Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Sunday, January 13, 2013

"The Catholic voice against the death penalty is growing stronger"

by Sister Helen Prejean

Can it possibly be happening? After years of relentless dialogue on the death penalty among Catholics in the United States, are we at last beginning to see signs that Catholics are becoming a significant moral force in efforts to abolish state-sanctioned death? Yes! I see it and rejoice.

For the last 34 years I have been engaged in this dialogue—ever since I walked out of Louisiana’s killing chamber in the early morning hours of April 5, 1984, after seeing a man strapped down and killed in front of my eyes.

Now, at last, there are signs of hope. As support for the death penalty has steadily declined in the United States in recent years, Catholic support has dropped even more significantly. According to the Pew Research Center, 78 percent of Americans—and a higher proportion of Catholics, 80 percent—supported the death penalty in 1996. By 2011, however, those numbers had fallen to 62 percent and 59 percent, respectively. Now Catholics support the death penalty at a lower rate than the general population.

[Read the rest here.]

 

Saturday, January 12, 2013

Happy (belated) birthday to Hosanna-Tabor

Yesterday was the one-year anniversary of the Court's (9-0) decision, vindicating the ministerial exception and (in my view) a crucial dimension of religious freedom, in Hosanna-Tabor.  Nice job, Becket Fund.  (For more on my "take" on the case, go here.)

"Against Apocalypticism"

University of St. Thomas law prof Churck Reid has a very interesting post here--a post that bears both on aspects of contemporary Christianity and aspects of contemporary politics.

Friday, January 11, 2013

"Never Weary, Never Rest"

Shortly before his death, Richard John Neuhaus, speaking at the annual convention of the National Right to Life Committee, delivered what I believe to be the greatest pro-life speech ever given. It will inspire the pro-life faithful of all traditions and stations until the field is finally won. It was, I believe, his final gift to the movement and to all men and women of goodwill. In this period of January between the anniversary of Fr. Neuhaus' death and the anniversary of the Supreme Court case that licensed the deaths of millions of our tiniest and most vulnerable brothers and sisters, it is worth recalling his words: 

http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2009/01/we-shall-not-weary-we-shall-no

Law as Tradition: Law's Pastness

One of the happy byproducts of a recent exchange with my friend John Inazu was his reference to an essay by Martin Krygier from nearly thirty years ago, Law as Tradition, 5 Law & Philosophy 237 (1986).  Because the essay is not publicly available, and at the risk of provoking the copyright goddess, I thought to post a few portions of it in this and subsequent posts.  The essay is well worth reading in full.  Krygier identifies and discusses three special features of law as tradition: law's pastness, law's authoritative presence, and law's transmission or continuity from past to present. 

Here's the sense of Professor Krygier's discussion of law's pastness.  As in every tradition, law records, preserves, and 'hands down' across the generations a composite of opinions and values.  But unlike in other traditions, in law the maintenance and transmission of the past is itself institutionalized.  And that institutionalization gives the past a particular kind of power, though the power is of course far from absolute (in part this is because the tradition itself is variegated and not univocal).  

Judging, he writes, 

that activity so favoured with jurisprudential attention and writings, is an archetypally traditional and tradition-referring practice. For however innovative judges are, their modes of justifying decisions, and therefore the sorts of arguments which must be addressed to them, in fact or hypothetically, differ systematically from those of other decision-makers such as, say, engineers or entrepreneurs, or workers in less self-consciously authority-filled traditions, such as novelists, artists or scientists, who themselves are in no way free from the traditions of their calling. Judging is a specific and characteristic mode of making and justifying practical decisions: a judicial decision is one which is justified publicly by reference to authorized institutional tradition. In those hard cases that lawyers and legal theorists so enjoy to contemplate, the need publicly to justify one's decision in terms of interpretations of the legal past which seem plausible to experts, remains important long after simple rule-application has ceased to be possible. Doing this involves neither application of a clear unequivocal rule, as in the perhaps mythical easy cases, nor invention ex nihilo, but inescapably (though not only) inter-pretation of authorized institutional tradition. (245)

The "Freedom of the Church" at AALS

At the recent Annual Meeting of the AALS in New Orleans, the Law and Religion Section -- so ably chaired by Paul Horwitz this past year -- put on a first-rate panel on "The Freedom of the Church."  (About which more here.)  Michael Moreland, Michael McConnell, Sarah Gordon, and Paul Horwitz each gave excellent presentations, and Jessie Hill moderated expertly. 

Paul helpfully "set up" the issue, noting that the issue is timely in part because of events and controversies like the Hosanna-Tabor decision and the HHS-mandate litigation.  He then presented, and reflected briefly on, the criticisms of "religious institutionalism" that have been developed by Micah Schwartzman and Rich Schragger (in this paper).

Sarah Gordon reminded the audience that, the First Amendment's free-exercise and no-establishment clauses notwithstanding, religious institutions and (especially) their property were pervasively and closely regulated in many places during the 19th century, and suggested that this fact complicates arguments that the founders and ratifiers constitutionalized a strong "freedom of the church" principle.

Michael Moreland's very thoughtful presentation noted, among other things, that the debate in the public square and in the legal academy about religious freedom generally, and the "freedom of the church" principle specifically, is shaped -- and perhaps distorted -- by the (contingent) fact that the principle so often is in play in debates about, well, "sex."  As he reminded us, the conversation needs to be about "God" and "law," too.

Finally, Michael McConnell reflected on the (he thinks) strange fact that the Free Exercise, in Smith, was held to provide almost no protection to individuals, while Hosanna-Tabor, drawing on a principle of church-autonomy that might seem less textually grounded than individual "free exercise", provided strong protections to religious institutions.  (In the Q & A, it was suggested that a number of the Court's decisions -- including Kedroff (more on that case here) -- and also the original meaning of the term "establishment" provide substantial support for the principle applied, and the result reached, in Hosanna-Tabor.

Anyway, thanks very much to the organizers, presenters, and moderators for a really good AALS program. 

Two Books Worth Reading

I have recently read two books that shed considerable doubt on scientific assumptions that the supernatural does not exist. The first is by Kyriacos C. Markides, The Mountain of Silence: A Search for Orthodox Spirituality (2001). The book explores the beliefs and practices of Orthodox monasterial life as practiced by monks and hermits. In particular, he follows a remarkable larger-than-life priest named Maximos to the island of Cyprus and reports on his actions, his views, and his spiritual practice. Most important for this post, he reports on numerous phenomena that can only be called miracles.

I read this book in a reading group. One of our members knows the author and vouches for his integrity. After reading the book, I became convinced that scientific materialism could not possibly explain the events reported, and I very much doubt that the events were concocted, were dreams, or were otherwise fictitious. That said, I think the theology embraced by these monks, though sometimes qualified, too often seems to subtly denigrate those who care for and act in this world whether it is action for social justice or caring for children. I resist the suggestion that one has to be a monk to lead a fulfilling religious life though there is an impressive spiritual intimacy in monasterial life and, in fairness, the monks would not explicitly denigrate those who choose a life engaged in the world. I am reacting to a tone and a usually unspoken attitude.

Another book explicitly challenging scientific materialism currently sits atop the New York Times non-fiction bestseller list: Proof of Heaven: A Neurosurgeon’s Journey into the Afterlife (2012) by Eben Alexander. Although the book is somewhat repetitious, the story is riveting. Alexander, an academic neurosurgeon was struck by a sudden illness and was in a coma for seven days. He had previously thought that near death experiences felt real but were fantasies produced by the brain under severe stress.  His case was unique because the experience he had during his coma in his view could not have been produced by the brain because the part of the brain that produces thought and emotion was not functioning during his coma. His recovery from the illness was unprecedented. But his near death experience was even more impressive. Alexander richly details what he experienced and he has since learned that his experience is similar to those who also have had near death experiences. His experience has led him to the conviction that heaven and God are real. Proof of Heaven is a powerful book that will strengthen the faith of believers and might give second thoughts to those who think belief in the supernatural is simply nonsense.

Professor Kurt Lash on the 9th Amendment

After posting the reply I had written to Judge Bork's request for my thoughts on the meaning of the Ninth Amendment, I received a note from MoJ reader Professor Kurt Lash of the University of Illinois Law School, author of The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment (Oxford University Press, 2009).  Professor Lash reports on the basis of his research that what I had inferred from the Founders' theory of government finds confirmation in the historical record. Here is his note, which I post with his kind permission:

Dear Robert,

I am a regular reader of the Mirror of Justice website and noticed your post today on the late Robert Bork and the Ninth Amendment.  Having read your linked essay of reply to Judge Bork, you should be encouraged to know your reading of the Ninth Amendment is powerfully supported by the historical evidence.  The founding generation understood the Ninth and Tenth Amendment as declaring and preserving the people's retained rights of local self-government.  The rights would be protected in every case where federal power was properly limited, and violated every time federal power was unjustifiably expanded.  Nor did this change at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment (contra Randy Barnett).  In fact, this is how both amendments were broadly understood, and cited, for the next century or so.  All of this evidence is laid out in my book "The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment" (Oxford Press, 2009).

I always felt that Judge Bork had been wrongly maligned for the "ink blot" statement--he was entirely right to reject the Clause as a source of federal judicial power to constrain the states.  And he was right to treat the clause as unenforceable absent sufficient evidence of original meaning.  Even worse, when Philip Kurland testified against Bork in part because of the judge's views on the Ninth Amendment, Kurland knew of historical evidence that supported Judge Bork's view--evidence that Kurland excluded from the Founders' Constitution (but can be found in his original files at the University of Chicago).  Happily, I got to defend the Judge on this matter in person while he was still with us, as part of a conference in honor of the Judge back in 2008.  See Lash, Of Inkblots and Originalism: Historical Ambiguity and the Ninth Amendment, 31 Harv.J.L. and Pub. Pol'y 467 (2008).

The Ninth is not an inkblot.  It is, sadly, too often misunderstood.  Your essay is a wonderful antidote.

Sincerely,

Kurt Lash
Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law
Director, Program on Constitutional Theory, History and Law
University of Illinois College of Law

Thursday, January 10, 2013

Neither an inkblot nor an invitation to judges to rule

My reply to a request from Judge Bork (may he rest in peace) for thoughts on the meaning of the Ninth Amendment:

http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/337262/robert-p-george-ninth-amendment-ramesh-ponnuru

Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Remembering Fr. Neuhaus

Yesterday was the fourth anniversary of the death of Richard John Neuhaus. Those who knew him intimately and those who knew him only through his writings share the pain of his loss. Since he was irreplaceable, it is scarcely a surprise that no one has taken his place in American intellectual and public life.  Here is the tribute to him that I published at First Things shortly after his death:

http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2009/03/he-threw-it-all-away