Read it over at dotCommonweal. As of now, there are 53 comments!
from the December 05, 2009 edition -
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1205/p09s02-coop.html
Monday, December 7, 2009
Cathy Kaveny on "Conscience and Culture Wars -- and Lawyers" (and on Rick Garnett too)
Christianity in contemporary Europe
Notre Dame's Fr. McBrien on the state of the Catholic Church today
Fr. McBrien writes:
If anyone wonders why the Catholic church presents such a different face to the world and to the Body of Christ today in comparison with the world and the church of the 1960s and 1970s, we need look no further than the extraordinarily abbreviated pontificate of John Paul I.
. . .
Paul VI died of a heart attack at Castel Gandolfo Aug. 6, 1978, the feast of the Transfiguration. He had planned his own funeral. His coffin was at ground level, surmounted not by the papal tiara nor even by a miter or stole, but by the open book of the Gospels that fluttered in the light breeze across St. Peter's Square.
His successor was the Patriarch of Venice, Albino Luciani, who was the first pope to take a double name, to honor, he said, the pope (John XXIII) who had ordained him a bishop and who preceded him as Patriarch of Venice, and the pope (Paul VI) who had named him a cardinal.
In his remarks just before he gave the traditional Sunday blessing from the window of the Apostolic Palace (it was Aug. 27, the day after his election), he pointed out to the enthusiastic crowds below in St. Peter's Square, "Be sure of this: I do not have the wisdom of heart of Pope John. I do not have the preparation and culture of Pope Paul."
John Paul I was not only the first pope to take a double name; he was also the first pope in more than a thousand years to refuse to be crowned with the triple tiara.
Late in the evening of Sept. 28, John Paul I died of a heart attack while reading in bed. The Romans had taken such a liking to this humble, smiling pope that they reacted more emotionally to his death than they had to Pope Paul VI's only two months earlier.
The cardinal-electors rushed back to Rome in virtual shock, determined to elect someone with the necessary physical vigor to bear the burdens of the office.
The assumption was that the new pope would be another Italian, as had been the case for the past four centuries and a half. The leading candidate, Cardinal Giovanni Benelli, archbishop of Florence, had spent many years in the Roman Curia and, in the process, had made some enemies. There was also some resentment of the key part he had played in the election of John Paul I.
Although Cardinal Benelli received the most votes on the early ballots, he could not reach the required two-thirds necessary for election and his support began to wane. The cardinals then turned to the 76-year-old Cardinal Carlo Columbo, archbishop of Milan, but he announced that he would not accept election.
This left the Italians without a viable candidate, and so for the first time since 1522 they elected a non-Italian, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Poland, who took the name John Paul II.
Although he would do many good things in the 26 and a half years he occupied the office, John Paul II's appointments to, and within, the hierarchy were not among them.
And that is the main reason why the Catholic church is experiencing such difficulty today.
[Fr. McBrien is the Crowley-O'Brien Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame. His entire piece is is here.]
Quick Point on Cathy Kaveny's Observation
Hello All,
I've been out of town and away from the present conversation, and am just now catching up. (More on the interesting conference that had me away in a subsequent post presently.) I do think I have a quick partial reply to Cathy, however, with which perhaps Robby and others will agree:
So I think that in a scenario like Cathy's 2, I would argue, for one thing, along lines of her option 2.d. But I would also argue along another line that sort of fuses, in what I think more persuasive form, Cathy's stated options 2a. through 2.c.:
I would first note that there are a very few quite morally fundamental issues (all of which seem to involve life or death) over which disagreement is and has always been widespread and profound, which we accordingly often call 'inherently contestible' issues. I would then say that where somebody conscientiouasly holds a position in re such an issue which in good faith prevents her performing certain actions that represent a very small portion of the full set of those actions constitutive of a particular profession, accommodation is not only reasonable, but is both morally and, perhaps, legally (on 1A grounds) required. One might indeed be incapable of being a conscientiously Catholic abortion clinic operator, for example; but it beggars belief to suppose that one could not be a conscientious Catholic doctor simply because one could not in good conscience perform one or two or three (life-taking) out the the literally thousands of (over-whelmingly life-ensuring or -saving) procedures that doctors characteristically perform.
To take up one of Cathy's proferred analogies, by way of illustration: It is of course true that we do not admit those who will not fire weapons to the profession of police officer. But this would seem to be because, in the US at any rate as distinguished, say, from the UK, weapons-use is, for better or worse (I think maybe worse), at the core of the job.
(Perhaps, by the way, we should indeed allow conscientious objectors to weapons use into our police forces. It might be a very good idea, and even take us in the direction of the UK. I'd go for that -- it might even be an instance of the good that Cathy sees promised by her Option d. -- at least if we could get Uzis out of the hands of crooks. Real gun control laws might enable us to employ many more unarmed constables.)
Now contrast the situation of the would-be non-lethal constable with that of Catholic medics, who object to only the tiniest fraction of procedures now considered 'medical.' To my thinking, it would constitute an intolerable form of intolerance for the state to say, to so all-pervasively life-cherishing a healer as our envisaged Catholic doctor, 'no, you must be willing to perform this marginal killing procedure as well, on pain of prohibition from licensure to perform any of them, including the thousands of life-ensuring ones.' To me it would be disquieting indeed to learn that anyone thought this reasonable.
I also am quite convinced, by the way, that I would argue this even were I the most militantly NOWish of 'pro-choicers.' Choice surely cuts both ways if it cuts any. To say otherwise is surely to be, not pro-choice, but pro-conscription.
All best,
Bob
Cathy Kaveny comments (with a question for Robby) in the wake of the Robby-Chip to-and-fro
[Cathy writes:]
I read the interchange between Robby and Chip a couple of times, with an
increasing sense of disquiet. Finally, I realized it is because the discussion
is running together two distinct situations, which seem to me to need separate
arguments. To see how this is the case, focus on the central case of
"conscientious objection"--in American law and perhaps in American political
morality: the military and the pacifist.
The conscientious objection
situation comes up in its core form because a) the military wants to draft the
pacifist; and b) coerce him to do things he doesn't want to do: kill people.
It's not, after all, as if the pacifist is banging down the door of the local
recruitment center, saying a) let me join the military ; and b) by the way, you
oughtn't make me kill people.
So how does this transfer to the current
situation in the medical realm (I'm assuming no laws on the books)? It seems to
me we need to distinguish between two situations.
1. People who are
already in the medical profession. These people, it seems to me, have a strong
case on exemption from new requirements to act in a way that violates their
morality based in a reliance interest. They joined the profession knowing they
wouldn't have act in a way that violated their conscience, the professional
entrance requirements are long, expensive, and difficult. It imposes a hardship
on them forcing them to choose to give up their jobs --their livelihood-- in
order to act with moral integrity. They have a right to continue on the terms
they joined the profession.
2. People who are not already in the medical
profession. These people have no reliance interest. They haven't made the
investment in their careers--they haven't spent the money, the time, and the
training. They can act according to their consciences and earn a livelihood by
going into a different profession. They're still young. What they want is to
say a) let me join the medical profession; and b) don't make me violate my
conscience by acting in a way that I consider killing. Prima facie, they are in
exactly the same position as the pacifist who a) wants to to join the army; and
b) who doesn' want to kill.
I think the case for allowing conscientious
objection is very strong and self-evident in case 1. But it's harder in case
2--and that's the key case. The argument needs to be made that they ought to be
allowed to enter into a profession, some of whose requirements are inconsistent
with their view of the requirements of moral norms. Suppose a legislative body
said, "Okay, we'll grandfather in all people who won't do abortions, etc., for
fairness reasons. But we're not going to let anyone else in who won't do the
job as the job is defined." What do you say to them.?
a. You could
say, "well, we're right on the merits--abortion is intentional killing of the
innocent." The problem with doing that, of course, is that in this scenario,
you've already lost that argument. They're making the law, and they don't
agree.
b. You could say, "well, we have a right to go into the medical
profession and not do procedures to which we morally object." But why? We
don't say that people have a right to become policemen if they won't fire a
weapon. We say, "don't become a policeman if you don't want to fire a weapon."
c. You could make an analogy to the Americans with Disabilities Act.
You could say, "we have an objection to performing an act which is not an
essential act of the job, and you should treat it like a moral disability--make
reasonable accommodation." This would get you coverage for the pharmacists, and
most doctors--not OB/GYNS, probably. And people would have to admit their moral
beliefs were a disability--that's a huge problem.
d. You could make a
holistic argument. The vision of health care that is provided by pro-life
doctors and nurses is a a radical witness to mercy--to the value of all life, to
the unconditional demand for care. Having such a witness in the system is a
leaven--it's worth the price people might have to pay in inconvenience in
getting some procedures, because of the way in which their values vividly focus
on the importance of each human life in the system. The majority doesn't see
the witness as inevitably connected to refusal to perform those procedures--but
the people themselves do, and that's what's important. I myself think this is
the way to go.
At any rate, I would love to hear Robby's arguments based
on conscience that address my scenario 2.
Chip Lupu's reply to Robby George
[Chip has indicated that this will be his final comment in the to-and-fro with Robby.]
There is no point in beating up on the New York Times. The reporter read to me
in advance what she was attributing to me. I did not know that "fear-mongering"
was in quotation marks. But, in the rush of the conversation, I was more
concerned with the accuracy of the rest of the quote, and so did not focus on
the offending word until it was too late. And I do believe -- and I said this
to the reporter, which led her to choose that word -- that the Declaration, like
the anti-Prop 8 campaign, stokes unfounded fears among religious conservatives,
whether or not it is designed to do so.
Robby thinks that I am
insufficiently sensitive to pro-life convictions and rights to religious
liberty. I think he is utterly insensitive to competing rights and interests --
those of pregnant women, and of members of same-sex couples. I try to balance
the competing rights; he doesn't. Enough said.
As to the purely
religious content of the Declaration -- at whom were the passages on marriage
aimed? If they were aimed at the faithful, they are unobjectionable. If,
however, they were aimed at lawmakers, they are entirely objectionable as an
attempt to persuade those who exercise state power to impose an exclusively
religious view on the law of marriage. The Constitution forbids the state from
restricting liberty based on exclusively religious reasons. Robby, I believe,
was a defender of the regime that was legitimated by Bowers v. Hardwick, which
allowed for the criminalization of same-sex intimacy. Until Bowers was
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, that too involved the use of legal machinery to
impose a view that had no secular justification. If aimed at lawmakers, the
Declaration's passages on marriage -- wholly devoid of any secular justification
for prohibiting same-sex marriage -- are a replay of that.
Cert Grant in Christian Legal Society Leadership-Selection case
See the press release from CLS and the Alliance Defense Fund. It is excellent news for organizational freedom that the Court is willing to look at overturning the Ninth Circuit decision in this case.
The U.S. Supreme Court Monday agreed to decide whether a public university can refuse to recognize a religious student group because the group requires its leaders to share its religious beliefs. Attorneys with the Christian Legal Society and the Alliance Defense Fund Center for Academic Freedom represent a student chapter of CLS, which Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco refused to recognize because the group requires all of its officers and voting members to subscribe to its basic Christian beliefs.
Robby replies to Chip (where's Fred MacMurray when you need him?)
I'm grateful to Chip Lupu for responding to Michael Perry's request for a comment on his post and my reply. I'm glad that Chip regrets the use of the word "fear-mongering" that, he says, was wrongly attributed to him by the New York Times reporter. He says that he didn't use the word. It must be frustrating to him, as it is to me, that the reporter claimed to be quoting Chip directly. Indeed, the reporter singled out the word for placement in quotation marks. It is outrageous conduct on the part of the reporter, and another black mark against the Times.
Having expressed regret about the rhetoric attributed to him, Chip nevertheless closes his reply by accusing me of not having a "balanced" view of the subject of religious liberty and the claims of conscience. Looking closely at Chip's third paragraph, we can easily see the worth of this accusation. One has a "balanced" view when one sides with Chip on such questions as whether physicians should be required to refer for abortions and in some cases perform them, and whether pharmacists ought to be required to dispense abortifacient drugs, One doesn't have a "balanced' view when one disagrees with Chip.
The most important thing to see about that paragraph is that Chip doesn't deny that the impositions on conscience that I catalogued are coming at Catholic and other pro-life physicians, nurses, and pharmacists. It's just that he thinks some or many of these impositions on conscience are justified. Pro-life health care workers, Chip says, "cannot just ignore those women's interests [in obtaining an abortion] because they dislike what the women plan to do." Note Chip's characterization of the ground of pro-lifers' objections to implicating themselves in the deliberate taking of innocent unborn human life: they "dislike" what the women plan to do. That characterization, if Chip can get the reader to buy it, even if only implicitly, would be very helpful to his effort to weaken the moral force and intellectual plausibility of conscience claims by pro-life health care workers (and people like me who lack a "balanced" view). After all, governments legitimately require people to do things they "dislike" all the time. But the truth is that pro-lifers don't merely "dislike" abortion. That is at best a tendentious and grossly inadequate characterization of their view. They reasonably believe that abortion is the deliberate taking of innocent human life. That should matter in thinking about whether it is just to compel pro-life health care workers to implicate themselves in abortions. Now, Chip is entitled to his view that the impositions on conscience he favors are justifiable. What no one is entitled to do, in my opinion, is to deny what is a plain matter of fact, namely that these impositions are indeed coming at pro-lifers in the health field. So I'm glad that Chip didn't deny it. The fact that he didn't deny it is, to my mind, the most telling and important thing about his comment.
I was a bit puzzled by Chip's claim that the Manhattan Declaration's sections on marriage are "obviously a statement of theological views dressed up in sort-of secular talk." What's the charge here? Is it that the Manhattan Declaration pretends to be a secular statement while in reality it is a theological statement? Could the Manhattan Declaration have possibly made it clearer that it is a religious statement. Its subtitle is "A Call of Christian Conscience." It says that "[w]e, as Orthodox, Catholic, and Evangelical Christians . . . act together in obedience to the one true God, the triune God of holiness and love, who has laid total claim on our lives and by that claim calls us with believers in all ages and all nations to seek and defend the good of all who bear his image. We set forth this declaration in light of the truth that is grounded in Holy Scripture, in natural human reason (which is itself, in our view, the gift of a beneficent God), and in the very nature of the human person."
In my own scholarly writings, I usually analyze moral problems as matters of natural law. That's the business I'm in. I present arguments that do not appeal to revelation, theological convictions, or authority of any type beyond the authority of reason itself. The Manhattan Declaration is a different kind of project, however. Although the sanctity of human life in all stages and conditions, the dignity of marriage as the conjugal union of husband and wife, and the right to religious freedom are certainly defensible as matters of natural law, they are also principles of Christian faith (as the Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Evangelical Protestant traditions understand the faith), and the Manhattan Declaration presents them as such. The signatories, far from hiding (or "dressing up") their Christian convictions in "sort-of secular talk," place these convictions in the foreground.
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Taking a break from political controversy
[We can watch it on television December 29.
If my Irish Catholic maternal grandmother--ever, and understandably in her time, insecure about the place of Catholics in the United States--were alive and posting this item, she would emphasize that Dave Brubeck and Bruce Springsteen are Catholic. For all I know, De Niro is too. Mel Brooks, however, I am confident, is not!]
WASHINGTON — Political and entertainment luminaries gathered here over the weekend for the 32nd annual Kennedy Center Honors, a two-day celebration that brings together some of the most influential figures in Washington and Hollywood.
The recipients of the award this year were Robert De Niro, Mel Brooks, Bruce Springsteen, the mezzo-soprano and soprano Grace Bumbry and the jazz musician Dave Brubeck. A gala performance on Sunday night at the Kennedy Center capped off a busy weekend for the recipients, who also attended a dinner Saturday hosted by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and a Sunday reception with President Obama at the White House.
The performance, which was scheduled to include appearances by Meryl Streep, Aretha Franklin, Sting and Herbie Hancock, will be broadcast on CBS on Dec. 29.
In remarks at the White House, Mr. Obama thanked the honorees for “the joy and the beauty” they brought to people’s lives.
“In times of war and sacrifice, the arts — and these artists — remind us to sing and to laugh and to live. In times of plenty, they challenge our conscience and implore us to remember the least among us,” Mr. Obama said. “In moments of division or doubt, they compel us to see the common values that we share; the ideals to which we aspire, even if we sometimes fall short. In days of hardship, they renew our hope that brighter days are still ahead.”
A 19-time Grammy winner firmly rooted in the Jersey Shore, Mr. Springsteen has made top-selling albums including 1975’s “Born to Run” — which, in addition to the title track, included “Thunder Road” and “Tenth Avenue Freeze-Out” — and 1984’s “Born in the U.S.A.” He has also won an Academy Award.
At the State Department dinner, which was emceed by the comedienne and 2003 honoree Carol Burnett, the violinist Itzhak Perlman spoke of how Mr. Springsteen, 60, who is known for his famously long concerts with his E Street Band, connected with his audience.
“He gives his audience what it wants, but he also lets them know what they want and helps teach them to want more,” said Mr. Perlman, also a 2003 honoree.
The dinner was also attended by Jon Stewart, Martin Short, Caroline Kennedy and Melissa Etheridge.
Mr. De Niro, 66, who was born in New York, won Oscars for his portrayal of Vito Corleone in the 1974 film “The Godfather: Part II” and 1980’s “Raging Bull,” in which he played the boxer Jake LaMotta under the direction of his longtime collaborator Martin Scorsese, a 2007 Kennedy Center Honor recipient. The two also worked together on, among other movies, “Goodfellas,” “Mean Streets” and “Taxi Driver.”
Mr. Brooks, who was born in Brooklyn, is among an elite group of performers who have won Emmy, Grammy, Oscar and Tony Awards. “The Producers,” a 1968 film that was retooled as a musical and brought to Broadway more than three decades later, captured 12 Tony Awards and won Mr. Brooks an Oscar for Best Original Screenplay. At the State Department dinner, Mr. Brooks said becoming an honoree at age 83 was “better late than never.”
Susan Stroman, who directed the musical version of “The Producers,” said, “I don’t know anyone who loves being themselves as much as Mel Brooks loves being Mel Brooks.”
Mr. Brubeck is perhaps best known for “Time Out,” the 1959 album he made with the Dave Brubeck Quartet that included the single “Take Five.” According to event organizers, Mr. Brubeck, who turned 89 on Sunday, is believed to be the first honoree to celebrate a birthday on the day of the gala performance.
On Saturday night, former President Bill Clinton spoke of humming a portion of Mr. Brubeck’s “Blue Rondo a la Turk” to prove to the jazz pianist he was a fan.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Clinton recounted, he received a signed picture from Mr. Brubeck and the chart to the song. “It hangs in the music room of my home today,” Mr. Clinton said. “It hung in the White House every single day I was there.”
Ms. Bumbry, 72, made her debut at the Paris Opera in 1960, playing Amneris in “Aida.” She performed in honor of Marian Anderson at the first Kennedy Center Honors in 1978.
Chip Lupu responds to Robby George
[I sent my post and Robby's response to Chip Lupu for possible comment. Here is Chip's comment:]
Thank you very much
for sharing this exchange with me. It might surprise you (and perhaps
make Robby feel better) to learn that I was not happy with the attribution of
the word "fear-mongering" to me in that story. I never used it
in talking to the reporter. I did say, as I do believe, that the concerns
and fears of the anti-same sex marriage movement are vastly overstated—that's
an objective reference, relating their statement to the actual state of the
law, and is not a subjective imputation of motives. And, as I recall, I
also said to the Times reporter that the Manhattan Declaration was of a piece
with articles that had been published in law journals and elsewhere, and with
ads that ran in connection with Prop. 8 in California, that did indeed play
upon the anxieties of religiously conservative voters. The best example
is the suggestion that pastors would be prosecuted for anti-gay sermons.
In the recent debate over federal Hate Crimes legislation, this was
repeated. Was that "in good faith"? Or was it designed to
stir up irrational opposition to a law that does not and could not (see the
First Amendment) criminalize expression of the view that homosexual intimacy is
sinful?
So I do regret the use of the word "fear-mongering," but I do not
regret the objective point that religious liberty is well-protected, by
Constitution and statute, against most of the onslaughts referenced in the
Declaration.
Robby's long list of examples in his post is impressive—until you break it down
and reflect upon its details. First, some of what he describes may well
be unlawful; does he think the First Amendment is insufficient protection of
religious liberty just because states sometimes violate it? Second, most
of his comments on abortion-related exemptions ignore entirely the competing,
constitutionally based interests of women who seek abortions.
State-granted religious exemptions cannot unduly burden their rights.
That takes some juggling in at least some of the cases that Robby describes—his
side won't always win the balancing match. Doctors and nurses and
pharmacists who treat pregnant women have professional obligations to them—they
cannot just ignore those women's interests because they dislike what the women
plan to do. Compare the situation of those who were exempt as
conscientious objectors from the draft in WWII—they did not have to be part of
the fighting force, but they did have to perform alternative service (e.g.,
work in hospitals caring for the wounded) in the war effort. And, unlike
medical professionals, they had not voluntarily entered the relevant class;
they were conscripted.
I hope that Robby has read the Lupu-Tuttle paper on same sex marriage and
religious liberty (it's on SSRN). [The paper is downloadable here.] If he has, he will see that we are
quite respectful of the concerns of religious institutions, and we acknowledge
the concerns of wedding industry vendors (though we think exemptions for them
from an obligation to serve gay couples cannot be squared with the
long-standing American tradition of creating only very narrow exemptions,
especially for business firms, from civil rights laws.)
I'm tempted to say much more about that Declaration—the sections about marriage
were so obviously a statement of theological views dressed up in sort-of
secular talk (e.g., sexual complementarity of males and females). Robby's
church, and all religious communities, of course may have that view as an
internal matter. (Whether or not it is a bigoted view, bigots will seek
its comfort.) No one is forcing
religious communities to perform or celebrate same-sex marriages. When
they "go public" with social services, however, they may open
themselves up to regulation. Even there, exemptions (see the Connecticut
legislation) may be advisable. Because of the force of the interests on
both sides of this debate, it is good to have a balanced view of this
subject. Robby's message suggests that he does not.
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