A new entry on the ledger of anti-Muslim hysteria: A bill has been introduced in the Tennessee legislature that would make it a felony to follow Shariah law. OK, I understand the concern about Shariah law being allowed to subvert civil law, but making it a crime for an individual to follow the dictates of their religious tradition? If we are concerned about some elements of Shariah law having the potential to lead an individual to commit acts of violence or treason, let's focus on the violence or treason, not the purported religious justification for the acts. For the good of all concerned, I hope the bill meets a quick and painless demise in committee. (It will meet its demise in the courts, at the very least.)
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Follow Shariah? Go directly to jail.
J. Brian Benestad's book on Catholic Social Doctrine
J. Brian Benestad's book "Church, State, and Society: An Introduction to Catholic Social Doctrine" has just been released by The Catholic University of America Press. Here. It is difficult to find a relatively brief account of the Church's social teaching, although the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church is the best place to start. Here. Benestad's book, which I have not yet had a chance to read in full, looks like a very useful introduction. His linking "understanding and living" Catholic social doctrine with "living the whole Christian faith," including the life of holiness to which we are all called, seems particularly valuable.
Richard M.
A free marketplace of ideas (except . . . )
The "sweet mystery of life" passage and conscience protection
Prof. Mark Rienzi writes, at Public Discourse, and adapting (I think) a longer law-review piece, that the Court's Casey decision provides support for a constitutional conscience right of health-care providers to refuse to perform abortions. Worth reading.
The British Foster Parenting Case
I've always been baffled by the perception of so many of my socially liberal friends and acquaintances that it is the social conservatives who are the principal aggressors in the "culture war." It has always seemed obvious to me, beginning with the campaign to legalize abortion and make it as widely available as possible, that the opposite is true. The British foster parenting case and controversy settles the issue, I think.
Tuesday, March 1, 2011
A Step Further Away from the Law
Earlier today Rob posted a notice of the recent action taken by the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division directed against a Christian couple and quoted from N. 93 of the approved judgment in Eunice and Owen Johns v. Derby City Council on the suitability of observant Christians to be foster carers (parents) in the UK. The full decision is here [Download Johns_Approved_Judgment]. Later on in N. 102, the court raises the question of the status of the freedom of religion and the refusal of the would-be foster parents to compromise the tenets of their Christian faith. The court holds that there is only a “qualified” right founded on religious freedom [the court’s italics] based on the authorities upon which it, the court, relies. The court then asserts that there are other interests at stake, and this “will be particularly so where a person in whose care a child is placed wishes to manifest a belief that is inimical to the interests of children.” (My italics)
So, the court holds and imposes the view that Christian beliefs which do not embrace homosexuality are “inimical to the interests of children.” I would suggest that the court, for whatever reason or no reason, overlooks other law that is applicable to this case. In this age when international law is often relied upon to help direct judicial decision-making, the court in Johns v. Darby City Council fails to acknowledge the fact that the UK is a party to both the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 18(4) of the ICCPR states that “The States Parties [here the UK] to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” Article 13(3) of the ICESCR presents an almost identical requirement “to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their [the parents] own convictions.” It would then seem that the High Court of Justice failed to take stock of pertinent law to which the UK is bound assuming that foster carers hold the status of legal guardians.
The justifications for these provisions of the two 1966 Covenants are found in the working papers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where the drafters of the declaration knew that they had to preserve the rights of parents regarding the moral and religious education of their children which had first been compromised and then eviscerated by National Socialism. It appears that the High Court of Justice failed to take stock of this as well.
So what does Catholic legal theory have to say about all this? In 1965, one year before the ICCPR and the ICESCR were finalized, the Second Vatican Council in Dignitatis Humanae Personae, the Declaration on Religious Liberty, stated that,
Parents, moreover, have the right to determine, in accordance with their own religious beliefs, the kind of religious education that their children are to receive. Government, in consequence, must acknowledge the right of parents to make a genuinely free choice of schools and of other means of education, and the use of this freedom of choice is not to be made a reason for imposing unjust burdens on parents, whether directly or indirectly. Besides, the rights of parents are violated, if their children are forced to attend lessons or instructions which are not in agreement with their religious beliefs, or if a single system of education, from which all religious formation is excluded, is imposed upon all. N. 5.
Additionally, in 1983, the Pontifical Council for the Family issued the Charter on the Rights of the Family, and it had this to say about the issues found in the Johns case:
a) Parents have the right to educate their children in conformity with their moral and religious convictions, taking into account the cultural traditions of the family which favor the good and the dignity of the child; they should also receive from society the necessary aid and assistance to perform their educational role properly. b) Parents have the right to freely choose schools or other means necessary to educate their children in keeping with their convictions. Public authorities must ensure that public subsidies are so allocated that parents are truly free to exercise this right without incurring unjust burdens. Parents should not have to sustain, directly or indirectly, extra charges which would deny or unjustly limit the exercise of this freedom. c) Parents have the right to ensure that their children are not compelled to attend classes which are not in agreement with their own moral and religious convictions. In particular, sex education is a basic right of the parents and must always be carried out under their close supervision, whether at home or in educational centers chosen and controlled by them. Article 5
It would seem, then, that if the court were to revisit the issues in this case, it would need to take account of the two 1966 Covenants. Moreover, if a Catholic family were to find itself in the situation confronting the Johnses, they would also be guided by the principles of Dignitatis Humanae Personae and the Charter of the Rights of the Family.
RJA sj
A Catholic "Sullivan Principles"
John Allen's newest column describes a very promising initiative to draft a Catholic template for business ethics in the 21st Century, something analogous to the "Sullivan Principles", which worked so effectively to focus the world on practical steps that could be taken to pressure South Africa to abandon apartheid. This initiative was kicked off last week by a conference hosted by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, co-sponsored by St. Thomas's John A. Ryan Institute for Catholic Social Thought of the Center for Catholic Studies. (The initiators of this effort include Bob Kennedy, who co-directs the Murphy Institute with me.) As Allen describes it:
As [Michael] Naughton [director of the Ryan Institute] put it, the idea would be to produce a short “primer” on Catholic social principles as they apply to concrete business challenges – maybe ten pages, designed to appeal to business people who won’t read Caritas in Veritate or the recently published “Compendium” of Catholic social teaching, but who are nevertheless eager to bring their moral and spiritual convictions to bear on their business activity.
Though the Sullivan Principles are likely the best-known model for such a project, Naughton said there are other examples to draw upon, including the U.N. Social Compact and the principles of the “Caux Round Table,” an international organization of business executives that aims to promote ethical practice.
As Naughton laid out the argument, the Catholic church has unique resources to get the job done. Three in particular stand out:
- Arguably the most extensive tradition of social thought, teaching and practice of any religious body in the world.
- A extensive network of groups and associations of Catholic business professionals, such as the Brussels-based “International Christian Union of Business Executives,” founded by Catholics in the early 20th century though now ecumenical;
- More than 1,000 Catholic colleges and universities around the world, most of which have business schools – though many, Naughton said, don’t actually draw upon the Catholic social tradition in any systematic way.
Naughton said the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace is the logical aegis under which a Catholic set of “Sullivan Principles” ought to be elaborated. Business is a global reality, and the Vatican is a global institution. Moreover, he said, such a “primer” would be a template for how the church can engage culture, of which business is one key expression.
Are Christians who oppose homosexuality fit to be foster parents?
Perhaps not, at least in the U.K. While postponing the ultimate decision, the Queen's Bench division of the High Court of Justice issued this opinion yesterday:
If children, whether they are known to be homosexuals or not, are placed with carers who . . . evince an antipathy, objection to or disapproval of, homosexuality and same-sex relationships, there may well be a conflict with the local authority's duty to "safeguard and promote" the "welfare" of looked-after children. There may also be a conflict with the National Minimum Standards for Fostering Services and the Statutory Guidance. Religion, belief and sexual orientation are protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010. . . . While as between the protected rights concerning religion and sexual orientation there is no hierarchy of rights, there may . . . be a tension between equality provisions concerning religious discrimination and those concerning sexual orientation. Where this is so, Standard 7 of the National Minimum Standards for Fostering and the Statutory Guidance indicate that it must be taken into account and in this limited sense the equality provisions concerning sexual orientation should take precedence.
HT: Howard Friedman
Schragger on the Beneficent Underenforcement of the Establishment Clause
I am a fan of Richard Schragger's work on the Religion Clauses, especially his superb piece a few years ago on the role of localism in religious liberty in which he claimed, in part, that decentralized decisions that benefit or burden religious liberty ought to be given greater deference than analogous centralized decisions.
Professor Schragger recently posted The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, a very interesting looking piece sounding related notes about the advantages of underenforcement of the disestablishment norm. From the introduction to the piece:
This Article argues (1) that a pervasive feature of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that the Court’s stated doctrine is underenforced or is irrelevant to a whole range of arguably pertinent conduct; (2) there are some legitimate reasons for this judicial underenforcement or irrelevance; and (3) to the extent the Court is capable of enforcing its stated nonestablishment principles, it can only do so indirectly by managing establishment in the political/legal culture that exists beyond constitutional law. How the Court does or fails to do (3) is the main subject of this Article.
Choosing Haiti
Some family friends of ours are missionaries in Haiti, and while some of their children are adopted Haitians, others are American-born. In light of our conversation yesterday about parents' purported "obligation" to value their kids' ability to choose over the substance of the choice, I was struck by the example of our friends, living with their kids among the poor in a country where medical care, schools, and opportunities to develop musical/artistic interests, etc. all fall short of what is available in America. As they put it, "We've always wanted to be sure that school does not get in the way of other ways for our kids to be educated." (They're getting a bit more publicity than normal b/c their daughter just translated for Miley Cyrus during her visit to Haiti.) You can check out their blog here.
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