Thursday, July 29, 2010
Check out Joe Carter's short essay at First Things. Great quote:
It is often said that for national security conservatives, it is always 1938. A corollary is that for us religiously-oriented conservatives, it’s always 1968. Our society is always having to be retaught the laws of moral hygiene.
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
In the current issue of First Things, our own Robby George has this short piece, about the strange decision by the American Constitution Society to include, in its pocket-sized edition of landmark American documents, a version of the Gettysburg Address that does not include the words (which Lincoln actually spoke) "under God."
Monday, July 26, 2010
Here is an op-ed of mine, which appeared in today's edition of USA Today, about the Court's recent (and upcoming) religious-liberty decisions, and about the way that a Justice Kagan should approach such cases. A bit:
. . . What does Kagan's embrace of both judicial responsibility and restraint tell us about how she would have approached, or will approach, such cases? We know that she will, in general, be a reliably "liberal" or "progressive" voice on the court, but will she follow in Justice Stevens' footsteps when it comes to religious liberty?
As she told the Judiciary Committee, the First Amendment ensures that religion "never functions as a way to put people, because of their religious belief or because of their religious practice, at some disadvantage with respect to any of the rights of American citizenship." "You are a part of this country," she insisted, "no matter what your religion is." She was right. Our Constitution protects religious liberty and welcomes religion in public life, but the criteria for membership in our political community are secular. Clearly, courts have a role to play in policing these criteria and making sure that "rights of American citizenship" are never made to depend on religious professions or practices.
But what is that role, and how should it be exercised? The ability of unelected judges to identify those government actions that actually "establish" religion is limited, and so is their authority to second-guess others' policy decisions. It is not just the responsibility of judges, but also of legislators, public officials and voters, to be good stewards of our "blessings of liberty" and to guard against political exclusions on religious grounds. . ..
Comments are open.
Laura Rosenbury is a productive and original scholar. That said, I disagree with almost everything she has been writing recently (see, e.g., here and here), and her new article appears to be no exception, at least judging from my quick glance at the introduction. Here's an excerpt:
This Article challenges the underlying assumption in Lawrence that sex is valuable only when potentially in service to emotional intimacy and proposes a new theory for extending legal protection to a wider range of consensual sexual activities. The current regulation of sex devalues both sexual relationships that lack an intimate component and intimate relationships that ack a sexual component. We argue that the state should independently protect both intimate relationships and sexual interactions because sex can constitute a vital part of individual identity and self-expression even when not channeled into intimacy. Other legal scholars have argued that intimate sexual relationships should be protected outside of marriage, or that sex and marriage should be separated from state support for families. Our project is unique in that we extend the deconstructive project to intimacy in general, arguing that sex should be decoupled in the legal sphere from both domestic relationships and other traditional forms of emotional intimacy. We thus challenge the dominant, almost sacred, understanding that the most important relationships between adults should always be both sexual and emotionally intimate.
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Over the past several days, many things—all things—in the world, in the Church, and within this web log have caught my attention. While I am still trying to take stock of all these things, I found it necessary to reflect on a passage from the works of Henri Cardinal de Lubac, S.J. that I have been reading in the context of the contemporary Church. Although written in 1964 while he was attending the Second Vatican Council, then Fr. de Lubac had this to say:
Today, even some of the faithful, and even some priests (without excluding the religious), are tempted “to open themselves to the world” in such a manner that they free themselves to be invaded by it... As for non-believers, many will not neglect to say: the Church abandons little by little her dogmas. She is vaguely aware that her role is finished; thus she comes to us in order to preserve herself, without daring to yet abandon her religious phraseology.
I, for one, think that de Lubac’s words, although written forty-six years ago, aptly describe some segments of the Church, the world, and humanity today. In short, it seems that even though they may be people of good will, some Christian Catholics succumb to the siren sounds of the world and culture that surround them, thus failing to realize that the body of Christ, the People of God may, as a result, suffer because of their words and deeds. I further think that the condition identified by de Lubac and his discussion of them offer great insight into the problematic issues that confront the Church today. I hope to address the application of de Lubac’s point in subsequent postings in the coming days.
RJA sj
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
I've been sufficiently consumed in associate-dean duties that I haven't blogged for months about anything, including the debate over the health-care law and abortion. I have, however, written a memorandum posted on the Democrats for Life of America website, arguing that the pro-life Democrats who voted for the bill acted quite reasonably in doing so. Here's part of the summary:
This memorandum has three purposes. First, it provides a brief reminder that PPACA contains many provisions reflecting pro-life values and having pro-life effects. Second, it assesses the two major criticisms of PPACA concerning abortion raised by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). Although the USCCB has been the most detailed and thoughtful critic of the statute on abortion-related matters, this memorandum concludes that there are convincing answers to the USCCB’s criticisms and thus it was eminently reasonable for pro-life legislators to support PPACA.
Finally, the memorandum concludes that it also makes perfect sense for a pro-life legislator to support further efforts to clarify restrictions on abortion funding and protections of religious conscience in the context of a stand-alone bill. Unlike the context of the PPACA vote, enactment of stand-alone clarifications will not destroy health-reform legislation and its many positive pro-life features and effects. But support for such further clarification should in no way be seized on as an admission that PPACA’s provisions against abortion funding were inadequate.
In particular, as the memo indicates, I think that the USCCB's criticism of the community-health-center funding overlooks that the statute's language most sensibly is read to say that the funding is to go through HHS accounts that are already subject to the Hyde Amendment and accompanying regulations (the provision refers to "accounts within HHS" and to "increas[ing] funding"); and the commingling of funds there solidifies the proposition that these funding increases cannot be used by CHCs for abortion.
In the Alvare/Jost debate, Professor Jost cites my memorandum, and my argument is indeed an expansion of a couple of the arguments he's made over the last few months. He does misidentify me as a Catholic, whereas MOJ readers (at least those who've read for a while) will know that I've been a kind of Protestant observer welcomed at this site (maybe because I'm deeply drawn to Catholic social doctrine, maybe on the thought that I'll see the ecclesial light someday). Jost and I have corresponded, and I imagine there will be some sort of correction at dotCommonweal. The misidentification doesn't hurt his legal argument (nor would my being a Catholic bolster mine or his).
Tom
Robby is right that I did not intend to weigh in on the Alvare, Commonweal debate. I was primarily interested in the question raised in the editors' post and was relying on their characterization of Alvare's argument (which I have not yet read). I do think, though, that the position (which I'm glad to see Robby agrees with) that the bishops' legal interpretations or empirical policy predictions are not entitled to uncritical deference is not wholly uncontroversial. In a different NCR article, John Allen reported on the "gap" that has emerged between the USCCB and the Catholic Health Association over health care reform. The article included this back and forth between Cardinal George and the CHA:
CHA officials also insist that their rift with the bishops was narrow.
"We did not differ on the moral question, or the teaching authority of the bishops," Keehan said.
George, however, isn't so sure.
"This may be a narrow disagreement, but it has exposed a very large principle," he said.
The principle is ecclesiological: Who speaks for the church on matters of faith and morals, including how morality is translated into law?
"If the bishops have a right and a duty to teach that killing the unborn is immoral, they also have to teach that laws which permit and fund abortion are immoral," George said. "It seems that what some people are saying is that the bishops can't, or shouldn't, speak to the moral content of the law, that we should remain on the level of abstract principles."
That's a point, George argued, with implications across the board.
"For example, it affects our discussion of immigration," he said. "Are we supposed to just say that the present situation is morally unjustified, or do we have the right and the duty to make moral judgments about whatever legislation comes down the line?"
The challenge of navigating those two outlooks has already complicated one effort at reconciliation.
George (the Cardinal, not Robby) seems to be suggesting -- though he's far from clear on this point -- that the bishops' authority to teach about faith and morals, if it's to be effective, must also include authority to determine the moral valence of a particular piece of legislation. Now, his words might be simply mean that the bishops are entitled to weigh in on the question. If so, they would be consistent with the point of my original post. But that is not at least how Allen seems to have interpreted Cardinal George's comments, because otherwise the back-and-forth he sets up between CHA and the bishops (indeed, the entire "gap" referenced in the article) collapses. No one, as far as I know, is saying that the bishops are not entitled to take a position on the consequences of legislation. CHA (and the sisters) are just saying its ok for Catholics to disagree with the bishops' prediction of those consequences, as long as they don't simultaneously reject the Church's position on the underlying moral principles.
In the same article, Allen also reports this statement by Bishop Lynch, of St. Petersburg:
"I've been associated in one way or another with the episcopal conference of the United States since 1972," said Bishop Robert Lynch of St. Petersburg, Fla. "I have never before this year heard the theory that we enjoy the same primacy of respect for legislative interpretation as we do for interpretation of the moral law." Lynch, who sits on the CHA Board of Trustees, spoke in a June 13 interview with NCR on the margins of the Denver conference.
Again, this comment, though a bit opaque, suggests that Bishop Lynch has, for the first time this year, heard people (bishops? someone else?) argue that bishops enjoy some sort of "primacy" with respect to "legislative interpretation." This is consistent with the more expansive reading of Cardinal George's comments, and inconsistent with the notion that the position I am arguing for remains uncontroversial, at least in some circles.
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
Eduardo:
It's not clear from your recent post whether you yourself read the article by Helen Alvare to which the editors of Commonweal responded. You quoted the editors' characterization of her argument, not her argument itself. If you haven't read Professor Alvare's article, I strongly urge you to do so. I believe you will see that in the passage you quoted, the Commonweal editors mischaracterized Alvare's argument by suggesting that her claim was that to disagree with bishops on policy matters (such as health care legislation) is ipso facto unacceptable.
This suggestion is reinforced by the insinuation that Alvare disagrees with the following claim: "neither the bishops nor their lay advisers have an exclusive claim to competence when it comes to the technical evaluation of public policy. Nor can the bishops conference, despite its consistent and often heroic efforts on behalf of the unborn, fairly claim ownership of prolife principles."
You yourself say, in speaking of that claim: "I would have thought this a relatively uncontroversial position among Catholic conservatives." And you are absolutely right about that. I agree with that position, and Professor Alvare agrees with it, too. Commonweal's suggestion that Alvare denies it is way out of line.
In truth, Alvare made a specific claim against the argument and position of Commonweal on abortion and the health care bill. She claimed that that position (which is a position rejected by the bishops, who believe, rightly in my view, that the bill will result in an expansion of abortion) is arrogant and naive. She did not make the general claim that to disagree with the bishops on policy matters is ipso facto wrong. To defend themselves from Alvare's criticisms of their position, they suggest that she is making a broad claim to episcopal authority that, to my knowledge, no Catholic conservative (and no Catholic liberal) makes. Alvare herself certainly does not make it.
And while we are speaking of claims Alvare did not make, she also did not claim that Timothy Jost has less credibility as a pro-lifer because he is not a Catholic, or that it is impossible "for Mennonites — or Mormons or Zoroastrians — to construe a piece of legislation correctly and for Catholic bishops to misconstrue it." For the Commonweal editors to suggest that Alvare made such claims is outrageous.
Let me add one more fact. Alvare's criticisms of Commonweal were a response to Commonweal's criticisms of the U.S. Catholic Bishops and the nation's major pro-life groups. Alvare did not start this. Nor were her criticisms of Commonweal harsher or even as harsh as Commonweal's criticisms of the bishops and the pro-life groups. When Commonweal launched its assault on the bishops and groups, it scarcely treated the matter as one on which reasonable people of goodwill could reasonably disagree. Its editorial plainly questioned the motives of people who disagreed with Commonweal's view that the health care legislation was "abortion neutral." It strikes me as unseemly now for the editors to cry foul when Alvare characterizes their position as arrogant and naive.
I recognize that the point of your post was not to defend Commonweal or criticize Professor Alvare, but to make a general point about the scope of episcopal authority. For what it's worth, I don't find much to disagree with in your general point. I've set forth my own views here: http://www.winst.org/fellows/george/Moral_Witness_of_the_Catholic_Church.pdf. The point of this post is to defend Professor Alvare against a mischaracterization of her views by the Commonweal editors. It is not directed against anything you yourself have asserted.
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