Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, February 5, 2009

Killing Abortion Doctors

In a sparkling post that ignited a flurry, Rob argued among other things that killing 12 year olds is different from killing fetuses, and that if the former took place we would not stand idly by. As I recall, only one post addressed the comparison and argued to the contrary that killing a fetus was more serious because of its relative vulnerability. Assuming it would be morally permissible to kill a doctor to prevent the killing of a 12 year old (that is, assuming you do not take a pacifist position), is it morally permissible to kill abortion doctors? Does the legality of abortion make a difference? Why should it if you think abortion law is immoral and unjust? For a thoughtful discussion of many of the issues raised by a "pro choice" proponent who tries to think within the "pro life" framework, see Sherry Colb http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20080109.html.  I am interested in why those who are strongly in the "pro life" camp think that such killing would be immoral (to the extent they do) especially if they have something to add to the arguments made by Colb.

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Michael Paulsen on the Freedom of Choice Act and Moral Accountability

My colleague here at the University of St. Thomas, Mike Paulsen, has posted an analysis on the Moral Accountability website of the likely and substantial legal consequences should the Freedom of Choice Act be enacted.  He concludes that FOCA would have "dramatic and important implications for abortion. It is no mere restatement and duplication of existing Supreme Court decisions (and even if it were, it would remain significant for its entrenchment effects)."

Professor Paulsen's four major points, each of which is developed in further detail in the post, are these:

First, by banning state laws that in any way “interfere with” the choice of abortion before viability - a more abortion-protective standard than exists under present law and a central feature of the bill - FOCA would materially expand abortion rights in several ways. It would invalidate state laws that attempt to persuade women to choose not to have abortions by providing them with information about alternatives to abortion, about the ability of pregnant women to receive state assistance for support of their child, and about the condition and stage of development of the child at the point in pregnancy at which the abortion is sought. FOCA would also likely invalidate “informed consent” laws and 24-hour waiting requirements, on the ground that they “interfere with” the abortion choice. So too, almost certainly, would FOCA void the laws of many states that provide for parental involvement in minors’ abortion decisions. Finally, FOCA’s ban likely would eviscerate state “conscience” laws protecting the right of medical providers and individuals not to provide or assist in providing abortions. FOCA would also invalidate state constitutional provisions (including state constitutional protections of the freedom of speech or the free exercise of religion) protecting pro-life conscience in such fashion.

Second, FOCA also likely would invalidate state law bans on particular methods of abortion, like “partial birth” abortion, that sometimes may be prohibited under current law.

Third, FOCA appears to provide a new federal statutory right to equal state government funding of abortion, where a state provides resources or benefits that support the alternative choice of childbirth and child care and education.

Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, FOCA would serve to entrench abortion rights, in two ways. First, FOCA would provide a federal statutory right to abortion that protects legal abortion at least as much as (indeed, more than) the Supreme Court’s constitutional abortion doctrine under Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In the event the Court were to overrule, limit, or cut back on those decisions, FOCA would provide equivalent or greater legal abortion rights. Second, by so doing, FOCA likely would prevent the Court from ever having the occasion to reconsider (and thus overrule or modify) Roe and Casey in the first place, by rendering such reconsideration unnecessary and pointless. Because a federal statute would in any event protect the abortion right to an equal or greater degree, it would never be necessary for the Supreme Court to “reach” the question of whether the Constitution protected such a right, under usual principles of judicial restraint and avoidance of decision of constitutional questions.

Teens, abstinence, etc.

So, according to this, teenagers are not having sex as much as they used to (or, as much as we were told that they were).  Ann Althouse and others think about why. 

Also relevant, is this essay, by Ryan Anderson, from Public Discourse, about student-led responses to the "hook up" culture on college campuses.

Another new blog

"Law's Eschatology", by former Notre Dame law student, Andrew Hiller.  Check it out.  Some cool clips of St. Thomas More in film, and more to come.

Why Analogies?

Rob's question is exactly right.  As a descriptive matter, the tendency to reach for analogies, I suspect, frequently derives from the fact that abortion analogies are used as cheap rhetorical cudgels with which to beat one's opponents into submission.  (This is, obviously, not true of everyone who uses analogies, but it is quite common to use them in this way and for this reason.) "Abortion is like slavery," so if you equivocate on its legal status, you are like the weak-kneed politicians of the 19th century who opposed slavery but refused to press forward towards abolition out of fear of the social unrest it might generate.  "Abortion is a holocaust," so if you think other issues are weighty enough to justify voting for a pro-choice candidate, then you are like those who sat by silently while the Jews went to the gas chambers.  And on and on...  If, however, abortion is sui generis, as Rob (correctly, in my view) suggests, then it becomes much harder to reject as out of bounds (or per se unreasonable) certain conclusions concerning how to weigh it against other issues.  And, of course, since talk is cheap, using these analogies imposes no costs on the person wielding them to act as we think those people who lived through the Civil War and the holocuast ought to have acted.  If you doubt my reading of the motives for using analogies in this area, I invite you to take a look at some of the comments in the story to which Michael P. linked below about Leslie Tentler's discussion of the recent election. 

"Hallowed Secularism"

Prof. Bruce Ledewitz's blog, "Hallowed Secularism", might be of interest to MOJ readers.  Lots of interesting stuff.  This post, from back in 2007, gives you a sense of the enterprise:

This blog will track the progress of a new way of life in this society, a way of life that may come to be known as Hallowed Secularism. In the short run of the next few months, I will be writing a book that describes this way of life, at least as I see its future. But, in the longer run, others will decide the future of hallowed secularism by living it. There are many religious people who live holy and fulfilling lives. But there are others, like me, who do not fit, or do not quite fit, any of our religions. Such people are secular by definition, at least in popular understanding, but they are not necessarily atheists. Is it possible to live a life of holiness without any of the religions? The easy answer is yes, of course. But, believe me, it is not at all easy even to imagine such lives. Much less live them. Our lives are easily dominated by the power of the everyday, by the mall and the news and the media, and money. A grubby and unfulfilled life. The same sort of life lived by most religious people. But imagine a different life. A life of power, awe and mystery. The sort of life the Bible promises. A taste of the world to come. But not one run by the conventional wisdom of what our religions have become. It is a little hard to believe, but it is possible.

Yes, the election is over, ...

... but the issues remain.  Many MOJ readers will be interested in this piece, published yesterday in NCR online:  Bishops who called Obama vote a sin challenged (here).

(Is that title an intentional double entendre?!)

Michael Dubruiel, R.I.P.

Most MOJ readers know that Amy Welborn is a pioneering and thoughtful Catholic blogger and author.  Her husband, Michael (also a writer) has died, quite suddenly and unexpectedly.  God bless him, and her. 

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

George's clarification on selective abortion

Earlier today I posted an excerpt from CNN that included a rather odd characterization of Robby George's views on selective reduction.  Prof. George writes to clarify:

[The reporter's characterization of my position] is very misleading, though I don't think she intended to mislead.  It was a very long interview that unavoidably required the introduction of some complicated scientific and philosophical issues. At the beginning of the interview, I explained why I and others are opposed to IVF in principle in the first place.  I then explained the health and safety issues that exist even if we lay aside the question of the morality of IVF -- issues having to do with the safety of mothers and the health of children they may conceive by IVF.  Then I explained the European regulations that limit the number of embryos that may be implanted and said that if IVF is permitted by law at all, then regulations such as these should be imposed.  I further explained that the creation of so-called "spare" embryos that might either be destroyed or placed in cryopreservation is a grave violation of the rights of those embryonic human beings.  Then I tried to explain to her at great length the distinction between direct and indirect abortions, not to justify indirect abortions (which, as I explained, are sometimes justified -- e.g., in the case of removal of a cancerous but gravid uterus -- but usually not), but to show her that in the case of indirect abortions questions of fundamental fairness or justice are what control the moral evaluation.  I think that this is what she had trouble following, despite my efforts (and what I'm sure was her good faith).  It is, after all, a complicated business for people who are not accustomed to thinking through issues like this philosophically and who aren't acquainted with the long western and Catholic tradition of casuistry about the ethics of actions that cause death.  In my opinion, which I explained to her, "selective reduction" need not be, and often is not, "direct killing."  (I am using "direct" here as it is used in philosophical analysis--for a good explanation see Germain Grisez's famous article entitled "Towards a Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing."  In natural-law ethics, killing in self-defense and killing advancing enemy combatants in a justified war are examples of "indirect" killing.)  But even in those cases in which it does not violate the norm against direct killing, it is still wrongly causing death (because there is a violation of fundamental justice) and it is therefore an offense against the rights of the child or children whose lives are taken.  That's why I oppose it.  It is true that it is often not the same (though in some cases it is the same) as a social indication abortion, and I conceded that.  (The motivation can be different, as can be the orientation of the will. The ultimate goal may be to save the life of the mother and/or the lives of the remaining children in circumstances in which the number of children being gestated creates a grave risk that the pregnancy will fail prior to their viability.) 

But the norm against direct killing is not the only norm that is relevant, which is why even indirectly causing death (i.e., performing an act that one knows or believes will cause death even where death is not the precise object of one's act) is wrong (fundamentally unjust) in most cases.  When the reporter tried to compress all this into one or two sentences, I'm afraid it came out sounding rather odd and ambiguous.  My mistake, I guess, was in offering a level of philosophical depth and detail that just isn't suitable for inclusion in a newspaper article.  Incidentally, on the question of whether selective reduction is morally justified, I didn't say that I "probably" support the woman's choice to carry her babies to term.  Notice that she didn't quote me on this, it is her characterization.  I think I know what went wrong on this point.  At both the beginning and end of the interview (which was about the whole spectrum of issues raised by the case of the woman with octuplets, and not just the question of "selective reduction"), I told her that what I would say would have to be reported as tentative because there was a lot of uncertainty about the facts of the case and there had been some conflicting reports in the media.  She probably stuck in that term probably" (which, again, she didn't quote, it was her characterization) out of respect for that request.  It's too bad, though, because it makes it sound like I'm unsure.  In fact, I haven't any doubt that what the woman did in refusing selective reduction was right.  To have done otherwise would have been wrong.

Abortion funding is least popular Obama decision

Survey results here.