Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, May 9, 2011

Summer reading

Now that summer is almost here (I still have some grading to do), I'm looking forward to reading a few things that have been on my bookshelf for awhile. So, I was particularly happy to begin reading Eric Siblin's, Bach's Cello Suites between games at my son's soccer tournament this past weekend. Siblin's work usually focuses on contemporary rock. He came to the Cello Suites by accident when he attended a recital on a whim. In the book, he weaves together the story of J. S. Bach's composing of the Suites (itself a mystery as there is some question of whether his second wife, Anna Magdalena, had a role in composing the suites) with their accidental recovery by Pablo Casulis, the son of a anti-monarchist Republican Catalan. According to Siblin, Casulis discovered the then unknown Bach cello suites at age thirteen while on a walk with his father.  He carried on his father's politics in his adult life by resisting Franco and eventually facing exile. Sibin writes that Causlis brought an unwavering commitment to his music and his politics. In an interview with Harpers (contains link to Youtube of Casulas playing Suite No. 1), Siblin suggests that "For Casals, the sovereignty of Catalonia was as natural and correct as infusing Bach with earthiness, dance, and humanity."

Aesthetic theory has been on my mind quite a bit lately, and the nature of the inexpressible in music, art and language. Last fall I read Fergus Kerr's Theology after Wittgenstein. Kerr speaks favorably of Stanley Cavell and his influence on Kerr's understanding of Wittgenstein. And so I picked up Cavell's The Claim of Reason and Must We Mean What We Say

Now, after reading Cavell, I am looking for something in Siblin's book that might help me understand the Cello Suites and a person like Casulis, who could blend his passion for music and his politics so totally. There seems to be an aspect of language and of the mystery of the person that is methodologically excluded in philosophy today, even as it becomes more focused on consciousness.  Can we doubt that it is significant for jurisprudence?

Indiana expands school choice -- Yay, Hoosiers!

"Republican Gov. Mitch Daniels on Thursday signed into law a plan giving Indiana the nation's most sweeping private school voucher program."  More here.

In my view, the policy-, constitutional-, and social-justice-based arguments for educational-choice-expanding programs is compelling.

 

A sobering, and sad, tale about religion and the academy

In this WSJ book review of "More God, Less Crime", by Byron Johnson, James Q. Wilson concludes with this: 

The second story that Mr. Johnson has to tell in "More God, Less Crime" is about what happens to academics—in his case, a criminologist—who turn their attention to religion. When he was a young scholar at Memphis State University (now the University of Memphis) in the mid-1980s, Mr. Johnson was told by his department chairman that none of his articles involving religion would count toward getting tenure. Though Mr. Johnson began publishing articles in academic journals about subjects other than religion, two years later he was fired. In his appeal to the dean, Mr. Johnson mentioned his publications and high student evaluations. The dean replied: "I don't need to have a reason," adding: "I can let you go if I don't like the color of your eyes."

With three small children at home, Mr. Johnson was desperate to save his job. He appealed to the provost, who told him: "You simply don't fit in here. I think you need to consider getting a job teaching at some small Christian college." The provost added, according to Mr. Johnson, that he would have "the same problem" at any other state university. Mr. Johnson then said to the provost: "If I were a Marxist we wouldn't even be having this conversation, would we?" The provost "nodded in agreement."

Mr. Johnson moved on to the University of Pennsylvania, where in the 1990s he continued to publish material on religion (even though the school is funded in large part by the state). In 2004, he took a job at Baylor University, a private Baptist institution, where he has been quite successful. His advice to young scholars: Get tenure before you start writing about religion.

A new (to me) blog: "Mere Orthodoxy"

This blog, "Mere Orthodoxy", might be of interest to MOJ readers:

Since 2004, Mere Orthodoxy has been working to provide intelligent and insightful discourse on all matters of faith and culture from a classically minded, conservative Christian standpoint.

The name is a fusion of the two most famous writings of C.S. Lewis (Mere Christianity) and G.K. Chesterton (Orthodoxy). Both authors exemplify the sort of intelligent approach to faith that we want to emulate, and identify what we want to conserve:  an orthodoxy that is humble, confident, and vibrant.   We want to see how that orthodoxy intersects with politics, film, literature, work, and every other realm of human life.

Thursday, May 5, 2011

More on John Finnis and others at Villanova Law

As previously announced, the sixth-annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and Culture, to be held at Villanova Law on Friday, September, 30, 2011, will be dedicated to exploring and celebrating the work of John Finnis, Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy in the University of Oxford and Biolchini Family Professor in the University of Notre Dame.  As readers of MOJ will be aware, Oxford University Press will soon publish five volumes of Prof. Finnis's collected papers and a new edition of his now-classic 1981 bookNatural Law and Natural Rights.
 
The Conference's other speakers are a suitably distinguished and varied group:
 
-George Christie, James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law
-Michelle Madden Dempsey, Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law
-John Keown, Rose M. Kennedy Professor of Christian Ethics, Georgetown University
-Frederick G. Lawrence, Professor of Theology, Boston College
-Mark Murphy, McDevitt Professor of Religious Philosophy, Georgetown University
-Fr. Martin Rhonheimer, Professor of Philosophy, Pontifical University of the Holy Cross (Rome)
-Michael J. White, Professor of Law and of Philosophy, Arizona State University
Please mark your calendars for September 30, 2011.  All of the many topics and themes on which Prof. Finnis has worked will be fair game for dialogue at the Conference.

Is Vengeance Forbidden?

In the discussion of the killing of Osama Bin Laden here (see below for various posts and comments), I have been struggling with the notion that the motivation/justification of vengeance seems to be categorically off the table -- an unequivocally forbidden reason for wanting to kill -- at least for Catholics, and perhaps for Christians generally.  Contemporary theories of punishment, to the extent that they are analogous (perhaps they are not), likewise generally disdain vengeance, preferring instead to rest on deontological or consequentialist bases.  It was not always so for theories of punishment -- and as some authors (e.g., Paul Robinson and John Darley) are finding out, popular ideas of retribution and vengeance are not so easy to disaggregate. 

But I've got a different question for MOJ readers.  For Catholics, is vengenace totally off limits?  I ask the question in all humility, as I genuinely don't know.  I anticipate that someone might cite Romans to me -- "'Vengeance is mine,' saith the Lord."  Fair enough -- but the admonition here seems to be not that vengeance is morally wicked (after all, it is God's) but that human beings should act with great caution when they are motivated by vengeance.  They ought to temper their vindictive instincts because they (unlike God) are not in an epistemic position to act purely from vindictive motives (cf. John 8:7).

Does that mean that human beings should repress totally the emotion of vengeance?  I have difficulty believing this. 

Continue reading

From Atheist to Catholic Thanks to Blessed JPII

The Washington Post recently ran a series on people impacted by the life of JPII.  Jennifer Fullwiler writes that the first time she took notice of JPII was during his funeral at a time when she was an atheist.  Two years later and much influenced by the late Pope's profound work, "Theology of the Body," Jennifer and and husband entered the Church.

HT:  Maria Ruiz Scaperlanda

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

Helping tornado victims in Alabama

MOJ-friend Paul Horwitz -- who teaches at the University of Alabama -- passed along this information, which I thought would be of interest, about how we can work with local Catholic agencies in helping out tornado victims:

Holy Spirit Catholic Church in Tuscaloosa has been very active in helping victims of last week's tornado, and especially the substantial, largely impoverished, and very hard hit local Hispanic community.  The church's web site is 
http://www.hschurch.com/.  I don't know what help the church needs, but I'm sure it would welcome your inquiries and prayers.  Those wishing to help might also visit the Facebook group called, I believe, the Tuscaloosa Tornado Donations. The state of Alabama's office of faith-based and community initiatives is also an excellent site for information on how you can help.

God bless!

Imminence, Unlawful Aggressors, and Proportionality in Self-Defense

Below, in a thought-provoking post by Eduardo, I express some reservations that the Catechism's provisions on "legitimate defense" are applicable to the killing of Osama Bin Laden.  I hope I did not derail that thread by petulantly resisting the hypo, but I think it might be worthwhile to spell out a few reasons for my view.

Part of the reason that I continue to question whether it is appropriate to characterize the killing of Osama Bin Laden as governed by the legitimate defense section of the Catechism deals with the traditional requirements in criminal self-defense of imminence, proportionality, and the resistance to unlawful aggressive force.  I believe that each of these elements of the criminal law of self-defense makes an appearance in the Catechism in the "legitimate defense" section (sections 2264-67).  And I believe that none of them has a role in the military killing of Bin Laden. 

First, imminence.  In criminal law, a person is not justified in using defensive force of any kind (deadly or non-deadly) unless the threat is imminent.  The requirement has been challenged by scholars, but I think it is a good one.  Kimberly Kessler Ferzan has argued that the requirement of imminence individuates those aggressive threats which a human being feels in some way compelled, just in virtue of being human, to respond to for purposes of self-protection.  One would not be a human being without the primal instinct toward self-defense in the face of an imminent threat, but absent imminence, it's a different story.  Second, unlawful aggressive force.  It is this kind of force, and only this kind of force, which triggers the possibility of self-defense in criminal law.  Note that the requirements of imminence and unlawful aggressive force relate to one another.  One would not get a self-defense instruction if there was evidence that, for example, 10 years ago, somebody used deadly aggressive force on you, but when you actually killed the aggressor, he was asleep or even resisting you with non-deadly force.  Most states also retain the rule that self-defense is unavailable to the initial aggressor, unless that aggressor stands down and communicates his withdrawal.  Third, proportionality.  Whatever self-defensive force is used must be proportional to the aggressive force.  Deadly self-defensive force in response to a non-deadly aggressive threat is not justified.

One sees each of these three components in ss. 2264-67.  Imminence and response to unlawful aggressive force are addressed together, and the Catechism even notes the issue of "[l]ove toward oneself" as the motivating issue in response to imminent aggressive force.  Proportionality shows up in the example given in s. 2264: "If a man in self-defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repels force with moderation, his defense will be lawful. . . . Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's."

None of these elements of self-defense is applicable to the killing of Bin Laden.  The threat that he posed, at the time when he was killed, was not imminent -- at least insofar as he posed a deadly imminent threat.  He may have been using unlawful aggressive force (though I wonder about this too -- unlawful according to what law, exactly?), but it is now known that he was unarmed at the time.  Applying criminal law principles of proportionality, the most that one could say is that any proportionate self-defensive force should have been non-deadly.  He should have been wounded, but not killed.  But the military was not instructed to apply principles of criminal law (quite rightly, of course).  It was instructed to "kill or capture" -- which I have since learned is the standard instruction when killing the target is the aim of the mission. 

Greg Sisk, in a previous post, pointed up other provisions of the Catechism which might apply to the killing of Bin Laden.  That might be right -- I'm not certain those apply either.  Maybe it's the case that nothing in the Catechism is on point.  But if that's the case, I don't think we should squeeze the round peg of a military killing into the square hole of criminal self-defense.  Bin Laden's killing, if it is justified, doesn't require justification through those principles.

UPDATE: In a story reported here, Attorney General Holder suggests that Bin Laden could have been killed by our military forces had he offered no resistance.  If that is true, we are at an enormous distance from the domestic criminal law of self-defense, as well as what is contained in the portions of the Catechism discussed in this post.

Mary Ann Glendon on Religious Liberty

The Pontifical Academy for Social Sciences has been meeting in Rome under the expert leadership of it's President, Mary Ann Glendon. The theme of this year's meeting is religious liberty, a topic of great interest to the Mirror of Justice community. I do not have the capacity to link to the Vatican website pages with her detailed address as well as the Holy Father's message to the Academy. However both are easily accessed in today's bulletin of the Holy See's Press Office's page. Incidentally, both addresses are in English. Professor Glendon's detailed intervention addresses a number of pressing concerns such as: pluralism; the nexus between Christianity and authentic human rights; and other important issues. As our dear friend and colleague, Rick Garnett, might exhort, check it out! RJA SJ