Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Saturday, August 7, 2004

Where's the Beef? Or, What "Explanation"?

I just read Ferguson's piece--the whole thing. Alas, I can't find any explanation for the suggested relationship bewteen "faith" and "work". Isn't there a formal name for the following fallacy:

1. A has more C than D does.
2. A also has more E than D does.
3. Therefore, A has more E than D does *because* A has more C than D does.

Maybe I'm missing something. Wouldn't be the first time.

(If I weren't so hard at work this Saturday afternoon in early August, I'd probably be able to think about this matter more carefully ...)

Michael

Thursday, August 5, 2004

Comment on Rick's Posting

I agree with Rick's central point.

It is correct for a court to say the following: "That the political majority's morality supports challenged legislation does not entail that the legislation is constitutional." This proposition may be what O'Connor was trying to articulate in Lawrence. (Is that too charitable?) In any event, the truth of the proposition is easy to discern. For example, that the political majority's morality condemns interracial marriage does not entail that antimiscegenation legislation is constitutional. The point here is that the political majority's morality may itself be constitutionally offensive.

By contrast, it is incorrect for a court to say the following: "That the political majority's morality is the sole support for challenged legislation entails that the legislation is unconstitutional." I agree with Rick that a court should be embarassed to affirm that proposition.

Michael

Wednesday, August 4, 2004

Here is Outka's article ...

Steve et al.,

Sorry, I should have done this to begin with.

Click here:

Download outka.pdf

(Given the sideways appearance of the article, you'll need to print it before you read it.)

The issue, of course, is of great importance--and the article, not long.

I feared that if I tried to summarize the argument, I would not do it justice--and might even mislead.

Thanks.

Michael

Reply to Steve

Thanks, Steve. I was hoping that those of you who are interested in this issue would read Outka's piece and comment on his argument--and, if you are so inclined, point out where, in your judgment, the argument doesn't work. After all, the point you make in your posting below is not one that Outka has overlooked.

Michael

Tuesday, August 3, 2004

The Morality of Human Stem Cell Research

I am attracted by the position of Gene Outka, Dwight Professor of Philosophy and Christian Ethics at Yale University. Outka "take[s] conception and all that it alone makes possible as *the* point at which one should ascribe a judgment of irreducible value." Outka opposes the creation of embryos for use in stem cell research. But Outka would permit the use of "excess" embryos, i.e., embryos that are left over after fertility treatments have been completed. I would appreciate some help in thinking further about Outka's argument. See Gene Outka, "The Ethics of Human Stem Cell Research," in Brent Waters & Ronald Cole-Turner, eds., God and the Embryo: Religious Voices on Stem Cells and Cloning 29 (2003).

Michael

Saturday, July 31, 2004

"When One Is Enough" con't

[These are the letters to the editor published in the New York Times Magazine, Aug. 1, 2004.]

When One Is Enough

I sat in stunned silence after reading the Lives column about Amy Richards (as told to Amy Barrett, July 18).

The casualness of Richards's decision to decide which fetus to keep was heartbreaking beyond words. The surviving child is the doomed one.

Thea Roeser
Atlanta

I have always been pro-choice. What I realized after wrestling with my disturbance at your article is that "pro-choice" seems to preclude any choice but one. If the freedom to choose removes a sense of awe from the realm of human possibilities, is it freedom or a cruel burden?

Elaine A. Zimbel
Montreal

Of all the reasons for having an abortion, I never thought that the prospect of living in Staten Island and shopping at Costco would be among them.

Elizabeth Cosenza
Coram, N.Y.

I would suggest that "one is too many" for a woman who risks unwanted pregnancies by not taking the pill because it makes her moody, who is not married and who is willing to eliminate innocent offspring out of inconvenience.

My compassion goes to those infertile readers of this horrible and horribly cavalier story.

Laura Schlessinger
Los Angeles

Kudos for daring to print this. For better or worse, your readership needs to know that such women exist, that such things occur and why they do. The story from Peter's point of view would be well worth a follow-up.

Bruce Bender
Oceanside, Calif.

Richards's decision brought back memories of "Sophie's Choice." How does one "choose" which of her children will live and which will not? A woman's right to choose is a never-ending moral and legal debate. A woman's right to "select," as Richards did, must certainly be divisive within the pro-choice movement.

David Vermylen
Lake Forest, Ill.

I was frozen by the coolness and apparent indifference of Amy Richards toward the twin babies she found would complicate her life.

Upon concluding her essay, I wondered how many new members she brought to the ranks of the pro-life movement and, on a positive note, how many women's minds were changed among those who were pondering an abortion in their own lives.
Robert R. Farley
Elizaville, N.Y.

I am speechless. As the mother of multiples (identical twin daughters), I was hoping there would be a different ending. I used to think I was pro-choice. Not anymore. Not after reading that Richards wanted to "get rid of one of them. Or two of them."

Margaret Cate
Ocean Grove, N.J.

This is perhaps the bravest story I have ever heard. I am sure that it will cause a barrage of hate mail from those who will mourn the lives of the unborn children, and it is sad that there are so many who would impose their morality.

The issue of having children, how many and the choice of when and even if one bears them once conceived is among the toughest an individual will ever make. There will always be those who say the rules in life are simple and inflexible, but life really isn't that way.

David J. Melvin
Chester, N.J.

Though I respect Richards's right to choose — and she obviously has a keen awareness of that right — I find it surprising that she seems to have neglected adoption as one of her possible choices. There are people who would have been thrilled to raise her twins. I suspect that the joy of helping someone start a family might ease the burden of a difficult pregnancy.

Dave Smith
Blauvelt, N.Y.

Friday, July 2, 2004

New Article by Brugger on Aquinas and Capital Punishment

Earlier I recommended E. Christian Brugger's book, Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition (Notre Dame 2003). More recently, Rick Garnett called our attention to a symposium issue of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy. In that symposium issue, there is an article by E. Christian Brugger: Aquinas and Capital Punishment: The Plausibility of the Traditional Argument. Given Brugger's argument, the subtitle should be "The Implausibility of the Traditional Argument". If you would like to read the article, which I recommend, please click here:

Brugger article

Sunday, June 27, 2004

Theology and Abortion

[Thought this would be of special interest--from this morning's New York Times. --Michael]


The Bishops vs. the Bible
By GARRY WILLS


EVANSTON, Ill.

Catholic bishops recently met and sought the best way to enforce "church teaching" with Catholic politicians who fail to oppose laws that allow abortion. Some critics of the bishops see this as a violation of the separation of church and state. Both sides are working from misconceptions. Abortion is not a church issue, so what the bishops have to say about it cannot be an intrusion of the church into state concerns. Abortion is, admittedly, a moral issue — but not one that can be settled by theology or by religious authority.

Modern "right to life" issues — abortion and contraception — are nowhere mentioned in either Jewish or Christian Scripture. Pope Pius XI said they were, in his encyclical Casti Connubii (1930), where Onan's "spilling his seed on the ground" (and the reason for his punishment by God) was interpreted as preventing conception and birth. Yet no scholar of Scripture accepts that reading of Genesis 38:9 anymore; it is read as referring to levirate marriage duties. The Vatican now agrees with this interpretation. Even in his own sphere, the revealed word of God, the pope could be wrong.

Some, deprived of the Onan text, say that abortion is forbidden by the scriptural commandment "Thou shalt not kill." But that commandment does not cover all human life. My hair and fingernails, while growing, are alive with my own human life. Semen and ova have human life even before their juncture. They continue to have it after mingling — for example, the fertilized ovum that does not lodge itself in the wall of the womb. Yet no attempt is made to retrieve such "dead" detritus and give it decent burial.

So "right to life" as a slogan is a question-begging term. The command not to kill is directed at the killing of persons, and the issue in abortion is this: When does the fetus become a person? The answer to that is not given by church teaching. Even St. Thomas Aquinas, who thought that a soul was infused into the body, could only guess when that infusion took place (and he did not guess "at fertilization"). St. Augustine confessed an agnosticism about the human status of the fetus.

Natural reason must use natural tools to deal with this question — philosophy, neurobiology, psychology, medicine. When is the fetus "viable," and viable as what? Does personality come only with responsibility, with personal communication? On none of these do the bishops have special expertise. John Henry Newman said, "The pope, who comes of Revelation, has no jurisdiction over Nature."

The evidence from natural sources of knowledge has been interpreted in various ways, by people of good intentions and good information. If natural law teaching were clear on the matter, a consensus would have been formed by those with natural reason. The fact that the problem is unsettled by them does not mean that a theological authority can be resorted to. An invalid authority (theology) does not become valid faute de mieux.

Church authorities have not acted on their own claims. Aborted fetuses, if they are persons, should be baptized, just as infants are, and buried in consecrated ground. But that has not been regular church practice. If abortion kills a person, then the woman who undergoes an abortion should be punished as a murderer — and the worst kind of murderer, a filicide. Church authorities have not demanded such punishment.

"Tradition" does not give an answer where Scripture is silent. Augustine condemned abortion, not because of the status of the fetus, but because it meant that sex was used for reasons other than procreation, which he thought always wrong. He condemned, for that reason, sex after menopause, during infertile periods, during pregnancy — a ban church authorities long ago lifted.

Nothing I have said is a defense of abortion. There are strong arguments from natural reason to oppose it, including a presumption in favor of personhood where the possibility exists. That they are not so strong as to command general assent does not free anyone from the duty of considering those arguments seriously, and of making a decision in conscience based on that consideration.

All I am saying is that the bishops have no special mandate from their office to supplant the individual conscience with some divine imperative. For them to say that this is a matter of theology is, simply, bad theological reasoning. If they, as citizens, wish to express their opinion on the natural-reason arguments, they have every right to do so. But that does not give them the right to deny others the same kind of arguing, on the same grounds. The subject of abortion is not a matter of church-state relations, since the bishops as church authorities have nothing distinctive to contribute to the discussion.


Garry Wills, adjunct professor of history at Northwestern University, is the author of "Why I Am a Catholic."

Thursday, June 24, 2004

More on the Church and Capital Punishment

This posting is a followup to my posting on June 12, 2004, about the Church and Capital Punishment.

In Lent of this year, 45 U.S. Catholic bishops from 12 southern states issued the fourth of their planned six statements on criminal justice. For the statement, see 34 Origins 63-64 (June 10, 2004).

The bishops begin by quoting a November 2000 statement of the U.S. Catholic bishops: "We are guided by the paradoxical Catholic teaching on crime and punishment: We will not tolerate the crime and violence that threaten the lives and dignity of our sisters and brothers, and we will not give up on those who have lost their way. We seek both justice and mercy...." (Emphasis added.)

The 45 bishops then declare, later in their statement: "A Catholic approach never gives up on those who violate laws. We believe that both victims and offenders are children of God. Despite their very different claims on society, their lives and dignity should be protected and respected. We seek justice, not vengeance. We believe punishment must have clear purposes: protecting society and rehabilitating those who violate the law...."

If anyone thinks that capital punishment can be reconciled--even if only "in principle"--with "not giving up on those who have lost their way", please indicate how it might be done. If anyone thinks that capital punishment can be reconciled--even if only "in principle"--with what the 45 bishops call the "Catholic approach" of "protecting and respecting" the lives of the offenders (as well as those of the victims), please indicate how it might be done.

Let me say again that as between, e.g., John O'Callaghan (Notre Dame, Philosophy) and E. Christian Brugger, Brugger seems to me to offer the more compelling reading of John Paul II's present theology, and of the Church's emergent theology, of capital punishment. (The 45 bishops are surely not out in front of John Paul II on this issue, are they?)

I worry that for too many, the position that there is there is room for prudential disagreement among Catholics with respect to the morality of capital punishment but not with respect to the morality of abortion is little more than an instance of politically inspired wishful thinking. Cf. Justice Scalia's statement that he is happy that opposition to capital punishment is not mandatory for Catholics because that would disqualify Catholics from being judges and "I like my job."

John Kerry supports, if not abortion, "abortion rights". George Bush supports (to say the least) capital punishment. What is a conscientious Catholic voter to do? I understand that Cardinal Ratzinger has said in a letter to the U.S. Catholic bishops that it would be wrong to back a candidate specifically because he or she supported abortion rights; but, according to Cardinal McCarrick, Ratzinger also "left open the possibility that a voter could legitimately decide to support a pro-abortion candidate, based on that person's overall platform."

Michael

Saturday, June 19, 2004

Communion and Excommunication

Thought the item below would be of interest:

Holy Communion and Unholy Politics
By John P. Beal

When Cardinal Francis Arinze, prefect of the Vatican Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments, was asked at a press conference in Rome on April 23 whether Senator John F. Kerry should be denied Communion, he responded: “The law of the church is clear. The church exists in the United States. There are bishops there, let them interpret it.” The flurry of conflicting statements prompted by the cardinal’s remark suggests that the law relevant to determining who can be barred from the reception of Communion may be clear, but its applicability to Senator Kerry (or any other politician) is not.

Church Teaching and Politics

The church’s magisterium has emphasized that politicians are not free to leave their moral principles in the cloakroom when they go to the floor of the legislature, or on the bus when they espouse public policy positions on the campaign trail. Pope John Paul II has clearly stated that all citizens, and by implication public officials, have “a grave and clear obligation to oppose” any law that attacks human life (Evangelium Vitae, No. 73). In a doctrinal note issued in 2002, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith gave the pope’s directive particular application to public officials. The note quotes from Evangelium Vitae (No. 73), “For them, as for every Catholic, it is impossible to promote such laws or to vote for them,” and then comments that nevertheless, when the politician’s personal opposition to abortion is a matter of record and it is impossible to overturn laws allowing abortion, it is permissible for politicians, as Evangelium Vitae says, “to support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion or public morality.”

In fact, most Catholic politicians in the United States more or less clearly assert their personal opposition to abortion, but this personal opposition is rarely put to the test in straight up-or-down votes on abortion or other life issues. Conformity with the teaching of the church must be discerned from politicians’ public records—their policy pronouncements, campaign rhetoric and actual votes on a variety of issues touching on life but not directly attacking (or promoting) it. On both sides of the aisle, these public records often reflect, to put it charitably, something less than ringing endorsements for the consistent ethic of life. Discrepancies between personal protestations and public records have sparked the current controversy over the admission of some politicians to Communion.

Exclusion From Holy Communion

The basic principle concerning admission of Catholics to holy Communion is clear: “Any baptized person not prohibited by law can and must be admitted to holy Communion” (Canon 912). Exceptions to this norm are to be interpreted strictly, i.e., by giving them the narrowest construal consistent with their literal meaning (Canon 18). The Code of Canon Law does contain two exceptions to this principle that are relevant for assessing the eligibility for reception of Communion by politicians whose public record is inconsistent with church teaching. Canon 916 addresses those who are conscious of having committed grave sin and warns such individuals that they are not to approach holy Communion unless they have first been reconciled to God and the church through sacramental confession. Since sin involves not only an external violation of a moral norm but also internal advertence and consent, the law normally leaves the decision about approaching holy Communion to the informed conscience of the individual. Canon 915, on the other hand, is addressed to ministers of holy Communion and stipulates, “Those who have been excommunicated or interdicted after the imposition or declaration of the penalty and others obstinately persisting in manifest grave sin are not to be admitted to holy Communion.”

Excommunication

If anything is clear, at least to canonists, about the current furor over admission of politicians to holy Communion, it is that no so-called “pro-choice” politician has been excommunicated as a result of her or his public record. Those who successfully procure an abortion and their necessary cooperators do, by that fact, incur the penalty of excommunication (Canon 1398). A necessary cooperator is one without whose assistance a specific abortion would not have occurred (Canon 1329 §2). However reprehensible politicians’ records on life-related issues may seem, it is virtually impossible to establish the causal link between their views and votes and any specific abortion, which is a necessary condition for them to incur the penalty. Nor does it seem plausible to claim that their public pronouncements amount to heresy. Thus, exclusion of politicians from holy Communion must rest on a judgment that they are obstinately persisting in manifest grave sin. The question immediately arises, however, what precisely is their grave sin? Does the fault lie in their views or in their votes?

Grave Sin

Most Catholic politicians do not directly contest the truth of the church’s moral teaching; they do, however, disagree with bishops and often among themselves about how this teaching can and should be applied in a pluralistic society in which there is no consensus on how public policy should deal with critical moral issues. The binding force of church teaching diminishes as it descends from the mountaintop of moral principles to the dark valley of practical applications. Thus it is hard to say, when views of politicians on public policy issues clash with those of church authorities, that the politicians’ dissenting views are per se sinful. They may be open to criticism, wrong-headed, inconsistent, pusillanimous or even stupid, but they are not unambiguously sinful.

Politicians’ votes on issues touching on the sacredness of human life can be equally ambiguous. In European countries, laws allowing abortions were enacted by (and could be repealed by) legislatures; in the United States, however, the basic law allowing abortion has since 1973 been one imposed by judicial fiat. Absent a constitutional amendment or a change of heart by the U.S. Supreme Court, public officials must make their choices within the stifling parameters established by Roe v. Wade and its progeny. Consequently, what is possible for politicians in this less than best of all possible worlds may fall considerably short of enactment of the full pro-life agenda. A legislator’s voting record, moreover, reflects only a fraction of his or her legislative activity. Votes on the floor do not disclose the log-rolling, compromising, horsetrading, armtwisting and other behind-the-scenes legislative maneuverings, which may render the bill on which politicians eventually vote, if not ideal, at least less toxic than it might otherwise have been. Votes on the floor, furthermore, especially when they are negative votes on bills favored by church authorities, leave opaque the motives without which a moral assessment of a legislator’s public actions is hazardous. In short, it is difficult to characterize a politician’s voting record as unambiguously sinful.

Manifest Grave Sin

Even if a politician’s views or votes can be fairly characterized as sinful, they do not qualify as “manifest” grave sin, as that word has been used in canonical tradition. For a sin to be manifest, it is not enough that it be public or even notorious; it must also be so habitual that it constitutes an objectively sinful lifestyle or occupation. The 1917 code, like the current Eastern code, spoke of excluding the “publicly unworthy” from holy Communion. Commentators suggested that these publicly unworthies included pimps, prostitutes, fortunetellers and magicians. While wags have long accused politicians of bearing uncanny resemblances to these miscreants, no one has seriously suggested that politicians constitute a comparable class of practitioners of an inherently disreputable occupation or cultivators of an intrinsically immoral lifestyle.

Under Pius XII, the Holy Office declared that, as presumed apostates who adhered to an anti-Catholic society, members of the Communist Party and some of its “fellow travelers” were to be refused holy Communion, since they were not properly disposed for its reception. But it requires a stretch to find an analogy between the Communist Party in Italy in the late 1940’s and any mainstream American political party today. If there were such an analogy, the refusal of holy Communion would have to be extended beyond politicians to those who support and vote for them, as it once was in Italy.

In its declaration in 2000, the Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts affirmed the traditional exclusion from holy Communion of the divorced and remarried as a class of people “obstinately persisting in manifest grave sin.” As authority for its declaration, the council cited Pope John Paul II’s Familiaris Consortio, which justified this traditional exclusion by the fact that the “state and condition of life [of divorced and remarried Catholics] objectively contradict that union of love between Christ and the church which is signified and effected in the Eucharist.” However loathsome some politicians’ views and votes on life issues may be, it is hard to see how it can be said that theirs is a state and condition of life in such objective contradiction to the Gospel that their grave sin should be judged “manifest.”

Obstinacy

To be refused admission to holy Communion, one must also “obstinately persist” in manifest grave sin. Such obstinate persistence presupposes that the one who would refuse politicians Communion has engaged in a serious effort to teach them to see the truth of the church’s teaching and the error of their ways. Effective teaching requires something more than turning up the rhetorical volume and brandishing anathemas. Resort to disciplinary measures like refusal of holy Communion is an implicit acknowledgment by church authorities that they have failed as teachers to convince Catholic politicians in particular and the larger society in general of the truth of the Gospel of life. Resignation to such a failure ill befits those who are charged to “proclaim the message; be persistent whether the time is favorable or unfavorable; convince, rebuke, encourage with utmost patience in teaching” (2 Tim 4:2).

Conclusion

It may be objected that by making it difficult to discipline erring members of the flock by refusing them Communion, this strict interpretation of Canon 915 makes “a scarecrow of the law.” This was, in fact, an objection raised during the code revision process about drafts of what eventually became Canon 915. The response of the commission responsible for revision, however, was not to lower the bar for refusing holy Communion but, if anything, to raise it. One of the functions of law in the church, as in every society, is to make it difficult for people, especially those in authority, to act on their visceral instincts, lest hasty action inadvertently harm a higher ecclesial value. By making it difficult for church authorities to refuse admission to holy Communion to politicians whose public records arguably cannot be squared with church teaching, a necessarily strict interpretation of Canon 915 serves as a brake on the temptation to politicize the Eucharist by allowing the sacrament that signifies and effects the union of love between Christ and the church to become a sacrament that signifies and brings about disunity. Zeal to protect the Eucharist from profanation by sinners can unwittingly lead to an even greater profanation by transforming the eucharistic celebration into a continuation of politics by liturgical means.

The Rev. John P. Beal is an associate professor in the School of Canon Law of The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.