The Nation,a strongly "pro-choice" left weekly, had an article in its April 19 issue in which it said,"The healthcare reform debate exposed the weakness of the prochoice movement....The picture that emerged wasn't pretty, as supporters of choice found that they don't have the influence many assumed they did....[W]omen across the country were left with less access to the procedure and a seriously weakened power base from which to protect and advocate for abortion rights....Obama's top legislative priority, healthcare reform, ensnared and ultimately set back abortion rights generally - and funding for abortion in particular." See the full article at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20100419/lerner
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Maybe pro-life didn't lose so badly after all.
Connecticut's statute-of-limitations proposal
The Connecticut Catholic Conference is urging Catholics to oppose the enactment of H.B. 5473, which would "completely eliminate the existing 30 year statute of limitations relating to sexual abuse of a minor." To its credit, the Hartford Courant (not exactly an apologist for sexual abuse by clergy) highlighted, in this editorial, the un-wisdom of this proposal. As the Conference states:
- HB 5473 is unwise because it compromises sound judicial practices. A statute of limitation is a deadline for filing a claim. If missed, the claim expires, and the parties can rely upon this fact to arrange their affairs. Such statutes serve the common good by helping courts produce accurate results. Delayed claims means litigation after documents have been discarded, memories have faded, and witnesses have moved away or died. When California passed a similar bill, the dioceses there were forced to defend cases involving allegations against over 100 dead priests. Trials are unlikely to produce fair results when the only person able to testify about the alleged wrongful conduct is the party seeking the damage award.
- HB 5473 is unjust because it imposes the burden of litigation expense and damages upon Catholic institutions that the State is unwilling to impose upon itself. The State is unwilling to permit a direct right of action against itself or any action against other government entities like towns, school boards, or public schools. Thus, a student victimized by a teacher in a Catholic school can sue the school for damages. A student suffering an identical assault in a public school cannot seek damages because his claim is barred by a doctrine called sovereign immunity. HB 5473 leaves this unfairness unaddressed.
What explains the frequent tone deaf comments by Church leaders?
The media coverage of the Church's response to sexual abuse by priests has not always been fair, but Church leaders sure aren't helping matters. Blaming pedophilia on homosexuality seems irresponsible, at best. This is an area that is so inflammatory, so prone to bigotry and perceptions of scapegoating, that if the Church is going to make causal pronouncements about the underlying incidents of abuse, those statements need to be careful, restrained, and backed up by evidence. A coordinated Vatican response would be helpful (and would have been more helpful a few weeks ago). If this is the coordinated response, then there is even more cause for concern.
Why has it been so difficult for Church leaders to respond to the sexual abuse media coverage in a way that does not come off as self-pitying, overly defensive, or shifting the blame? Is this a consequence of Church leaders operating largely beyond the reach of public criticism for so many years? Have the anti-Christian strains in today's culture created an unhealthy "circle the wagons" mentality among Church leaders that is difficult to escape? Is there a perception that admitting mistakes by Church leadership -- including the pope -- will cause believers to stumble in the faith, and thus such admissions should be avoided at all costs? Is it the media's failure to report the responses that are actually and appropriately humble and remorseful? Something else?
Thinking Small
At the Front Porch Republic, Jason Peters has a post on the importance of thinking small and lcoal. On MOJ, when issues turn from "law" to broader policy or political issues, the focus tends to be national. Should Catholic legal theory address the small and the local? How? Comments are open.
HT: Anamaria Scaperlanda Ruiz
Who knew Catholic legal theory would be so "sticky?"
We may not be at the top of the blogosphere when it comes to overall traffic, but we are second only to Volokh when it comes to "stickiness" -- i.e., the length of the average visit. Paul Caron has the details.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
"The Better Pope"
In his column yesterday, Ross Douthat, speaking of the papacy of John Paul II, wrote:
"The church’s dilatory response to the sex abuse scandals was a testament to [John Paul's] weaknesses. So was John Paul’s friendship with the Rev. Marcial Maciel Degollado, the founder of the Legionaries of Christ. [John Paul] loved him and defended him. But we know now that Father Maciel was a sexually voracious sociopath. And thanks to a recent exposé by The National Catholic Reporter’s Jason Berry, we know the secret of Maciel’s Vatican success: He was an extraordinary fund-raiser, and those funds often flowed to members of John Paul’s inner circle.
Only one churchman comes out of Berry’s story looking good: Joseph Ratzinger. Berry recounts how Ratzinger lectured to a group of Legionary priests, and was subsequently handed an envelope of money 'for his charitable use.' The cardinal 'was tough as nails in a very cordial way,' a witness said, and turned the money down.
This isn’t an isolated case. In the 1990s, it was Ratzinger who pushed for a full investigation of Hans Hermann Groer, the Vienna cardinal accused of pedophilia, only to have his efforts blocked in the Vatican. It was Ratzinger who persuaded John Paul, in 2001, to centralize the church’s haphazard system for handling sex abuse allegations in his office. It was Ratzinger who re-opened the long-dormant investigation into Maciel’s conduct in 2004, just days after John Paul II had honored the Legionaries in a Vatican ceremony. It was Ratzinger, as Pope Benedict, who banished Maciel to a monastery and ordered a comprehensive inquiry into his order.
So the high-flying John Paul let scandals spread beneath his feet, and the uncharismatic Ratzinger was left to clean them up. This pattern extends to other fraught issues that the last pope tended to avoid — the debasement of the Catholic liturgy, or the rise of Islam in once-Christian Europe. And it extends to the caliber of the church’s bishops, where Benedict’s appointments are widely viewed as an improvement over the choices John Paul made. It isn’t a coincidence that some of the most forthright ecclesiastical responses to the abuse scandal have come from friends and protégés of the current pope.
Has Benedict done enough to clean house and show contrition? Alas, no. Has his Vatican responded to the latest swirl of scandal with retrenchment, resentment, and an un-Christian dose of self-pity? Absolutely. Can this pontiff regain the kind of trust and admiration, for himself and for his office, that John Paul II enjoyed? Not a chance.
But as unlikely as it seems today, Benedict may yet deserve to be remembered as the better pope."
Douthat's entire column is here.
Christian Militias
Yale Historian Paul Kennedy on "The Church Adrift"
On Good Friday 1613, the English poet John Donne (then dean of St. Paul’s, London, but probably still a Catholic) was dispatched to the west of England on an official mission. As he rode toward the setting sun, he realized with dismay that he was riding with his back to Jerusalem, farther away from the place of the crucifixion and death of Christ. In remorse, he penned one of his most beautiful, famous and difficult poems: “Good Friday, 1613. Riding Westward.”
On the afternoon of Good Friday 2010, I attended the solemn 3 p.m. service at the Catholic chaplaincy of Cambridge University, and then walked westward, to a little cottage on the city’s fringes. And my mind was deeply troubled by an apprehension that today’s Catholic leadership is somehow also going in the wrong direction, is adrift, and appears completely unable to handle the international crisis of the many charges of sexual abuse made against an earlier generation of priests and of their superiors.
The church, my loyal pew-mates will assure me, will survive this crisis as it has survived many greater ones over the past two thousand years, and I suppose they are right. But does it have to “survive” so ineptly? I think not.
To my mind, the present crisis needs a much more decisive proclamation about where the Church stands on this very troubling issue. This should not be a proclamation to the bloodhounds of the media. It should not hold a press conference. It should not make stupid comparisons with anti-Semitism. All that will disappoint Catholics waiting for a better reply.
Of what should that proclamation consist? It surely doesn’t need a rocket scientist to figure out a logic chain. The pronunciation might consist of four interconnected parts.
The first is the strongest possible affirmation of the doctrine of the sheer evil of the abuse of power and trust, especially the abusing of the defenseless and the young. On this Christ himself seems to have been the most adamant. He could forgive the woman taken in adultery. He could forgive Mary Magdalene for her prostitution. He could forgive the thief on the cross. Indeed he seems to have forgiven all sorts of folks.
But not those who abused the young. The translation in King James Bible (Luke, Chapter 17) seems as good as any. It will be “impossible” for members of the Church, being human, to avoid future offences, he told his disciples. “But woe unto him through whom they come! It were better for him that a millstone were hanged around his neck, and he cast into the sea, than that he should offend one of these little ones.”
This seems to me a much more serious matter than many of those that the Church pays excess attention to.
The second is to remind all clergy that sexual abuse is not only a mortal sin but also a major transgression of criminal law. The perpetrator is liable for trial and punishment by the secular courts of any civilized society.
If a member of the clergy steals or cheats — or whatever else is forbidden in civil law — then that person should go to trial. There should be no dodgy transfers to offices outside the diocese.
The third is to articulate a sensible and just way of dealing with the superiors of the abusers. This is easier said than done, and it is probably worthwhile to make several distinctions.
If a Church superior really knew (or had the heaviest suspicions) that a member of his clergy had been abusive but sought to cover it up, then that superior is complicit both in the moral/religious and in the civil-law sense. What the civil system will do is up to the civil system itself. But the superior himself should certainly be moved on: There is many a Benedictine abbey with a spare cell for those who wish to reflect on the problems of good and evil, and many a foreign mission or medical station that could take a “worker priest,” stripped of hierarchical privileges, and now devoted to following the path of St. Vincent de Paul or Mother Teresa.
The fourth and final point tilts in a different direction. It would be a firm reminder that anyone who falsely and knowingly accuses an innocent clergyman of abuse some 20 or 40 years ago not only commits a dire mortal sin but also breaks the law. Bearing false witness is both a sin and a criminal offense.
This seems worth saying since one gets the impression that some bishops, in frantically responding to their earlier neglect, are reversing the old Anglo-Saxon legal principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty, and hastily suspending priests once an accusation has been filed.
In some cases the truth may never emerge; it will be a frustrating “he said this, but he said that” situation. And someone will have perjured himself. If you still believe in life after death, that perjury will take some explaining to St. Peter at the Pearly Gates. Nonetheless, it seems to me that reminding all present and former members of the Church that making false accusation is a heinous offence could be a reasonable part to the proposed Proclamation.
Looking back, I guess I was lucky. I was a Catholic altar boy from the ages of 7 to 21, often working early mornings and late at night with priests, canons, monsignors; nothing happened. I was in a Catholic boy-scout troop, with Catholic scoutmasters; nothing happened. I attended a superb all-boys Catholic high school from the age of 11 to 18, and we went out with our Catholic teachers to camps, marches, youth hostels; still, nothing happened. I have rarely missed Sunday Mass over the past 60 years.
The best thing that happened in those abuse-free places — apart from massive, massive learning of Chaucer, Shakespeare, Donne, Wordsworth, Browning, Hardy, Orwell and P.G. Wodehouse — was to be taught how to think in a clearheaded manner and to write intelligible paragraphs. One gets the sense that Holy Mother Church is not only mishandling the sexual-abuse scandal in a way that would have astonished the great Vatican diplomatic service of the past, but that it has no idea of how to explain itself; how to understand why people outside and inside the Church are so angry and disturbed.
The Church’s destiny has variously been described as akin to a person on a lengthy pilgrimage, or a caravan wending its way across the desert. If those are apt analogies, then it seems to me that the pilgrim has become lost in a forest, or the camel train has encountered a sandstorm. It is time to face the matter with grace and intelligence, and leave the belated breast-beatings and obfuscations behind. And read a few more of John Donne’s poems, both the sacred and the profane, to get a better sense of our round earth and humankind’s curious place upon it.
[Paul Kennedy is a professor of history and director of International Security Studies at Yale University and author of “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.”]
What "reason" is missing
A fascinating op-ed, in The New York Times, by the often-fascinating Stanley Fish, "Does Reason Know what it is missing?" Here's a bit (presenting Habermas):
What secular reason is missing is self-awareness. It is “unenlightened about itself” in the sense that it has within itself no mechanism for questioning the products and conclusions of its formal, procedural entailments and experiments. “Postmetaphysical thinking,” Habermas contends, “cannot cope on its own with the defeatism concerning reason which we encounter today both in the postmodern radicalization of the ‘dialectic of the Enlightenment’ and in the naturalism founded on a naïve faith in science.”
Postmodernism announces (loudly and often) that a supposedly neutral, objective rationality is always a construct informed by interests it neither acknowledges nor knows nor can know. Meanwhile science goes its merry way endlessly inventing and proliferating technological marvels without having the slightest idea of why. The “naive faith” Habermas criticizes is not a faith in what science can do — it can do anything — but a faith in science’s ability to provide reasons, aside from the reason of its own keeping on going, for doing it and for declining to do it in a particular direction because to do so would be wrong.. . .
As Norbert Brieskorn, one of Habermas’s interlocutors, points out, in Habermas’s bargain “reason addresses demands to the religious communities” but “there is no mention of demands from the opposite direction.” Religion must give up the spheres of law, government, morality and knowledge; reason is asked only to be nice and not dismiss religion as irrational, retrograde and irrelevant. The “truths of faith” can be heard but only those portions of them that have secular counterparts can be admitted into the realm of public discourse. (It seems like a case of “separate but not equal.”) Religion gets to be respected; reason gets to borrow the motivational resources it lacks on its own, resources it can then use to put a brake on its out-of-control spinning.
The result, as Michael Reder, another of Habermas’s interlocutors, observes, is a religion that has been “instrumentalized,” made into something useful for a secular reason that still has no use for its teleological and eschatological underpinnings. Religions, explains Reder, are brought in only “to help to prevent or overcome social disruptions.” Once they have performed this service they go back in their box and don’t trouble us with uncomfortable cosmic demands. At best (and at most), according to Habermas, “the encounter with theology,” like an encounter at a cocktail party, “can remind a self-forgetful secular reason of its origins” in the same “revolutions in worldviews” that gave us monotheism. (One God and one reason stem from the same historical source.)
But Habermas gives us no reason (if you will pardon the word) to believe that such a reminder would be heeded and lead to reason’s being furnished with the motivation-for-solidarity it lacks. Why would secular reason, asked only to acknowledge a genealogical kinship with a form of thought it still compartmentalizes and condescends to, pay serious attention to what that form of thought has to offer? By Habermas’s own account the two great worldviews still remain far apart. Religions resist becoming happy participants in a companionable pluralism and insist on the rightness, for everyone, of their doctrines. Liberal rationality is committed to pluralism and cannot affirm the absolute rightness of anything except its own (empty) proceduralism.
The borrowings and one-way concessions Habermas urges seem insufficient to effect a true and fruitful rapprochment. Nothing he proposes would remove the deficiency he acknowledges when he says that the “humanist self-confidence of a philosophical reason which thinks that it is capable of determining what is true and false” has been “shaken” by “the catastrophes of the twentieth century.” The edifice is not going to be propped up and made strong by something so weak as a reminder, and it is not clear at the end of a volume chock-full of rigorous and impassioned deliberations that secular reason can be saved. There is still something missing.
Articles: (1) SSM and Religious Liberty, and (2) Religious Symbols
As an associate dean, I've found it next to impossible to have time to post on MOJ. But every once in a while I want to show up to let people know I still exist. So here are abstracts from a couple of new articles I've posted on SSRN.
"What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common"
This Article, from a symposium keynote talk, presents a case for adopting significant religious accommodations for objectors to same-sex marriages. My thesis is that there are important common features between the arguments for same-sex civil marriage and those for broad protection of religious conscience. Even though the two are pitted against each other in disputes, the strongest features of the case for same-sex civil marriage also make a strong case for significant religious-liberty protections for dissenters. One implication is that there are good reasons for recognizing same-sex civil marriage. But the other implication is that if a state does so, it should enact strong religious accommodations too, as a matter of consistency and even-handedness.
Among the parallels, both same-sex couples and religious believers claim that their conduct stems from commitments central to their identity – love and fidelity to a life partner, faithfulness to the moral norms of God – and that they should be able to live these commitments in a public way, touching all aspects of their lives. If gay couples claim a right beyond private behavior – participation in the social institution of civil marriage – so too do religious believers who seek to follow their faith not just in houses of worship, but in charitable efforts and in their daily work lives. Therefore, I argue, religious accommodation ought to protect not just churches and clergy, but also religious nonprofit organizations like Catholic Charities, and small businesses like the wedding photographer providing personal services related to a marriage.
"Religious Displays and the Voluntary Approach to Church and State"
This article, from a keynote talk for a symposium on Ten Commandments monuments and other government religious displays, argues that the distinctive constitutional approach to church-state relations in America has been the “voluntary” approach, under which government leaves religious practice to the free decisions and energies of individuals and groups. Several principles within that approach call for invalidating official displays that endorse the religious truth of propositions such as the Ten Commandments. But another key component of the American constitutional approach is that religion remains important to public life: indeed, in America a primary argument for religious freedom and other human rights has been a religious argument that rights are God-given and therefore have priority over government authority. Thus, although religious voluntarism calls for invalidating many government-sponsored religious displays, the rationale for doing so must recognize multiple ways in which religion is relevant to public life at the most fundamental levels. The paper concludes with three suggested means of recognizing that relevance.
Tom
