Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Increasing religious pluralism in society is a major factor in causing societies to move toward greater religious freedom. (For an excellent book exploring this and related factors, see Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty). In a recent post at Balkinization, Andy Koppelman recommends a new book by Kevin Schultz entitled Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and Jews Held Postwar America to its Protestant Promise. Koppelman observes that, “Schultz shows how a deliberately fashioned coalition of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews (which eventually became the National Conference of Christians and Jews) worked together in a movement to refashion national identity so that all three faiths were understood as equally American.” He describes it as riveting reading. (In addition to Koppelman’s discussion, I would look at an essay by Schultz at the Huffington Post which provides additional support for the view that his book is worth reading).
Koppelman maintains, however, that if the Tri-Faith America notion met American needs in the 1940’s, it cannot possible meet the needs of our country now because of the increasing pluralism implicated by rising populations of Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, New Agers, atheists and agnostics. He specifically chides Justice Scalia for suggesting that we live in a monotheistic society. As a sociological matter and as a matter of political equality, I agree with Koppelman: “Theism is no better as a basis for social unity than the generalized Protestantism that prevailed at the time of the founding. If the aim is shared agreement, then it is counterproductive to propose unifying principles that large numbers of citizens cannot possibly agree to. If we are going to find bases of social unity today, they will have to be broader than this.”
I would point out, however, that monotheism is still a dominant strain in the culture. More important, if Koppelman is making a constitutional argument, (I am not sure), I believe he is wishing for a constitution we do not have. God is not only inscribed on our currency and our coins, mentioned in our Pledge of Allegiance and asked to bless America at the end of every Presidential address, God is mentioned in the constitution of virtually all, if not all, of the 50 states. God is used to legitimize our governments and often their policies. (I am quite sure that Koppelman and I agree this is bad for religion).
Ironically, as our country becomes more pluralistic (by the year 2050, Muslims are expected to be the second largest denomination in the United States (see Charles Lippy, Pluralism Comes of Age)), the Court in my view has moved to restrict religious liberty. Instead, I believe increased pluralism should lead us to increased religious respect toward others and increased religious liberty. But those who have been dominant will circle the wagons for a long time before they are persuaded or forced to retreat.
We are honored that Oklahoma City's new Archbishop, Paul Coakely, will celebrate Mass for our conference at St. Thomas More University Parish at 5:30 pm on Tuesday, May 17. The Mass is scheduled to take place right after what promises to be an enriching discussion with Paul Griffiths on the Essential St. Augustine for 21st Century Lawyers and Law Professors.
If you are attending the conference and haven't registered, please do so soon. Thanks!
Joe Carter reflects on the question that has haunted conscientious evangelicals for more than 100 years. I post it here for two reasons: 1) to express thanks for the fact that, while many questions haunt conscientious Catholics, this is not one of them; and 2) I have an excuse to bring up my favorite explanation of how Jesus was a teetotaler: the unfermented wine theory.
This is an interesting and provocative piece by a professor at the John Jay College of Law and a former police officer. Whether the author is truly serious about flogging is less clear than the larger point that he is making -- that the rehabilitative model of punishment was itself a cause (not the cause, but a cause) of the proliferation of penitentiaries (where one ought to be, of course, penitent) and later (round about the 1950s) "correctional institutions." I suppose the argument fits neatly with the claim that we entertain politely, comfortably, liberal ideas that by incarcerating the offender we are improving him, we are communicating to him his moral wrongdoing with the hope that he internalize the message, we are righting some sort of mystical imbalance in the universe which he created. But really what we are doing is using the force of law (it is always the force of law which in the end matters) to remove him from our midst and congratulating ourselves that we are treating him with the "respect" that the liberal state purports to owe its villainous subjects.
Corporal punishment, says the author, would return the punished to the public eye -- it would make the rest of us, for whom the world of crime is a shadowy specter that we hide from compulsively, that we tremble to see, confront it after a fashion. I once heard Judge Alex Kozinski say that if we are to retain capital punishment, executions ought to be publicly broadcast, so that we can see and sense and feel what we are doing. Here's James Fitzjames Stephen on the subject (from the piece, Pain, in his collection, Essays by Barrister):
It should not be wished that whatever is wrong and bad should be penned off from the rest of the community in a moral cesspool . . . . A somewhat more precise acquaintance than is commonly possessed with some of the secrets of prisons and hospitals would make many of us sadder, and most of us wiser.
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Talking Points Memo has more background on King & Spalding's decision to drop the DOMA defense. This part jumped out at me:
Sources with knowledge of the backlash confirm that one of King & Spalding's top clients, Coca Cola, also based in Atlanta, directly intervened to press the firm to extricate itself from the case.
Maybe I'm wrong, but it doesn't seem to me that clients have traditionally chosen their lawyers based on the moral standing of the lawyers' other clients. I do support lawyers making moral decisions about the cases they'll take -- or more accurately, acknowledging the moral dimension of those decisions, which is present whether or not they admit it -- and I suppose it's only natural that the moral accountability extends to other clients, but law firms need to be careful here. Coca-Cola's objective is to avoid offending anyone; if lawyers adopt this by giving in too easily to client demands, they will have abandoned a key quality of the lawyer's traditional role: the willingness to offend.
