Some have suggested that the only reasonable choice for one who accepts the Catholic Church's position on abortion is to vote Republican. MOJ-readers may be interested in this editorial, which presents a different view:
National Catholic Reporter
November 3, 2006
Sorting through imperfect choices
In the early 1970s, when antiwar activist and stalwart liberal Allard K.
Lowenstein was running for Congress against a nondescript Republican incumbent
from Long Island, N.Y., he received the endorsement of conservative pundit
William F. Buckley. Buckley’s rationale: As long as the House of
Representatives was going to be dominated by liberals (remember those days?) it
might as well have a smart one in the bunch.
Another anecdote from that era: The second choice of the 41 percent of
New Hampshire primary voters who supported Eugene McCarthy and forced
LBJ’s withdrawal from the 1968 presidential race was none other than
… segregationist pro-war Alabama Gov. George Corley Wallace. New
Hampshirites, it seems, were more interested in “sending a message”
than in the messenger.
Voting, it seems, is a complex act.
So what is a conscientious Catholic to do this year? There’s plenty
of advice out there.
The U.S. bishops’ document, “Faithful Citizenship,”
offers a sound approach. It is a voter’s responsibility, say the bishops,
“to measure all candidates, policies, parties and platforms by how they
protect or undermine the life, dignity and rights of the human person, whether
they protect the poor and vulnerable and advance the common good.”
It can be found at
www.usccb.org/faithfulcitizenship.
More recently, a new kid on the block, Catholics in Alliance for the
Common Good, issued its voter guide, “Voting for the Common Good.” It
strikes the right chord, noting that “There is no Catholic voting formula,
and there is rarely, if ever, a perfect candidate for Catholic voters.”
That voter guide can be found at
thecatholicalliance.org.
Unfortunately, the guide that has drawn the most media attention in the
past is from the conservative group Catholic Answers, which has reissued its
“Voter’s Guide for Serious Catholics.” It is essentially the
same pamphlet describing the “nonnegotiable issues” the group
distributed, to much publicity, in 2004. To Catholic Answers, voting is an
equation: If Candidate A is closer to Catholic teaching on the
“nonnegotiable issues” than Candidate B, the “serious”
Catholic should vote for A. The “nonnegotiable issues” are abortion,
embryonic stem cell research, gay marriage, euthanasia and human cloning.
In fact, it’s hard to take the “Voter’s Guide for Serious
Catholics” very seriously. For starters, it takes candidate’s
assertions (“I oppose abortion”) as statements of purpose.
In Tempting Faith, his new book describing his experience in the
Bush White House, David Kuo recalls a spat conservative icon William Bennett
had with James Dobson, founder of the influential Focus on the Family. “If
a pro-choice candidate of exemplary character used the bully pulpit to talk
about, say, teen abstinence, adoption, crisis pregnancy centers, individual
moral code -- and did this well -- he could have a profoundly positive impact
on the nation’s cultural condition,” Bennett told Dobson in a letter.
“And he could do more to lower the number of abortions than a presidential
candidate who supports a constitutional ban but does nothing more than pay lip
service to the pro-life constituency.”
Check and mate.
Next, the “Serious Catholics” voting guide leaves out some
equally nonnegotiable issues like, say, torture, which, says the Catechism of
the Catholic Church, is “contrary to respect for the person and for human
dignity.” Clearly a “nonnegotiable” issue.
It’s perfectly reasonable -- an inescapable conclusion we think --
to conclude that a large number of candidates bidding for office this year
actually support torture. Sure, they call it something else (“harsh
interrogation techniques”) but it’s clear that some lawmakers and
would-be lawmakers believe that “water-boarding,” for example, is a
good way to get information from would-be terrorists.
Or maybe the war in Iraq is on a voter’s mind. One doesn’t
have to accept the conclusions of the recent Johns Hopkins study, which
estimated Iraqi war deaths as high as 655,000 (more than died in the U.S. Civil
War), to conclude that both the initial decision to invade that country and the
continuing military effort are counter to the church’s teaching on just
war. Sure, it’s debatable, and, yes, Catholics can come to different
conclusions, but a “serious Catholic” is surely free to determine
that this is the overriding issue of this election and vote accordingly.
Or maybe there’s a gubernatorial election where one candidate
supports the death penalty and another opposes it. According to the catechism,
capital punishment is justified only and exclusively when society
has no other means of protecting itself from a heinous criminal. That’s
not the situation in the United States, where we employ the electric chair as a
deterrent and, according to those who support the practice, as a tool of
justice. Those are certainly debatable points, but they have nothing to do with
Catholic teaching. To support the death penalty for reasons other than the
protection of society makes one a dissenter from, here it comes, a
nonnegotiable issue.
Pennsylvania’s Senate contest provides a concrete test for the
conscientious Catholic. Republican Rick Santorum is the strongest and most
effective antiabortion voice in Washington. No doubt about it. Further,
Santorum has voiced reservations about the death penalty (though he’s
voted for legislation that includes the ultimate punishment).
Democrat Bob Casey, son of a politician who bucked his party on abortion
and paid the price for his dissent from the political orthodoxy, says he, too,
is pro-life. Yet he supports the over-the-counter availability of the
“morning-after pill” and is a strong proponent of the death penalty.
Yes, Casey will vote to ban partial-birth abortion, but he won’t put a
litmus test on judges who might stray from the antiabortion line.
Santorum supports the war in Iraq; Casey would likely side with
Democrats working to end U.S. involvement in the quagmire. Casey supports civil
unions, Santorum speaks harshly about gays and opposes same-sex marriage.
What’s a conscientious Pennsylvania Catholic to do?
Here’s a suggestion: If opposition to abortion or gay marriage is
the issue that a Pennsylvania voter has determined is paramount, the most
important in the current context, then he or she probably should vote for
Santorum. He’s clearly someone who will continue to make these issues a
priority.
If, however, a pro-life Keystone State voter thinks there is more at
stake in this election than abortion and gay marriage -- the war, economic
opportunity, social justice, tolerance for those who are different -- then that
Keystone State voter should probably pull the lever for Casey.
An imperfect choice? Certainly. It always is.
Democracy ain’t easy. That’s why we’re fortunate
God’s given us brains and a conscience. Use them well.
Voting, indeed, is a complicated act.
Wednesday, November 1, 2006
Thanks again to Karen Stohr for her contributions (here and here). Here is another:
I must say, I have always found the terms of this particular debate [ecgtopic pregnancy] quite troubling. As a Catholic philosopher (and mother) who subscribes to the basic tenets of double effect, I am very skeptical of attempts to apply it definitively in such situations. If anyone is going to insist that a woman suffering from an ectopic pregnancy must undergo the removal of her fallopian tube, on the grounds that nothing else is a morally licit option, one had better have a *very* good justification for that view. After all, her health, hopes, and dreams may rest on it (what if it is her only remaining fallopian tube?). And the justification for the view depends on philosophical concepts that are undeniably murky.
In order to use double effect in a philosophically responsible way, one must have reasonably defensible views about intention and related issues in action theory. The distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' killing requires, among other things, an account of what it is to intend something (including whether actions can be intentional only under descriptions and if so, which descriptions of one's actions one must accept) and an theory of action individuation (including how we can distinguish actions from their consequences). Many discussions of double effect just slide past these issues. I have not seen a comprehensive and persuasive action theory that supports May's contention that while salpingectomy does not count as intentional killing, salpingostomy and methotrexate do. It's not that there couldn't be such a theory, but I do not see it in the articles Professor Myers cites, nor have I seen it elsewhere.
On the other hand, the line on intention taken by Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle in the article I mention[ed] in the email to Rob [here] undermines the distinction as May draws it. And in her seminal book, /Intention, /the great Catholic philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe argues for a theory of intention that also cannot support the salpingectomy/salpingostomy distinction. The accounts of these four thinkers are far from decisive, but their combined philosophical skill and sophistication ought to carry considerable weight, and hence, give pause to anyone who wants to insist that women suffering from ectopic pregnancy choose evil if they choose salpingostomy or methotrextate.
Thanks to Professor Karen Stohr (Georgetown, Philosophy), who sent this e-mail:
In response to Professor Myers, one might also argue (as I would) that
while intentional killing is always wrong, salpingostomy and
methotrexate do not count as instances of intentional killing. I think
this is easier to defend from a philosophical standpoint than the
position you take below:
"Given that no matter which of the two
paths I take Z is going to die, and given that it is morally
permissible for me to take action A, why should we accept that it is
morally impermissible for me to kill Z intentionally, thereby achieving
something that is morally worthy at no cost to Z, who is going to die
no matter which choice I make?"
This position leaves open the
possibility that if Z, very soon to die from some incurable disease, is
a perfect organ match for Y, it would be permissible to kill Z so as to
take his organ to save Y. I would rather avoid this implication!
Tuesday, October 31, 2006
Sister Margaret is giving a lecture at Notre Dame tomorrow (Wednesday). Click here for details.
Then, on Thursday, she will discuss her new book--the one Rob referenced in his post--with an interdisciplinary group of Notre Dame faculty. If you would like informatioon about the Thursday gathering, please e-mail Cathy Kaveny (who studied under Margaret at Yale):
[email protected]
Michael P.
In his post below, Rob refers to Margaret Farley's new book. MOJ-readers may be interested to know that Margaret Farley , who holds an endowed position at Yale Divinity School, is Sister Margaret Farley: She is a member of the Sisters of Mercy--and a past president of the Society of Christian Ethics.
Dear Richard,
Your invocation of Dr. Kevorkian suggests to me that you may not grasp Rob Vischer's point.
Assume (1) that objective O is a morally worthy objective (e.g., saving the life of a pregnant woman with an ectopic pregnancy).
Assume (2) that under the doctrine of double effect it is it is morally permissible for me to take action A (e.g., surgically remove the fallopian tube) in order to achieve O even though A will result in the death of Z (e.g., the fetus).
Assume (3) that I can achieve O by killing Z intentionally--and that the advantage of this latter course of action over action A is that I can achieve something else that is morally worthy (e.g., preserving the woman's capacity to bear children).
Given that no matter which of the two paths I take Z is going to die, and given that it is morally permissible for me to take action A, why should we accept that it is morally impermissible for me to kill Z intentionally, thereby achieving something that is morally worthy at no cost to Z, who is going to die no matter which choice I make?
Michael
Friday, October 27, 2006
Linda McClain's work is always worth taking seriously, whether or not, in the end, one agrees. See her new book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility (Harvard, 2006). If you are interested in the controversy over same-sex marriage, read on ...
"The Evolution - or End - of Marriage?: Reflections on the
Impasse over Same-Sex Marriage"
Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-28
Family Court Review, Vol. 44, p. 200, 2006
Contact: LINDA C. MCCLAIN
Hofstra University - School of Law
Email: [email protected]
Auth-Page: http://ssrn.com/author=233178
Abstract: http://ssrn.com/abstract=930989
ABSTRACT: The debate over legalization of same-sex marriage
implicates the question of whether doing so would signal the end
- or destruction - of the institution of marriage, or instead
would be an appropriate evolution of marriage laws that is in
keeping with the ends of marriage and with relevant public
values. This essay comments on an earlier published debate on
that question: Special Issue: The Evolution of Marriage, 44
Family Court Review 33-105 (2006). The essay contends that the
appeal to preserving a millennia-old tradition of marriage
against destruction fails to reckon with the evolution of the
institution of civil marriage that has already occurred.
Invocations of gender complementarity between parents as
essential to child well-being also conflict with the growing
recognition in family law that children's best interests can be
served by gay and lesbian parents. Canada's path toward same-sex
marriage suggests that impasse need not be inevitable. In the
United States, the impasse stems in part from the problem that
same-sex marriage serves as an emblem of everything that
threatens marriage.