I just came across this story from my native place in Massachusetts where I shall be visiting my family for Christmas. Yes, Christmas. I don’t mind saying Merry Christmas, or Happy Christmas as is the English custom. It is a sad day when a young individual is sent home and ordered to undergo psychological testing for drawing a picture of the crucifixion. For those unfamiliar with the La Salette shrine, it is a Catholic place of worship and devotion that has drawn many faithful over the decades. During Christmas, the shrine is decorated with lights that accentuate the images of the nativity. There is a large crucifix on a hill where the faithful can pray and/or recite the rosary. I think this particular part of the shrine left an impression on the young artist.
I wonder if he would have been disciplined if he copied for his art class Michelangelo’s Last Judgment or one of the famous depictions of the martyrdom of St. Sebastian?
It is a sad day when a school official believes that a student’s depiction of an important Christian image is analogous to a picture that depicts a student shooting a teacher and classmate and takes disciplinary action on such a misguided belief. What is permitted and what is not in the Massachusetts public schools these days is troubling. (In full disclosure, the mayor’s assistant is my cousin.)
[At my invitation, MOJ friend Chris Eberle (Philosophy, U.S. Naval Academy) weighs in. (You may remember that in an earlier post, I referred to Chris's brilliant book, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge, 2002).) Here is what Chris has to say:]
According to George Weigel, the just war tradition does not
incorporate a so-called “presumption against war,” which he construes as the
toxic assumption that the tradition “begins with a prima facie moral duty to do
no harm to others.”Rather, just war thinking
begins with “a passion for justice” – duly authorized political authorities
have a duty to secure a peace “composed of justice, security and freedom” … by
employing military violence in some circumstances.As I see it, Rob Vischer rightly expresses
skepticism about this overall view.A
couple of points seem worth making here.
First, it might be the case that most reputable just war
thinkers did not affirm anything like a presumption against war; perhaps they
repudiated any such presumption.So the
just war tradition might not include a presumption against war.But this claim has only the slightest
normative weight.After all, it might be
the case that there is a presumption against war and the tradition should come
to reflect that moral fact.
Second, why believe that the just war tradition should
incorporate a presumption against war?I
don't think we need much heavy lifting here.Waging war inevitably involves the destruction, maiming, 'dehousing,' of
human beings – soldiers slit throats, bombs obliterate bodies, armies dislodge
and disorient populations.Given what
waging war on human beings inevitably involves, and given that each human being
possesses great worth, we always and everywhere have powerful moral reason not
to wage war.That is, we have a prima
facie duty to refrain from waging war.This is no less true of modern industrialized war than it is over
ancient siege warfare or contemporary counter-insurgency.I can't imagine why anyone committed to human
dignity would want to deny this.
Third, the claim that there is a presumption against war is
consistent with the claim that there is also a presumption in favor of
justice.Weigel seems to think that
there is some tension here.I can't see
that there is.There can be many moral
'presumptions' (read: prima facie duties) that bear on the moral propriety of a
given act and, when there are, then one should take them all into
consideration.So, for example, the
political authorities have a moral duty to prosecute citizens who have violated
the law, but they should also presume that each and every citizen is
innocent.Presuming innocence isn't at
all in tension with a duty to protect the innocent from the rapacious.Again, the political authorities have a prima
facie duty to secure a just peace and they also have a prima facie duty to
refrain from employing military violence as a means to achieve that end.No tension here either.
Fourth, the claim that there is a presumption against war is
consistent with the claim that that presumption can be overridden by
sufficiently weighty considerations.This is standard fare: we have a prima facie duty not to kill our fellow
human beings, but certain normative considerations might count decisively in
favor of our killing some particular human being in some particular case – when
he is bearing down on my children with the clear intent to kill.Again, we have a prima facie duty not to wage
war, but compelling normative considerations might override that prima facie
duty – when the Japanese launched their unjust attack on Pearl Harbor, for
example.Indeed, the countervailing
considerations that count in favor of war can be sufficiently weighty that
waging a given war can be, not only permissible, but obligatory.I take it that the United States was not only
permitted but required to wage war against Japan after Dec 7, 1941 – despite
the presumption against doing so.
One final point.Although I think that it's pretty obvious that there is a presumption
against war, and so the just war tradition should incorporate such a
presumption, I find it very difficult to get all wee wee'd up aboutit.Weigel thinks it important to deny such a toxic claim, but I really don't
see the harm in it.Do others have a
better sense than I for what's at stake?
Yesterday I wondered whether George Weigel is correct in insisting that the Catholic just war tradition does not (and should not) include a "presumption against war." Jonathan Watson points out James Turner Johnson's article on just war theory, including this excerpt:
The idea that Catholic just war teaching begins with a “presumption against war,” more recently phrased as “a strong presumption against the use of force,” first appears in the United States bishops’ widely read 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace. In the context of its original adoption, this conception had three important roots. First, it reflected a judgment about modern warfare as inherently grossly destructive, so much so that it could never be conducted morally or be an instrument of moral purpose. In the immediate context of The Challenge of Peace this conviction was focused specifically on the question of nuclear weapons and whether they might ever be morally used; the United States bishops’ answer was No, and in this they concurred with a wide range of opponents of nuclear weapons around the world. Though in certain ways this pastoral letter drew on the thought of Paul Ramsey, the statement (without mentioning him by name) explicitly rejected Ramsey’s conception that even in the case of nuclear weapons the key issue is human moral control: Ramsey argued for the possibility of a rational, politically purposive use of nuclear weapons—namely, counter-force warfare—while the U.S. bishops rejected any and all possible “war-fighting” uses and plans for use of such weapons. Their conclusions about the likely result of any war involving nuclear weapons mirrored Jonathan Schell’s contemporaneous image of global nuclear destruction and the end of human life: a “republic of insects and grasses,” as he famously put it in The Fate of the Earth."
And Alabama 3L Abe Delnore comments:
I think that George Weigel's problem, fundamentally, is that he thinks just war is the only intellectual tradition on war within Catholic teaching. In fact there is an older, better-attested rival tradition: pacifism. The presumption against war makes sense if you see just war as a response to pacifism, which of course is how it developed. Furthermore, every presentation of just war I can think of begins with the premise that killing is wrong; however, just war provides an exception to the general rule. So there is a good case for the presumption against war underlying even just war theory. And, of course, Catholics also have access to the pacifist tradition. (Indeed, I think I am right in saying that some Catholics--members of particular religious orders--are obliged to be pacifists; none are obliged to accept just war theory.)
... sent our way by MOJ friend and law prof Gerry Whyte of Trinity College Dublin. Gerry writes:
"MOJ readers may be interested in this Supreme Court decision handed down today
in which the Court ruled that in vitro embryos do not enjoy protection under the
Irish Constitution."
Court rules against woman in frozen embryos case
The Supreme Court has
unanimously dismissed an appeal by a separated mother of two
against the High Court's refusal to order a Dublin clinic to
release three frozen embryos to her with a view to becoming
pregnant against the wishes of her estranged husband. Story here.
Abstract: Economists have long realized the importance of credit markets and borrowing behavior for household finance and economics more generally. However, none of this previous work has explored the role of biological constraints. Here we present the first evidence of a specific gene that may influence borrowing behavior. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we show that individuals with a polymorphism of the MAOA gene that has lower transcriptional efficiency are significantly more likely to report having credit card debt. Having one or both MAOA alleles of the low efficiency type raises the average likelihood of having credit card debt by 7.8% and 15.9% respectively. About half of our population has one or both MAOA alleles of the low type. The results suggest that economists should integrate innate propensities into economic models and consider the welfare consequences of possible discrimination by lenders on the basis of genotype.
I am delighted to welcome Prof. Kevin Lee, who teaches at Campbell, to our merry band of MOJ-ers. (Kevin's bio, CV, and the like are here.) Kevin brings to our conversation, among other things, the fruits of his advanced studies in religious studies and political ethics. Welcome aboard!
Commenting on President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, George Weigel laments what he sees as the decline of an authentic just war tradition in our popular discourse. He is especially concerned that a presumption against war seems to have taken root among those purporting to apply the just war tradition. Weigel writes:
So the notion that just-war analysis begins with a “presumption against war” (or, as some put it, with a “pacifist premise”) is simply wrong. The just-war way of thinking begins somewhere else: with legitimate public authority’s moral obligation to defend the common good by defending the peace composed of justice, security, and freedom. The just-war tradition is not a set of hurdles that moral philosophers, theologians, and clergy set before statesmen. It is a framework for collaborative deliberation about the basic aims of legitimate government as it engages hostile regimes and networks in the world.
Given his outspoken defense of the invasion of Iraq, I take George Weigel's interpretation of the just war tradition with a huge grain of salt. That said, he knows a lot more about the subject than I do. If a "presumption against war" is inconsistent with the Catholic intellectual tradition regarding war, then has the Vatican also lost touch with the tradition? It seems that a presumption against war is an obvious theme in statements by all of the post-WWII popes. Or check out various statements in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church -- e.g., para. 437 (calling for "the rejection of war as a means for resolving disputes"), para. 438 ("rejection of war"), para. 501 ("engaging in a preventive war without clear proof that an attack is imminent cannot fail to raise serious moral and juridicial questions"). Are they wrong? In past centuries -- when wars were limited and did not threaten the very existence of humanity -- perhaps there was no presumption against war. But I have a hard time supporting the suggestion that, in the 21st century, any moral or religious framework designed to facilitate serious thinking about war and the human condition should not include a presumption against war.
LGBT refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people. Currently,
there is a ‘tsunami’ of a debate raging in Uganda, in particular, and Africa, in
general about LGBT. This paper delves into impressions of the Ugandan people and
their leaders about the phenomenon, if one can call it that. Homosexuality, or
LGBT, is still a taboo subject in many African societies. There was fallout in
the Anglican Church over the ordination of gay priests as bishops in the
worldwide Anglican Communion. In October 2009, a bill entitled the
'Anti-Homosexuality Bill' was tabled before the Ugandan parliament with the aim
of legislating penalties for 'homosexual acts' and those who defend the rights
of people who engage in sexual relations with people of the same gender.
President Museveni said, “We used to have very few homosexuals traditionally.
They were not persecuted but were not encouraged either because it was clear
that is not how God arranged things to be.” A Ugandan Minister has been quoted
saying that LGBT people are trying to impose a strange, ungodly, unhealthy,
unnatural, and immoral way of life on the rest of our society.
On the
flip side, gay groups in Uganda say the proposed law is not necessary and will
only legalise discrimination. They call on government to respect people’s rights
and fundamental freedoms, as prescribed by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Human
Rights Watch has accused the government of promoting state homophobia in Uganda
and urged it to repeal of a colonial-era law against sodomy.
The debate
is so intense it is bordering on extremism. The same scenario is playing out in
many parts of Africa and one wonders if there is a possibility of finding a
middle ground. There is talk of possibilities of aid being cut and an increase
in the number of people seeking refuge in western capitals because they believe
their rights are being denied.
A Canadian journalist writes that debates about cap-and-trade subsidies, wind farms, and climate science are really missing the point: what the world needs desperately is to adopt China's one child policy. According to Diane Francis of The Financial Post,
China has proven that birth restriction is smart policy. Its middle class grows, all its citizens have housing, health care, education and food, and the one out of five human beings who live there are not overpopulating the planet.
For those who balk at the notion that governments should control family sizes, just wait until the growing human population turns twice as much pastureland into desert as is now the case, or when the Amazon is gone, the elephants disappear for good and wars erupt over water, scarce resources and spatial needs.
As Rod Dreher points out, the one child policy is proving highly problematic for long-term social health, even in China.
