Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

Are Minnesotans Too Nice to Win the Presidency?

For a relatively small state on the Canadian border, my home state of Minnesota has produced a disproportionately large number of presidential candidates, though all were unsuccessful at winning the White House: Harold Stassen (who sought the Republican nomination eight times between 1948 and 1992 and seriously contended for the nomination in 1948 and 1952), Eugene McCarthy (a former Benedictine novice who came close to winning the Democratic nomination in 1968 and ran again in 1972 and 1976), Hubert Humphrey (the "Happy Warrior" who sought the Democratic nomination in 1952 and 1956, almost defeated John F. Kennedy for the Democratic nomination in 1960, and narrowly lost the general election to Richard Nixon in 1968), and Walter Mondale (who won the Democratic nomination in 1984 but lost the general election to Ronald Reagan in a landslide). There are two Minnesotans now seeking the 2012 Republican nomination: former two-term Governor Tim Pawlenty and U.S. Rep. Michele Bachmann. Compare those six candidates from Minnesota to California's five over that period: Ronald Reagan (1976, 1980, 1984), Richard Nixon (1960, 1968, and 1972), Jerry Brown (1976, 1980, 1992), Alan Cranston (1984), and Pete Wilson (1996).

During last night's Republican debate in New Hampshire, Governor Pawlenty declined to attack former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney's health care record despite several attempts by the moderator, John King of CNN, to goad Governor Pawlenty into a confrontation. Gene McCarthy was also reluctant to attack Robert Kennedy in the 1968 campaign (though McCarthy was privately disdainful of Kennedy), and Hubert Humphrey distanced himself from President Johnson and the Administration's policy on the Vietnam War only very late in the 1968 general election campaign, which may have cost Humphrey the election against Nixon. Minnesotans' civility and decency are a tonic for a coarsened political culture, but perhaps they have also been our undoing.

Strangulation and Undercriminalization

It seems to be something of a truism these days that there are too many criminal laws, and too many new criminal laws being created.  There is much that is sensible about the claims of overcriminalization; I'd recommend especially the (as usual) superb and thoughtful treatment by Doug Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of Criminal Law as well as a piece I think I've recommended before here by David Skeel and the late William Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law.

But not all new criminal laws are evidence of fatuous overcriminalization, even new laws which are used with frequency.  The offense (though of course not the act) of strangulation is a comparatively new phenomenon in criminal law.  New York passed its strangulation law in 2010, as did 13 other states.  The New York law creates three offenses, a misdemeanor and two felonies (classes C and D), and it is an important development in the law of domestic violence.  As this story explains (behind a pay wall, unfortunately), many victims of domestic violence state that they have been strangled at least once by their partner, but because strangulation often leaves no visible injury -- even when a victim has been strangled severely and near the point of death -- assailants generally could not be charged with anything more than harassment or some kind of simple assault.  The laws available did not accurately reflect the specific nature of the harm and threatened harm involved in strangulation.  Since the law's passage in New York and elsewhere, it has been used frequently, filling an undercriminalized gap. 

Group Agency

I am sitting in a hotel room with a horrid summer cold. At least I have the company of a good book. Christopher List and Phillip Pettit have written Group Agency, which is an investigation into the behavior of groups. They are particularly concerned with understanding what it means to attribute agency to a collection of individuals. Using recent work in economics, social choice theory, and philosophy, they argue that groups possess agency apart from the individuals that compose them. And, this agency must be accounted for in social thought. Their conclusions are significant for many legal issues that we discuss today. 

Monday, June 13, 2011

Patrick Leigh Fermor

Patrick Leigh Fermor, who died last Friday (obituary here), was one of the great figures of the twentieth century. His daring military exploits during World War II (where he led guerilla operations on Crete against the Nazis while disguised as a Cretan shepherd and kidnapped the commander of the German garrison) were combined with a remarkable literary career as a master of English prose and the author of two celebrated books (A Time of Gifts and Between the Woods and the Water) describing his 1934 walk across Europe at the age of 18. As Anthony Lane wrote in the New Yorker a few years ago, Leigh Fermor had "so much living to his credit that the lives conducted by the rest of us seem barely sentient--pinched and paltry things, laughably provincial in their scope, and no more fruitful than sleepwalks." But most of the obituaries for Leigh Fermor have neglected or mentioned only in passing his little book about French monasticism, A Time to Keep Silence, which includes this beautiful Latinate paragraph about the monastic life:

To begin with, I slept badly at night and fell asleep during the day, felt restless alone in my cell and depressed by the lack of alcohol, the disappearance of which had caused a suddent halt in the customary monsoon. The most remarkable preliminary symptoms were the variations of my need of sleep. After initial spells of insomnia, nightmare and falling asleep by day, I found that my capacity for sleep was becoming more and more remarkable: till the hours I spent awake; and my sleep was so profound that I might have been under the influence of some hypnotic drug. For two days, meals and the offices in the church--Mass, Vespers and Compline--were almost my most lucid moments. Then began an extraordinary transformation: this extreme lassitude dwindled to nothing; night shrank to five hours of light, dreamless and perfect sleep, followed by awakenings full of energy and limpid freshness. The explanation is simple enough: the desire for talk, movement and nervous expression that I had transported from Paris found, in this silent place, no response or foil, evoked no single echo; after miserably gesticulating for a while in a vacuum, it languished and finally died for lack of any stimulus or nourishment. Then the tremendous accumulation of tiredness, which must be the common property of all our contemporaries, broke loose and swamped everything. No demands, once I had emerged from that flood of sleep, were made upon my nervous energy: there were no automatic drains, such as conversation at meals, small talk, catching trains or the hundred anxious trivialities that poison everyday life. Even the major causes of guilt and anxiety had slid away into some distant limbo and not only failed to emerge in the small hours as tormentors but appeared to have lost their dragonish validity. This new dispensation left nineteen hours of absolute and god-like freedom. Work became easier every moment; and, when I was not working, I was either exploring the Abbey and the neighbouring countryside, or reading. The Abbey became the reverse of a tomb--not, indeed, a Thelema or Nepenthe, but a silent university, a country house, a castle hanging in mid-air beyond the reach of ordinary troubles and vexations. A verse from the office of Compline expresses the same thought; and it was no doubt an unconscious memory of it that prompted me to put it down: Altissimum posuisti refugium tuum...Non accedet ad te malum et flagellum non appropinquabit tabernaculo tuo [Thou hast made the Most High thy refuge...No evil shall befall thee nor any plague come near thy dwelling].

The Holy See at the U.N. on HIV/AIDS

I had the extraordinary privilege of spending a few days with the Holy See's Delegation to the High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS at the United Nations last week.  (In the category of examples of the truth of the adage, "Men plan, God laughs":  When I entered Columbia Law School decades ago, I had dreams of a career in international diplomacy, leading to some sort of work at the U.N.  I certainly could never have imagined the convoluted career trajectory that started me off as a corporate lawyer lobbying for banks in D.C., to an academic career teaching Contracts and Sales in Minneapolis, and only then actually took me to the U.N. -- as an Advisor to the Holy See.)

Despite my official title, I was doing more observing than advising.  One thing that I observed was the tremendous courage of H.E. Archbishop Francis Chullikatt, the Apostolic Nuncio, Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the U.N., and his talented staff, and advisors like Jane Adolphe from Ave Maria School of Law.   The constant criticism of the Catholic Church for its position on the use of condoms tends to obscure the fact that the Church provides 25% of the world's care of people living with HIV/AIDS.  When you compare the breadth and scope of the Church's position on the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS with the more narrowly-focused, intensely political statements of most of the participants in the conference, the wisdom gained from that hands-on experience is clearly evident.  But, still, statements like Archbishop Chullikatt's here, and other similar statements by Professor Adolphe, are often greeted with derision (and even boo's) in this "most civilized" forum for debate.

Here's a taste of some of the battles that the Holy See's delegation has to fight.  The earliest drafts of the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS that was being negotiated at this Meeting referred consistently to "evidence informed" approaches to addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis.  The Holy See negotiators consistently recommended changing this to "evidence-based."  What's the difference?  Take a look at this explanation from UNAIDS' "Terminology Guidelines" (Jan. 2011):

"In the context of research, treatment, and prevention, evidence usually refers to
qualitative and/or quantitative results that have been published in a peer-reviewed
journal. The term ‘evidence-informed’ is preferred to ‘evidence-based’ in recognition of
the fact that several elements may play a role in decision-making, only one of which may
be scientific evidence. Other elements may include cultural appropriateness, concerns
about equity and human rights, feasibility, opportunity costs, etc."

What's at stake?  Perhaps the fact that scientific evidence seems to be providing more and more validation of the effectiveness in HIV/AIDS prevention of programs stressing behaviorial changes such as abstinence and fidelity, and the ineffectiveness of prgrams stressing use of condoms?  (See, e.g., the work of Edward C. Green, former director of the Harvard AIDS Prevention Project, here and here.)

As I flew home after a couple of days of observing this sort of debate, I felt I really ought to reread Nineteen Eighty-Four

University Faculty for Life conference

Thanks to Rick for his recent post highlighting John Breen's fine talk at this last weekend's University Faculty for Life (UFL) conference. The conference was supported by a generous grant from Our Sunday Visitor Institute, and hosted by the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Notre Dame's chapter of University Faculty for Life, and the Notre Dame Fund to Protect Human Life. After all lhe recent controversies concerning Notre Dame and the life issues, it was good to be at Notre Dame with the many members of that community who support the pro-life cause in so many ways.   

In addition to John's talk, the conference featured an interesting discussion of the Phoenix abortion case with Father Kevin Flannery SJ and Father Tom Berg, and talks by individuals such as Sam Calhoun, Tom Cavanuagh, Michael New, Teresa Collett, Clarke Forsythe, Mark Rienzi, Bill Saunders, Chris Kaczor, Richard Stith, Gerry Bradley, and John Keown. David Solomon of Notre Dame's Center for Ethics and Culture also gave a wondeful talk when he received UFL's Smith Award for distinguished contributions to pro-life scholarship.

Next year's UFL conference will be on June 1-2, 2012 at BYU.

Richard M. 

 

The Family's End?

Scott Yenor has posted "The Family's End" at Public Discourse, tracing the various intellectual threads in the family's demise.  An excerpt:

These profound intellectual trends have affected how men and women view themselves and view children and childbearing. The logic of contract has culminated in a triumph of autonomy. The movement to conquer nature promotes greater gender equality as an exercise in autonomy. Institutions buckle things together, suggesting that they have a necessary or salutary relation to one another, and both these trends reflect the modern penchant for separating what institutions once united. Marriage and family life had, among other things, buckled love and marriage, marriage and parenthood, parenthood and sex, marriage and sex, and sex and procreation together. Every modern defender of some family form ends up defending, in one way or another, various connections among these goods; the more radical the critics of the family are, the more buckles they seek to loosen.

Today we face the possibility of the family’s end, in part because of the attractive promise to free us from the buckles that nature seems to place on our freedom. The erosion of these buckles explains, in no small part, the amazing decline in birth rates seen across the Western world. Encapsulating all of these separations in one fell swoop is the move for public recognition for same-sex marriage, as it is the victory of the adult-centered marriage contract to secure whatever goods the adults choose, and is the final detachment of marriage and family life from nature.

I agree that we should be troubled by many aspects of the move from status to contract in family law, and I have argued as much in print (see chapter 9).  For a similar argument, you should also check out Mitt Regan's wonderful Alone Together.  Though I agree with much of what Yenor writes, the difficulty is trying to explain why and how the marriage and procreation buckle matters.  Same-sex marriage keeps the love and marriage, marriage and parenthood, marriage and sex, and parenthood and sex buckles together.  Unless it can be shown that same-sex marriages detrimentally impact the quality of the caregiving function, it's hard to make a convincing argument that the loss of the marriage-procreation buckle, standing alone, should determine the public definition of marriage.  I'm not addressing all arguments against same-sex marriage; I'm just adopting Yenor's framework and speculating that, of all the buckles that the public seems to care about, the marriage-procreation buckle would appear fairly far down on the list.

Stinneford on Proportionality as Part of the Original Meaning of the Eighth Amendment

Via Larry Solum, I see that John Stinneford has posted a new version of his terrific piece on the issue of excessiveness of punishment as part of the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  John also discusses the theoretical nature of proportionality as exclusively retributivist (see note 32 and the section beginning at page 961 for John's position w/r/t utilitarian aims -- he basically stakes out a negative retributivist place for proportionality).

For those that do not know John's excellent and interesting work on originalism and the Eighth Amendment, may I also recommend his The Original Meaning of Unusual and his piece on chemical castration, which a couple of my students this last year found helpful as we talked about various kinds of punishment practices -- the possibility of physical castration as punishment is (incredibly, to me) a live one in some states in this country. 

O'Brien and Koons on Natural Law

Matthew O'Brien and Robert Koons have an interesting and provocative series of posts at Public Discourse on, among other things, natural law, metaphysics, social practices, moral absolutes, and the history of twentieth century Anglo-American moral philosophy that MOJ readers will want to check out (here, here, and here).

Sunday, June 12, 2011

Not So Nice Item in Today's New York Times

Katherine Stewart writes in today's New York Times that she's terribly upset that the public school (with a red door, no less) she can see from her Upper East Side apartment is hosting Christian worship services on Sundays. Ms. Stewart writes that Good News Club v. Milford Central School "appeared to suggest that keeping religious groups out of schools after hours amounted to discrimination against their religious views." Indeed, Good News Club (and Rosenberger, and Lamb's Chapel) stands for the proposition that where the government maintains a "limited public forum" (such as after-hours use of public school facilities), it cannot single out religion for special disfavor and discrimination. I gather Ms. Stewart disagrees with that line of cases, or at least she agrees with the recent Second Circuit decision that "worship" (because that's an "activity") is readily distinguishable from other forms of speech, which just goes to show that the distinctions among belief-speech-conduct-activity (and "worship") are often arbitrarily drawn in such a way as to favor whomever is making them at the time.

I'm also puzzled by her grievance that the PTA spent $100,000 last year renovating the school building's restrooms, since "my P.T.A. donations should not be used to supply furniture for a religious group that thinks I am bound for hell." This is merely anecdotal, but, as the parent of children in a local public school, it never crossed my mind to wonder whether my donations to the PTA were an endorsement of the views, religious or otherwise, of whatever groups use the public school facilities after my kids come home (and, even if I were as bothered as Ms. Stewart seems to be, I'd worry that such a complaint would pose a state action or standing problem).