From Family Guy to our government leaders, there seems to be no shortage of support for the discouraged conclusion of a mom who recently wrote a touching essay in the Globe & Mail: ". . . intellectual disabilities or developmental delays or mental differences are the last stance for discrimination."
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Maybe the Family Guy's just taking its Cue from our Leaders?
Washington archdiocese ends foster care program
The lack of a broad religious exemption in the Washington D.C. SSM bill claims its first, but presumably not its last, casualty.
What should Catholic legal theory say to the "Tea Party" movement?
What does Catholic legal theory have to say, if anything, to the "Tea Party" phenomenon? I realize that the New York Times is pretty quick to attribute ominous motives to any political movements that find considerable traction outside the 212 area code, but the destructive anger that seems to be building -- and the enthusiastic embrace of that anger by leaders of the movement -- is troubling. I can think of a couple of lessons that Catholic legal theory could bring to the table: 1) blanket attributions of bad faith to our political leaders is a recipe for disaster; we are called to work together toward the common good, and a reflexive demonization of office-holders is not in keeping with our obligations as citizens; 2) references to the need for violence or revolution should not be made casually or except as a last resort; in this regard, does the rhetoric of Tea Party leaders reflect an awareness of the ideal toward which we, including our elected leaders, should be oriented -- i.e., a "civilization of love?" This is not to ignore the potential value that the movement can bring, particularly with its focus on fiscal responsibility and its potential to cast a critical light on the corrupting potential of power. But the substantive ends are not all that matters -- the tone of the conversation also matters if we are to promote, as the Church teaches, a "social life based on civil friendship." Thoughts?
The Personhood Movement
I may be the last to know about this, but I was intrigued by the movement in Colorado (and other states?) to add a 'personhood" amendment to the state constitution. Details here. (HT: Howard Friedman) The amendment would be struck down by federal courts, but it raises some interesting issues, such as whether any law allowing abortion -- even in cases of rape, incest, or to protect the life of the mother -- would unconstitutionally discriminate against preborn persons. These are just academic questions, it seems to me, at this stage in American legal history.
DeGirolami on Nussbaum on Equal Respect
Marc DeGirolami has posted his excellent new paper reviewing Martha Nussbaum's book, Liberty of Conscience. Here's the abstract:
This essay critiques Professor Martha Nussbaum’s book, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008). Nussbaum’s thesis is that the entire tradition of religious liberty in America can be both best understood (as a historical exercise) and justified (as a philosophical one) by recourse to the overarching principle of “Equal Respect” – that “[a]ll citizens have equal rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live.” Nussbaum insists that Equal Respect pervades the tradition and that all other values of religious liberty are subordinate to it. She examines various free exercise and establishment issues in light of this principle, concluding that the tradition of religious equality is under threat and calling for renewed vigilance in its defense.
This piece criticizes Nussbaum’s elevation of the principle of Equal Respect to supreme normative status. It claims that Nussbaum’s single-minded focus on Equal Respect distorts and misunderstands the conflicts actually at issue in many religious liberty disputes. The essay focuses specifically on the inadequacies of her assessment of two prominent religious liberty cases, one in the free exercise and the other in the establishment context. The essay concludes that there are reasons for deep skepticism about Nussbaum’s approach as a comprehensive theory of the religion clauses.
As Larry Solum says (and did say!), "Highly recommended."
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
Dang, I used to enjoy "Family Guy"
I'm not sure I can anymore.
Save the Date!
Open Hearts, Open Minds and Fair Minded Words
A Conference on Life and Choice in the Abortion Debate
Princeton University – October 15 & 16, 2010
Sponsors:
University Center for Human Values & James Madison Program,
Princeton University; Department of Theology, Fordham University;
Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania
Organizing Committee:
Charles Camosy, Fordham University, Frances Kissling, University of Pennsylvania
Jennifer Miller, Bioethics International, Peter Singer, Princeton University
Inspired by President Obama’s address at Notre Dame in which he called on those on different sides of the abortion issue not only to work together where we agree, but lso to engage in ‘vigorous debate’ with open hearts, open minds, and fair minded words.
Conference Panels
Plenary: The Moral Status of the Fetus.
Different perspectives on the moral status of the fetus deeply
divide those who favor and those who oppose legal abortion. Proponents
of different views will present and discuss their perspectives.
• Moderator: Arthur Caplan, Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania
• John Finnis, University of Oxford
• Margaret Little, Georgetown University
• Peter Singer, Princeton University
Plenary: A Woman’s Moral Duty to the Fetus?
This panel will bypass the moral status of the fetus and instead ask
the following question: if we were to grant that the fetus has moral
status, does it follow that there is a moral obligation on the part of
a woman to bring her pregnancy to term?
• Moderator: Jennifer Miller, Bioethics International
• Charles Camosy, Fordham University and Ruth Macklin, Einstein College of Medicine
Plenary: From Morality to Public Policy.
This panel will debate the complex and important public policy
questions remaining even after drawing conclusions about the topics of
the previous two panels. For instance, if we were to agree that
abortion is morally wrong, does this mean that we should prohibit it?
Is it legally or practically possible to significantly restrict
abortion?
• Helen Alvare, George Mason University
• David Garrow, University of Cambridge
• Cathleen Kaveny, University of Notre Dame
• Dorothy Roberts, Northwestern University
Plenary: Opening Hearts and Minds on Abortion. Is Common Ground Possible?
This panel will explore efforts to increase understanding, reduce
conflict and find common ground among those who hold different views on
abortion. In addition to analyzing past efforts, it will explore the
current efforts of the Obama administration and make suggestions for
improving that work.
• Panelists include: David Gushee, Mercer and Rachel Laser, Third Way
Plenary: Abortion in America, Should it be a Constitutional Question?
The United States and South Africa are the only two countries where abortion’s legality has been determined on the basis of a constitutional right. In the US this approach has been applauded and criticized on both legal and ethical grounds. This panel will ask whether it is sound public policy to rely on the courts, rather than the legislatures, to settle abortion policy.
Concurrent Sessions:
Do Some Reasons for Abortion Exacerbate Discrimination against Persons?
Preventing Unintended Pregnancies
When Might a Fetus Feel Pain and What Should We Do about It?
How Far Does the Right of Conscientious Refusal Extend?
Providing Support for Continuing Pregnancy
To receive early notification when registration opens, please contact:
Kim Girman, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University
[email protected]
A conference: Jean Bethke Elshtain: The Engaged Mind
The University of Chicago's Divinity School is hosting "a series of cross-disciplinary conferences reflecting on themes inspired by the work of Jean Bethke Elshtain. Given the protean nature of her thought, one conference each year will take up a set of related issues drawn from her body of work. The series will bring together senior scholars and major thinkers, many of whom have been Professor Elshtain's interlocutors over the course of her thirty-five year career. From a variety of viewpoints, they will examine Elshtain’s contributions to the ongoing scholarly conversation and consider how the intellectual landscape has changed over time." (More here.) Participants and speakers include John Witte, Bill Galston, Mary Ann Glendon, and others. Should be fun!
SSM and moral opposition to same-sex sexual conduct
Michael Perry asks a good question, "Who but one who believes that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral will think it is legitimate, that it is just, to deny access to civil marriage to the same-sex couples who intend for their unions to be lifelong, monogamous unions of faithful love, because there are other same-sex couples who do not so intend?" I'm interested in the related but broader question: what percentage of people who oppose SSM believe that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral? I'm guessing that it's a pretty high percentage, but there are noteworthy exceptions. David Blankenhorn, for example, writes:
I reject homophobia and believe in the equal dignity of gay and lesbian love. Because I also believe with all my heart in the right of the child to the mother and father who made her, I believe that we as a society should seek to maintain and to strengthen the only human institution -- marriage -- that is specifically intended to safeguard that right and make it real for our children.
Legalized same-sex marriage almost certainly benefits those same-sex couples who choose to marry, as well as the children being raised in those homes. But changing the meaning of marriage to accommodate homosexual orientation further and perhaps definitively undermines for all of us the very thing -- the gift, the birthright -- that is marriage's most distinctive contribution to human society. That's a change that, in the final analysis, I cannot support.
I still struggle with the move from "adoption as concession to fallen world = very good" to "adoption as the child-rearing norm for a new type of marital relationship = so bad that the relationship threatens the well-being of children." But it is this type of argument on which the SSM debate will rise or fall, I think. In public policy debates, for better or for worse (and I know Robby would say for worse), it seems that everyone is a consequentialist now. Are some of the consequentialist arguments shaped by moral opposition to same-sex sexual conduct? No doubt. But they still need to be engaged on the merits. In the end, the outcome of the debate may turn on the question, "Who bears the burden of proof?" Those who wish to change the longstanding definition of a social institution to include citizens who currently cannot participate given their sexual orientation, or those who believe that the institution's value to society derives in significant part from the nature of the procreative relationship between a man and a woman?
Monday, February 15, 2010
On religious objections to granting access to civil marriage to same-sex couples, con't
And this is what I have to say:
"If the only rationale for concluding that a coercive and/or discriminatory law serves a legitimate and sufficiently weighty governmental interest—the only rationale, that is, other than an implausible secular rationale—is a religious rationale, then the law violates the right to freedom of religion, which includes, after all, not only freedom to practice one's own religion (if one has a religion) but also freedom not to practice someone else's religion—or, indeed, any religion at all. Freedom not to practice someone else's religion includes, of course, freedom not to be punished or discriminated against based on one's refusal to practice someone else's religion. A coercive and/or discriminatory law for which the only rationale, other than an implausible secular rationale, is religious imposes religion on those the law coerces or against whom it discriminates; such a law . . . 'enforce[s] a purely religious morality [and thereby] unacceptably impose[s] religion on others.'"
Perry, The Political Morality of Liberal Democracy 119 (2010) (quoting Kent Greenawalt, “History as Ideology,” 93 California L. Rev. 367, 390-91 (2005)). See also Kent Greenawalt, 2 Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness 533 (2008).
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