Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, August 20, 2009

Ted Olson

With respect to Michael's shout-out to members of the Federalist Society (yes I am!), Ted Olson's quip -- "I thought, why wouldn’t I take this case?  Because someone at the Federalist Society thinks I’d be making bad law? I wouldn’t be making bad law.” -- misses the point of those who are critical of his involvement in the effort to secure a declaration by judges that same-sex marriage is constitutionally required.  As Orin Kerr explains, here, the criticism is not that Ted is "making . . . law" that "someone at the Federalist Society" thinks is "bad", but rather that he is making arguments of a type that he has been rejecting and opposing for years:

What makes Olson's involvement in the same-sex marriage litigation so interesting — and among right-of-center lawyers, controversial — is that his position is relying on the kinds of constitutional arguments that Olson is personally so closely identified with rejecting. The Times story touches on this, but I would add a bit more detail. Those who have watched Olson's annual Supreme Court Roundups for the Federalist Society know how harsh Olson tends to be about judges who Olson thinks are constitutionalizing their policy views, especially when that means constitutionalizing social policies popular among elites. Olson hasn't just been critical of those who take a broad view of constitutional meaning in this setting: he has been dismissive and sometimes even brutal. 

The surprising aspect of the new case is that it has Olson making same kinds of constitutional arguments that he has specialized in ridiculing for so long. . .

Rob's (and Vischer's) question

In response to Rob -- whose question would certainly "deserve an answer", even if Prof. Dershowitz's did not -- who asks, "if moral opposition to the death penalty requires resignation for a judge who is required to preside over the death penalty, why doesn't moral opposition to the killing of an innocent person (who appears at the habeas hearing with the wife he's accused of murdering) require resignation?", two quick thoughts. 

First, I think Justice Scalia is mistaken (and I said so, I recall, at the same event where he gave the speech from which Rob quotes) if he thinks that "moral opposition to the death penalty [necessarily] requires resignation" for a judge.  It depends.  (John Garvey and Amy Coney Barrett have a very helpful law-review article on this subject, as does Ed Hartnett.)  Second, Justice Scalia probably believes that exceedingly unlikely that he would ever be put in the position of having to provide the vote that would result in (even though it would not require) the execution of a person known (and believed by Scalia) to be innocent.  Perhaps, if he had to cast such a vote -- if he believed both that he lacked the power to stop the execution and that the person in question was innocent -- he would, and should, resign.

A Conservative’s Road to Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy

That's the title of an interesting piece (NYT, 8/19/09) about Ted Olson's role in the effort to get SCOTUS to rule that states may not deny the benefit of law to same-sex unions.  An excerpt:

Theodore B. Olson's office is a testament to his iconic status in the conservative legal movement. A framed photograph of Ronald Reagan, the first of two Republican presidents Mr. Olson served, is warmly inscribed with “heartfelt thanks.” Fifty-five white quills commemorate each of his appearances before the Supreme Court, where he most famously argued the 2000 election case that put George W. Bush in the White House. On the bookshelf sits a Defense Department medal honoring his legal defense of Mr. Bush’s counterterrorism policies after Sept. 11.

But in a war room down the hall, where Mr. Olson is preparing for what he believes could be the most important case of his career, the binders stuffed with briefs, case law and notes offer a different take on a man many liberals love to hate. They are filled with arguments Mr. Olson hopes will lead to a Supreme Court decision with the potential to reshape the legal and social landscape along the lines of cases like Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade: the legalization of same-sex marriage nationwide.

[Any members of the Federalist Society out there?  In the article, Olson says:]

“I thought, why wouldn’t I take this case?  Because someone at the Federalist Society thinks I’d be making bad law? I wouldn’t be making bad law.”

Read the rest, here.

Why doesn't Dershowitz's question deserve an answer?

In fairness to Prof. Dershowitz, I do not think he is scolding Justice Scalia for, as Rick puts it, "not being more aggressive about incorporating the moral teachings of the Roman Catholic Church into the constitutional doctrines of the United States Supreme Court."  Dershowitz is referring to Justice Scalia's assertion in First Things that he would have to resign from the bench if he was morally opposed to the death penalty.  Back in 2002, Scalia wrote:

But while my views on the morality of the death penalty have nothing to do with how I vote as a judge, they have a lot to do with whether I can or should be a judge at all. To put the point in the blunt terms employed by Justice Harold Blackmun towards the end of his career on the bench, when he announced that he would henceforth vote (as Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall had previously done) to overturn all death sentences, when I sit on a Court that reviews and affirms capital convictions, I am part of “the machinery of death.” My vote, when joined with at least four others, is, in most cases, the last step that permits an execution to proceed. I could not take part in that process if I believed what was being done to be immoral.

Dershowitz raising this does not suggest that Catholics must incorporate Church teachings into the Constitution in order to be good Catholics.  Scalia's assertion focuses on the judge's duty to conscience in the face of a directly conflicting legal/professional obligation.  I think Dershowitz's question is a valid one: if moral opposition to the death penalty requires resignation for a judge who is required to preside over the death penalty, why doesn't moral opposition to the killing of an innocent person (who appears at the habeas hearing with the wife he's accused of murdering) require resignation?

Dershowitz's disingenuity

It is strange to hear Prof. Dershowitz scolding Justice Scalia for not being more aggressive about incorporating the moral teachings of the Roman Catholic Church into the constitutional doctrines of the United States Supreme Court.  Weren't we supposed to be afraid of Catholic justices precisely because of their supposed irresistible tendency to engage in such incorporation? 

Putting aside this transparent double-standarding, I am almost surprised that Prof. Dershowitz allowed his name to be attached in print to this:

[W]hatever the view of the church is on executing the guilty, surely it is among the worst sins, under Catholic teaching, to kill an innocent human being intentionally. Yet that is precisely what Scalia would authorize under his skewed view of the United States Constitution. How could he possibly consider that not immoral under Catholic teachings? If it is immoral to kill an innocent fetus, how could it not be immoral to execute an innocent person?

Yawn.  Of course, Prof. Dershowitz, it is an immoral exercise of public authority to "kill an innocent human being intentionally."  And, of course, Justice Scalia would consider such a killing immoral.  (He might ask you, though, why you think it's fine to kill an "innocent fetus.")  But (see Ed Whelen's response):  "[T]here is nothing in Scalia’s position as to what the Constitution permits on this issue that speaks to what he regards as moral or immoral."

To be clear:  to cringe at Prof. Dershowitz's silly piece is not to endorse the view that Justice Scalia expressed in Herrera about the power of a federal court to enjoin a state's execution.  But, it seems to me that even we Catholics who oppose capital punishment should object to such an opportunistic and simplistic deployment of the "Catholic morality" card.

U.S. Bishops Must Back Obama

So says an editorial in the August 15 issue of The [London] Tablet  The International Catholic Weekly:

President Barack Obama’s health-care reforms are in deep trouble. All over the United States rival lobby groups have argued and sometimes clashed as opponents of the reforms sense they may be on the verge of victory. There may be sufficient votes in Congress from an awkward alliance of Republicans and conservative Democrats to ensure that whatever legislation emerges from the hullabaloo is a pale shadow of what Mr Obama intended, and indeed promised, during his election campaign. It is unfortunate that the one body that could turn out to be a decisive strategic force in his favour, the US Catholic bishops, have so far concentrated on a specifically Catholic issue – making sure state-funded health care does not include abortion – rather than the more general principle of the common good. Through the national network of Catholic hospitals, delivering nearly 20 per cent of all hospital care, and through the influence they wield as leaders of America’s largest Christian denomination, they could play a central role in salvaging Mr Obama’s health-care programme.

This is indeed a Catholic matter. Few government proposals have had “preferential option for the poor” stamped over them more clearly. Nearly 50 million Americans do not have health-care coverage, which means they cannot afford to go to their doctor when they have symptoms that ought to be investigated, nor can they buy simple and effective remedies such as antibiotics. The Church’s teaching is clear: health care is a basic right, derived from the right to life itself. Of course abortion is important, but the Catholic bishops have not put anything like equal stress on these other social justice dimensions of the health-care debate. Though some grass-roots Catholic lobby groups have mobilised to support the Obama reforms, without episcopal support they will remain marginal to the debate.

The opponents of change are largely funded by the operators of the health insurance industry, which, as in the early 1990s, sense a threat to their profits. They are the robber barons of their age. All the dark arts of media misrepresentation have been deployed to turn public opinion against Mr Obama’s policy. Through their greed and inefficiency, America spends something like double per head on health care compared with a country such as France, whose state-run health system is acknowledged as one of the world’s best. Even at the level of spin and sound bites, the bishops could make a difference. They could refute the constant slur of “socialised medicine” that opponents throw mindlessly around, simply by saying that health care for all is in fact “Catholic medicine”. Once they began to introduce reason and truth into the debate, they could also point out that what Mr Obama is proposing is in principle no different from extending Medicare – which brings affordable medical treatment to America’s elderly – to everyone.

When Britain’s National Health Service was set up in 1948, the Catholic hierarchy led by Cardinal Griffin was also preoccupied with its own Catholic agenda, not abortion but winning an opt-out for Catholic hospitals. So the birth of the National Health Service, one of the great forward strides for social justice, had no Catholic blessing. The bishops failed to put the promotion of social justice above their churchly priorities. It is a mistake the American bishops may be about to repeat.

Transubstantiation

As we have been working our way through John 6 at Mass these past few weeks, this passage from the Omnivore's Dilemma caught my attention.  "[The grass farmer] reached down deep where his pigs were happily rooting and brought a  handful of fresh compost right up to my nose.  What had been cow manure and woodchips just a few weeks before now smelled as sweet and warm as the forest floor in summertime, a miracle of transubstantiation." 

Wednesday, August 19, 2009

Dershowitz vs. Scalia on Catholic social teaching

One of the highlights of my first year of law school was when my Criminal Law class signed a petition asking Justice Scalia to attend one of our class sessions and debate our professor, Alan Dershowitz, who was always challenging Scalia's views on the Constitution without the Justice being around to defend himself.  To our surprise, Scalia accepted and called Dershowitz (who did not know about our invitation) to let him know that he was going to have a visitor in class.  I had a front row seat for a rollicking debate.

History may be repeating itself, and the coming debate, if it happens, should prove to be even more interesting for those interested in Catholic legal theory.  Details here

On Callahan on Rationing

Peter Steinfels quotes Dan Callahan as saying  "whenever demand for some resource outstrips supply, as seems to be the case for quality medical care, some kind of rationing, whether by official policy or by economic advantage, starts to operate."

However, "rationing" must be conscious in order to be degrading. When market forces (or geographic distances or any other barriers not aimed against any particular group) discriminate, as at present, there is physical harm to the health of some of us -- and we should indeed help those of us in need through higher taxes.

But when the State says who deserves to live and who does not, an invidious principle become a knife inserted into the heart of democracy, human equality, and human dignity. Some of us lose not only money or health care but also (and more importantly, I think)  equal respect for our lives and for our very being.

Question about Natural Family Planning and the EEOC

WIth respect to the question posed by our reader, I agree with Rob that the EEOC is unlikely to deem the coverage of NFP sufficient.  It is the second of the reasons Rob mentioned that is key.

The claim here is not that an employer is obligated to provide some family planning coverage (such that NFP might be viewed to be sufficient), but that failing to cover prescription contraception is a form of sexual discrimination.  Because prescription contraceptives are used exclusively by women, the exclusion of coverage is viewed as discrimination on the basis of sex (and/or pregnancy).  It has also been argued that if a plan cover other prescription medication and not contraceptives, women bear a disproportionate share of out-of-pocket health care costs.

As an aside, the state laws that deal with this issue typically require that if a plan provides any prescription coverage, it has to provide coverage of all FDA-approved means of prescription contraception.

I don't think Rob's first argument would be persuasive in the absence of the second.  Employers have tremendous freedom re what they cover under their health plsns.  In the absence of a claim of sexal discrimination, it is irrelevant what other purpose contraception is used for.