Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, May 19, 2009

The elephant in the room ...

... namely, the disagreement, no less among Catholics than among others--the intractable disagreement--not about the *biological* status of unborn human--yes, HUMAN--life at the successiive stages of its development, but about its *moral* status.

In the United States (and elsewhere), there is a deep and widespread controversy about the moral status of unborn human life at the earliest stages of its development.  Moreover, there is little if any reason to doubt that this controversy will endure.  Referring to "philosophy, neurobiology, psychology, [and] medicine," Garry Wills has observed that "[t]he evidence from natural sources of knowledge has been interpreted in various ways, by people of good intentions and good information.  If natural law teaching were clear on the matter, a consensus would have been formed by those with natural reason." Garry Wills, "The Bishops vs. the Bible," NYT, June 27, 2004.

On the the enduring absence of a consensus, compare Robert P. George & Patrick Lee, "Acorns and Embryos," The New Atlantis, Fall 2004/Winter 2004, www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/7/georgeleeprint.htm, with Michael S. Gazzaniga, "The Thoughtful Distinction Between Embryo and Human," The Chronicle Review, Apr. 8, 2005. See also Anthony Kenny, "Life Stories:  When an Individual Life Begins--and the Ethics of Ending It," [London[] Times Lit. Supp., Mar. 25, 2005, at 3.

Jesuit moral theologian Richard McCormick foresaw that because of this dissensus about the moral status of unborn human life--in particular, about its moral status during early pregnancy--"public policy [would] remain sharply contentious and the task of legislators correspondingly complex."  Richard A, McCormick, SJ, "The Gospel of Life,"America, Apr. 29, 1995, at 12, 13.  See also John Langan, SJ, "Observations on Abortion and Politics," America, Oct. 25, 2004:  "[T]he fact of continuing and intense public disagreement [underlines] how far we are from having a broad public consensus against the practice [of abortion] and of how difficult it would be to . . . enact a legal prohibition against it."  Cf. Clifford Longley, "'The Church Hasn't Yet Made a Mature Appraisal of What Democracy Demands'," The Tablet [London], May 7, 2005, at 11:  "The criminal justice system . . . only works when there is at least a minimal degree of assent by the public to the moral framework in which it operates. . . .  [W]hat you have to persuade the majority of is not just that your moral principle is correct but that it is right to insist that the minority which does not agree with it must nevertheless comply with it too."

For the views of some Roman Catholics on the issue, see Joseph F. Donceel, SJ, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Homonization," 31 Theological Studies 76 (1970); Joseph F. Donceel, SJ, "A Liberal Catholic's View," in Robert Hall, ed., Abortion in a Changing World 39 (1970); Thomas A. Shannon, "Human Embryonic Stem Cell Therapy," 62 Theological Studies 811, 814-21 (2001); Jean Porter, "Is the Embryo a Person?  Arguing with the Catholic Traditions," Commonweal,Feb. 8, 2002, at 8; John Haldane & Patrick Lee, "Aquinas on Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life," 78 Philosophy 255 (2003); Robert Pasnau, "Souls and the Beginning of Life (A Reply to Haldane & Lee)," 78 Philosophy 521 (2003); John Haldane & Patrick Lee, "Rational Souls and the Beginning of Life," 78 Philosophy 532 (2003).  Cf. Anthony Kenny, "The Soul Issue," Times Lit. Supp.,Mar. 7, 2003, at 12.

Consider these passages from an essay that Peter Steinfels, the then-editor of Commonweal, published in Commonweal in 1981:
  "[T]he right-to-life movement is naively overconfident in its belief that the existence of a unique "genetic package" from conception onwards settles the abortion issue.  Yes, it does prove that what is involved is a human individual and not 'part of the mother's body.'  It does not prove that, say, a twenty-eight-day-old embryo, approximately the size of this parenthesis (--), is then and there a creature with the same claims to preservation and protection as a newborn or an adult. . . .  Although it is not logically impossible, for example, to consider the great number of fertilized eggs that fail to implant themselves in the uterus as lost 'human beings', a great many people find this idea totally incredible.  Similarly, very early miscarriage usually does not trigger the sense of loss and grief that miscarriage does.  Can we take these instinctive responses as morally helpful? . . .  It is simply not the case that a refusal to recognize Albert Einstein or Anne Frank as human beings deserving of full legal rights is equivalent to the refusal to see the same status in a disc the size of a period or an embryo one-sixth of an inch long and with barely rudimentary features."  Peter Steinfels, "The Search for an Alternative," Commonweal, Nov. 20, 1981, reprinted in Patrick Jordan & Paul Baumann, eds., Commonweal Confronts the Century:  Liberal Convictions, Catholic Tradition 204, 209-11 (1999).  Cf. Jean Porter, supra:  "What can we [Catholics] say to convince men and women of good will who do not share our theological convictions or our allegiance to church teaching that early-stage embryos have exactly the same moral status as we and they do?  It will not serve us to fall back at this point on blanket denunciations such as "the culture of death."  Naturally, these tend to be conversation stoppers.  What is worse, they keep us from considering the possibility that others may not be convinced by what we are saying because what we are saying is--not convincing."

The sixty-four-dollar question:  Who is more unreasonable:  (1) One who denies that Christians (and others) can in good faith reasonably reject the position (even though, of course, one can reasonably accept it too) that unborn human life has the same moral status from the very beginning of its existence as it has as every later stage; or (2) one who rejects the position that unborn human life has the same moral status from the very beginning of its existence as it has as every later stage?

This disagreement--again, among Catholics no less than among others--is the elephant in the room.  The Bible doesn't resolve the issue.  The magisterium may say, clearly and emphatically, what it believes about the issue ... but, again, ""[t]he evidence from natural sources of knowledge has been interpreted in various ways, by people of good intentions and good information.  If natural law teaching were clear on the matter, a consensus would have been formed by those with natural reason."

Now, ponder the implications of this disagreement--this *reasonable* disagreement?--for our politics, for our law, and for our evaluation of those who, like Obama, disagree with the magisterium.  I suggest you
re-read what John Noonan had to say at Notre Dame, quoted below in Robertt Araujo's post.

Thursday, April 16, 2009

Any Ann Rice fans out there?

I've never read anything by her, but I thought that some MOJ readers might be interested in this:

Sightings 4/16/09

Destiny’s Child

– Thomas Zebrowski

In her recently-released spiritual memoir, Anne Rice, the bestselling author of Interview with the Vampire, writes that the mass appeal of her fantasy books may be due partially to the way she has draped their otherworldly trappings over a conventional three-act frame.  Called Out of Darkness: A Spiritual Confession is itself no exception.  Yet the personal story she fits into this familiar dramatic pattern is not so much the prodigal daughter’s, as the one C.S. Lewis called “the pilgrim’s regress.”  The accent is less on sin and redemption than the loss and recovery of childhood faith.

The importance of origins to the tale Rice has to tell is demonstrated by the convincing detail with which she recreates and defends the pervasively Catholic culture of 1940s New Orleans, underlined by the manifest stability in her lifelong conception of God and his Church.  According to Rice, her preliterate openness to a world of sense experience in which “there was a profound connection between narrative, art, music and faith” is at the root of her abiding religious “interests and tendencies,” not to mention her knack for writing popular fiction about supernaturally haunted lives.  At the center of this incipient world was the icon of Jesus Christ who, present in the Holy Sacrament and in his Church, was able to call her back to Catholic faith after decades of hopeless wandering in a professed atheism one feels she never fully inhabited.  And as anyone knows who is familiar with the first two volumes of the novelized autobiography of Jesus upon which Rice has audaciously embarked, Christ remains for her the person proclaimed in the Church’s creeds and the canonical New Testament, presented with literary embellishments yet without significant concession to the skeptical conclusions of modern biblical scholarship.

It thus comes as an amusing surprise to discover that this deeply traditional and even nostalgic Catholic makes no apologies for some of the most colorful sins of her waywardness – neither the pseudonymously authored pornographic novels, still less the more pedestrian eroticism and gender play in which she has drenched her mainstream fare.  Just to make the point that she is not simply the anti-modern Christian her old-fashioned catechesis set her up to be, in fact, Rice quietly reminds the reader about her “transgressive” sexuality.  Though her tone, to be sure, is one of openness to correction rather than outright dissent, she devotes a portion of the book’s closing chapter to discussing the reasons why she remains unpersuaded by the Catholic Church’s teachings on women’s ordination and sexual morality.

The long shadow cast by Rice’s early impressions might help us to make sense of these apparent incongruities as well.  There is more than a hint here that the relaxed sexual attitude Rice adopted contemporaneously with her college departure from Catholicism came quite naturally to the same person whose “oversensuous mind” had made her so open to the rich physicality of pre-conciliar Catholic piety.   And haven’t the more puritan strains of Christianity always suspected a certain connection between carnal permissiveness and lavish sensuality in worship?  Of course, these tendencies were kept apart and an elevated aesthetic maintained by an overarching awareness of original sin, and a concomitant mistrust of the untutored passions, in the ordered world in which Rice grew up.  But there is some evidence that Rice herself may have developed a weaker view of human corruption – an Augustine or a Pascal could have some fun with her innocent-sounding notion that because her fall from faith was “sincere” it must have been morally blameless. 

Rice’s personal misgivings about some traditional Christian mores are far from being the focus of her lovely memoir, even less central to it than a related belief about herself as a “genderless” person, which she also traces to childhood.  Yet they fit in with our picture of her as a bracingly straightforward and unironic person who has learned from experience to trust her intuitions.  Indeed, the “tragedy of mind and heart” she memorializes in Called Out of Darkness is partly about the consequences of her mistake to abandon Catholicism, the first love and only meaning of her life, just because she wasn’t intellectually prepared to reconcile her deep religious convictions with what appealed to her in the secular world in which she came of age.  Here, the prescient words of a youthful Paulist priest who tried (counterproductively) to counsel her as her teenage faith wavered go straight to the point:  “For a Catholic like you,” he melodramatically cautioned, “there is no life outside the Catholic Church.”  From the Gothic tales that brought her fame to the devotional literature she’s now turning out, Anne Rice’s body of work bears consistent witness to this fact.

References

Anne Rice, Called Out of Darkness (Knopf, 2008).

For an excellent appreciation of Rice’s writings on Jesus see, “In Defense of Anne Rice” by Patricia Snow, which appeared in First Things:  http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/?p=1297.

Thomas Zebrowski is a Ph.D. Candidate in Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, and a former junior fellow in the Martin Marty Center.

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Sightings comes from the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

Tuesday, April 14, 2009

Conscience at Fordham

FORDHAM CENTER ON RELIGION AND CULTURE | HEADLINE FORUM

Matters of Conscience
When Moral Precepts Collide with Public Policy

Tuesday, 28 April 2009 | 6 – 8 p.m.
Fordham University | Lincoln Center Campus
Pope Auditorium | 113 West 60th Street

What happens when individuals or institutions are called upon to cooperate with actions that they consider gravely immoral but that the law and public policy allow?

Recent legislative and judicial developments touching on life, death, sexuality, and family have stirred deep conflicts about moral and religious norms.

Should “conscience clauses” protect individuals or institutions from being compelled to cooperate with conduct that violates their religious or moral principles?

Can protection for conscience be balanced against the rights of those seeking morally controversial but lawful services?

MODERATOR
Russell Pearce, the Edward and Marilyn Bellet Chair in Legal Ethics, Morality and
Religion, Fordham University School of Law

PANEL
Douglas Kmiec, professor of constitutional law and Caruso Family Chair in Constitutional Law at Pepperdine University
Marc D. Stern, acting co-executive director of the American Jewish Congress, and a leading expert on church-state issues
Nadine Strossen, professor of law at New York Law School, and past president of the American Civil Liberties Union
Robert Vischer, associate professor at the University of St. Thomas Law School


FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
R.S.V.P: [email protected] or (212) 636-7347
For more information: www.fordham.edu/ReligCulture

Saturday, April 11, 2009

States Slashing Social Programs for Vulnerable

A depressing story, here.

The Narrative Concluded (Part 4)

[Previous entries here, here, and here.]

Based on the evidence presented from experts from all over this country and abroad, it is clear that sexual orientation is not a predictor of a person’s ability to parent. Sexual orientation no more leads to psychiatric disorders, alcohol and substance abuse, relationship instability, a lower life expectancy or sexual disorders than race, gender, socioeconomic class or any other demographic characteristic. Qualities indicative of good parenting include attentiveness, involvement in a child’s educational development, the ability to sooth, offer comfort, advice and a secure base for a child, the provision of resources and maintaining a warm, harmonious environment. The most important factor in ensuring a well adjusted child is the quality of parenting.

Similarly, a child in need of love, safety and stability does not first consider the sexual orientation of his parent. More importantly, sexual orientation, solely, should not interfere with a child’s right to enjoy the accoutrements of a legal family. John and James, due to no fault of their own, were removed from an environment perilous to their physical, emotional and educational well being. Their biological parents relinquished them to the State, which in turn placed them into an environment that allowed them, eventually, to heal, and now flourish.

The quality and breadth of research available, as well as the results of the studies performed about gay parenting and children of gay parents, is robust and has provided the basis for a consensus in the field. Many well renowned, regarded and respected professionals have reduced methodologically sound longitudinal and cross-sectional studies into hundreds of reports. Some of the longitudinal studies have tracked children for six, ten and fourteen years. The starting ages of the children in the longitudinal studies has varied from birth, six to ten years old and followed them throughout childhood, adolescence and into adulthood. The studies and reports are published in many well respected peer reviewed journals including the Journal of Child Development, the Journal of Family Psychology, the Journal of Child Psychology, and the Journal of Child Psychiatry. Each of the studies and hundreds of reports also withstood the rigorous peer review process and were tested statistically, rationally and methodologically by seasoned professionals prior to publication.

In addition to the volume, the body of research is broad; comparing children raised by lesbian couples to children raised by married heterosexual couples; children raised by lesbian parents from birth to children raised by heterosexual married couples from birth; children raised by single homosexuals to children raised by single heterosexuals; and children adopted by homosexual parents to those raised by homosexual biological parents, to name a few. These reports and studies find that there are no differences in the parenting of homosexuals or the adjustment of their children. These conclusions have been accepted, adopted and ratified by the American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatry Association, the American Pediatric Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Child Welfare League of America and the National Association of Social Workers. As a result, based on the robust nature of the evidence available in the field, this Court is satisfied that the issue is so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational to hold otherwise; the best interests of children are not preserved by prohibiting homosexual adoption.

The Guardian Ad Litem, the adoption agency and the assessing professionals agree that Petitioner and his domestic partner’s ability to parent is excellent. The quality of parenting, the level of bonding and attachment and the thriving relationship of the children with Petitioner, Roe and Tom Junior is uncontroverted by all parties to this litigation. This Court has presided over John and James case since its inception. This Court has presided over 58 hearings in their case and has had the opportunity to observe the children, Petitioner, and the growing relationship between them. It is clear to this Court that Petitioner is an exceptional parent to John and James who have healed in his care and are now thriving. Accordingly, Petitioner, John and James should be permitted to permanently and legally share the emotional, psychological, and familial bonds of parentage. Nevertheless, based on the law of this state, only a finding that the statute is unconstitutional will permit this Court to grant the petition.

[An excerpt from the conclusions of law:]

The equal protection argument of the Petitioner has been considered by other courts. In D.H.R.S. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), two gay petitioners sought to adopt a child. Per Fla. Stat. §63.042(3), the application was denied. The men filed a state action to declare the statute unconstitutional on right of privacy, substantive due process, and equal protection grounds. Relying solely on copies of various law review articles, reports, editorials, and discussions appearing in magazines and journals submitted by the parties, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioners as to the three constitutional arguments.

On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal overruled the trial court’s findings holding there was virtually no evidence in the record to support a constitutional attack. The Florida Supreme Court agreed that the record below lacked factual evidence to determine whether the statute could sustain an attack as to its constitutional validity on equal protection grounds34 and remanded the matter to the trial court for further fact-finding. The petitioners, however, did not pursue the case.

With regard to the evidence presented in Cox, the lack of “major scientific articles,” the credentials and expertise of the authors, the quality and objectivity of the publishing journal, and the only “glimmers of answers” provided for by the available research caused pause for the reviewing court. Id. at 1213. The court further provided, “It may be that the legislature should revisit this issue in light of the research that has taken place in the last fifteen years, but we cannot say that the limited research reflected in this record compels the judiciary to override the legislature's reasoning.” Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). The research reflected in the record in this case is far from limited and compels a different result.

Section 63.042(3) was also challenged at the federal level in Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Srvcs., 358 F. 3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). There, homosexual foster parents attacked the constitutionality of the statute on various right to privacy theories and equal protection claims.35 The Lofton court, nearly five years ago, acknowledged the question to be determined was not whether the research and experts “support” the legislative prohibition, “but whether that evidence is so well established and so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational for the Florida legislature to believe that the interest of its children are best served by not permitting homosexual adoption.” Id. at 825. At that time, the Lofton court also reasoned, "Openly homosexual households represent a very recent phenomenon, and sufficient time has not yet passed to permit any scientific study of how children raised in those households fare as adults. Scientific attempts to study homosexual parenting in general are still in their nascent stages and so far have yielded inconclusive and conflicting results. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the question of the effects of homosexual parenting on childhood development is one on which even experts of good faith reasonably disagree. Given this state of affairs, it is not irrational for the Florida legislature to credit one side of the debate over the other." Id. at 826. As to the respective equal protection arguments, the failure to present any evidence in Cox 15 years ago and the weight of the evidence presented in Lofton nearly five year ago are both cited as the grounds for the courts’ inability to find the statute unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection of the U.S. and Florida Constitutions. However, today, based on the developments in the fields of social science, psychology, human sexuality, social work and medicine, the existence of additional studies, the re-analysis and peer review of prior studies, the endorsements by the major psychological, psychiatry, child welfare and social work associations, and the now, consensus based on widely accepted results of respected studies by qualified experts, the issue of whether Fla. Stat. §63.042(3) violates the equal protection of homosexuals and children adoptable by homosexuals, is again ripe for consideration.

[The court eventually conluded:]

This Court finds Fla. Stat. §63.042(3) violates the Petitioner and the Children’s equal protection rights guaranteed by Article I, § 2 of the Florida Constitution without satisfying a rational basis.

[The court's entire opinion is here.]

[Here is a picture of the petitioner and the two brothers:]

Thursday, March 26, 2009

More on the poverty of housing for the poor in the USA

This is a disturbing story (here).

Sunday, March 22, 2009

Benedict in Africa: Women's Rights


News from NCRonline.org
March 22, 2009 National Catholic Reporter  

 
NCR News AlertPope extols women's rights in Africa

Women say pope's words undercut by discrimination they see inside church
 
By John L. Allen Jr.
Pope Benedict XVI delivered a strong plea for women's rights during the next-to-last day of his first trip to Africa, insisting that discrimination against women "forms no part of God's plan." Several African women, however, said the pope's message is undercut by what they see as a pattern of discrimination inside the church itself.
Read More
  
or paste this link into your browser: http://ncronline.org/node/12658
 

Sunday, March 15, 2009

The Religious Violence of "Defending Marriage"

Sightings 3/12/09


The Religious Violence of "Defending Marriage"


Jon Pahl


[Jon Pahl is Professor of the History of Christianity in North America at The Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia.  He recently edited and published An American Teacher:  Coming of Age and Coming Out, the Memoirs of Loretta Coller (Infinity Publishing, 2009).] 


A recent article in The Atlantic and recently released Lutheran documents give good reasons to revisit the status of gays and lesbians across American society.  Unfortunately, few commentators to date have addressed the most troubling development of the past few years:  the growth of DOMA Laws, or "Defense of Marriage Acts."  These laws are forms of religious violence.

 

The Federal Defense of Marriage Act, passed in 1996, stipulates that for the purpose of federal laws and operations, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife."  According to domawatch.org – a website sponsored by supporters of these laws – thirty-seven states now have some form of DOMA Laws on the books.  The rationales for such defensive laws are often couched in neutral, "secular", or "naturalist" language.  But the move to establish such laws came from religious groups, notably conservative Protestants, Catholics, and Mormons.  And the logic and appeal of these laws also originates in religion, and functions as a form of violence.  Six theses can clarify the contours of the religious violence embedded in these laws.

           

1)  DOMA Laws violate sacred texts.  Many of the arguments against gay and lesbian civil unions or marriage appeal to biblical texts from Genesis, Leviticus, Romans, or I Corinthians.  But such arguments impose upon the texts a twentieth century understanding of sexual identity alien to the Jewish or Hellenistic cultures in which these texts arose.  

           

2)  DOMA Laws elevate heterosexual marriage to idolatrous status.  In some communities of faith, defending "marriage" has become all but an item of confessional status (it is absent from any historic Christian Confessions).  This arrogates to a majority – heterosexuals – special privileges (economic, social, and spiritual) not available to sexual minorities. 

           

3)  DOMA Laws scapegoat gays and lesbians.  As Rene Girard argues, scapegoating is a chief manifestation of religious violence.  It is difficult to see what real threat is posed to heterosexual intimacy, much less to civil society, by the desire of homosexuals for similar rights.  It is easy to see how DOMA laws organize consent over and against a relatively voiceless and powerless group.

           

4)  DOMA Laws sacrifice homosexual rights, and damage civil society, in the interest of religious purity.  One measure of the justice in any society is how well it cares for vulnerable members.  Sexual difference marks individuals as both vulnerable and "dangerous."  And as Mary Douglass showed, any "danger" against which a law must defend is invariably constructed around some purity interest.  DOMA Laws require gays and lesbians to sacrifice rights others take for granted, and render them subject to legalized forms of exclusion and discrimination.  They damage the deep trust that is the most important social practice in civil society. 

           

5)  DOMA Laws confuse legislation with religion, and violate the First Amendment, as Ann Pellegrini and Janet Jakobsen have argued.  It is entirely permissible (although ethically subject to scrutiny) for private communities to shape the boundaries of association in whatever ways members agree upon.  It is a violation of the First Amendment's protection of free association to inhibit by law some forms of association that pose no harm to the common good, and a violation of the freedom from an established religion when religiously-inspired exclusions are written into law.

           

6)  DOMA Laws perpetuate an association of sex with power, and thereby do damage to any sacramental sensibility that might remain in association with even heterosexual marriage.  As Hendrik Hartog and other historians have shown, marriages have shifted in the modern era from patriarchal patterns of coverture to social contracts in which couples seek mutual fulfillment.  Such contracts might be compatible with a sacramental sensibility, since they entail pledges of sexual fidelity and commitments to share social resources and responsibilities, along with (one might argue) other gifts of God.  DOMA Laws associate sexual fidelity with legislated forms of coercive power, and inhibit the deep trust and mutuality intrinsic to modern (and sacramental) marriage.  They establish hierarchies of relationships, and associate heterosexual unions (and sexual practices) with dominance.

           

DOMA Laws have been passed with the support and lobbying of religious groups.  Such laws point, unfortunately, to a deep tendency of religions to consolidate power through exclusion, as Miroslav Volf has so cogently shown; these laws have no rationale for their existence apart from that exclusion.  People who wish to "defend" [against] corrosive influences on marriage – and I count myself as one – might actually find allies among gays and lesbians who desire public recognition for their pledges of fidelity and their commitments to share resources and responsibilities with one another.  A true defense of marriage would not involve mean-spirited exclusions, but would embrace practical policies that strengthen deep trust and support families facing economic challenges.

 

References:

 

Paul Elie’s article in The Atlantic,"God, Grace, and Sex," is online as "The Velvet Reformation" at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903/archbishop-canterbury/2.

 

The Social Statement "Human Sexuality: Gift and Trust" and the ECLA’s recommendations on ministry practices are online at http://www.elca.org/What-We-Believe/Social-Issues/Social-Statements-in-Process/JTF-Human-Sexuality.aspx.

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Sightings comes from the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

Friday, February 20, 2009

Religion as a Basis of Lawmaking?

UPDATE:  I've corrected the link.  (Thanks to Chris Green, Ole Miss.)

I am in substantial agreement with Steve Shiffrin's position on this issue.  I present and defend my position here.

Kent Greenawalt defends essentially the same position in his recent book on the establishment clause.

If anyone thinks that my argument misfires, I'd love to hear where and why it misfires.

Saturday, February 14, 2009

Channeling Eduardo ...

Our colleague and friend Eduardo Peñalver is no longer blogging here at MOJ.  But, happily, he is still blogging over at dotCommonweal.  Click here to read Eduardo's response ("Democracy and Abortion") to the posts, including the most recent post, by Richard Stith.