The Catholic News Agency is reporting:
Intellectual heavyweight, Professor Robert P. George, has received an appointment as a member of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST).
More here. Congrats to Robby!
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
Robert George to U.N.
Monday, November 10, 2008
Even More Questions on Election Reflections
Amy, I'm a little confused about how you articulate some of your questions/statements in your most recent post.
First, regarding disqualifying a candidate because of a position on a single issue of intrinsic evil, you say that you "think many people read the “may” (not “must”) as leaving room for discretion and prudential judgment." I guess I'm not sure how one could read the "may" in any other way. The document states explicitly that although “[a] Catholic cannot vote for a candidate who takes a position in favor of an intrinsic evil, such as abortion or racism, if the vote’s intent is to support that position,” that “a voter should not use a candidates’ opposition to an intrinsic evil to justify indifference to inattentiveness to other important moral issues involving human life and dignity” and that “a Catholic who rejects a candidate’s unacceptable position may decide to vote for that candidate for other morally grave reasons.” That seems to me pretty strong support for reading "may" disqualify in a way that does not require "must."
Second, if I'm reading you correctly, you appear to posit as one possible pole "the notion that lay people must simply follow how a particular bishop has worked out the prudential application of the teaching in a given social context." If the Conference itself takes the position, as it does in Faithful Citizenship, that their role is to help people form their consciences and not "to tell Catholics for whom or against whom to vote", how can it possible be the case that people must vote the way an individual Bishop instructs them to? That seems to me completely inconsistent with what the document calls for, which is why many people reacted negatively to the statements of some individual Bishops in this campaign. In the view of many of us, "vote Republican or be eternally damned" is not an exercise in helping people form their consciences.
Election Reflections: More Questions
A response to Sean Dudley’s first point in the post by Michael S: I think the key word that seems to be generating differing interpretations of Forming Consciences is “may”: “a candidate’s position on a single issue that involves an intrinsic evil, such as support for legal abortion or the promotion of racism, may legitimately lead a voter to “disqualify” a candidate from receiving support.” I think many people read the “may” (not “must”) as leaving room for discretion and prudential judgment on the part of the voter (especially because the statement seems to be referring to the thought process of voters).
Here’s a holler for help from folks with more depth in moral theology that I have, because I do not know the answers to these questions about the scope of the authority of the teaching office of the bishop: 1) is there space within the tradition for a mid-point between a completely “individual” (and perhaps “free rein”) notion of conscience formation, and the notion that lay people must simply follow how a particular bishop has worked out the prudential application of the teaching in a given social context? 2) Should we make a distinction between a particular bishop’s reflection on the prudential application of Church teaching which can inform how voters consider the issues, and a much broader claim that such particular interpretation is required as a matter of Church teaching and authority (at least within that bishop’s diocese)? 3) Does all of this depend on the issue? Eg, is abortion somehow different because of the urgency that this claim has on our consciences and our community at this point in history? Or more broadly, is the analysis for “intrinsic evils” somehow different than other social maladies? If so, why?
And on that last point, it would be interesting to mesh the current conversation about the election with some negative reactions to the strong statements on the part of some bishops a couple of years ago pressing for changes in law and policy to respect the dignity of undocumented immigrants, to probe whether the foundational arguments about the scope of the authority of the teaching office of the bishop are the same or different, and why.
Election Reflections: A Response to Michael P.
Sean Dudley responds to Michael P.'s post, Election Reflections, which reprints a Peter Steinfels NYT op-ed:
In his criticism of the bishops who told Catholics that they could not in good conscience vote for Sen. Obama, Steinfels misreads the bishops’ joint statement on faithful citizenship and mistakes spiritual guidance for domination of conscience.
First, “Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship” states that it can be appropriate to disqualify a candidate based on a single issue. “A candidate’s position on a single issue is not sufficient to guarantee a voter’s *support*. Yet a candidate’s position on a single issue that involves an intrinsic evil, such as support for legal abortion or the promotion of racism, may legitimately lead a voter to *disqualify* a candidate from receiving support.” Where was the contradiction, then, in proclaiming that Obama’s radically pro-abortion stance alone can and should disqualify him from our consideration?
Second, “Faithful Citizenship” states that some issues are more important than others, but it does not establish an end-of-season national ranking of the problems we face. Where was the double-speak, then, in a bishop’s helping his flock to determine the relative weight of various issues? Moreover, the joint statement announces that Catholics may only vote for a pro-abortion politician if done (1) despite the pro-abortion stance and (2) for proportionately grave moral reasons. Where was the double-speak, then, in a bishop’s application of these principles to find that the legal termination of 4,000 human lives per day has no moral equivalent and thus should disqualify Obama?
Third, identifying the moral ramifications of a vote for a pro-abortion candidate is part of forming voter consciences, not overriding them. If a bishop saw no proportionate issue that could counterbalance Obama’s abortion position, making a vote for Obama a soul-endangering cooperation in evil, was the bishop not allowed to guide his flock away from such a spiritual pitfall?
Steinfells seems to read the joint statement as handing to individuals the reins of conscience formation while muzzling the bishops on the matter, leaving the faithful no map for the journey except the joint statement itself. This misses the fact that “Faithful Citizenship” paints only in broad strokes and that the bishops charged with the salvation of their flocks should be allowed to fill in the details.
Does Religion Make Us Nice?
From Slate, an interesting essay on the effect of religion. From the opening:
Arguments about the merits of religions are often battled out with reference to history, by comparing the sins of theists and atheists. (I see your Crusades and raise you Stalin!) But a more promising approach is to look at empirical research that directly addresses the effects of religion on how people behave.
Studies show that religious Americans tend to be happier and more generous than their secular counterparts. But what explains the relatively happy and godless Scandinavians? The author suggests that religion's positive effect is more about community than belief:
The Danes and the Swedes, despite being godless, have strong communities. In fact, Zuckerman points out that most Danes and Swedes identify themselves as Christian. They get married in church, have their babies baptized, give some of their income to the church, and feel attached to their religious community—they just don't believe in God. Zuckerman suggests that Scandinavian Christians are a lot like American Jews, who are also highly secularized in belief and practice, have strong communal feelings, and tend to be well-behaved.
American atheists, by contrast, are often left out of community life. The studies that Brooks cites in Gross National Happiness, which find that the religious are happier and more generous then the secular, do not define religious and secular in terms of belief. They define it in terms of religious attendance. It is not hard to see how being left out of one of the dominant modes of American togetherness can have a corrosive effect on morality. As P.Z. Myers, the biologist and prominent atheist, puts it, "[S]cattered individuals who are excluded from communities do not receive the benefits of community, nor do they feel willing to contribute to the communities that exclude them."
Dane on Civil Marriage
Rutgers law prof Perry Dane has posted his paper, A Holy Secular Institution. From the abstract:
This article examines the notion that civil marriage is a "wholly secular institution." It concludes that the "secular" and "religious" meanings and institutions of marriage are so intermeshed in our history, legal and religious imagination, and doctrine that trying to wall off "civil marriage" from religious considerations is neither possible nor desirable. The idea of "marriage" is a piece of intellectual and cultural "capital" common to both church and state, and changes in the meaning of that idea would have both secular and religious implications. Moreover, the institutions of "civil" and "religious" marriage are not as easily divisible as many believe. Religious believers are legitimate stakeholders in any debate over the meaning of civil marriage.
All this is not to suggest that religious objectors should have a veto on the recognition of same-sex marriage in civil law. Indeed, this article does not reach any bottom-line conclusion on the marriage controversy. The intermeshing of the secular and religious dimensions of marriage does have practical consequences, which the article discusses. But those consequences cut both ways, in the manner of interlocking opposites. This article's overriding goal is to illuminate the playing field, not to score points for one side or the other.
Sunday, November 9, 2008
Reason, Logic, and the Law
Now that the election is over and change is in place—the face of that change is commencing to take shape—the need to take stock of Catholic Legal Theory on many fronts will be the task of the day, yet again.
Some of us have suggested that religious freedom will become a pawn in the new games of political and legal chess that will be begin as we get closer to January 20, 2009. Already there have been suggestions that groups are reviewing statements made by Catholic bishops during the election season on matters of public import in order to assess the possibility and probability of challenges to the Church’s—including local churches—tax exempt status. A chill wind is beginning to blow on these horizons.
I am one of those who considers and believes that Catholic Legal Theory has something to say on these and most matters legal. Moreover, I consider that reason and logic are critical elements of the law in a democratic society and that reason and logic are essential to expressions of Catholic Legal Theory. So I am troubled by an article which appeared in today’s Boston Globe entitled “Utah Faces Boycott after Push by Mormons vs. Gay Marriage.” I am not sure why the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints has been singled out since other religious groups joined in the debate and campaign in several states to define marriage as the union between one man and one woman. On this point, the Latter Day Saints and the Roman Catholic Church are of the same belief and presented the same arguments in the political discussion surrounding the nature of marriage. Based on reason and the logical argument that accompanies the exercise of reason, these two religious communities, and others, have entered the democratic debate to present their views knowing full well that homosexual lobbies have contested, sometimes bitterly, the arguments advanced by the Mormons, Catholics, and others regarding the nature and definition of marriage. I submit that these religious communities have done nothing untoward that threatens freedom and democracy in the United States or anywhere else. Moreover, their participation is what is expected of citizenship and the role it must play in the public square where our lives in common are addressed.
Today’s article in the Globe to which I have referred carried me back to my first year of law school (almost forty years ago) when I had the occasion to read and contemplate some of the revered maxims of the law. One such maxim is: when the reason for the law changes, so must the law. But, if reason is the foundation of the law and, therefore, the justification that motivates individuals, groups, and legal societies to do certain things rather than others, reason triumphs, and the law is based on a solid foundation. The catalyst in the article that made me focus on reason and the law was this quotation attributed to Mr. John Aravosis, who is identified as a “gay rights activist”:
At a fundamental level, the Utah Mormons crossed the line on this one. They just took marriage away from 20,000 couples and made their children bastards. You don’t do that and get away with it.
It appears that Mr. Aravosis is not only outraged by an exercise of democracy, but he is willing to do something about what he perceives to be an injustice, i.e., consider a boycott against the State of Utah and an end to the Mormon church’s tax exempt status (but why not the State of California where the vote of which he complains took place; why not the end of the tax exempt status of other religious organizations that contributed their voices to those of the Mormons?). It seems that he thinks that the Mormons responsible for the successful vote on Proposition 8 are all in Utah. Where is the reason and logic in that? He takes no account of other groups, religious and secular, who also supported Proposition 8—some in Utah, some in California, and others located elsewhere. Where is the reason and logic in that? He seems unable to register that until the California Supreme Court decided In Re Marriage cases in May of this year, the “20,000 marriages” about which he is concerned were not recognized as marriages at all under California law. Where is the reason and logic in that? And, he argues that the children of persons who are now in five-month old “marriages” are “bastards.” He does not stop to consider: from where did these children come—surely not from the physical, sexual relation of two men or two women. Where is the reason and logic in that?
Mr. Aravosis appears to be on a crusade against the Mormon church. I must stop for a moment and ask: when will he diversify his campaign against the Catholic Church and other religious communities that also supported Proposition 8? For the time being, I must be satisfied to watch how he manages his current battle which is described in this fashion:
The main focus is going to be going after the Utah brand. At this point, honestly, we’re going to destroy the Utah brand. It is a hate state.
Should his campaign show promise, I ponder where else will he return to “destroy” that which he despises and labels “hate”? The fact that he is willing to commence his war against one religious group and one state does not bode well for democracy or religious freedom—something with which Catholic Legal Theory clearly has an interest.
RJA sj
Further Reflections on Thomas More Conference
At dinner last night, Fr. Koterski linked the study of the past with important questions facing us today. As the right of conscience is being challenged, especially in the medical profession, More can serve as inspiration and guide. Thomas More pray for us.
Another random memory from the conference. One of the speakers, an expert on the trial, asked how well and accurately the trial was portrayed in "A Man for All Seasons," the academy award winning movie that was based on the recently revived Robert Bolt play. The expert thought the movie and play did an excellent job.
Reflections on Thomas More Conference
Nearly 200 people gathered at the University of Dallas this past weekend for the annual Thomas More Conference. The theme this year was “Thomas More on Trial: Law and Conscience in More’s Last Letters and Trial Accounts. Many noted More scholars were joined on the program by practicing lawyers and jurists, including Judge Edith Jones (5th Circuit) and Sir Michael Tugendhat ( Judge of the High Court, England and Wales.
One of the many themes that unfolded during the weekend was the development and change in tone of More’s letters and writings in the tower as the months went by but especially as it became clear that he would suffer death. Dr. Seymour Baker House developed this theme in contrasting More’s Dialogue of Comfort Against Tribulation with the Sadness of Christ with the former much lighter and the latter much darker, being written probably after the execution of the Carthusian monks and just prior to Bishop Fisher’s execution. Dr. Elizabeth McCutcheon explored the changes in the letters to his daughter Margaret written after three different interrogations. And, Dr. John Boyle looked at the letters to fellow prisoner Wilson.
More’s trial was also examined from a number of angles – procedure (did he get a fair procedure for the time period and how does that contrast to today’s procedures), the substance (the Acts of Succession, Supremacy, and Treason; the indictment; the fact that Parliament had insisted that “malice” be an element of treason; whether Richard Rich may have misunderstood More rather than engaged in perjury – the consensus was a resounding “no;” and the roles of the King, Parliament, Judges, and jury).
One of the high points of the conference included a dramatic reading of the trial based upon the multiple accounts of the trial. The trial had the feel of a Good Friday Service and the trial of Jesus. During a question and answer session, one of the lawyers present opined that all the great trials in history are miscarriages of justice, revealing our fallen human nature and the need for redemption in Christ.
The conference was also a great place to begin friendships with fellow travelers, including practicing lawyers, English professors, and philosophers. I became acquainted with the journal Moreana and its editor who traveled from France
New Pastoral Letter on Immigration
Little Rock's new bishop, Anthony Taylor issued his first pastoral letter last week. For those interested in immigration, "I was a Stranger and You Welcomed Me..." A Pastoral Letter on the Human Rights of Immigrants is an important read.
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