Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

My response to Rick remains what it was on February 1

And here it is, posted in response to Rick's post earlier the same day:

"The passage in my book that Rick cites is about cases in which there are First Amendment--political process--values on one side and non-political-process values on the other.  But in Citizens United there were political process values on both sides!  And, so, the Thayerian presumption stands:  There is no reason in such a case for a majority of the Court to act imperially by insisting on its own judgment that the legislation at issue disserves political process values if the competing judgment that the legislation serves political process values is a reasonable one."

I added, in my original post:  "Marc DeGirolami's comments, in the thread following Rick's post, are right on target!  In particular:  Perhaps the Thayerian presumption should stand even in cases in which there are political process values on one side and non-political-process values on the other.  But for better or worse, Mark, I'm not there yet."

Now, much, much more importantly:  I want again to express my gratitude to Rick for reviewing my book in Commonweal--a book that, alas, only Rick, my family, and at most a half dozen others even know exists.

"Perry-esque": Another quick response to Michael

I wrote, in an earlier post, that "an appropriate (and Perry-esque) conception of the judicial role, and the best understanding of the Constitution seem to me to be in happy alignment."  In response, Michael says:

That seeming makes sense if, but only if, the competing First Amendment position--the position of the four dissenting justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) and Professor Fish--not to mention the Congress of the United States--is not merely a position Rick rejects but a position Rick concludes is unreasonable in the Thayerian sense:  a position no rational, well informed lawmaker of good faith could hold.  Rick concludes his post with "Nice when that happens!"  Yes indeed, nice when that happens.

I think, though, that this "seeming makes sense", even on Michael's terms, if -- as I discussed in this post -- the "unreasonable in the Thayerian sense" criterion does not apply in the context of government attempts to regulate the content of political expression and advocacy.  (I am happy to agree with Michael that a "rational, well informed lawmaker of good faith" could conclude that such attempts are consistent with a plausible understanding of the First Amendment.)  As I wrote in that earlier post:

There are some cases, [Michael] says, where the argument for Thayerian deference does not apply, that is, cases where closer judicial review "is likely, in the long run, to enhance the capacity of the citizenry either to deliberate about contested political . . . questions or otherwise to participate meaningfully in the political process."  These cases include cases involving regulations of the freedoms of "speech, press, and assembly." 

So, it seems to me that one can endorse Perry's modified Thayerian approach and still conclude (reasonably!) that the Court was correct in concluding that the restrictions invalidated in Citizens United were, in fact, unjustified efforts to protect incumbents from being challenged by citizens speaking through the corporate form.  (Such an application of Michael's theory seems to me at least as consistent with the theory's premises as is Michael's own conclusion that even a Thayerian Court should rule that the Constitution requires extending [-- because no reasonable legislator could in good faith think that it does not require extending -- ] the benefits of marriage to same-sex unions.) 

Now, that said, I'll say here what I say in my forthcoming Commonweal review:  Read Michael's book, and think about (i) the attractiveness of Michael's proposed standards for exercising judicial review in constitutional cases; and (ii) the applications of those proposed standards.  I don't want to wander too far from "Catholic legal theory" into Michael's and my shared interest in constitutional law and judicial review, so if Michael wants the last word, it's all his.

"an appropriate (and Perry-esque) conception of the judicial role"

"... an appropriate (and Perry-esque) conception of the judicial role, and the best understanding of the Constitution seem to me to be in happy alignment."  That seeming makes sense if, but only if, the competing First Amendment position--the position of the four dissenting justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) and Professor Fish--not to mention the Congress of the United States--is not merely a position Rick rejects but a position Rick concludes is unreasonable in the Thayerian sense:  a position no rational, well informed lawmaker of good faith could hold.  Rick concludes his post with "Nice when that happens!"  Yes indeed, nice when that happens.           

Interesting Defense of the Tebow Ad

Kate Michelman, former president of NARAL Pro-Choice America, and Frances Kissling, former president of Catholics for Choice, published an interesting defense of the Tebow ad in the Washington Post, analyzing it as an example of how effective the pro-life movement has been in changing people's mind about abortion.They conceded that: "Today, all sorts of well-educated and progressive people are comfortable calling themselves pro-life. [editorial comment:  Imagine that!!]  In the public eye, the term seems to encompass a broader and more moderate vision, not focused solely on what it opposes."

Among the reasons they give for this shift in public opinion are scientific advances giving everyone visual evidence of early fetal development and making fetal surgery possible, and Congressional action:

The "partial birth" abortion ban was introduced in 1995, shifting attention from the choice movement's effective "who decides" message -- which became the key question after the Supreme Court's 1989 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services decision -- to what the Catholic bishops had always wanted America to ask: "What is being decided?"  

The main focus of the article, though, is the effectiveness of the rhetoric of the advocacy messages of groups like one of my favorites, Feminists for Life.  Michelman and Kissling explain:

Groups such as Feminists for Life started out relatively small but invested heavily in reaching out to college students, talking not about making abortion illegal but about helping college women keep their babies. Their pro-life message wasn't exclusively anti-abortion; it was anti-capital-punishment, antiwar, for saving the whales, for not eating meat and for supporting mothers. It wasn't the mainstream of the antiabortion movement, but it had its appeal.

Now, I don't think FFL really takes a position on eating meat or killing whales, but it certainly has done yeoman's work in saving babies and supporting mothers!

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

A quick response to Michael re: Citizens United

Michael Perry is right.  I would, as a legislator, have voted against the restrictions on political advertising that were struck down in Citizens United. And, I would have done so because, in my view, those restrictions were -- in addition to being not-well-designed for their purported ends, though reasonably-well-designed to advance the interests of incumbent legislators and media corporations -- unconstitutional.  I should note, though, that I am perfectly happy to -- and have plenty of experience at -- (in Michael's words) "take issue with a constitutional decision of the Court when as a policy matter--as a matter of politics, if you will--you are sympathetic to the result."  In Citizens United, though, sound policy, an appropriate (and Perry-esque) conception of the judicial role, and the best understanding of the Constitution seem to me to be in happy alignment.  Nice when that happens!

Rabbi David Novak on homosexual conduct, reason, and disgust

 

In a post entitled "Who is David Novak . . . and why does it matter?"  Michael P. has called our attention to a blurb provided by Rabbi David Novak for a new book by Martha Nussbaum in which she depicts moral opposition to homosexual conduct as rooted in what the Publisher's Weekly review of the book describes as "a politics of disgust that centers on irrational fears of contamination, penetrability, and loss of social solidarity."  Michael rightly described Rabbi Novak as an acclaimed scholar and noted that he dedicated his most recent book to me.  I certainly agree with Michael's suggestion that he is a thinker whose ideas, arguments, and opinions matter and deserve to be taken seriously.  After reading Michael's post, I wondered what credit, if any, Rabbi Novak gives to the idea that belief in the immorality of homosexual acts derives from disgust rooted in irrational fears of contamination, penetrability, etc.  He has kindly replied: 

 

 

From David Novak:

 

I am opposed to homosexual conduct on moral grounds and on religious grounds.

 

Morally speaking, I am convinced that human sexuality’s function in the world is to be the means for the establishment and furtherance of human community. Community is an inextricable need of human nature. To either ignore it or distort it is disruptive of authentic or natural human life in the world. To act against human nature is immoral. The most primary instance of human community is the family, which begins in the sexual union of a woman and a man in marriage, is kept together by the exercise of this female-male marital union, and is perpetuated by the co-creation of children from this union. Since homosexual conduct is contrary to authentic human sexuality in the world, it is immoral. Morality enhances human life, while immorality diminishes human life. Minimally, I think homosexual conduct should be discouraged persuasively; maximally, I think an effort should be made to treat a person struggling with homosexual desire to redirect it, that is, if the person truly wants to do that.

 

As for same-sex marriage, I think the very term is an oxymoron. As such, same-sex should not receive the legal approval of the state by including it within civil marriage. The state should not recognize what is basically untrue, just as the state should not recognize my impersonation of someone else since I am undoubtedly not that person.

 

My religious opposition to homosexual conduct is because my own religion, Judaism, teaches that God commands all human beings not to engage in homosexual conduct. Jewish theology also teaches that God’s reason for willing this prohibition is because it is contrary to authentic human community for which God created humans. Though I believe this religious approach provides the best metaphysical grounding for the moral prohibition of homosexual conduct, one can argue for the reason of the prohibition without requiring one’s interlocutors to accept one’s metaphysics – theology being the way religious people deal with metaphysical issues like the origin and ultimate purpose of human nature. In that way, though, my theology best undergirds my morality ontologically; my morality is not deduced from my theology logically.

 

My opposition to homosexual conduct is not rooted in irrational fear or disgust. I am neither afraid of nor disgusted with homosexual persons per se. My opposition to homosexual conduct is rational inasmuch as I have very good reasons for it. Because I believe in the sanctity of every human person created in the image of God, and because of that I have been commanded to love him or her, disgust for any other human person would violate what I have been commanded to do in the world in my interactions with my fellow humans. That does not mean I should or can approve of whatever any other human being does.

More on the Court's misadventure in Citizens United

In his online column today, here, the wonderful Stanley Fish helpfully identifies and elaborates the First Amendment philosophy of the majority in Citizens United and the First Amendment philosophy of the four dissenters.  (Do yourself a favor:  read the column.)  At the end of the column, Fish announces, parenthetically, that his own First Amendment philosophy is that of the dissenters, but he doesn’t assert or imply that the First Amendment philosophy of the majority is unreasonable.  It’s just that his own First Amendment philosophy is that of the dissenters.  If neither First Amendment philosophy—that of the majority or that of the dissenters—is unreasonable, then why wasn’t the proper decision in Citizens United, pace James Bradley Thayer ("our great master of constitutional law," Felix Frankfurter called him), to reject the constitutional challenge to the federal legislation?

Let me assume what I do not know:  that had he been in the Congress, Rick Garnett would have voted against the legislation.  John Ely made it clear that *he* would have voted against the legislation struck down in Roe v. Wade.  But that didn’t prevent Ely from critically savaging the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.  See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:  A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale Law Journal 920 (1973), here.  It’s hard—believe me, I know it’s hard--to take issue with a constitutional decision of the Court when as a policy matter--as a matter of politics, if you will--you are sympathetic to the result.  (Especially, no doubt, when the decision is that of your mentors, role models, whatever.)  Where, oh where, are the John Ely’s of today now that we need them?  Such clarity, such integrity.  John was utterly gripped by the conviction that constitutional law should not be politics by another name.  See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts are no Different from Legislatures, 77 Virginia Law Review 833 (1991).  Alas, the Court’s decision in Citizens United is politics by another name.

Rick, in his recent post on Citizens United, here, mentioned—understandably mentioned-- my position on the constitutionality vel non of state refusals to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions.  (Nota bene:  the constitutionality vel non *not* of state refusals to call such unions “marriages”, but  of state refusals to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions.)  Rick wonders—understandably wonders—whether I am not, Whitman-like, contradicting myself (“I contain multitudes”) in contending that state refusals to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions are unconstitutional.  A wonderful topic for us con law freaks.  But a topic for another day …                    

Nitpicking the Tebow Ad

Honestly,I think it's verging on petty to be complaining about the Tebow ad because of all the little collateral messages one could read into it, like Rob's concern about only celebrating dramatically successful lives, or Saletan's concern about underplaying the particular risk that Pam Tebow assumed (placental abruption).  Rob, Tebow's story makes for a good ad because it's a particularly dramatic telling of the story of the value of all life.  (If you want an equally dramatic telling of the story of the value of life for a single mom living in poverty, please, please, please go out and see the movie Precious).  The risk of placental abruption that Pam chose to take is potentially dangerous, but it is not irresponsible to share a story of someone taking that risk and having everything come out fine.

No one should underestimate the tremendous amount of pressure put on women to abort pregnancies based on the slightest suggestion of any sort of a risk, to the baby or the mother, whether based on a real physical condition, or the statistical possibility of such a condition.  It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out why -- why should any doctor concerned about litigation not prefer every woman she is treating to "chose" to eliminate any possibility that something might go wrong with the pregnancy?   An excellent book with a great introduction documenting some of these pressures, followed by stories of women throughout the world encountering such pressures is Melinda Tankard Reist's Defiant Birth:  Women who Resist Medical Eugenics .  (Full disclosure:  one of the stories is mine; a version of it as originally published in another collection is available here.) 

A couple of minutes of having the beer-guzzling masses watching the Game, sandwiched in between ads of bikini-clad women hawking beer, see a dramatic story where a woman assumed such risks and everything came out just fine isn't going to do that much to counter all of that pressure.  But God Bless the Tebow's and Focus on the Family for whatever good it does do!

Is the Tebow ad dangerous?

As I've stated before, I think it's great that there will be an ad during the Super Bowl celebrating life, and I thank Tim Tebow and his mom for having the courage to step up on an issue like this.  To be honest, though, I wish that the ad featured a single mom who raised her child in a poor neighborhood, and watched her child struggle to find steady work as an adult, or parents who want to express their love and thanksgiving for their child with special needs.  Choosing life is its own blessing; the blessing is not that you'll receive a world-conquering hero in return.  I know that the Tebows would be celebrating life regardless of the Heisman Trophy, but I think the life-affirming message is even more powerful when life is celebrated in circumstances where the culture is prepared to see only hardship and regret.

The other wrinkle is that Pam Tebow ignored her doctor's advice about her health.  This makes the message a bit more complicated, it seems.  William Saletan writes:

Pam's story certainly is moving. But as a guide to making abortion decisions, it's misleading. Doctors are right to worry about continuing pregnancies like hers. Placental abruption has killed thousands of women and fetuses. No doubt some of these women trusted in God and said no to abortion, as she did. But they didn't end up with Heisman-winning sons. They ended up dead. . . .

On Sunday, we won't see all the women who chose life and found death. We'll just see the Tebows, because they're alive and happy to talk about it. In the business world, this is known as survivor bias: Failed mutual funds disappear, leaving behind the successful ones, which creates the illusion that mutual funds tend to beat market averages. In the Tebows' case, the survivor bias is literal. If you're diagnosed with placental abruption, you have the right to choose life. But don't be so sure that life is what you'll get.

And:

If Pam Tebow's abruption had taken a different turn, her son would be just another perinatal mortality statistic, and she might be just another maternal mortality statistic. And you would know nothing of her story, just as you know nothing of the women who have died carrying pregnancies like hers.

Thoughts?

Monday, February 1, 2010

Do Catholics have a sense of humor?

I wonder if Bill Donohue would like this commercial for rubber cement (here).