Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, February 12, 2021

An Open Letter About/To Senator Marco Rubio on the Eve of the Senate Trial Verdict

In 2016, I was a proud supporter of Senator Marco Rubio’s campaign for the Republican nomination for President. I put a Rubio sign in my front yard. I blogged about my support for Rubio. I encouraged people I knew to turn out for Rubio at the Minnesota caucuses. I attended the Minnesota caucuses, where my precinct voted overwhelmingly for Rubio. Although Donald Trump carried primaries nearly everywhere else that day, the good people of Minnesota stood for principle and character, giving the strong win to Marco Rubio.

Rubio1
In 1980, I was a delegate to the Republican National Convention, as part of the Montana delegation that put Ronald Reagan over the top for the nomination. In 2016, I thought I saw in Marco Rubio another powerful leader of principle and character. Rubio integrated conservative values with equal opportunity. Rubio spoke openly of his Christian faith and how it provided moral guidance to his political role. He saw faith and people of faith as playing a key role in promoting the common good for people of all faiths and beliefs. I saw him as offering us the best of a person of deep faith and positive spirit in seeking political office.

After the tragedy of Trump’s nomination and then the start of the long four-year downward spiral of the Trump presidency, Rubio’s moral standing appeared to falter, not by words or action but too often by silence. From time to time, Rubio would return to his first values and separate himself from this or that of the worst of Trump’s outrages. Indeed, I often defended Rubio to others who were dismayed by the Trump perversion of the conservative movement.

No more.

Barely a month ago, we watched a defeated president call for his extremist followers — the White Nationalists and conspiracy theory crazies that Trump had welcomed for four years — to join him at what he promised would be a “wild” rally on January 6 to overturn the election results. Once again drawing on his repertoire of violent imagery, Trump enraged the crowd and then sent his crazed mob down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol. Repeating word-for-word what Trump had told them, the mob chanted Trump’s slogans and lies as they attacked the citadel of democracy. We watched the Trump mob beat police officers with Trump flags.

When Trump’s long-delayed response came hours later, he said of these domestic terrorists who were acting in his name, “We love you. You’re very special.”

Documenting history is a moral obligation if we are ever to learn from mistakes and aspire to something better. Over the past few days, the impeachment managers have done exactly that. As graphic and disturbing as was the video and documentary evidence, we as citizens were rightly called to bear witness along with the Senate to Trump’s inflammatory words and to the Trump mob attack on the Capitol.

Then we learn what Marco Rubio thinks about this. He branded the whole thing as “stupid.” To be sure, he said that Trump bore responsibility for what happened. But he nonetheless said that he wanted to end it as soon as possible and, indeed, even before any evidence was presented. And Rubio promised to join most of his fellow Republicans in the Senate in giving Trump a pass for the most dangerous attack on American democracy in more than a century. In fairness, however, Rubio said this before we saw the full story in living color.

I pray that Marco Rubio will think carefully about what he now has seen. I hope that he did not turn his eyes away, but watched carefully and thoughtfully. I urge him to draw on the conscience that he spoke of during his 2016 presidential run. Please consider, Senator Rubio, that you may be on the wrong side in dismissing the infamous events of 1/6 as something to rush past “at the first chance” to “end” this. Do not allow others behind the scenes to sweep away the broken glass, while you fail to demand that justice be rendered against the president who shattered the windows of American democracy.

Now is the time. Later recognition that this opportunity was lost is simply too late. It’ll be too late for history, which will not look kindly on those who hastened to move past this outrageous episode. It’ll be too late for our country which needs a new beginning. It’ll be too late for the Republican Party which has tolerated a faction that accepts political violence and desperately needs to move on to a different and more uplifting path.

Please surprise me, Senator Rubio. Please let us see the same man of principle, character, and conscience that inspired me in 2016. Prayerfully and regretfully, but firmly, vote to convict Trump. Let the truth set you free.

Thursday, February 11, 2021

Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Initiative files amicus brief in support of Apache Stronghold in Oak Flat litigation

The Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Initiative has filed an amicus brief in the United States District Court in the case Apache Stronghold vs. United States of America. The brief argues in favor of religious liberty protections for Oak Flat, an Indigenous sacred site in Arizona being threatened with destruction.


The brief was filed by Notre Dame Law Professor Stephanie Barclay, a First Amendment scholar who directs the Law School’s Religious Liberty Initiative, along with the Religious Liberty Initiative’s student cohort. “Our brief highlights a history of callousness and coercion against Indigenous sacred sites like Oak Flat. Our religious freedom laws wouldn’t allow the government to demolish churches with impunity, and the same should be true of a site that has been sacred to the Apache people for generations,” Barclay said. The brief represents Ramon Riley, the White Mountain Apache Tribe Cultural Resource Director, the Morning Star Institute, and the MICA Group (Multicultural Initiative for Community Advancement).


“Notre Dame’s campus is blessed with many sacred places: from the Grotto of Our Lady of Lourdes to the Basilica of the Sacred Heart. But for the Apache people, there is only one Oak Flat,” said Dan Loesing, a 2L student who took a lead role on this brief. “It's an honor to work to protect this historic sacred site and the free exercise rights of those who gather there for prayer and religious ceremonies.”


In Apache Stronghold vs. United States of America, the District Court of Arizona may decide whether the ramifications of the Resolution Copper project meet the “substantial burden” requirements of the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The anticipated physical destruction of Oak Flat will leave an empty crater where religious gatherings and ceremonies once took place. The amicus brief filed by the Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Initiative pushes back against arguments by the government that would provide basically no religious freedom protections for Indigenous sacred sites, and that would result in disparate treatment between those sites and other similar types of non-Indigenous religious exercise.


About the Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Initiative:


Notre Dame Law School recently launched its Religious Liberty Initiative under the leadership of Stephanie Barclay. The Initiative will involve promoting more religious liberty scholarship, coordinating events for thought leaders in this space, and starting a new Religious Liberty Clinic aimed at promoting religious liberty for people of all faiths. In just the past six months, students in the Religious Liberty Initiative cohort have already helped write briefs filed in the Northern District of New York, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court, defending the rights of Muslims, Evangelicals, and Orthodox Jews.

Additional Quotes on the Amicus Brief:


The amicus brief was supported by Mona Polacca, President of the International Council of the Thirteen Indigenous Grandmothers. She stated, “The Oak Flat Stronghold is not just a place, but a home to spiritual powers. ... For centuries, Oak Flat has remained an active place where Indigenous people come to pray, harvest, and gather where holy beings reside and holy springs flow. The San Carlos Apache cannot have this spiritual connection with the land anywhere else on Earth.”


Alexandra Howell is a third-year law student at Notre Dame who also helped with the brief, and she explained, “While what is sacred to majority culture and religion is generally safe from government interference, minority religious groups do not have this same guarantee. Our amicus brief made me think about how the Apache burial site located at Oak Flat is akin to Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, D.C. This section of the brief is a crucial reminder of how easy it is to disregard the need for others’ beliefs to receive protection when they look different from our own.”


Ramon Riley, a respected Apache elder, has spent the last two decades working to defend Oak Flat. He opposes the proposed mining project for Oak Flat, because he believes it is wrong to “destroy sacred land that made us who we are.”


The troubling pattern of lack of protection for Indigenous sacred sites is something of particular interest to Professor Barclay. Together with co-author Professor Michalyn Steele, Barclay just yesterday published a Harvard Law Review article that argued Indigenous people should be able to more easily make a claim of a substantial burden under RFRA in order to correct certain inequalities in the law. “Allowing Indigenous peoples to demonstrate a substantial burden on their religion on the same basis as other religious groups does in any way guarantee that they will always win their case. Rather, it simply requires government to actually justify its burdens, and it incentivizes government to be more protective of sacred sites if it can be,” the article argues.


“We are so grateful and honored that Notre Dame is helping the Apache in our time of greatest need," said Apache Stronghold leader and former San Carlos Apache Tribal Chairman Dr. Wendsler Nosie, Sr. "The government is saying that destruction of Chi'chil Bildagoteel will not be a serious problem for us when its destruction will force us to stop practicing our religion.”

https://law.nd.edu/news-events/news/notre-dame-law-school-religious-liberty-initiative-files-amicus-brief-in-support-of-apache-stronghold-in-oak-flat-litigation/

Wednesday, February 10, 2021

Fifth Annual Notre Dame National Appellate Advocacy Tournament for Religious Freedom

Notre Dame Law School Moot Court Board is pleased to announce its Fifth Annual Notre Dame National Appellate Advocacy Tournament for Religious Freedom, taking place Friday, April 9, 2021 through Sunday, April 11, 2021.

Every year, teams from law schools across the country participate in our Tournament, arguing before a mock Supreme Court of the United States. We hope you will join us this spring to celebrate student scholarship, appellate advocacy training, and address challenging questions involving the First Amendment. Be sure to mark your calendars, and we hope to see you (virtually) for this exciting event!

Tournament takes place: Friday, April 9, 2021 through Sunday, April 11, 2021 Formal registration opens: January 21, 2021

Tournament Fee: $300 per team

Briefs due: March 27, 2021

If you have any questions or would like to reserve space for your team(s) before formal registration opens, please contact Natalie Piazza, Tournament Director, at [email protected].

Congratulations to Dean Vince Rougeau

MOJ-veteran Vince Rougeau -- the longtime dean of Boston College Law School, and also my former colleague at Notre Dame -- has been named the new president of the College of Holy Cross.  Congrats to both Vince and the College!  More here.  

Tuesday, February 9, 2021

My message to students in my course on Civil Liberties at Princeton

Dear Enrollees in Politics 316: Civil Liberties --

Welcome to our course. The precepting team and I look forward to exploring with you the broad range of principles, issues, and arguments that are its substance.

Precepts [discussion sections] are a bit longer than is typical in Princeton courses: 1 hour and 20 minutes. This will enable us to dig deeply into the complex and difficult issues we will be addressing. Precept participation is important. Please be an active participant in the discussions. The virtual format presents challenges, to be sure, but don't let it deter you from contributing to the conversations.

Please don't be reluctant to speak your mind! Even if you hold an unpopular view, please be willing to share and defend it. Also, please be willing to be "devil's advocate" on behalf of views that you do not hold, or aren't sure whether you should hold. By robustly defending a controversial position to see whether, in the end, it can be successfully defended, or how far it can be defended, you will be doing all of us in the course a service.

On freedom of speech in our discussions, please see the statement on the syllabus referencing Princeton University's free speech policies set forth in Rights, Rules, Responsibilities. Princeton students and faculty enjoy the broadest possible free speech protections in all courses and other university activities, but surely free speech should be especially sacrosanct in a course on civil liberties! At the same time, we value civility--but that does not mean or require that anyone hold or decline to hold any particular view, or that one submit to anyone else's ideas about the language in which issues are to be framed, or the terms in which they are to be discussed, or the assumptions on which the dicussion will proceed. What it does mean and require is that we all do business in the proper currency of intellectual discourse--a currency consisting of evidence, reasons, and arguments.

Some of the issues we will be discussing are not only controversial, but also sensitive and, to some people, personal. We nevertheless need to discuss them frankly. As Dean Jill Dolan says, we need to be "resilient and brave" in discussing matters that engage our emotions. One thing I can guarantee is this:  Whatever your political, moral, religious, and other opinions happen to be, you will encounter in our readings and discussions challenges to them. You may even be offended or scandalized by what some authors or some participants in the course believe and say. Please bear in mind that, as Cornel West has stated, "the very point of a liberal arts education is to disturb and unsettle us." I have deliberately chosen readings representing radically opposed positions on the issues we explore. There is not an official position in the course about who is right and who is wrong about anything. All positions and points of view, no matter how radical or even unjust or immoral they may seem to people who oppose them, are on the table for discussion, scrutiny, and assessment on equal terms. There is no orthodoxy in the course; there are no dogmas. There is no censorship or policing of thought. I hope there will be no self-censorship.

My philosophy of teaching is straightforward and rather simple: My job is not to tell students what to think, or induce or encourage them to think as I do; it is, rather, to help students to think more deeply, more critically, and for themselves. What I ask of students is open-mindedness, tolerance of those whose opinions differ from yours, a willingness not only to challenge others but to be challenged in turn, and a genuine and deep desire to learn--and to learn by seriously engaging authors and fellow students whose ideas differ, even radically differ, from your own.

There is never a bad time to study and think hard about civil liberties; but this is an especially good time--indeed, an exciting time. We are in the midst of massive national disagreements about issues having to do with freedom of speech, the free exercise of religion, due process of law, the equal protection of the laws, and more. In my opinion, though it need not be yours, some of these disagreements do not admit of obvious or straightforward answers, no matter how certain partisans on the competing sides are of the righteousness of their causes. In any case, I hope that our deliberations together will enable us all to be better, more constructive participants in the debates, no matter where we come down in them.

Best wishes,

Professor George

VIRTUAL EVENT: "Jews, Christians, and Muslims: Allies in Pursuit of Truth, Virtue, and the Common Good?" Featuring John Finnis, David Novak, and Hamza Yusuf

To what extent do Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have a shared way of determining truth, and a shared vision of virtue and the common good? Does that shared vision have the potential to help heal society's deep divisions and restore faith in the American social and political order?

Explore these questions with three world renowned scholars, Professor John Finnis, Rabbi David Novak, and Shaykh Hamza Yusuf. RFI Senior Fellow, Kent Hill, and Director of RFI's Islam and Religious Freedom Action Team, Ismail Royer, will host the event.

https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/rfievents/jews-christians-and-muslims-allies-in-pursuit-of-truth-virtue-and-the-common-good

Monday, February 8, 2021

Christian Political Thought at Notre Dame

MOJ readers might be interested in viewing Daniel Philpott's annotated bibliography for his grad course in Christian political thought:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VsbyiRRY8mev44gjZSjjHX8Y2TI9JKVN/view

Professor Philpott welcomes suggestions, as it is still a work in progress. 

Friday, February 5, 2021

Judicial freedom, binding precedents, and en banc review — a comparison and question

"Binding" precedent may be thought to conflict with judicial freedom. But does it?

Suppose a judge on a a three-judge panel must decide an appeal in a federal circuit court of appeals in which one panel cannot overrule another. On such a court, only the court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision.

Now suppose that the appeal to be decided is an "easy case" because the correct resolution follows straightforwardly from a prior panel decision. A judge in this later case thinks that the binding precedent was wrongly decided. But she recognizes the precedent is controlling. Because she wishes to rule lawfully, she applies the wrong but binding precedent to resolve the case before her. The full court then takes the case en banc.

Is this judge now sitting en banc more or less free than she was while sitting on the three-judge panel? It depends on what judicial freedom amounts to.

If judicial freedom is the ability to choose between contrary outcomes, then the lawful judge is more free en banc than on the panel. There was only one lawful outcome on the panel. En banc she has a choice. She can overrule the previously binding precedent or she can leave it standing. On this understanding, judicial freedom and binding law stand in opposition. 

But what if judicial freedom is the ability to render judgment according to law? On this understanding, the lawful judge is less free sitting en banc than on the panel. The judge may fail to render judgment according to law when sitting en banc. She might make a mistake about what the law requires. No such mistake was possible while the "binding" precedent controlled her choice on the panel. On this understanding, judicial freedom and law are mutually reinforcing. It is easier to render judgment according to law the more and more clearly the law binds.

Given the dominance of the conception of freedom as the ability to choose between contrary outcomes, one might be suspicious that there's something funny going on with the second conception of judicial freedom. But isn't the ability to render judgment according to law the kind of judicial freedom we have in mind when we think about "judicial independence"? When we say that judges should rule without fear or favor? When we laud judicial impartiality?

What is Christian nationalism, and what is it not?

(This is an op-ed published by Religion News Service.)

One unfortunate aspect of the American culture war is the tendency to weaponize words in ways that stretch them beyond any semblance of their original meanings. Terms such as “woke,” “PC” and “cancel culture” are now deployed to signal that something is bad without shedding meaningful light on the reasons why it’s bad. 

The latest term to meet this fate may be “Christian nationalism.” Since the attack on the U.S. Capitol, it’s showing signs of becoming an all-purpose condemnation of any effort to integrate Christian beliefs with civic engagement, even perfectly peaceful ones.

So what is Christian nationalism, and what is it not?

Paul Miller, a Georgetown University professor and author of a forthcoming book on Christian nationalism, explains that Christian nationalism is a political ideology that holds that “the American nation is defined by Christianity and that the government should take steps to keep it that way to sustain and maintain our Christian heritage.”

If America was founded for a unique purpose by God, then the Constitution was divinely inspired, and displaying the American flag in church sanctuaries is not a blurring of American and Christian identity but a natural marker of faith. In the rhetoric of Christian nationalism,  power is emphasized over principle.

Why is Christian nationalism so dangerous?

Put simply, when we merge our religious identity with our political identity, we will do anything to ensure that our political tribe prevails. We are no longer debating ideas about which reasonable people can disagree; we are defending Christianity against its enemies.

It’s why Eric Metaxas said, in reference to his claims of a stolen election, that it’s “God’s will” for America to keep spreading liberty around the world, and so, “Who cares what I can prove in the court?” Regardless of what the courts say about election fraud, “we need to fight to the death, to the last drop of blood because it’s worth it.”

When a particular political outcome becomes a tenet of my Christian faith, there’s nothing left to argue about. And when there’s nothing left to argue about, that’s a very dangerous place for democracy to find itself.

So there you have the broad outlines of what Christian nationalism is. What is it not?

Christian nationalism is not Christian patriotism. Love of country is a healthy aspect of being human, a reflection that the particularity of place matters to our identity and values. Patriotism becomes unhealthy when we reimagine our national identity as an expression of divine will, elevating our nation above others on some sort of God-ordained hierarchy.

Christian nationalism is not Christian political engagement. We are not a “Christian nation” in the sense that Christian nationalists mean. We are a nation in which our political discourse has long been shaped by Christian values, on both the left and the right. The civil rights movement was infused with Christian images and principles. The progressive push for immigration reform prominently features Christ’s admonition about welcoming the stranger.

Christian ideas should only be an entry point to a broader conversation with Americans of any (or no) faith tradition, not as a sledgehammer to stop their contribution to the debate. On the issue that’s been the most contentious over the past half-century, abortion, the most effective pro-life voices have been steeped in Christian principles. But the core of their arguments has been grounded in observations about fetal development and articulations of life’s value in terms that are accessible beyond Christianity.

On both sides of the political spectrum, the most effective advocates convey the public relevance of Christian values in terms that are wide open to rational disagreement.

The dangers of Christian nationalism are real, but let’s not let tribal posturing confuse those dangers in ways that marginalize the values-based arguments that have been — and hopefully will continue to be — central to American democracy. 

Thursday, February 4, 2021

Book Announcement: Christianity and Private Law

I am pleased to announce that a book I have co-edited with Bob Cochran, Christianity and Private Law, has been published by Routledge in its Law and Religion series and commissioned by the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory. The book leads off with a Foreword from John Witte, an Introduction from Bob Cochran and me, and survey chapters by James Gordley and Brent Strawn. The rest of the book engages property, contracts, and torts from a range of theologically-informed views. In the torts section, Jeff Pojanowski and I have a chapter on "The Moral of Torts" on what a natural law perspective might bring to some debates in contemporary tort theory. Below are an excerpt from John Witte's Foreword and the Table of Contents.

“Private law” is a common phrase for Europeans who readily divide the legal world into public, private, penal, and procedural law categories, building in part on ancient Roman law, medieval canon law, and modern civil law.  “Private law” is a less common term for Anglo-American common lawyers. They are more familiar with several discrete legal subjects that Europeans gather under the canopy of private law – contracts, property, and torts at the center of the canopy, associational law, family law, testamentary law, civil procedure, remedies, and other topics nearer the periphery.  In both civil law and common law lands, private law focuses on the voluntary and involuntary legal relationships between private parties, whether individuals or private groups. The laws of the state – sometimes the laws of other non-state associations, too – facilitate and support those private relationships, articulate and vindicate interests and expectations that emerge from them, and offer remedies for harms that result from misfeasance, non-feasance, or breach of duty by another.  The editors and several chapter authors do a fine job defining and defending “private law” as a category, and drawing interesting relationships between contracts, torts, and property which are the main subjects treated in these pages.

“Christianity” comprises all manner of Christian ideas and institutions, norms and habits that are shaped by the familiar quadrilateral of Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience.  Distinct Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Anglican, Anabaptist, and Evangelical voices, both historical and contemporary, come through in these pages, as does the powerful new Jewish voice of Michael Helfand.  The authors variously trace, describe, interpret, and critique the discrete contracts, property, and torts topics assigned to them.  Opening chapters in each of the four sections are devoted to biblical and traditional Christian teachings.  They underscore the depth, nuance, and complexity of Christian engagement with these fundamental private legal relationships.  Constructive and critical chapters later in each section highlight and illustrate the enduring value of these traditional Christian teachings for addressing discrete modern private law questions.  At the heart of many of these Christian reflections on torts, property, and contracts is the fundamental biblical question about how to love all of our neighbors – even our enemies and others who hurt us. Do we “turn the other check” to the tortfeasor?  Do we give aid and comfort to the stranger in imitation of the Good Samaritan?  Do we give our “second coat” to the thief who has stolen our first?  How do we responsibly acquire and use, have and hold, share and steward our property?  How do we balance freedom and fairness in contract?  It is just price or just market price that sets the bargain? Do we sue, arbitrate, or mediate our private conflicts, given the biblical injunction to “Go tell it to the church”?  And how do we judge and reason through the private law conflicts in a way that balances justice and mercy, rule and equity, principle and prudence?  These and many other questions have inspired centuries of deep thought by Christian jurists and judges who have variously drawn on biblical, theological, jurisprudential, historical, and natural law arguments to work out their legal systems. That rich world of Christian perspectives on private law is nicely illustrated in these authoritative but accessible chapters that will edify novices and experts alike.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
    1. John Witte, Jr. (Emory) – Foreword
    2. The Editors – Introduction
    3. James R. Gordley (Tulane) - Christian Origins of Private Law
    4. Brent A. Strawn (Duke) - Biblical Understandings of Private Law
  2. Property
    1. David W. Opderbeck (Seton Hall) - Christian Thought and Property Law
    2. William S. Brewbaker III (Alabama) - Augustinian Property
    3. Richard H. Helmholz (Chicago) - Religion and English Property Law: 1500-1700
    4. Adam J. MacLeod (Faulkner) – Property and Practical Reason
    5. Paula A. Franzese and Angela C. Carmella (Seton Hall) – Housing and hope: private property and Catholic social teaching
  3. Contracts
    1. Wim Decock (KU Leuven, Belgium) - Contract Law in Early Modern Scholasticism
    2. David S. Caudill (Villanova) - Private Law in Christian Perspective: The Example of Dooyeweerd on Contracts
    3. Scott Pryor (Campbell) - Destabilizing Contract: A Christian Argument For Revitalizing Unconscionability
    4. Val D. Ricks (South Texas) – Christianity, Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consideration
    5. Michael A. Helfand (Pepperdine) - Privatization and Pluralism in Dispute Resolution: Promoting Religious Values through Contract
  4. Torts
    1. Michael P. Moreland (Villanova) and Jeffrey A. Pojanowski (Notre Dame) – The Moral of Torts
    2. David F. Partlett (Emory) – Christianity and Tort Duties
    3. Nathan B. Oman (William & Mary) – Christianity’s Quarrel with Civil Recourse Theory
    4. Robert F. Cochran, Jr. (Pepperdine) - Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Catholic and Calvinist Theories