Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, June 27, 2011

What's Love Got to Do With It

Along with several other MOJ'ers, I attended the Annual Law & Religion Roundtable at Northwestern Law School this past Thursday and Friday.  As Steve Shiffrin and Marc DeGirolami's posts (here and here) have already suggested, it was a wonderful conference.  The biggest reason for my delay in posting about the gathering was that there is so much one could write about.

Among the presentations was one by Alan Brownstein (UC Davis), who advances an alternative ground for religious liberty, one grounded in love.  Arguing that the conventional religious justification for religious freedom, which describes the relationship between the person and God as that of sovereign subject, is unconvincing to unbelievers, he suggests that the theological argument in support of religious liberty be cast in terms of our duty to God being a manifestation of a relationship grounded on love.  Brownstein argues that claims for religious liberty based on the relationship  between the believer and God being one based on love may be more persuasive and less threatening to nonbelievers than claims based on a relationship of sovereignty.

This argument generated a lot of discussion by the roundtable participants - both regarding the extent to which is mattered to Brownstein's claim whether the love between a human and God and is the same or different as the love between two human beings, and whether a claim based on love make it less easy to distinguish religion as deserving of special protection in the law.

I loved the love argument for two reasons.  First, it grounds religious liberty in that which I believe to be most foundational from a spiritual perspective - the love relationship between us and God.  Second, love is a much more powerful force for our action than is obedience to a sovereign.  Obedience to the law makes us think of doing what we need to do to satisfy the letter of the law.  Love as a grounding motivates us to fully actualize the command of hte law.

Hopefully some of the other MOJ'ers in attendance will post some other thoughts.

 

Law and Religion Roundtable

Like Steve, and Marc, I attended last week the (second) Annual Law and Religion Roundtable, in Chicago, which was organized by Nelson Tebbe, Paul Horwitz, and me, and generously hosted by Andy Koppelman and Northwestern University.  It was a great event -- many interesting, provocative, engaging papers; good friends and fellowship; and a beautiful city.  I'm sure other MOJers who were there will chime in, too (hint, hint), but I agree with Steve about the two (related) questions / themes that seemed to run through the event:  (1) "Is religion special?" and (2) "How should we think about the religious freedom of groups / communities / associations . . . churches?"  As you might guess, the upcoming Hosanna-Tabor case came up often.

Two quick thoughts:  First, I think we should never be *too* confident in our ability to identify clean lines between "religion" and "the secular" -- let alone "religion" and "nonreligion."  I do not know what "nonreligion" is.  To be sure, there's no getting around the fact that we have to construct (even if we cannot identify) categories of religion's "free exercise" and "establishment" in order to interpret and apply our Constitution, but the idea that we can distinguish between, say, "religious" reasons for legislation and "moral-but-secular" reasons seems implausible to me.

Second, with respect to Steve's statement that "religious claims for exemptions should clearly be honored over general liberty claims, but I see no good argument for honoring religious claims for exemptions over non-religious claims of conscience."  I guess, for me, it depends on what is meant by "over."  I think that the First Amendment gives us good reasons for treating "religion" and "religious" claims of conscience (see above, though, re: "religious") over other "conscience"-based claims.  The latter category, it seems to me, will be taken seriously by, and accommodated to the extent possible by, a decent political community, not because they are the same as religious claims, but because such a community should, to the extent possible, avoid causing pain and suffering to its members.

The Maximalist Uses of Dante

From Justice Scalia's majority opinion in today's case involving violent video games, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn.:

California's argument would fare better if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children's access to depictions of violence, but there is none.  Certainly the books we give children to read -- or read to them when they are younger -- contain no shortage of gore.  Grimm's Fairy Tales, for exmaple, are grim indeed.  As her just deserts for trying to poison Snow White, the wicked queen is made to dance in red hot slippers "till she fell dead on the floor, a sad example of envy and jealousy." . . . . Cinderella's evil stepsisters have their eyes pecked out by doves.  And Hansel and Gretel (children!) kill their captor by baking her in an oven.

High-school reading lists are full of similar fare.  Homer's Odysseus blinds Polyphemus the Cyclops by grinding out his eye with a heated stake . . . . In the Inferno, Dante and Virgil watch corrupt politicians struggle to stay submerged beneath a lake of boiling pitch, lest they be skewered by devils above the surface . . . . And Golding's Lord of the Flies recounts how a schoolboy called Piggy is savagely murdered by other children while marooned on an island.  FN4

FN4: Justice Alito accuses us of pronouncing that playing violent video games "is not different in 'kind'" from reading violent literature.  Well of course it is different in kind, but not in a way that causes the provision and viewing of violent video games, unlike the provision and reading of books, not to be expressive activity and hence not to enjoy First Amendment protection.  Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat.  But these cultural and intellectual differences are not constitutional ones.  Crudely violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The Divine Comedy, and restrictions upon them must survive strict scrutiny[.]

It is interesting that Justice Scalia cites Canto XXI of Inferno right in the text of the opinion.  This is the fifth bolgia of the Eighth Circle, where those guilty of barratry are submerged in boiling pitch, while demons (in this case, the Malebranche) torture them in various horrible ways.  Barrators are public servants and officials who sold their offices for money.  And barratry in civil law is the bringing of legal claims that are totally meritless, for purposes of harassment.  It isn't in Justice Scalia's opinion, but in addition to the cultural and intellectual differences between the Inferno and Mortal Kombat, it may be worth noting that Dante meant to condemn the barrators, not to celebrate them.    

UPDATE: Commenter Elena reminds me that there is a rather violent video game (rating 18, just like the rating challenged in Brown) of Dante's Inferno.  In the video game, of course, it is the player who can, in his considered discretion, "punish the damned, or absolve them as they are defeated." 

Is Religion Special?

I just returned from the Annual Law and Religion Roundtable held at the Northwestern Law School and organized by Nelson Tebbe, Paul Horwitz, Rick Garnett and hosted by Andy Koppelman (who presented chapters from an excellent forthcoming book of his). It was a wonderful conference despite too many of my rambling interventions. Two themes in the many papers particularly interested me. One of them was the question of whether religion is special. Several of the papers focused on this in terms of general free exercise claims. My own view is that religious claims for exemptions should clearly be honored over general liberty claims, but I see no good argument for honoring religious claims for exemptions over non-religious claims of conscience. My only reservation involves the kind of utilitarian who believes as a matter of conscience that she must maximize social welfare in every action she takes. For her, there is no line between conscience and anything else she does. My inclination is not to consider that a conscience claim for legal purposes, but I am not sure.

A subsidiary question is whether religious associations are special and should be so treated under the law in some circumstances. Here I think explaining the special character of religion for legal purposes is easy though the explantion is controversial. More difficult is assessing when religious association should be treated differently from other associations and when not. I will return to this issue in subsequent posts.

cross-posted at religiousleftlaw.com

comments open, but I doubt I will have time to respond

Workshop on Ethical Stem-Cell Research at Notre Dame

I thought readers might be interested in hearing about what looks to be an important and impressive gathering at the University of Notre Dame:

Some of the world’s leading experts across a variety of relevant disciplines are coming to the Notre Dame Law School for a weeklong “Workshop on Adult and Non-embryonic Stem Cell Research” June 27 – July 1.

In conjunction with the workshop, an afternoon lecture series, “Alternate Visions of Stem Cell Research: Scientific, Ethical, Legal & Theological Dimensions” will be open to the public from 4 – 5 p.m. each day in the Patrick F. McCarran Court Room in the Law School’s Eck Hall of Law.\

Notre Dame Law Professor Carter Snead and Emeritus Professor Phil Sloan (of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science and Notre Dame’s Program of Liberal Studies) will co-lead the workshop and are hosting the week’s public events, which are part of a University-wide effort to develop a center for high-level interdisciplinary work on the various dimensions of human developmental biology. Professor Snead will deliver a public lecture on Thursday, entitled “The Legal and Public Policy Dimensions of Stem Cell Research.” Numerous entities throughout the wider University . . . have endorsed the initiative, which seeks to demonstrate that respect for the equal dignity of every human being (from conception to natural death) and a commitment to excellence and rigor in research are both integral and complementary goods necessary to pursuing the proper ends of biomedical science, most richly understood.

As the premier American Catholic research university, Notre Dame is ideally suited for this work. It has strong departments in biology, engineering, law, theology, philosophy, and the history and philosophy of science with individuals in each component with expertise in all aspects of stem cell research. Moreover, given its distinctive Catholic mission, Notre Dame offers a unique voice to this domain of inquiry.

The university is grateful for the many participants in this inaugural event, including Dr. Donald Landry, M.D./Ph.D. (the Chair of the Department of Medicine at Columbia University) and Dr. Carlos Cordon-Cardo, M.D./Ph.D (Chair of the Department of Pathology at Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York City), as well other top academics from both University of Notre Dame and other elite universities in the U.S. and abroad. Finally, we are thankful for the interest and participation of the Holy See, including especially the involvement of Msr. Melchor Sanchez de Toca, M.A., S.T.D, D.Phil (Undersecretary for the Pontifical Academy for Culture) and Rev. Tomasz Trafny, S.T.D., D.Phil. (Executive Coordinator, Science Theology, and the Ontological Quest (STOQ) Project; Head, Science and Faith Department, Pontifical Academy for Culture).

Richard Stith on de-defunding Planned Parenthood

As Wesley Smith reports (here), a federal district court judge has issued an opinion blocking Indiana's recently enacted effort to withhold state funding from Planned Parenthood.  In my view, the opinion is unfortunate, and mistaken.  Richard Stith, asks, at the University Faculty for Life blog, a question that, it seems to me, often gets overlooked:

The best reason not to fund Planned Parenthood is never mentioned in the newspapers. (Could it also have been overlooked in the briefs?)

Numerous undercover investigations have shown that Planned Parenthood prefers money to the interests of women. But even without that evidence, it would be unwise to entrust pregnancy prevention and pregnancy counseling to Planned Parenthood as long as it is profiting from abortion. No organization that is supposed to prevent pregnancy, or counsel pregnant clients on their options, should be making money from a particular post-pregnancy outcome, i.e. abortion. Fair and neutral pregnancy prevention and counseling will be much more likely with organizations or agencies that do not have such a built-in conflict of interest. (German constitutional law, for example, requires the separation of abortion counseling from abortion provision, and South Dakota has wisely moved in this direction recently.)

The above rationale should easily withstand both constitutional and regulatory challenges, for it focuses solely on benefits to clients, not on the pros or cons of abortion.

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Political History of Law and Religion Scholarship

I am just back from a useful and interesting conference organized by Nelson Tebbe, Paul Horwitz, and RMOJ (that's Rector of Mirror of Justice) Rick Garnett, convened at Northwestern Law School with Andy Koppelman's gracious hospitality.  The conference brought together scholars from an extraordinarily broad range of perpspectives, and it was a pleasure for me to see and speak with MOJ family members Steve Shiffrin, Tom Berg, Mike Moreland, and Susan Stabile.

The various projects that people presented were very interesting -- some highlights for me were an Augustinian project in political and legal theory by John Inazu and a paper on freedom of the church (as distinguished from "religious" freedom) by Steve Smith, as well as a panel discussion of the Hosanna-Tabor case by deeply informed and insightful folks, but there were many others.  But I was also impressed by the distance of the projects from each other -- distance in perspective, in tone, and most especially in weltanschauung.

That got me wondering about something that might sound a little like navel-gazing, though in my defense it's really more about gazing at other people's navels than my own.  What would a political history of law and religion scholarship look like?  Would it show consistency with respect to the range of world views espoused by scholars in this area?  Or would it show expansion?  Or something more complex?

My horse sense is that the political history of law and religion scholarship might track (very) roughly the comparatively recent history of American politics.  It would evince, that is, a movement from a state of relative convergence on a set of agreed upon views to a state of increasing splintering and balkanization (or, to put it in more sanguine as well as ambiguous terms, to a state of increasing pluralism) of perspective.  Of course I don't mean that the earlier convergence among religion clause scholars tracked or mirrored an earlier political convergence, or that the current, more balkanized situation runs parallel to contemporary American politics.

What I mean is that if one were to survey the state of the field, say, roughly 30-40 years ago, one would probably see something approaching a rough similarity of perspective among many law and religion scholars -- folks who read both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses in a 'strong' way.  Many of the most important scholars of that generation held that general view, even as there may have been intramural differences among them.  Indeed, some of those very same folks were in attendance at our conference.  Of course there were dissenters from that general position 30-40 years ago too -- but the point is that there existed such a majority view, and that it was considered, for lack of a better term, mainstream, or eminently reasonable within the academic world -- a mid-20th century academic moderate liberal's view (which is not the same as a non-academic moderate liberal view).  Part of the power of the view was that a strong reading of the Establishment Clause gave these scholars a kind of bona fides -- certainly within academic circles -- when arguing for a strong reading of the Free Exercise Clause.  If you are against majoritarian religion, the chances might increase in the academy that people will listen to you when you argue in favor of anti-majoritarian religion. 

But today, I think it is much more difficult to identify any mainstream or consensus-like position.  There are those who like a strong EC and a weak FEC, those who prefer weak readings of both, those who go for a strong FEC and a weak EC, and those who hold to the strong reading of both.  But even those who prefer the dual strong reading aren't necessarily coming at the issue from the point de depart of mid-century academic moderate liberalism.  Some are coming from traditions of faith; some from radical political perspectives; some from rather specialized policy engagements; some from distinct philosophical traditions, and so on.  That variety of background has generated a broadening of normative preferences.  And so too, perhaps like the political culture itself, the political culture of law and religion scholarship exhibits a pattern of fragmentation -- it begins to look much more like a European parliamentary arrangement than the American situation at least as it once was.

Whether these developments are good or bad is not a particularly interesting question when framed in those stark terms.  Like all developments and changes, there is both gain and loss.  But sometime, somewhere down the road, it might be enjoyable and interesting for someone more capable than I to write a piece about the trajectory of law and religion scholarship -- what its political and cultural history looked like at inception, how it appears now, and how it may appear in years to come. 

The Changing Tide

The passage of same sex marriage legislation in New York may represent a significant shift in the direction of electoral politics related to civil rights for sexual minorities.  Essays (here) by Luke Timothy Johnson and Eve Tushnet at Commonweal provide interesting Catholic perspectives on this issue.

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism

 

Thank you, Robby, for your post about the liberal/conservative divide in present day “democratic” politics and culture. I am grateful for your cogent expression of some important points, and I think you have expressed them well including your acknowledgment that there are instances in which the divide does not prohibit people of good will who hold different perspectives from recognizing and acknowledging the valuable contributions that can be made by those with whom some views—be it political, social, cultural, economic, religious, etc.—are not shared but still appreciated.

I would like to offer a few complementary thoughts about the worry to which Robby refers. Is the worry real, or is it not? Is the present-day dominant Western culture that considers itself democratic inching toward authoritarianism? In this culture are the God-given rights of conscience and religious belief so vital to the foundation of democracy being pushed aside? Robby relies upon one example to reinforce his worry, the emerging case from Washington, DC.

I am sure that Professor John Banzhaf, III of the George Washington University Law School thinks he means well and is acting consistently with liberal and democratic ideals codified in the DC Human Rights Act by challenging The Catholic University of America’s decision to restore student residences to single-sex dorms.

Here it is relevant to take stock of something which CUA President John Garvey did while still Dean of Boston College’s Law School and President of the Association of American Law Schools when he raised the need for “institutional pluralism” in the American academy of the present age. Yet, Professor Banzhaf thinks otherwise by arguing that CUA will be violating the DC law presumably on the basis of discrimination in housing or public accommodation. The day that this kind of allegation against a Catholic institution could be taken seriously in one of the greatest Western democracies has been forecasted in the past.

In 1960 Christopher Dawson contended that even the Western democracies, which would include the United States, had the potential for becoming totalitarian states through an aggressive assertion of state authority. As he said:

the modern state exerts no less authority underground in the subway and the air raid shelter than it does on the earth and in the air. The totalitarian state—and perhaps the modern state in general—is not satisfied with passive obedience; it demands full co-operation from the cradle to the grave. Consequently the challenge of secularism must be met on the cultural level, if it is to be met at all; and if Christians cannot assert their right to exist in the sphere of higher education, they will eventually be pushed not only out of modern culture but out of physical existence. That is already the issue in Communist countries, and it will also become the issue in England and America if we do not use our opportunities while we still have them.

It strikes me that John Garvey, a friend to many of us here at the Mirror of Justice, is doing the very thing that Dawson exhorted, that is, to defend the right to exist in the sphere of higher education in a Catholic, Christian manner. But he is not without opposition. Professor Banzhaf appears intent on denying him and CUA that very right that is logical, reasonable, and essential to the raison d’être of Catholic higher education by relying on the tools that the state has provided, perhaps unintentionally, to declare that student housing that is designed to cultivate the virtuous life is in fact discrimination in housing and/or public accommodation.

But the foreshadowing does not end with Dawson’s warning from over fifty years ago. Let us fast forward to the 1990s when Blessed John Paul II occupied the Chair of Peter and exercised his office. He understood the concerns that Dawson expressed in his 1991 encyclical letter Centesimus Annus wherein he said:

Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of a correct conception of the human person. It requires that the necessary conditions be present for the advancement both of the individual through education and formation in true ideals, and of the “subjectivity” of society through the creation of structures of participation and shared responsibility. Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life. Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view, since they do not accept that truth is determined by the majority, or that it is subject to variation according to different political trends. It must be observed in this regard that if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism. (italics supplied)

A few years later in 1995 in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, John Paul reiterated his concern about the inopportune evolution of democracy when he stated:

In this way democracy, contradicting its own principles, effectively moves towards a form of totalitarianism. The State is no longer the “common home” where all can live together on the basis of principles of fundamental equality, but is transformed into a tyrant State...

So what is one to do regarding these and other developments in the great democracies of today where long-held values and traditions are merely tolerated if they are not, in fact, designated for annihilation?

First we must pray to our merciful God for guidance and His generous assistance. Second, we can muster the wisdom with which God abundantly blesses us to chart a prudent but firm course through the political, social, and cultural storms of our own times. And third, as Robby has suggested, we can reach out in friendship to those with whom we may not share Christian belief and certain values but nevertheless possess the same dislike of authoritarianism.

Critics may argue that the Church is authoritarian and what is asked in my third point is therefore nonsense. But is it, is it really? I suggest that the Church is not authoritarian. She is an authority without question, but she is the Body of Christ who seeks that which is good for all members of the human family by propostion rather than imposition. On the other hand, it seems that, for the time being, Professor Banzhaf is intent on imposing his understanding of democracy, which seems an awful lot like a thinly disguised totalitarianism, on the Christian community that calls itself The Catholic University of America.

 

RJA sj

 

More on More

For a very interesting reflection on the life of St. Thomas More, one that draws connections between various aspects of More’s family and public life and Familiaris Consortio, Chesterton, Waugh, Tolkien, and the movie Braveheart, see the essay “The Uncompromising Man” by Omar Gutierrez available here.