Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, June 22, 2009

Is an attorney's moral deference a problem?

In light of our conversation about the Catholic legal thought project being too disconnected from the practice of law, I thought readers might be interested in this exchange about how lawyers should view their professional roles. The Northwestern Law Review Colloquy has published an essay by Michael Hatfield titled "Professionalizing Moral Deference."  Hatfield uses the torture memos as evidence of a broader problem: our tendency to professionalize lawyers to view moral deference as a moral good. Here's an excerpt:

From the beginning of law school, a lawyer is idealized as a zealous advocate for her client’s objective.  This biased zealousness is justified by an appeal to the adversarial American legal system.  Each side has a lawyer, and each lawyer is devoted to one side.  The professional role is to further the client’s objective, even if, personally, the lawyer opposes it.  The young lawyer learns to defer to the client’s moral conclusions about the objective.  But the young lawyer also learns to defer to the legal system’s conclusions that this is what lawyers should do.  We are told to suspend our personal moral instincts and to have faith that the legal system accomplishes a greater moral good by our accepting a truncated personal moral role than it could accomplish if we accepted full personal moral responsibility for what we help our clients do.  We are professionalized into believing that we are at no personal moral risk so long as we do a professional job (for which we will be well paid).  We are told to accept the moral good of moral deferenceboth to our clients and to the system.  We are professionalized to believe that moral deference is simply what lawyers do, as if it were a self-evident, natural principle that pardoned our moral misgivings. 

I've written a response essay titled "Professionalizing Moral Engagement."  Here's the opening:

In Professionalizing Moral Deference, Michael Hatfield argues that the way we form lawyers “begins with moral desensitization,” a technique that teaches future lawyers “to override [their] moral intuition.”  In making his case, Hatfield offers the infamous torture memos as Exhibit A, but they may not be the best vehicle for proving his thesis. As the work of John Yoo shows, some of the most scandalously deficient legal advice may stem (at least in part) from the lawyer’s inability or unwillingness to override his moral intuition.  There is no reason to believe, however, that Yoo’s moral intuition would have led him to reject the conclusions set forth in the memos, and there is some evidence that his moral intuition helped shape his analysis.  Seen in this light, the memos could be construed—in direct opposition to Hatfield’s characterization—as evidence that law schools need to redouble their efforts to train lawyers to override their moral intuition.  But this reaction would miss the partial truth underlying Hatfield’s analysis.  The torture memos do underscore a desensitizing that afflicts many lawyers, though its implications are broader—and perhaps less insurmountable—than Hatfield describes.  Although he is undoubtedly correct that lawyers should “stop telling [one another] that overcoming personal moral squeamishness is the great call of the law,” the law’s call is a bit more nuanced: although lawyers should not ignore their own moral squeamishness, neither should they wallow in it.  The lawyer’s cognizance of her own moral intuition should mark the beginning, not the end, of her inquiry into the moral dimension of the representation.

So should Catholic legal thought buy into the notion that an attorney's moral deference to her client is a problem?  My views are set out in the essay, and I'd welcome feedback. 

Sunday, June 21, 2009

An SAT analogy? The election of JPII to the papacy is to the Soviet Union as the election of BHO to the U.S. presidency is to the Iranian theocracy

Well, just a thought, prompted by this piece.

Why should we respond to SSM by having the state get out of marriage?

Over at Public Discourse, David Novak has a typically thoughtful take on same-sex marriage, and while I find the various elements of his analysis reasonable, I have a hard time connecting all the dots.  He argues that a child has a natural right to be raised by his or her biological father and mother.  The tricky part with this argument, of course, is what you do with adoption.  Here's how Novak handles it:

Despite all my talk about natural parentage and childhood, I am in favor of the institution of adoption. Surely, a child’s right to being raised by adults is better upheld by adoptive parents than by natural parents, when these natural parents are unable or unwilling to raise their natural offspring. And, in principle, I am not opposed to a gay or lesbian couple being able to raise a child whose natural parents have abandoned him or her (whether voluntarily, or necessarily in cases of death or debilitating illness). Surely, a child is better raised by a couple who love him or her and each other than being raised in the less personal setting of an orphanage, or being raised by foster parents who are paid by the state to care for children nobody else wants, and who do so at less cost to the state than the cost of maintaining orphanages. Nevertheless, all things being equal, I think it is best that such an abandoned child be adopted by a heterosexual married couple rather than be adopted by a homosexual couple. That is because a heterosexual couple can better simulate—perhaps improve upon—the heterosexual union that produced this child and should be raising this child. It better simulates the duty of the natural parents to this child, a duty they would not or could not exercise. This, by the way, is not arguing empirically that opposite sex couples are necessarily better at raising children than same-sex couples. My arguments are based on the concepts of rights, not on the concept of utility. Thus my arguments are a priori, not a posteriori.

And then he concludes:

I agree with [Martha] Nussbaum when she says: “I personally favor the solution of leaving civil unions to the state and marriage to religions and other private entities.” In fact, for me, such a move would greatly strengthen the social prestige of religious marriage. Yet neither of us is willing to give up on civil marriage, at least not yet. I suspect that giving up on civil marriage now would be an admission of political defeat neither of us is willing to make. In Nussbaum’s case, that would seem to be an admission that the institution of civil marriage cannot be reformed to ever really include all those she wants included in it. In my case, that would seem to be an admission that civil marriage can never be restored to its richer and more coherent traditional meaning. However, since this society is so divided on this question, the disestablishment of civil marriage altogether and its total replacement by civil unions could well be the way this society might have to go for the sake of civil peace.

Here's where I have trouble following the logic: Novak asserts that the public reason of marriage is to "facilitate procreation and the exercise of parental rights and obligations as well as filial rights and obligations."  If same-sex couples should be permitted to adopt children -- and indeed, if opposite--sex couples "are not necessarily better at raising children than same-sex couples" -- then why is the inclusion of same-sex couples so disruptive to the public rationale of marriage so as to justify disestablishing civil marriage altogether?  (I know he's not calling for that, but he is open to the prospect that it might be the most sensible of the viable options.) 

If the state has a role in supporting the commitments that are essential to stable and effective child-rearing, then why abandon civil marriage simply because the institution expands beyond its ideal form, especially since the new form, by my reading of Novak, still supports many (but not all) of the child-rearing goods promoted by marriage?  (Obviously, marriage routinely -- nearly always -- is practiced in some sort of non-ideal form among these fallen human vessels, though SSM expands the non-ideal form categorically, under Novak's argument.) 

Let me put the question somewhat differently: are committed same-sex couples who raise children together more like a traditional marriage, or more like any other civil contract with no capacity for, or inclination toward, the self-transcendence that should accompany marriage?  Even if SSM is deemed to be closer to the latter, isn't ending civil marriage altogether a bit like throwing the baby out with the bath water?  I can understand opposition to SSM, but I have a harder time understanding the argument that the proper response to SSM is to get the state out of the marriage business entirely. 

Saturday, June 20, 2009

Thoughts and Action—Catholic Legal Theory

 

 

I am grateful to the previous interveners who have presented some important points regarding the role of Catholic legal theory in the daily work and lives of Catholic lawyers. I intend my small contribution today to complement what has already been presented.

I include myself amongst those who have questions, even suspicion, about some legal theories. In reading particular law review essays on “legal theory,” for example, I get the impression that their authors either have given little if any consideration to the application of what they have to offer, or if they have, they could only realize in practice what their theories espouse through a radical revolution in the economic, political, and legal structures and cultural institutions in which we exist today.

However, when it comes to Catholic legal theory, or at least what I think we are attempting to accomplish in this agora, I have a different outlook. While we may not often probe the ethical issues surrounding some aspects of the conduct of lawyers, such as reconciling work done and fees charged, we nevertheless do wrestle with fundamental issues that address the essence of the human person and his nature, the relation of the individual and the societies in which the individual exists, and the proper role that law may have involving these important matters that intersect the lives of everyone.

One individual who exemplifies this synthesis of theory development and practical application is Heinrich Rommen. As I page through his The State in Catholic Thought: A Treatise in Political Philosophy and The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, I encounter the mind of a great Catholic layman who was, as Russell Hittinger reminds us, not a theoretician so much as a practicing lawyer writing “in response to a political and legal crisis.” The crises of our day are different from those of the time in which Dr. Rommen wrote these remarkable and insightful texts. Nonetheless, I think that the contributors to the Mirror of Justice expend our humble efforts as Catholics to think about and write on what we understand to be the role of law in responding to the predicaments of the present age.

 

RJA sj

 

Friday, June 19, 2009

Thoughts about the Catholic Legal Theory Project on the Feast of the Sacred Heart

When I went to mass this morning, and heard the readings to celebrate the Feast of the Sacred Heart, I was taken by the beauty of the selection from the letter to Ephesians 3:8-12.14-19.  Here’s a snippet: “…that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith; that you, rooted and grounded in love, may have strength to comprehend with all the holy ones what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, so that you may be filled with all the fullness of God.” 

 

The Gospel (John 19:31-37) then drove home just how fleshy is the whole endeavor: “But when they came to Jesus and saw that he was already dead, they did not break his legs, but one soldier thrust his lance into his side, and immediately blood and water flowed out.”

 

What I like about the questions of our thoughtful practicing-lawyer friend is that they seem to be a call for a deeper sense of the connectedness of the whole project.  I wonder if the idea of a “root” and a “ground” – specifically in love – might be an interesting starting point in answering the question of what is the point of spending time working out a theoretical framework, but in a way that does not become disconnected from the lived experience, and in particular, the lived struggles and sufferings of humanity (including lawyers) around us – so as to ultimately surpass knowledge, and in some way touch the fullness of the experience of God. 

 

I also thought it was interesting that so many of our practicing-lawyer-friend’s questions rang true for me, but I would have framed them not as a tension between practice and theory, but as a more feminine critique of the inaccessibility of theoretical abstractions; or in some contexts, as came up in our discussion of the documents, as a North-American critique of European tendencies to high (for me inaccessible) levels of abstraction. 

 

I am a big believer in the importance of taking time to spin out a theoretical ground and framework for our scholarship.  For me the highlight of the Conference on Catholic Legal Thought last week was the help that I received in working out what could be a fairly abstract argument about the relationship between law and morality as a grounding for my summer work in progress on duty to rescue.  We wrestled quite a bit with the question of whether the underlying story we tell about rescue makes a difference, regardless of the legal outcome.  But I do think that our practicing lawyer friend is right, that in the work of theory, we do need to keep in mind the “questions and needs of real people” – and perhaps having this as a focal point (or to put it another way, being “rooted and grounded in love”) might be the ultimate key to comprehension in any meaningful sense.

 

Finally, over the past week I have spent some time thinking about the journey of the CCLT since the initial 2006 brainstorm.  At that initial gathering we faced a fork in the road: whether to focus more intensively and purposefully on projects to form the next generation of legal scholars in the Catholic intellectual tradition; or more on building an intentional community of mutual encouragement and support among those who are working in the field, with the secondary goal of initial and continued formation in the tradition.  While the first remains a vitally important project and piece of unfinished work, we chose to take the second path. 

 

As Susan and Rob already mentioned, the group includes a very diverse span of perspectives and approaches to the tradition.  My Fordham colleague and others who were there for the first time were impressed to find in an academic environment such an encouraging, accepting atmosphere where one finds what I think is a rather extraordinary capacity to listen to and welcome each other across and within differences.  As our culture, the blog world, and the church itself face the risks of increasing polarization, perhaps one of the real beauties of the CCLT project is the priority that it gives to building these kind of relationships, the space it fosters to be “grounded and rooted in love,” and in this way, to nourish an exchange which is all the richer because of the real differences in our theoretical, practical and experiential perspectives, perhaps even giving us a taste of the “breadth and length and height and depth” of God’s love.

What do lawyers need from Catholic legal thought?

Marc DeGirolami adds these further comments to our discussion of CLT's focus on theory:

Part of the trouble with these sorts of discussions is that it is difficult to know exactly what lawyers "need" from Catholic legal thought.  Sometimes what they need isn't what they think they need.  Sometimes what they think they need is only one small tip of an iceberg that extends much further down than they know about, or perhaps even want to know about.  And I hastily add that I am very much among those lawyers who do not know, but who want to know. 
 
I am not in disagreement with your correspondent that it is foolish to ignore matters of practicality, or application.  But I do very much think that it is unwise to tear away the top-most branch of a tree -- because the urgencies of the day-to-day are all too pressing, or because one just wants to be told the "takeaway" (an ugly, voguish phrase suggesting that what is not immediately consumable is probably useless anyway), or because one finds the branch especially aesthetically pleasing all by itself -- and expect that little fragment to live for long.  The branch belongs to the tree.  I am not suggesting that your correspondent thinks otherwise.  Yet sometimes I wonder in discussions about theory and practice whether those "against theory" can really be against it and still retain a proper sense of intellectual self.

Relevant Work in Property Law and Theory

Cornell Law Review

Volume 94 Issue 4

May 2009
 
SPECIAL ISSUE


Property and Obligation

A Statement of Progressive Property
Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler

Articles

The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law
Gregory S. Alexander

Land Virtues
Eduardo M. Peñalver

Responses

Virtue and Rights in American Property Law
Eric R. Claeys

A Few Questions About the Social Obligation Norm
Jedediah Purdy

Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law
Henry E. Smith

Should Property Scholars Drop Economics for Virtue?  A Skeptical Comment
Katrina M. Wyman

Essay

Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society
Joseph William Singer

Reply

The Complex Core of Property
Gregory S. Alexander

St. Gregory's University and Catholic Higher Education

Recently, I was appointed to St. Gregory's University's Board of Directors.  Yesterday, I attended my first board function - an all day retreat,  And, I came away inspired and very hopeful about the future of Catholic higher education, at least in Oklahoma.  The day started with the University's Chancellor, Abbot Lawrence Stasyszen, O.S.B. providing an overview of St. Gregory's mission and vision.  What was clear from the start was that St. Gregory's aspires to provide an integrated Catholic education in the fullest sense.  Abbot Lawrence said that although the Board has a separate Committee on Mission Effectiveness, mission effectiveness ought to be a top or central priority for every committee.  He said that the Catholic and Benedictine identity of the university must be intentionally fostered and not left to chance and must be present in every facet of the university. He pointed to Paragraph 49 of Ex Corde Ecclesiae (the Catholic university as "a living institutional witness to Christ and his message...") as a foundation for the work of the university.  I look forward to contributing my small part to the development of this wonderful institution.

St. Gregory's is a small Catholic liberal arts university located in Shawnee, Oklahoma (with a College for Working Adults located in Tulsa, Oklahoma City, and Shawnee).  Its fascinating history dates to the 1870's when the Citizen Potawatomi Nation asked the Benedictines to send priests to Indian Territory.  The relationship between the Benedictines and the Citizen Potawatomi continues to this day with the current Chairman of the tribe serving on St. Gregory's board.  (As an aside, both Jim Thorpe and Tony Hillerman were baptized by this group of Benedictine's in their Sacred Heart Mission in nearby Konawa, Ok).

Theory and Practice

Two quick responses to the practicing lawyer's concernsthat our conversations may be too theoretical and too disconnected from the issues that matter to Catholic lawyers.

  • As Marc DeGirolami's comments suggest (to me anyway) the issue isn't theory vs. practice so much as examination of the foundational structures of our society vs. the practical day to day issues facing practicing lawyers.  Both sides of the equation have theoretical and practical aspects.  What I hear from the practicing lawyer is that s/he would like those of us who are gifted with more time for reflection to devote some energy to helping envision a way to make the practice more human.  And, this seems to be a worthy goal.
  • The Catholic Legal Theory project is developing along multiple fronts.  Some professors devote the bulk of their scholarly energy to what I consider a rear guard action of protecting the religious liberty of the faithful.  Others are involved primarily in exploring the foundations of our political communities, attempting to mine what is good in the liberal tradition, disregarding what is inhumane (radical autonomy, for instance), and recover what the Catholic tradition has to offer our ailing culture.  Still others focus on humanizing the law practice.  As to the latter, in the Spring of 2007, MOJer, Lisa Schiltz organized and hosted an excellent conference at St. Thomas, Workplace Restructuring to Accommodate Family Life, which is published in the St. Thomas Law Journal.    

A clarification on CLT and "theory"

The Catholic attorney who has raised questions about the direction of the Catholic legal thought project offers this clarification in response to Marc DeGirolami's post:

At one level I agree with Marc that the issue isn't whether CST is too focused on "theory"; it's whether the "theory" has any application to practice.  Mathematics, like CST, is, at one level, all theoretical, but academics still make a distinction between theoretical and applied mathematics.  I think the more important question is whether Catholic academics are using CST to speak to the questions and needs of real people (applied) or are using CST to engage the "law" as a purely, or at least primarily, theoretical matter.