I am most grateful to Mike
Moreland, John Breen, and Greg Sisk for raising and addressing challenging
issues that pertain to the content of legal scholarship these days that
consciously addresses the neuralgic issues from a perspective that is Catholic
or aligned with views consistent with Catholic social thought. If publications
in the law reviews and journals, which are considered the most prestigious,
offer a one-sided view of the neuralgic issues, can we infer anything from the
content of legal education that law students are receiving in this age of great
and grave challenges to legal education?
Many years ago, another professor
took strong issue with what I had to say in one of my earliest articles that addressed
abortion. In that essay, I attempted to portray a sincere and serious dialogue
between conversing partners about Roe v.
Wade. In short, by use of this device, I thought I could present in an
objective manner this critical issue, i.e., abortion.
Within a short time, I noticed that
another professor, who was aggressively pro-abortion, took to task what I had
to say in one of her footnotes in a published essay in a journal many would
consider prestigious to this day. In today’s nomenclature, her essay would fall
within the category of: reproductive rights and freedom. I did not mind her
taking me on, but I did mind her using ad
hominem methods in her critique which did not address in the least the
substance of my arguments that undergirded my position which she was
critiquing. In essence, the substance of her critique was that I did not agree
with her position. The scholarly and practical reasons of for her critique that
might have been proffered and explained were conspicuous by their absence. When
I suggested to the editors of the law journal which published her essay and
which is considered one of the more prestigious in the American legal academy
as I have mentioned, they rejected my request to offer a reply. In short, it
seemed that there was nothing more to say on the matter even though there was.
I know that there are law journals
and reviews which will publish manuscripts that offer a pro-life or
pro-traditional marriage perspective, just to mention two of the principal
neuralgic issues of the day, but these periodicals, which I hasten to add
provide a great service, are not considered “prestigious” because the law
schools that sponsor them do not fall within the upper echelons of the U.S.
News and World Report law school evaluations or similar surveys. But I wonder
aloud whether these surveys do an effective job of evaluating with objectivity
the nature of legal education today and what it is supposed to be about. The
fact that a journal and its law school were once prestigious does not mean that
this status will last forever. Moreover, as most law school faculties are
pondering the future of legal education in this bleak period where the future
of many law schools is a subject of question, shouldn’t the focus of their
discussions concern the nature of legal education? It may be that the emphasis
of these discussions is not on substance of legal education itself but on how
to market a particular brand of legal education.
For those interested in Catholic
legal theory and the education that is its natural companion, I suggest that
this is a time of opportunity for those schools which are sincerely interested
in their Catholic identity to consider the possibility that to be great
institutions of legal education does not necessitate mimicry of institutions
that were the prestigious institutions of the past.
The recent postings of Greg, John,
and Mike demonstrate that if something is missing from legal scholarship and
legal advocacy on the neuralgic issues of the day, there is likely something
also missing from the education which these authors and practitioners have
received. If nature abhors a vacuum, the time may well be now for those
interested in Catholic legal theory and who teach at institutions which in some
fashion rely on the moniker Catholic to ask the pressing question: what is
missing from what we have to offer current and future students (without
worrying about whether the “prestigious” institutions are doing the same). If
some of us are willing to ask and respond to this question, we may not only be
benefiting the institutions for which we labor but we could also be aiding our
students—both existing and future, the profession, and the institution of the
rule of law.
RJA sj
Kevin Walsh (Richmond) has a superb post about the question whether for-profit corporations are "persons" who "exercise religion" pursuant to RFRA. He makes his claims in the context of criticizing a recent panel decision of the Third Circuit. You should read the whole thing, but here is a selection:
RFRA provides that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless the government satisfies strict scrutiny. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added). In the U.S. Code, “person” ordinarily encompasses “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. Nothing in RFRA excludes corporations generally. To the contrary, it is plain that corporations can assert claims under RFRA. The only Supreme Court case applying RFRA against the federal government involved a claim asserted by a corporation, O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal . . . .
When one analyzes the claim, it turns out that the argument is not really about the meaning of the word “person” (even though the conclusion of the argument purports to be a claim about the meaning of this word). Rather, the argument pivots on “exercise of religion.” In the words of the district court opinion adopted by the Third Circuit, “a for-profit, secular corporation cannot exercise religion.”
Again, the claim is not that corporations cannot engage in exercise of religion. After all, corporations can, and do, exercise religion. Consider, for example,Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. or Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The claim, rather, is limited to “secular, for-profit corporations.” But the claim rests on a mistake about “exercise of religion” under federal law and a mistake about corporate action.
For Kevin's arguments about the meaning of "exercise of religion" under RFRA and about the purposes of corporate action, read the post. I will add that on the former point, it is unquestionably the case as a historical matter that refusals to behave in a certain way can count as "exercises of religion": two of the earliest religious exemption questions -- the Quakers' resistance to military conscription and the opposition in some religious communities to swearing oaths -- take just this form.
Paul Horwitz and I discuss his book in this podcast, the latest in the Federalist Society's worthwhile series of conversations on new books.