Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, June 6, 2013

A ministerial-exception case to watch in Cincinnati

The Washington Post reports that a jury found that the Archdiocese of Cincinnati unlawfully discriminated against a Catholic-school teacher whom it fired after she became pregnant via artificial insemination.  The jury awarded the teacher more than $170,000 (including $100,000 in punitive damages).  The trial court had disallowed the ministerial-exception argument because the "computer technology teacher" had no "ministerial duties." 

The Archdiocese also argued that the teacher was fired for not complying with her contract, but the fired teacher, "who is not Catholic, had testified she didn’t know artificial insemination violated church doctrine or her employment pact.  She said she thought the contract clause about abiding by church teachings meant she should be a Christian and follow the Bible."

As many (including several of us here at MOJ) have noted, the Supreme Court's important ruling in Hosanna-Tabor did not resolve the debate over the scope and coverage of the ministerial exception.  My own view is that a teacher -- of any subject and whether or not that teacher is Catholic -- in a diocesan school is a "minister" but . . . stay tuned.

Haupt on the Mirage of Constitutional Convergence

Check out Claudia Haupt's first post over at CLR Forum. Claudia is a fellow at Columbia Law School and the author of a fine book dealing with the law and religion regimes of the US and Germany. Her post makes a very interesting comparative point about "neutrality" in the law and rhetoric of the US and Germany. As she puts it, "From a comparative perspective, it might be tempting to assume that the courts say the same thing about the relationship between church and state, because they are both using the term neutrality.  But we have to look beneath the surface. The meaning of neutrality evolved contextually, separately in each system. If we take the language of neutrality at face value, without regard to history and context, we fall into the convergence trap: we see one thing that looks just like the other thing, and we assume they’re substantively the same."

Claudia is right that the meaning of a term like neutrality cannot be properly assessed without reference to cultural and historical particulars. The use of the same term inter-culturally creates a mirage of convergence. But an additional difficulty may be that the term lends itself to multiple and (at times) conflicting interpretations within the same legal and cultural system. That can create confusion about a term's meaning as well. At least, this is what I argue in Chapter 2 of The Tragedy of Religious Freedom.  

ADDENDUM: I was also reminded of this example from Joseph Raz's The Morality of Freedom (121-22):

Imagine that the Reds are fighting the Blues. We have no commercial or other relations with the Blues, but we supply the Reds with essential food which helps them maintain their war effort. If we want to be neutral, should we continue normal supplies to the Reds or should they be discontinued? If we continue supplying the Reds, we will be helping them more than the Blues. If we discontinue supplies, we will be hindering the Reds more than the Blues. (I am assuming that even if similar supplies to the Blues will help them, continuing not to help them is not hindering them.)....The[se cases] form a special class where, in the circumstances of the case, not helping is hindering....In [them] two standards of neutrality conflict. 

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

Judge Henry Friendly on the Establishment Clause

Here's an interesting selection from David Dorsen's recent superb biography of renowned Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly. The passage deals with the Establishment Clause, with particular reference to the issue of "shared time" remedial education by public school teachers in religious schools and the Supreme Court's decision Aguilar v. Felton. The passage is neat because it shows the fashion in which an intermediate appellate judge managed hierarchical constraint and substantive preference in crafting a decision. I'll have some more on this general issue soon, but here's Dorsen (at 162-63):

[I]n 1984, a time of doctrinal uncertainty and confusing precedents [ed.: when has this not been true?], Friendly wrote the Second Circuit's opinion in Felton v. Secretary, Dept. of Education, where, when other programs had proven ineffectual, New York City sent public school teachers into nonpublic schools, including religious schools, to provide remedial instruction to educationally deprived children. State law prohibited public school teachers and their supervisors, who were entirely in charge of the program, from involving themselves in religious activities or content. In a suit by taxpayers Friendly said that while he accepted the good faith of the city and the value of the program, the program was unconstitutional: "[T]he Establishment Clause, as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, constitutes an insurmountable barrier to the use of federal funds to send public school teachers and other professionals into religious schools to carry on instruction, remedial or otherwise, or to provide clinical and guidance services of the sort at issue here." His analysis of the Court's cases

leads inescapably to the conclusion that public funds can be used to afford remedial instruction or related counseling services to students in religious elementary and secondary schools only if such instruction or services are afforded at a neutral site off the premises of the religious school....To be sufficiently certain that public employees, in a program like the present one, will maintain strict religious neutrality, they and the institutions in which they work must be subjected to 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance.' This itself is a constitutionally excessive entanglement of church and state.

Precedent did not require a search of the record to find entanglement; the mere possibility was sufficient to reject the program.

Dorsen goes on to note that Friendly's separationist view of the Establishment Clause ("The Establishment Clause was the most notable constitutional-law area in which Friendly sided with the Supreme Court's liberal wing") coincided nicely with what was then the Supreme Court's prevailing view, so that he could claim plausibly that he was "just following the Supreme Court." "Nevertheless," Dorsen writes,

Friendly structured the opinion in a manner that increased the likelihood that the Supreme Court would affirm him. He placed heavy reliance on Meek v. Pittenger, virtually the same as Felton, including on the problem of entanglement, which held unconstitutional a secular textbook program for private schools. He later explained that in writing the opinion as he did his object "was to make the [Supreme] Court face up to the fact that it could not sustain the New York program without overruling, in contrast to distinguishing, Meek v. Pittenger. I thought that this, as well as some of the other considerations developed in the opinion, might give a little pause to Blackmun and Powell about the erosion of the establishment clause."

If you read through Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Aguilar v. Felton, you'll see that he relies heavily on Meek too. And, as Friendly half-predicted, Justice Powell's concurrence goes on at length not only about Meek, but it also specifically relies on and emphasizes Judge Friendly's reading of Meek.

It's also interesting that none of the dissenting opinions in Aguilar distinguished Meek--another very strong point in support of Judge Friendly's craftsmanship. Justice O'Connor instead wrote that "experience has demonstrated that the analysis in Part V of the Meek opinion is flawed. At the time Meek was decided, thoughtful dissents pointed out the absence of any record support for the notion that public school teachers would attempt to inculcate religion simply because they temporarily occupied a parochial school classroom....[I]t is time to acknowledge that the risk identified in Meek was greatly exaggerated." Justice Rehnquist's dissent does not mention Meek at all, presumably because he continued to dissent from it. And Chief Justice Burger explicitly states that he dissents in Aguilar for the same reasons as he dissented in Meek.

Of course, Agostini v. Felton, decided in 1997, overruled Aguilar and Justice O'Connor's opinion carried the day (5-4): "We have abandoned the presumption in Meek and [School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.Ball that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and religion." But that course reversal only highlights the importance of seeing how a master like Judge Friendly went about his work.

Tuesday, June 4, 2013

Thomas More and Important, Final Things

 

Thank you, Lisa, for your report about the Thomas More gathering co-hosted and sponsored by the Murphy Institute at Saint Thomas and the excellent University of Dallas Center for Thomas More studies. If I recall correctly, Marc had also posted an entry on this conference earlier in the spring before the gathering convened. Coincidentally during the same period in which the conference was held, I finished reading two books on More and Moreana. In one of them, I came across reference to an essay published in 1961 by the well-known More scholar Father Germain Marc’hadour. Father Marc’hadour investigated in this particular article the topic of More’s obedience. More surely was obedient to the law and civil authorities including Henry VIII; however, his ultimate obedience was to God and His holy Church.

In pursuing this particular study, Marc’hadour made a small digression in his pure study on More to demonstrate how the political difficulties of Thomas More’s time that contest faith in general, and Catholicism in particular, are not restricted to the Tudor era. During that period many good people had to make important decisions and, then, choices about loyalty and fidelity that essentially pitted the civil authority against the Church. But as Marc’hadour and others have demonstrated, this test has not been restricted to that era. I join the ranks of those who do not think that the Church-State issues which confronted Thomas More and his contemporaries were restricted to the sixteenth century. During that period, Catholic England became something else besides a nation that was breaking from Rome; in short, it was transformed into a totalitarian system headed and directed by a well-educated but increasingly despotic monarch. By the 1950s, another Englishman, Christopher Dawson, warned that the twentieth century democracies themselves could mimic the terrors generated by totalitarian states, and here I would include Henry’s England. Following the thought of Dawson, John Paul II noted in the 1990s that a democracy without values is but a thinly disguised totalitarianism.

Apparently Marc’hadour joined the ranks of Christopher Dawson and JPII by penning in 1961 these thoughts (which are quoted in James Monti’s excellent 1997 book, The King’s Good Servant But God’s First):

It may be that the near future will face all of us with the problem of harmonizing, or simply reconciling, our loyalty to Caesar with our loyalty to God… [But Caesar] is no longer a monarch; he is a cabinet or a party… [or] public opinion, which shapes—and is shaped by—the newspapers, the broadcasts, the schools… If we may bring a few examples, there are today fields of conduct, such as divorce, sexual behavior and education, the use of artificial contraceptives, abortion, mercy-killing… and a few more, in which a Catholic, especially if he [or she] is a lawyer, a doctor, a nurse, a teacher, will find himself alone against practically everyone else in [the] profession… As in penal days, the Catholic will sometimes be alone of his species in the whole street… [and] find fellow Catholics ready to taunt him… In extreme cases fidelity to the doctrine of Mother Church will mean worse than corporal death: it will alienate from a man the trust and esteem of the people he likes, or even loves, best… The prospect of this social disqualification, of this civic annihilation… is as strong and effective a pressure as the old forms of physical duress… [T]housands will apostatize simply because they see no rational justification for the Church’s position on a number of points, and they have not enough faith… to cling to her through sheer obedience.

However, Father Marc’hadour did have a remedy to address this problem: it was “the fervent intercession” of Saint Thomas More which “can remedy the sickly reluctance of many tepid Christians.” While Marc’hadour understood how More could be both a “dangerous patron” and a “dangerous friend,” something could be learned from one “who never believed in being carried to heaven on a featherbed.”

Today we find the neuralgic issues identified by Marc’hadour (and new ones such as the meaning of marriage and family) very much with us; moreover, we find those in national, state, provincial, and regional governments strongly pushing the agenda to transform abortion, euthanasia, access to artificial contraception, etcetera into so-called “human rights” issues which no one, especially faithful Catholics, should be able to challenge regardless of the reasons tendered for opposition or objection to these newly discovered “rights”. In addition, we see many in the academy and religious life, including those who use the modifier “Catholic” to self-identify, urging their co-religionists to cast aside the teachings of the Church and accept what are considered to be the more enlightened views of the present age.

But here at the Mirror of Justice, most of our discussions that are pursued and positions which are taken rely upon objective reason to consider, understand, and explain the Church’s teachings on these increasingly controversial topics, which have a bearing on the development of Catholic legal theory. But our discussions on this site really go beyond the important matters that intersect Catholic and any other legal theory—they also address, quite often, the nature of the human person and what our individual and social existence is all about: union with God.

In short, Thomas More understood that the dangerous political and social maelstrom in which he lived and died had to do not only with the civil governance of his time; it also had to do with human destiny, that is, with final things, including the final thing which I have just mentioned. As one goes through More’s vast correspondence and his so-called Tower Writings that he left and which are extant, you can see the mind and soul of the lawyer who was trying to be the good and obedient servant of both God and country. In the eyes of some, he failed in the latter category; but, I think the holders of this view are mistaken. Why? Thomas More understood that there is more about the human condition than the present moment and surviving it as best one can; he realized that the collection of “present moments” is but a prelude to the final things which we must all face. Thus, he used his intelligence and objective reasoning to try and avoid the traps with which the totalitarian king of his day attempted to ensnare him; but while doing this, More never lost sight of the final goal of the human condition and the necessary obedience that must be directed to the Universal Sovereign.

This goal is not about doing well in this world, a world which comes to an end for all of us with our natural or accelerated death; this goal is not about how to make friends and influence people; this goal is not about being the best or most powerful or most influential; this goal is not about getting along with everyone by doing what they are willing to do in order to join them in fellowship. The goal is about getting ready to meet God, and this is the final destiny we all share in common. Thomas More was the better lawyer, father, husband, and member of society for the path he chose. And what about each one of us: which path do we choose? After all, we are all like More because we share the important, final thing, too.

 

RJA sj

 

 

"Children and Young People (Scotland) Bill"

When I first heard about the "Children and Young People (Scotland) Bill" introduced into Parliament on April 17 of this year, I assumed naively that it was an "Onion" type spoof. Sadly, it is not. Under this proposal, every child and young person will be assigned a "named person" (parents of the child are ineligible) whose job it is to promote, support or safeguard the wellbeing of the child or young person by, among other things, advising, informing, or supporting the child or the child's parents; and raising a matter about the child with a relevant authority. Information deemed relevant on each child will be collected by the named person and passed on to successor named persons or other relevant authorites.

A "targeted intervention" is developed by the creation of a "child's plan" when "the child's wellbeing is being, or is at risk of being, adversely affected by any manner." In deciding whether a plan is needed and the contents of the plan, the "authority" making the decision will "so far as reasonably practicable ... ascertain and have regard for the views of the child, and the child's parents."

Scottish Ministers have broad authority, as far as I can tell, to determine what consitutes a threat to a child's well being.  The Bill itself doesn't contain an appeal mechanism for parents or their children although the existing Act may contain some provision for appeal.  

In "Vouchers Withing Reason," which I review here (see also here), and his his other books, law professor James Dwyer argues that parents are mere licensees of the state for child rearing purposes, with state experts determining (and dictacting to parents) the meaning of child wellbeing. Scotland seems to be taking a page from Dwyer's playbook.

Baude and Cohen on Change (Higher Education Edition)

Have a look at Will Baude's very interesting response to Glenn Cohen's post on the sorts of reforms to higher education that seem most and least promising in light of technological and other challenges (or advances). Here's a bit from Will's post:

I'm much more skeptical of a refrain that Glenn employs a couple of times in his post-- the idea that it's helpful for us to imagine that we were "creating the first universities for our day and age," and use those imagined ideal first universities to evaluate whether and how our actual universities ought to change. Maybe it's my inner Hayek, but I'm not sure how good our imaginations really are, and I'm not sure how relevant the product of those imaginations ought to be.

I mean, for starters, once we are in the imagining business, why universities? If we were creating the first system of higher education for our day and age, is there any reason to believe we would do it via university, rather than some much more unbundled combination of written and oral materials? Would we have general rather than specialized certifications? And if we did decide to invent universities, what ought they be like? Despite having thought about this for a while, I honestly have no idea, and I'm skeptical of most of those who do have a confident idea.

I come at this problem quite differently. One of the defining characteristics of American universities is the way that they've become embedded in our society over time, and the set of social norms in and around them. You don't have to be Tyler Cowen to think that two of the main reasons people learn things by going to universities are the effects of socialization and the higher social status obtained by going. We can tell stories about the superiority of interactive class discussion over the internet and the library, but surely those embedded social effects are a huge part of any such superiority. And many of those social norms are bottom-up, not top-down. Imagining new from-scratch universities pushes us to dissociate the university from some of its most important virtues.

Baude and Cohen appear to be discussing the best way to approach the reform of higher education. But I wonder if the fundamental difference between them isn't really so much about higher education specifically, but about the general nature of institutional change. One other quick thought: whether one believes that the university's existing educational virtues are worth preserving may depend at least in part on the extent to which one also believes that those virtues continue to be maximally conducive to the university's educational mission. But I take part of Will's point to be that it is difficult to think well about that sort of issue in vacuo.

"Pursuing the Truth in Love"

Over at America, Matt Malone has this essay, "Pursuing the Truth in Love," about "the mission of [the magazine] in a 21st century church."  (HT:  Jana Bennett at Catholic Moral Theology).  In the piece, he proposes (among other things) that "[w]hile we may have solved the problem of the relationship between the church and the state, the problem of the relationship between the church and the political remains. Solving that problem, or at least presenting credible solutions to it, is the pre-eminent task of the Catholic media in the United States."

I think all of us who participate, as Catholics, in "public discourse" should read Malone's piece.  I don't expect that everyone will agree with all he writes (!), but there's a whole lot in it for all of us, and each of us, to think about.  He concludes with this:

“Love manifests itself more in deeds than in words.” America makes the following commitments:

1. Church. The church in the United States must overcome the problem of factionalism. This begins by re-examining our language. America will no longer use the terms “liberal,” “conservative” or “moderate” when referring to our fellow Catholics in an ecclesiastical context.

2. Charity. How we say things is as important as what we say. America seeks to provide a model for a public discourse that is intelligent and charitable. In the next few months, America will announce a new set of policies for the public commentary on our various platforms.

3. Community. America will appoint a community editor who will moderate our public conversation, ensuring that it rises to the standards we set for thoughtfulness and charity. We will continue to provide a forum for a diverse range of faithful, Catholic voices.

Monday, June 3, 2013

"Cardinal backs civil unions"

[From The Tablet, here:]

Cardinal backs civil unions

3 June 2013

Two of the most senior Belgian clerics have voiced support for civil unions, but said the Church would not see such a partnership as a marriage, which they said was only between a man and a woman.

Archbishop André-Joseph Léonard, Archbishop of Brussels, made his comments through his spokesman in response to an interview by the Belgian newspaper De Tijd with his successor, Cardinal Godfried Danneels.

In an interview to mark his 80th birthday, the cardinal told the paper it was good that states were making reforms to normalise same-sex relationships, saying it showed "more nuanced thinking about the person in their totality rather than being fixated on the moral principle". He said the recognition of gay relationships was a legal matter and not one for the Church to comment on, even though they could not constitute real marriage.

Danneels said the Church had evolved in its understanding of homosexuals.

 

Governor Tom Corbett's Commencement Speech at Villanova

I want to echo Lisa's comment below about the rich discussion during the symposium on St. Thomas More sponsored by the Murphy Institute and the Center for Thomas More Studies. Speaking of Thomas More, Governor Tom Corbett of Pennsylvania delivered the commencement address at Villanova Law a couple weeks ago and spoke about Thomas More and Abraham Lincoln as role models for lawyers. The address is well worth watching, which you can do at this link (starting at 21:00).

Wieseltier on the Humanities

Leon Wieseltier delivered the commencement address at Brandeis a few weeks ago.  Here's a bit, sent to me by a correspondent (The full address is available at The New Republic, here):

For decades now in America we have been witnessing a steady and sickening denigration of humanistic understanding and humanistic method. We live in a society inebriated by technology, and happily, even giddily governed by the values of utility, speed, efficiency, and convenience. The technological mentality that has become the American worldview instructs us to prefer practical questions to questions of meaning – to ask of things not if they are true or false, or good or evil, but how they work. Our reason has become an instrumental reason, and is no longer the reason of the philosophers, with its ancient magnitude of intellectual ambition, its belief that the proper subjects of human thought are the largest subjects, and that the mind, in one way or another, can penetrate to the very principles of natural life and human life. Philosophy itself has shrunk under the influence of our weakness for instrumentality – modern American philosophy was in fact one of the causes of that weakness -- and generally it, too, prefers to tinker and to tweak.