Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, July 5, 2010

Continuing the conversation ...

I appreciate Robby's effort to clarify what then-Cardinal Ratzinger may have meant in his less-than-clear talk about "a dictatorship of relativism."  Robby:  "The point that Pope Benedict is trying to communicate, I believe, . . ."

Robby writes:  "[W]hen morality gets in the way, many are tempted to say (sincerely enough, even if often inconsistently) that morality lacks any objective basis."  True enough.  But it is also true that when a morality with which one disagrees rejects what one is convinced is the moral truth about one or another issue, many succomb to the temptation to accuse that morality and its proponents of being "relativist".  As in:  The growing acceptance, and even affirmation, of same-sex relationships in liberal democracies is depressing evidence of a growing relativist moral sensibility.

John Mackie was not a relativist.  And I doubt it clarifies much by calling him as a "subjectivist".  Mackie is best understood as someone who, like the (relatively) young (and highly respected) philosopher Richard Joyce, is a moral fictionalist.  See Joyce's The Myth of Morality (Cambridge, 2002).  What *is* clarifying is to point out that the kind of morality that in the view of both Mackie and Joyce is a fiction is not the only kind of morality there is--and not even the best kind.  As I understand it, and whatever the intent of its proponents, moral fictionalism does not pose a serious challenge to a eudaimonistic morality, and both Aristotle's and Thomas's moralities are eudaimonistic.  Presumably even moral fictionalists are committed to their own well-being; they want their lives to go well; they want to flourish rather than to wither.  The serious disagreement between Pope Benedict and Robby (and Catholic moral-theological traditionalists generally) on the one side, and some Catholic moral-theological dissidents on the other, with respect to the issue of same-sex sexual conduct, is a disagreement about the requirements of human well-being.  This is a disagreement between two groups neither of whom is relativist (or subjectivist), both of whom are fiercely anti-relativist.

Sunday, July 4, 2010

"Dictatorship of Relativism"

Rigorously consistent moral relativists (or subjectivists) are hard to find.  Less than rigorously consistent moral relativists are extremely common.  If you doubt the latter proposition, just teach a freshman philosophy class or attend a cocktail party (especially a cocktail party in a university town).

The point that Pope Benedict is trying to communicate, I believe, is that many people, including many influential people, appeal (sometimes only implicitly, but sometimes quite explicitly) to relativism in the face of demanding moral claims. People want to do what they want to do. As the socially liberal movie maker Woody Allen famously said, "the heart wants what the heart wants."  So, when morality gets in the way, many are tempted to say (sincerely enough, even if often inconsistently) that morality lacks any objective basis. "Values" are, they say, "merely subjective or relative." "There is no absolute right and wrong." "What's wrong for you, might be right for me."  So, they say (usually inconsistently with other things they believe or would say under the pressure of questioning), you shouldn't "impose your values on others" or even judge their conduct to me morally wrong ("stop being judgmental!").

Often, spectacularly inconsistently, people appeal to relativism or subjectivism as a putative ground of people's moral rights:  since there really is no "absolute" right and wrong, they say, people have a right to do as they please in matters that do not harm others.  The great liberal moral and political philosopher Joel Feinberg found this error common enough that he felt it necessary sternly to warn his fellow liberals against committing it. "Beware," he said, "or you will be hoist on your own petard."

Of course, not all moral subjectivists or relativists fall easily into self-contradiction.  The world of philosophy, notably including Oxford philosophy, has included very sophisticated subjectivists and relativists---some of them influential indeed.  One of the most powerful and influential defenses of the subjectivist position was written by John Mackie of University College, Oxford.  The title of his famous book says it all:  Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Mackie was the very opposite of a fringe figure---in Oxford or in the world of philosophy generally.  Lots of people share his view.  It was (and remains) mainstream.

My sense, however, is that Pope Benedict is less concerned with the positions and arguments of professional philosophers like John Mackie than he is with a cultural ethos in which many, many people live by (and the media of communication and entertainment frequently promote or valorize) the philosophy of "the heart wants what the heart wants."  Where such an ethos prevails, one who challenges it risks being labeled a reactionary and even a "bigot"---and being treated as such. 

Dear Michael S., [UPDATED]

You could scarcely be more anti-relativist than I am.  (Or, I suspect, than Les Green is.  But Les can speak for himself.)  As you might have understood if you had taken the time to look at the chapter I cited, in response to *your* query about *my* thinking.  I am at the University of San Diego during fall semesters, teaching a course on international human rights both to law students and to master's students in peace studies, in part precisely because I am a thoroughgoing anti-relativist.  One can be a thoroughgoing anti-relativist and nonetheless conclude that Cardinal Ratzinger's talk about "a dictatorship of relativism" is, at best--at best--confused and unproductive talk about a complicated matter.  For example:  There is nothing even slightly relativist about the argument that it is a human rights violation to refuse to extend the benefit of law to same-sex couples.

And by the way, I did not suggest--and neither did Les, as I read him--that the Pope is "attempting to confuse".  One can be confused, and be confusing, without attempting to confuse.

By contrast, as I read your post, you *are* suggesting that Les and I are attempting to confuse.  I suspect that you don't really mean that.  At least, I hope you don't.  But your saying as much is insulting.

[UPDATE:  I notice the accusatory "attempting to confuse" language has been changed to a non-accusatory "causing confusion".  As I said, I suspected--and hoped--that Michael S. didn't really mean what he originally said.]

Michael P.

Celebrating Relativism?

This Independence Day post is, in a way, a continuation of my conversation with Michael P. on "relativism" and "relativisms."

What are we celebrating today?  Authentic freedom or illusory freedom?  Freedom for or freedom from?  Freedom to do what we ought or freedom to do what we want no matter how base? If rights are not "inalienable," but can be alienated at the whim of a majority, whether it be a majority of the whole or a majority of the Committee of Nine (SCOTUS), aren't we really celebrating a false liberty?  In Centesimus Annus, 44, Pope John Paul II said:

If there is no transcendent truth, in obedience to which man achieves his full identity, then there is no sure principle for guaranteeing just relations between people. Their self-interest as a class, group or nation would inevitably set them in opposition to one another. If one does not acknowledge transcendent truth, then the force of power takes over, and each person tends to make full use of the means at his disposal in order to impose his own interests or his own opinion, with no regard for the rights of others. People are then respected only to the extent that they can be exploited for selfish ends. Thus, the root of modern totalitarianism is to be found in the denial of the transcendent dignity of the human person who, as the visible image of the invisible God, is therefore by his very nature the subject of rights which no one may violate — no individual, group, class, nation or State. Not even the majority of a social body may violate these rights, by going against the minority, by isolating, oppressing, or exploiting it, or by attempting to annihilate it.

I ain't as learnt as Michael P., and I don't got Leslie Green's academic credentials (but if it's a credential war, I suspect that Ratzinger wins), but this good  'ole boy from flyover country can spot confusion a mile away, and it ain't coming from Ratzinger but from Michael P. and L. Green. 

Michael P. and Leslie G. want to teach the world that in technical philosophical language there are different relativisms and that discussions about relativism "outside of technical philosophical literature [read me, Ratzinger, and others] are deeply confused, and, therefore, confusing."  Michael P. goes on to dismiss Ratzinger by suggesting that he is merely engaging in "attractive polemical posturing" rather than engaging in serious thought.

Ratzinger argued in the week before he became Pope that "[w]e are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's own ego and desires."  Green and Perry  dismiss Ratzinger because he isn't engaged in technical philosophic speak.  But, Green inadvertently affirms the future Pope's thesis when he argues that we do have minimum moral standards and that they are determined by the ever changing  whims the majority.  To this country bumpkin, that sure sounds like relativism. But, what do I know? 

And, neither Perry nor Green address the substance of Ratzinger's argument.  Who is causing confusion?  I don't think it is the Pope!    

 

Saturday, July 3, 2010

The Case for Catholic Schools (Part Six): Exercising Religious Liberty

[This is the last in a series.  The full series may be found here.]


Since the Catholic immigration to the United States began in numbers in the middle to late Nineteenth Century, religious liberty and Catholic schools have been intertwined in American history.


Beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1925 decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which affirmed the right of parents to choose faith-based education for their children over the state’s attempt to force all children into government-run schools, and continuing through the 2002 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which approved the inclusion of Catholic and other religious private schools in the Cleveland voucher program for disadvantaged families, a robust and living form of religious liberty has been realized in the right of educational choice for Catholic education.


The Catechism of the Catholic School recognizes the fundamental right of parents to choose the school for their children in keeping with their religious faith:

"As those first responsible for the education of their children, parents have the right to choose a school for them which corresponds to their own convictions.  This right is fundamental.  As far as possible parents have the duty of choosing schools that will best help them in their task as Christian educators.  Public authorities have the duty of guaranteeing this parental right and of ensuring the concrete conditions for its exercise."  Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 2229.

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution speaks in terms of “free exercise” of religious faith,  The plain import of this phrase – “free exercise” – is that of acting upon one’s beliefs.  “Exercise” denotes action, not merely passive contemplation. As Catholics, we among believers are especially drawn to collective exercise of our faith, in the aptly-named Mass and the other Sacraments.

Coming together as a community in Catholic education is also a vital form of devotion and religious expression.  When, as but one pedestrian example, my daugher and her class-mates talk about Christian themes in a great literary work in English class in a Catholic high school, knowing that such a discussion is welcomed and encouraged, their faith is exercised and the blessings of religious liberty are realized again.

By choosing Catholic education for our children, we continue in a long-standing tradition and participate actively in that continuing exercise of religious liberty.  And whatever choices we make as families, whether to parish or public schools or alternative arrangements such as home-schooling, we can join together in this weekend’s celebration of our nation’s birth by celebrating as well the cherished freedom to make educational choices for our children.  Let us also remain committed to expanding those opportunities for all.

Happy Fourth of July!

Greg Sisk

Coolidge on the Declaration

Here is an address, delivered by Pres. Coolidge (one of my favorites!), back in 1926, to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Declaration.  (It's hard to believe that presidents and politicians used to be able to talk, write, and think like this.)  A bit:

. . . When we take all these circumstances into consideration, it is but natural that the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence should open with a reference to Nature's God and should close in the final paragraphs with an appeal to the Supreme Judge of the world and an assertion of a firm reliance on Divine Providence. Coming from these sources, having as it did this background, it is no wonder that Samuel Adams could say "The people seem to recognize this resolution as though it were a decree promulgated from heaven."

No one can examine this record and escape the conclusion that in the great outline of its principles the Declaration was the result of the religious teachings of the preceding period. The profound philosophy which Jonathan Edwards applied to theology, the popular preaching of George Whitefield, had aroused the thought and stirred the people of the Colonies in preparation for this great event. No doubt the speculations which had been going on in England, and especially on the Continent, lent their influence to the general sentiment of the times. Of course, the world is always influenced by all the experience and all the thought of the past. But when we come to a contemplation of the immediate conception of the principles of human relationship which went into the Declaration of Independence we are not required to extend our search beyond our own shores. They are found in the texts, the sermons, and the writings of the early colonial clergy who were earnestly undertaking to instruct their congregations in the great mystery of how to live. They preached equality because they believed in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. They justified freedom by the text that we are all created in the divine image, all partakers of the divine spirit. . . .

Friday, July 2, 2010

Abortion as the "lesser evil"

"Yes, abortion is killing. But it's the lesser evil."

That's the tiltle of an op-ed by Antonia Senior that was published in the Times of London on June 30, 2010. The essay is causing a stir. See this response by Albert Mohler. I haven't found a good link to Senior's essay. 

She begins the essay by explaining that she was in the Tower of London and encountered an interactive display that asks visitors whether they would die for a cause. After some reflection, Senior answers that the cause for which she would stake her life is the cause of women's liberation, and for Senior, that includes the right to abortion.

Senior acknowledges that an abortion involves the taking of a life. But she concludes that that realization doesn't change the calculus. She states: "you can't separate women's rights from their right to fertility control. The single biggest factor in women's liberation was our newly found ability to impose our will on our biology." She concludes her essay with these words--"As ever, when an issue we thought was black and white becomes more nuanced, the answer lies in choosing the lesser evil. The nearly 200,000 aborted babies in the UK each year are the lesser evil, no matter how you define life, or death, for that matter. If you are willing to die for a cause, you must be prepared to kill for it, too."

I wish that Senior had heard the fine talk that Erika Bachiochi (see) gave on pro-life feminism at the recent annual conference of University Faculty for Life.  

Richard M.

"Seven Days that Shook the Vatican"

A must-read piece by John Allen, the reporter-on-things-Catholic whom all Catholics, of all stripes, seem to respect:

 . . . I’m inclined to think the past week does mean something, and here’s my first-blush stab at expressing it: Collectively, I think these events both symbolize and advance the collapse of Catholicism as a culture-shaping majority in the West. When the dust settles, policy-makers in the church, particularly in the Vatican, will be ever more committed to what social theorists call “identity politics,” a traditional defense mechanism relied upon by minorities when facing what they perceive as a hostile cultural majority. . . .

Of course, some observers -- and not just religion’s cultured despisers, but many Catholics themselves -- welcome all this, seeing it as a long-overdue dose of humility and accountability. On the other hand, a growing band of Catholic opinion, certainly reflected in the Vatican, believes that a “tipping point” has been reached in the West, in which secular neutrality toward the church, especially in Europe, has shaded off into hostility and, sometimes, outright persecution.

Some blame a rising tide of neo-paganism in the West for the church’s woes, while others say church leaders, and especially the Vatican, have no one to blame but themselves. Whichever view one adopts, the empirical result is the same: Catholicism no longer calls the cultural tune. Benedict’s decision to launch an entire department in the Vatican dedicated to treating the West as “mission territory” amounts to a clear acknowledgment of the point.

Facing that reality, Catholicism, both at the leadership level and in important circles at the grass roots, is reacting as social theorists would likely predict, with a strategy that other embattled minority groups -- from the Amish to Orthodox Judaism, from the Gay Pride movement to the Nation of Islam -- have often employed: Emphasizing its unique markers of identity, in order to defend itself against assimilation to the majority. . . .

To be sure, Benedict XVI’s ambition is not merely that the church in the West will be a minority, but a “creative minority,” a term he borrows from Arnold Toynbee. The idea is that when great civilizations enter a crisis, they either decay or are renewed from within by “creative minorities” who offer a compelling vision of the future.

The $64,000 question, therefore, is whether Benedict’s version of a “politics of identity” is the right way to unleash the creativity in Catholicism that will allow it to play a transformative role in the cultural movements of the future. One thing’s for sure: projecting a robust sense of Catholic identity seems poised to be the guiding principle in Rome for some time to come.

I reflected, by the way, a bit on the "creative minority" idea in this reflection on Deus Caritas Est, "Church, State, and the Practice of Love".

One more thing ...

Michael S.,

I don't know that I've ever met a relativist.  The serious issue, in my judgment, is ethnocentrism.  I've met some ethnocentrists.

On the challenge of negotiating the relationship—sometimes but not always a relationship of tension or even conflict—between “universal” values and “local” values, the essays in Andras Sajo, ed., Human Rights With Modesty:  The Problem of Universalism (2004) & Christopher L. Eisgruber & Andras Sajo, eds., Global Justice and the Bulwarks of Localism (2005) are a good place to start.

Michael P.

On "relativisms" (plural)

Michael S.,

There are different relativisms:  in particular, anthropological, epistemological, cultural.  Most discussions of relativism I've encountered outside the technical philosophical literature are deeply confused and, therefore, confusing.  Wringing one's hands about "a dictatorship of relativism" may be, in some quarters, attractive polemical posturing; it is not, however, productive philosophical discussion.  In any event, here are some thoughts:  Perry, "Are Human Rights Universal?  The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters," In Perry, The Idea of Human Rights:  Four Inquiries (Oxford, 1998).

Michael P.