns or saints (though it is also hard to ignore that other large percentage on Italian television: near-naked women).

All this might sound like fertile ground for a war of culture and values like the one raging in America, where there seem equal parts of hope and fear that religion will play a larger public role in the second administration of George W. Bush.

But in Italy, the European nation where religion and state have mingled most, the disagreements are somehow less bitter and absolute than in the United States.

"There is much more collaboration - a, let us say, reasonable attitude," said one Vatican official, an American. "Not such rigidity as we have in the United States. In the United States we find that rigidity on both sides, both the conservatives and the liberals, and it's hard for people to talk to each other."

It is not that the debate over religion's influence in political life has ended here, nor that Italy is exempt from a counterpoint argued angrily these days in Europe: whether the Continent has actually become so secular that it is now outright hostile to religion.

It may be more accurate to say that the debate over church and state has not stopped for 1,700 years, in this nation with a public Christian heritage stretching back to the Emperor Constantine's conversion early in the fourth century, where a neighborhood in Rome is its own country and seat of the Roman Catholic Church. Those years seem to have lent enough time and hard experience for church and state to settle into an almost indistinct whole, where the very real secularization in Italy in the last few decades is balanced by its history, culture, architecture and, even though church attendance has declined significantly, faith.

Paul Ginsborg, a prominent historian of Italy, described the overall atmosphere, in Italian, as "la religione diffusa." The religion of everyone or, in his loose translation, "It's in the air."

And so, Italy is a land of contrasts:

¶Perhaps the most Catholic politician in Italy is not a conservative, as might be expected in America, but Romano Prodi, the former European Union chief and leader of the center-left.

¶Italians routinely ignore the conservative Pope John Paul II in matters of private morality, like contraception, divorce or marriage (far fewer Italians are marrying, in the church or out), but admire him deeply for his stands on issues like caring for the poor or his outspoken opposition to the war in Iraq, unpopular in Europe.

¶Crucifixes may hang in public schools, but without the heavy political overtones that come with displays of, say, the Ten Commandments in public places in America.

"Even with such symbolism, you can't say the Catholic Church is shoved down people's throats in 2004," Mr. Ginsborg said.

The splintering a decade ago of the Christian Democratic Party, often seen as a main route for the church's influence, along with Europe's deepening secularization, helped make Italy more like other European nations. Despite the teachings of the church against contraception, Italy has one of the lowest birth rates in Europe. Divorce and abortion became legal in the 1970s despite strong opposition from the church.

But abortion is a non-issue here - perhaps the best example of the more civil tone of the debate over religion and state. Here, it seems less an argument than a very long conversation.

"I don't think the situation is so bad," said Rocco Buttiglione, an Italian governmental minister, a rigorous Catholic and a friend of the pope who has become something of a lightning rod on the issue of religion in Europe. "I think we can talk."

Conservative politicians like him and the Vatican lament the decline of values and religion, some wondering whether Italy and Europe have lost touch with their Christian roots at a time when, as some see it, the West is facing a deep challenge from Islam.

Mr. Buttiglione was rejected last month for a top post in the European Union for his opinions - private, he says, and thus distinct from any public duties - that homosexuality is a sin and that women would be better off married and at home.

But many of his general views, to American ears, can sound almost liberal. In an interview, he spoke of the complexities of the abortion debate, how even unwavering anti-abortionists like himself need to understand the difficulties of asserting the rights of a fetus against those of its mother.

"I have one rule, the rule of liberal society, which is the rule of freedom," he said. "I respect your freedom and you respect mine. Within this, we can talk."

On the more secular left, many leaders bemoan the lingering influence of the church among politicians, who they say pander to the Vatican.

But many left-wing politicians have their own strong ties to the church. Even more secular ones find allies in the church on issues like helping the poor and recent immigrants.

In the rest of Europe, this mix of church and state is often regarded skeptically. But, paradoxically, Italy has in many ways less religious zeal than the United States, where the lines between church and state are much more sharply drawn, but where personal religious conviction can be stronger.

Another part of this, church officials and conservatives say, is the long history with the church as a fallible institution, stripped over the centuries of much of its mystery. "We have the pope," said Giuliano Ferrara, one of Italy's leading conservative commentators. "You know history. You can understand this process."

And so, like urban architects who struggle to make Rome a modern city without destroying the ancient, Italians maneuver deftly around their heritage - granting both church and state a more equal share than do many other countries, and with greater equanimity.

"Everybody thinks that the pope is the only moral figure in my country as far as war and social justice go," said Emma Bonino, a leader of the Radical Party, who spearheaded the campaign to legalize abortion in the 1970's. "But on personal behavior, meaning sex, meaning divorce, meaning motherhood and pregnancy, people frankly do not care."

Friday, November 26, 2004

Scalia says religion infuses U.S. government and history

By VERENA DOBNIK
Associated Press Writer

November 22, 2004, 4:04 PM EST

NEW YORK -- U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia said Monday that a religion-neutral government does not fit with an America that reflects belief in God in everything from its money to its military.

"I suggest that our jurisprudence should comport with our actions," Scalia told an audience attending an interfaith conference on religious freedom at Manhattan's Shearith Israel synagogue.

An outspoken conservative, Scalia joined a gathering that included the chief judge of New York state, Judith Kaye, a member of this Orthodox synagogue where the late Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo had worshipped.

The discussion in the century-old edifice was lively.

"I have spent many private hours with Justice Scalia _ in print," said Kaye, who has led New York's highest court for almost a dozen years since she was appointed by Gov. Mario Cuomo, a liberal Democrat.

Scalia, 68, addressed the topic of government and its relationship to religion.

In the synagogue that is home to America's oldest Jewish congregation, he noted that in Europe, religion-neutral leaders almost never publicly use the word "God."

But, the justice asked, "Did it turn out that, by reason of the separation of church and state, the Jews were safer in Europe than they were in the United States of America? I don't think so."

Also participating in the three-hour session was Shearith Israel's senior rabbi, Marc Angel, as well as prominent members of New York's Protestant, Roman Catholic and Muslim clergy. Speakers included the Rev. James Forbes Jr. of Riverside Church, the Rev. Arthur Caliandro of the Marble Collegiate Church and Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, founder of the New York-based American Sufi Muslim Association, whose aim is to foster an American-Muslim identity.

Scalia told them that while the church-and-state battle rages, the official examples of the presence of faith go back to America's Founding Fathers: the word "God" on U.S. currency; chaplains of various faiths in the military and the legislature; real estate tax-exemption for houses of worship _ and the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Last year, Scalia removed himself from the Supreme Court's review of whether "under God" should be in the Pledge of Allegiance, after mentioning the case in a speech and complaining that courts are stripping God from public life.

"None of this is compatible with what we say when we express the so-called principle of neutrality," Scalia said.

He could be tapped as a possible nominee for chief justice should Chief Justice William Rehnquist step down because of his thyroid cancer.

Scalia was named to the Supreme Court in 1986 by President Reagan.

Since then, Scalia _ a Catholic raised in Queens and father of nine children, one a priest _ has become an anti-abortion hero to many in the American political right and a leading conservative voice on the court.

An "originalist," Scalia believes in following the Constitution as written by the Founding Fathers, rather than interpreting it to reflect the changing times.

"Our Constitution does not morph," he said Monday, deadpanning, "As I've often said, I am an originalist, I am a textualist, but I am not a nut."

Earlier this year, Scalia cast one of two dissenting votes in a 7-2 Supreme Court ruling that states may deny taxpayer-funded scholarships to divinity students.

At the time, Scalia wrote: "Let there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination against a religious minority."