Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, August 6, 2010

the dirty little secret about "activism"

I agree with the way Rick suggests "judicial activism" might be salvaged as a way of measuring and potentially criticizing judicial decisions.  I also join Rick in agreeing with Powell (as I have mentioned here on MOJ before) that humility, as Powell defines it, is a virtue judges should possess and practice  -- a willigness to work within the Constitution as a tool for debate.  Such humility needs to recognize, moreover, that there exists no single or unitary modality for the interpreting of our Constitution.  The Constitution itself does not set a fixed list of legitimate forms of argument, and the history of the document's interpretation manifests multiple approaches that are all legitimate, by which I mean that the Constitution does not rule them out.  The great irony and dirty little secret about activim is the textualist's deep complicity in it.  Under the guise of pacificism and judicial discipline, the textualist seeks to reduce the list of legitimate modalities to one, viz., his own.  As Powell has noted,  "[a]cademic constitutional lawyers and the occasional Supreme Court Justice sometimes make arguments that the list of legitimate modalities ought to be drastically shortened, which is itself a legitimate form of argument but ought to be recognized for what it is, a proposal for radical reform."  One reason, then, for resisting that proposal for radical reform is its unmitigated lack of humility.  Another is the one I mentioned in Rick's and my exchange on the topic a few weeks back, viz., that textualism falsifies the way in which the making and receiving of law actually work.  I won't repeat that here.

Another brief in the Arizona school-choice case

Like Tom Berg, I am filing an amicus brief in Winn (the Arizona school-choice case).  My brief, co-authored with Jack Coons, is being filed on behalf of the American Center for School Choice (with which our own Patrick Brennan is also involved).  Here is the gist:   

This case implicates – and this Court should vindicate – two foundational and animating principles of our Constitution and tradition:  First, as was emphasized long ago in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, parents enjoy the “liberty . . . to direct the upbringing and education” of their children.  268 U.S. 510, 534.  After all, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”  Id. at 535.  Arizona’s tax-credit program helps to make this promised right a meaningful reality for thousands of parents.

 

Second, and relatedly, this Court reminded the country in its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education[.]”  347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  See also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]ithout education one can hardly exercise the civic, political, and personal freedoms conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  Policy initiatives like Arizona’s bring this opportunity closer to thousands of children for whom it would otherwise, unfortunately, be out of reach. . . .

 

Parental choice in education, which the Arizona tax-credit program helps to promote, is constitutional, sensible, and just.  What’s more, it is essential to achieving equality of opportunity for American children, rich or poor.  School choice treats the poor as citizens of equal dignity; it promotes the independence upon which constitutional government depends; and it empowers parents to transmit their values to their children.  Because the decision below is inconsistent both with this Court’s controlling Establishment Clause precedents and with fundamental values that have long animated our traditions, it should be reversed.

More on "activism"

Patrick makes a good point, of course, that the "activism" charge -- lobbed against conservatives in the early 20th century, then against liberals in the 1960s and 70s, and now (again) against the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts -- can be frustratingly contentless.  For some thoughts of mine about what could be the content of the charge, see this exchange between Kim Roosevelt and me, about his then-new book, "The Myth of Judicial Activism."   Roosevelt wrote (among other things) that:

. . . “judicial activism,” as the phrase is typically used, is essentially empty of content; it is simply an inflammatory way of registering disapproval of a decision. It is supposed to indicate that a judge has decided a case based on personal policy preferences rather than law. . .

And I wrote (among other things) that:

[I]n his recent Walter F. Murphy Lecture, “Constitutional Virtues” (published in the Green Bag), Professor H. Jefferson Powell took up the question, why does the Constitution bind? Does it have, and how does it have, “legitimate authority?” Along the way to answering that question, he identifies “humility” as a constitutional virtue, and defines it as:

the habit of doubting that the Constitution resolves divisive political or social issues as opposed to requiring them to be thrashed out through the processes of ordinary, revisable politics. . . . [t]his virtue manifests itself in the continuing recognition that the Constitution is primarily a framework for political argument and decision and not a tool for the elimination of debate.

It seems to me that “judicial activism” might be salvaged, and used as a way of identifying and criticizing decisions—such as, in my view, Casey—that fail to demonstrate this virtue. . . .

More on the Plight of the Liberal Catholic

Cathy Kaveny believes, rightly I think, that the Catholic Church is in the midst of an acute crisis, a crisis that is underestimated by the hierarchy. In a post at dotcommonweal, she points to yet another liberal Catholic, an Illinois appellate judge who is in anguish about whether she should stay in the Church. That judge expresses the hope that the hierarchy would excommunicate her and make the choice for her. See here.

The comments to Cathy’s post are well worth reading for those interested in the plight of the liberal Catholic. Most of those who comment empathize with the Judge’s plight and have resolved it in various ways (leaving, staying to fight, staying but not receiving communion). One of my favorite comments is by David Nickol, “It seems to me to all boil down to a very basic decision. If you believe that the Church is so messed up that it can’t be what it claims to be — an organization to represent Jesus on earth, guided by the Holy Spirit, and indefectible — then you leave. If you believe the claims the Church makes about itself, then you stay.

“It surprises me to hear almost no discussion among Catholics about whether or not the Church’s behavior is evidence that it can’t be the divinely guided institution that it claims to be.

“Are the claims the Church makes about itself credible? If so, go to Mass every week, go to confession, etc., etc., and don’t read the newspapers.”

Arizona School-Choice Case

As many of you know, the Supreme Court is reviewing the Ninth Circuit's decision striking down Arizona's school-choice law that gives taxpayers tax credits for contributing to "student tuition organizations" that support scholarships at private, including religious schools.  Despite the huge similarities between this case and Zelman, where the Court upheld properly-designed school voucher programs, the Ninth Circuit stretched and strained to strike down this program.  I wrote this amicus brief together with Doug Laycock (now at Virginia) for the Catholic bishops, the Christian Legal Society, and others, pointing out how the court of appeals utterly disregarded the principles of respecting choice in religious matters that animated the voucher decision and should animate the Religion Clauses.  Other briefs in the case, as they are filed, are here

Thursday, August 5, 2010

"judicial activism"

I recognize I'm a tiresome bore (not boor, I hope) on this topic, but would intelligent (and other) people, please, please stop talking about the evils of "judicial activism" simpliciter?  The commentary leading up to and now following Elena Kagan's nomination and confirmation has pivoted, as it has on many recent Supreme Court (and other) judicial nominations and confirmations, around the question of whether the nominee would be -- quod Deus avertat!! -- an "activist," the asserted *assumption* being that activism is both (a) defined and (b) very, very, very bad.   The first thing I don't see, though, is the argument behind (a).  What is activism?  What is the evidence concerning what our Constitution actually charges judges to do?  What *exactly* is prohibited? And why?  What makes some offical judicial act passive rather than "active"?  Moving on to assumption (b),  passivism is not *inherently* a virtue, not even of a judge -- as Aristotle made clear the day before the day before yesterday.  The opponents of "judicial activism" invoke the Constitution, but they rarely and barely explain, in the contexts I have in mind (as well as some others), what exactly they mean by such activism and exactly why it is prohibited (or just plain evil).  Respect for the Constitution, at least, requires precision with respect to the Article III power.  We all understand what is going on behind and through this talismanic treatment/invocation of "judicial activism," but we can do better.  And we would be better for doing so. 

A follow-up to Eduardo's post

Here is my colleague Gerry Bradley's follow-up to the piece (which came out before the opinion in the California case did) to which Eduardo linked recently.

Gerard Bradley on Judge Walker

ND Law Prof. Gerard Bradley has a puzzling opinion piece up on Fox News in which he insinuates that Judge Walker might have been biased in the Prop. 8 case because he is in a long-term committed gay relationship (whether it is true that Judge Walker is gay or is in a long-term relationship I have no idea, though I'll stipulate for the purposes of this brief post that it is) and might himself want to marry.  I say "insinuate" because Bradley never comes out and says that Judge Walker decided the case the way he did because of his relationship, though it seems to be the clear upshot of his piece. 

My puzzlement is twofold.  First, I don't quite understand what Bradley is saying, because he expressly says that he is not arguing that Judge Walker should have recused himself: 

I am not saying that Judge Walker should have refused [sic] himself in Perry v. Schwarzenegger.  I am not saying so because nowhere (as far as I know) has Judge Walker volunteered or been made to answer questions about how the outcome of that case would affect his interest (whatever it is) in marrying, and thus his interest in the manifold tangible and intangible benefits of doing so. 

That is a conversation worth having. 

And, sadly, it is quite too late to have it.

So his point is not that Judge Walker should have recused himself, but that it would have been worth having a conversation about his possible bias because Judge Walker is in a committed gay relationship.  On the other hand, Bradley asserts that "I do not doubt that Judge Walker made up his mind about Prop 8 before the trial began."  So he does seem to have a great deal of confidence that Judge Walker was in fact biased and, if so, he should have recused himself. 

My second source of puzzlement is why Bradley thinks this is a conversation we need to have had in the absence of any actual evidence of improper bias -- apart from Bradley's certainty and the authority of conservative commentator Ed Whelan, whom Bradley also cites.  Here's my question:  by Bradley's logic, would a white judge with children be subject to recusal  from hearing a challenge to an affirmative action program (or at least a "discussion" about his biases) because he might not want his children to be disadvantaged by such programs or is this the sort of insinuation of bias that is only valid against minorities?

The Dearth of Mothers on the Supreme Court

A recent NYT article by David Leonhardt  ("A Labor Market Punishing to Mothers") points out:

The last three men nominated to the Supreme Court have all been married and, among them, have seven children. The last three women — Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor, and Harriet Miers (who withdrew) — have all been single and without children. 

This little pattern makes the court a good symbol of the American job market.

The article continues with one of my favorite arguments, that that the 'glass ceilings' that persist in the American job market have more to do with the demands of parenthood (borne predominately by women) than gender discrimination.   And, as Leonhardt points out:

The fact that the job market has evolved in this way is no accident. It’s a result of policy choices. As Jane Waldfogel, a Columbia University professor who studies families and work, says, “American feminists made a conscious choice to emphasize equal rights and equal opportunities, but not to talk about policies that would address family responsibilities.”

In many ways, the choice was shrewd. The feminist movement has been fabulously successful fighting for antidiscrimination laws that require men and women to be treated equally. These laws have not eliminated the blatant sexism of past decades — think “Mad Men” — but they have beaten back much of it.

As a result, outright sexism is no longer the main barrier to gender equality. The main barrier is the harsh price most workers pay for pursuing anything other than the old-fashioned career path.

Julie Suk has recently published an excellent article in Columbia Law Review, "Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women?  Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict", in which she analyzes the consequences of this strategic choice by the feminist movement in the U.S, contrasting it with the different legal frameworks that allow European countries like France and Sweden offer such generous maternity and paternity support.  In Europe, the issue of maternity leave was considered entirely separately from the issue of general sick leave or disability leave.  The resulting legal schemes treat childbirth as something unique, not necessarily a disability or a sickness, and an endeavor in which the women who were primarily affected by it deserve  the support of the entire social network – not just the individual employer.  In contrast, in the United States, the issue of maternity leave has always been inseparably intertwined with employment law, and has always shaped primarily by the concern of feminists that distinguishing between childbirth and any other medical condition, by requiring employers to offer more generous maternity benefits, would perpetuate negative stereotypes about women’s ability to work, exacerbating discrimination against women.     

Suk argues that we ought to follow the European lead, recognize childbirth as something unique to women, and distinguish family leave from medial leave.  As Leonhardt points out in his NYT article, though, these sorts of polices aren't enough -- even in those European countries with generous family leave policies, women fall behind men in rising to the top of the career tracks. That's because the costs of taking advantage of these generous policies persist -- the legal right to take off time from your career to parent doesn't immunize anyone from the judgment that doing so makes you a less serious candidate for advancement to the upper levels of your chosen profession.

On that front, I agree with Leonhardt's conclusion:  "The best hope for making progress against today’s gender inequality probably involves some combination of legal and cultural changes, which happens to be the same combination that beat back the old sexism. We’ll have to get beyond the Mommy Wars and instead create rewarding career paths even for parents — fathers, too — who take months or years off. We’ll have to get more creative about part-time and flexible work, too."  In a soon-to-be published book chapter ("Dueling Vocations"), I argue that these sorts work-life balance issues shouldn't be seen as only 'women's issues'  -- they're manifestations of the tensions inherent in the precarious balance between the private vocation and the public vocation to which each of us, whether male or female, a parent or childless, is called.

In all of these arguments about the importance of workplace restructuring to accommodate family care obligations, it's important to remember that those of us with who have the luxury of making these arguments are typically not the ones who most need the arguments to be made.  Yes, Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Sandra Day O'Connor did beat the odds and make it to the top of the legal profession with children.   Yes, many professional women do have the option accepting the career costs of parenting, by of 'opting out' of the workplace or simply accepting the lower salaries that the "Mommy track" offers.  But, as Leonhardt writes, "On the other side of the spectrum, low-income women generally do not have a choice between career and family.  Many are single parents.  Their chances of escaping poverty are hurt by the long-term costs of taking time off after childbirth and having little flexibility in their schedules."

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

The Prop. 8 decision

To the surprise of (I suspect) no one, a federal trial-court judge has struck down California's law affirming that legal marriage is limited to relationships between one man and one woman.  Here is the (very long) opinion.  Nutshell version:  the law serves no legitimate rational (let alone "compelling") state interest -- only "private moral view[s]" -- and so the burdens it imposes on the court's understanding of the constitutionally protected right-to-marry are unjustified. 

As was (I think) expected, much of the opinion's work is done through the court's findings-of-fact.  One of these (No. 77) might be of interest:  "Religious beliefs that gay and lesbian relationships are sinful or inferior to heterosexual relationships harm gays and lesbians."

Give the opinion a read, and let us know what you think . . .    

UPDATE:  Andy Koppelman agrees with me that the trial judge's "findings of fact", rather than his legal analysis, are what really matter in this case.  (Andy probably does not share my sense that many of the 'facts" which the judge regarded as beyond dispute or clearly established are actually contestible normative propositions, but that's another matter.)

ANOTHER UPDATE:  Dave Hoffman suggests that the trial judge's findings of "fact" are really better regarded as assertions of "constitutional fact", and so probably will not (and should not) enjoy the deference generally given by appellate courts to lower courts' fact-finding.