Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Wexler on Religious Disapproval as Endorsement Test Obverse

Jay Wexler has posted an interesting piece on the endorsement test, Government Disapproval of Religion.  Jay is a supporter of the endorsement test (one can see this in some of his past work as well as in this piece), but here he argues that the test can be used to invalidate not only government endorsements but also government disapprovals.  The latter, he writes, have become more common as of roughly 2009.  The piece is insightful, loaded with interesting examples, and (as often happens with Jay) funny too (have a look at the transition between paragraphs 2 and 3 on page 7).

Jay argues for an "explicitly negative reference" approach to evaluating government disapprovals.  "[S]tatements, displays, symbols, and other messages that do explicitly refer to and condemn religion" can be invalidated by the obverse of the endorsement test. (4).  I find this approach to endorsement appealing, but if we are to have explicit negative references as the standard, why not restrict endorsement analysis to explicitly positive references?  At present, the endorsement test does not operate on these assumptions; that is, an explicit positive reference is not required for courts to find a violation of the endorsement test.  I think Jay may disagree with me, as he writes that "framing the test in this way creates a fair parallel with the Court's current endorsement analysis[.]" (10).  Alternatively, Jay might argue (he does at some points in the piece) that government cannot operate without some implicit disapproval of religion, but it can operate just fine without any explicit or implicit endorsement.

On the first point, I am doubtful that the endorsement test requires "explicit" positive expression.  I assume that in order for the endorsement to be "explicit," it likely will need to be express, and therefore (often) expressed, in some way.  This is the gist of many of the examples that Jay uses to illustrate disapproval, at least.  Yet in most of the cases I'm familiar with, that has not been the way the test has been applied.  On the second point, I wonder whether the debate is really about whether the government can operate at all, as compared with whether (and how best) it can operate well.

At all events, check out Jay's good piece. 

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

Gaus on Public Reason

Matthew Lister--soon to join us at Villanova as a VAP--has a review at the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews of Gerald Gaus's new book, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. As David Brooks once said of Reinhold Niebuhr's The Nature and Destiny of Man, it looks like it covers a lot of ground:

Gerald Gaus's book, The Order of Public Reason, is long, rich, and highly ambitious. It is also an important work, one that attempts both to give a rigorous account of the idea of public reason, developed out of an account of "social morality", and to show how, when the idea is properly understood, Classical Liberalism is the best way to structure a society where all are treated as free and equal. The Classical Liberalism that Gaus defends is an interesting and distinctive view, differing in important ways from both the "High Liberalism" of Rawls and those working in his wake, and from Libertarianism of the sort defended by Nozick, Rothbard, and others. While there are conservative elements to Gaus's approach, his is not a social conservative view, either. Classical Liberalism is not a new view, but Gaus has provided perhaps the most philosophically sophisticated justification for it.

This barely begins to touch on the many topics covered by Gaus along the way, including the relationship between reason and emotion in ethics, the role of instrumental reasoning in morality, the rationality and development of moral rules, the proper way to understand punishment and blame, and the place of history in morality, among others.

Monday, July 11, 2011

Prayer breakfast heresies

Over at the Huffington Post, my colleague Mark Osler laments the sorry state of "prayer breakfasts."  A snippet:

What fascinates me about these events is that they drape themselves in the faith, yet create a scene that Christ himself would (and did) directly condemn. They are the epitome of a culture that celebrates itself, rather than embracing what Jesus actually taught.

Short Review of The Agnostic Age

I've got a little review at The New Republic on-line of Paul Horwitz's delightful book, The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution

As an aside, while you are over there, there is a formidable old piece by Rebecca West, The Duty of Harsh Criticism.  What a pearl of powerful writing -- truly a master. 

Saturday, July 9, 2011

Papal Populism

Not quite sure about this one.  The author, a self-described non-scholar and "agnostic Protestant" (that seems intended as oxymoron but it comes across more as swellingly proud redundancy) takes a drag race through 2000 years of Church history, coming around full circle to report, as the reviewer tells it, that "the popes who achieved greatness . . . were outnumbered by the corrupt, the inept, the venal, the lecherous, the ruthless, the mediocre and those who didn’t last long enough to make a mark."  This finding is preceded by the reviewer's warning that "[i]f you were raised Catholic, you may find it disconcerting to see an institution you were taught to think of as the repository of the faith so thoroughly deconsecrated."  I don't feel especially disconcerted or deconsecrated, but I haven't read the book.  But I suppose the reviewer must believe in earnest that this book is really doing a great service by explaining the papacy to Catholics -- notoriously innocent as we are of both history and culture  [eliminated, since there seemed to be confusion about whether I think Catholics don't know a lot about history and culture].  I'm reminded of Bernard-Henri Lévy's anthropological expedition through the American south; he, too, thought that America was best explained to Americans through the medium of realist popular zoology.

Friday, July 8, 2011

Hadley Arkes Responds

Hadley Arkes has written the following response to my post from earlier this week:

I would like to thank Michael Moreland for his comment on my piece in the Public Discourse on the so-called “video games” case and the opinion written by Justice Scalia.  For over 20 years Justice Scalia has been the one on the Court who has come the closest to speaking for me on the legal issues of the day.  But this is one of those places where friends diverge.  And it becomes even more interesting because the difference is bound up with the differences we have in taking seriously a perspective on natural law, as a perspective that gives us a practical hold on the cases coming before us.  Mike’s comment brings us to that ground, and I would talk his commentary as an occasion to get clearer on that ground for our friends.     

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The Casey Anthony Trial: A Prosecutorial Bridge Too Far?

Those of us who are lawyers (which includes all of us on Mirror of Justice) and who have litigated cases in court (which includes many of us) are all too aware of how unfairly uneasy is it to play the role of Monday morning quarterback and question another lawyer’s litigation strategies and advocacy style in a trial.  When the case is one as notorious as the Casey Anthony child murder trial, and when our law school colleagues and neighbors are talking about it and inviting our comments, the temptation is even greater.  (The day before the verdict, I predicted to friends that the jury would not find Casey Anthony guilty of premeditated murder.  Lest you think me too perceptive or prescient, however, I must admit that I did think she would be convicted of a lesser homicide charge.)

And when one believes that the outcome is unjust, the temptation to pontificate becomes irresistible.  (By unjust, I mean it in the moral sense of just desserts, rather than necessarily suggesting that the jury's verdict is unjustifiable under the appropriately high standard for conviction in a criminal case -- the subject of Marc DeGirolami's post immediately below.)  Could the trial have unfolded differently so as to bring about what I and most Americans believe would have been a just conviction and a long prison sentence to Casey Anthony?

And so here I go, indulging in post hoc speculation and asking "what might have been."  Still, I hope what I set out below rises to something more than mere second-guessing of trial tactics and closing argument rhetoric.  What I want to suggest is whether the prosecution reached too far, gambled too much, and, as a result, lost it all.  And I wonder whether this episode fits within a general pattern of prosecutorial aggressiveness and lack of wise restraint that we have seen so often around the country today.

In most instances, the tragedy of undue prosecutorial zeal has been visited on the accused, who may be subjected to a higher charge than the exercise of wise prosecutorial discretion would counsel or who may receive a more severe sentence than the accused’s culpability warrants.  On this particular occasion, however, the present-day prosecutorial tendency to seek the highest charge that probable cause can justify may have produced a different tragedy.  By shooting too high, and falling so low, justice has been denied to the most vulnerable of victims by not holding the wrongdoer to account.

As I and others have commented in the past on Mirror of Justice, we live in an era of criminal justice in which the wise and just exercise of prosecutorial discretion too often has been abandoned.  In an earlier era, more prosecutors understood their job to include the weighing of persons and circumstances so as to make a charging and sentencing decision calibrated to the just outcome in an individual case.  Not every person who has committed a criminal act, especially when he or she has not committed a violent act and the harm to any identifiable person is low, should be subjected to the full sanctioning power of the state, even if the evidence would support a successful prosecution.  Not every person who has been convicted of a crime should be subjected to the longest possible sentence, simply because the statute authorizes a sentence of that length.  Justice often calls for prosecutorial restraint.

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Thursday, July 7, 2011

The Intentionally Elusive Quality of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

I did not follow the Casey Anthony trial closely as it proceeded but I have (sort of) followed the reaction to her acquittal of the murder of her two-year old daughter.  In truth, and like most people who have not been involved with the case, I have no idea what the state of the evidence was like, though my untutored general impression is that the prosecution relied on powerful-seeming (again, to an external viewer) circumstantial evidence of guilt, but that it had little direct evidence.  The jury did not believe that the evidence met the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the general public (which was not privy to the evidence) seems to believe that it did; and the result is that Ms. Anthony was acquitted, to much consternation.

One piece of the reaction that hasn't gotten a lot of commentary is the legal experts' view of the broader disapproval of the acquittal.  The assessment in some quarters seems to be that the disconnect between the jury's finding and the public's reaction may be explained by the fact that the general public simply doesn't understand the nature of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it is for this reason that its reaction has been so intemperate.  If the general public only really understood what guilt beyond a reasonable doubt demands, it would be more likely to accept the jury's finding.

I am dubious about that.  It may well be that the general public does not understand BARD very well, but I doubt that these or other jurors understand it either.  Indeed, I wonder whether law professors understand it well -- really understand what it demands in terms of proof, and are able to explain it in a way that would achieve broad consensus about the nature of the proof required to satisfy it.

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Commitment Against Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Violates Free Speech

That's what a panel of the Second Circuit held yesterday in Alliance for Open Society Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l DevelopmentThe issue was whether the government can require assorted NGOs engaged in the fight against various diseases including HIV/AIDS to have a policy opposing prostitution and sex trafficking as a condition of receiving federal funds for their causes.  By a 2-1 vote, the panel held that it cannot and upheld the injunction against that portion of the "Leadership Act." 

The case has an involved procedural history, but the upshot seems to be that, in the majority opinion's view, the provision is not salvaged by Congress's broad spending powers because it imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of funds (the majority distinguished Rust v. Sullivan). "Compelling speech as a condition of receiving government funds cannot be squared with the First Amendment."  (majority opinion, at 23).  Note, though, that cases like Barnette are distinguishable from this context, since those dealt with existing benefits, while this one involves a putative funding program.

But setting aside the doctrine for a moment, and in light of Michael's smart post below about the jurisdictional quality of the First Amendment, a question arises for me about this.  Even if one views the First Amendment as jurisdictional, can it be right to say that asking organizations which make a claim on the government's money to have a policy against sex trafficking or prostitution is outside the government's proper ken, especially when those precise activities threaten the aims of the very reason to provide the funding in the first place?  Here Congress found specifically that as part of its effort to combat the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it ought to be helping to eliminate prostitution and the sexual exploitation of women and children.  So what sense does it make to say that it is unconstitutional for the government to demand that organizations which accept funds for the exact purpose of combating these diseases concomitantly affirm a commitment to fighting prostitution and sex trafficking?  Maybe there is a distinction to be drawn between sex trafficking and prostitution here?   

Thoughts from those more knowledgeable than I about free speech?  Mike? 

The right to misinform?

 

On Tuesday, July 5, the National Catholic Reporter (NCR) published an editorial entitled “Gay marriage, bishops and the crisis of leadership.” The editorial was highly critical of U.S. bishops in general but of two New York bishops in particular over the Church’s role in the recent legislation enacted in New York recognizing same-sex unions. I read with great care the NCR’s editorial, which is [HERE]. As it addresses the role of the Church in the public square and the right of all to inform lawmakers about what is good for society and what is not, the editorial, which is misinformed on many fronts, must be challenged.

At the outset, the editorial claims that the role of bishops in the promulgation of the New York legislation “is the latest and most glaring confirmation of some gloomy news for the Catholic church [sic].” This allegation is based on the “disturbing reality” that the bishops have “lost most of [their] credibility with the wider culture on matters of sexuality and personal morality.” If this is the case, then one would have to ask if the bishops, if the Church’s position on the major issues of the day must correlate to whatever the “wider culture” has to say on any issue? If we harken back to the antebellum age of the 1850s, should we say that Justices McLean and Curtis lost their credibility with the “wider culture” when they dissented in Dred Scott? Should we say that Justice John Marshall Harlan lost credibility with the “wider culture” in 1896 when he dissented in Plessy v. Ferguson? Fast-forwarding to the twentieth century, should we say that Justice Pierce Butler lost credibility with the “wider culture” in 1927 when he dissented in Buck v. Bell? And, for good measure, should we say that Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson lost credibility with the “wider culture” in 1944 when they dissented in Korematsu?  History is replete with instances of the objective, moral voice not wining the major discussions of the day in disputes where the “wider culture” thought it convenient to pursue in the making of law in a problematic and unprincipled way. The point is that the “wider culture” may well determine the outcome of what the positive law declares, but this culture does not always operate in a moral fashion that leads to that which is right and just. As I referenced in a previous post [HERE], we have been reminded on a number of occasions that when our democracy loses its proper values, it can morph into a thinly disguised totalitarianism.

Contrary to what the NCR editorial asserts, the bishops who addressed the New York redefinition of marriage did not react hyperbolically in a “wrong-headed” and “counterproductive” fashion. They did what the Church asks of them—to teach with authority, an authority that precedes the wisdom of the “wider culture” in propriety and justice. Well, at least they did what Christ asked and what councils from Trent to the second Vatican Council have taught.

The NCR editorial appears to be swayed by polls and political votes and argues that the Church can learn from them. But the Church must not be so inclined. Once again, human history demonstrates over the millennia that popular opinion and the opinion of public officials are not always right; moreover, they have been often wrong. And it is a further wrong when the reason used to justify these opinions become the basis of norms that are to direct society; then these norms, these laws are also flawed in fact, logic, and objective analysis and moral principle. The Church, through her teachers, the bishops, has a clear responsibility to demonstrate that the foundation of such norms is defective. The editorial seems to conflate these opinions and the views of the “wider culture” with the Gospel, and the teachings of Christ and His Church. But this conflation is also flawed.

The editorial then comments that if the bishops “want laws to reflect Catholic values, they need a new more sophisticated and potent model of legislative engagement.” Does the NCR editorial board propose that the bishops employ the methods that the New York governor purportedly used as discussed by the press to achieve this? Governors may be heavy-handed, but the bishops cannot be nor were they in this case. Stalin was right on one thing, neither the pope—nor for that matter, bishops—has or have military divisions or secular means, like the governor, to attain the objectives that he or they consider moral and proper. All they have are objective reasoned argument and fact. The NCR editorial fails to acknowledge this.

The editorial further offers a second critique of the bishops. It posits that even if the bishops “had a persuasive case to make and the legislative tools [whatever they are] at their disposal,” the use of “wholesale excommunications, railing at politicians, denial of honorary degrees and speaking platforms, using the Eucharist as a political bludgeon, refusing to entertain any questions or dissenting opinions, and engaging in open warfare with the community’s thinkers as well as those, especially women...” has resulted in the mistaken perception of the NCR editorial an “episcopal caricature” in which the NCR editors see only “common scolds” and the “caustic party of ‘no’.” However, the NCR editors again fail to take stock of the canonical, conciliar, and other authority of bishops to speak out against those who in fact contravene the Church and her teachings on the basis of their view of Catholicism.

The NCR editors finally impart their ultimate argument that the bishops have no credibility because of the scandal of clerical sexual abuse of minors. Could not a person also argue that when one considers that the sexual abuse of minors is also a scandal of society at large—and in far greater proportion than in the Church’s clergy—that legislators who go along with the “wider culture” might also have no credibility when we see that the public institutions for which they legislate also perpetrate sexual abuse on a much wider scale?

Somehow the NCR editorial finds need to insult two men who are faithful priests and the heads dioceses in New York. Calling them names and relying on ad hominem ridicule do little to advance the cause of robust debate and providing the public with objective and factual argument on any matter of important public policy.

Finally, the NCR editorial relies on an article published in the NCR on the same date by one who is a friend or colleague to many of us here at the Mirror of Justice, and that is Nick Cafardi. I will not respond to all of what Nick had to say in his article “Civil marriage is for Caesar to decide, not the Church.” [HERE] However, there are two quick observations I’ll make about several of his points.

The first is this: Nick states that, “No legislature can tell the church [sic] who to marry or who not to marry.” But this, in fact, is incorrect. The state—be it the German National Socialist State or the states of the United States—has, in fact, done this on the grounds of race, ethnicity, disease, degrees of consanguinity, age, and the list goes on. A second point that Nick asserts which I dispute is this: “Natural law, despite the church’s [sic] assertion, is not self-evident.” If that is the case, then Thomas Jefferson was wrong when he wrote that the American people held certain truths to be self-evident and our nation is premised on falsehood. But Jefferson has not been the only one in human history to make this claim. Many others have, too.

 

RJA sj