Tuesday, August 6, 2013
Yielding to Twitter
St. Ignatius, Pedro Arrupe, Hiroshima and Abortion
As my colleague and MOJ’s resident Jesuit, Father Bob Araujo, S.J., reminded us (here), last Wednesday the Church celebrated the feast of St. Ignatius Loyola, one of the outstanding leaders in the Catholic Reformation and the beloved founder of the Society of Jesus.
Pope Francis chose to celebrate the feast with his brother Jesuits at Rome’s Gesu Church. As Rocco Palmo notes in his story on the day’s events (here), following Mass the Holy Father went to pray at the tombs of St. Ignatius, St. Francis Xavier, and Pedro Arrupe, the Father General who led the Society following the Council and oversaw the changes that took place (both for the better and for the worse) as the Society redefined its mission as “the service of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an absolute requirement” (GC 32, Decree 4, ¶ 2, available here).
Prior to his service as Father General, Arrupe served as a Jesuit missionary in Japan. He was living outside of Hiroshima when the atomic bomb was dropped, August 6, 1945. Arrupe described the bombing as “a permanent experience, outside of history, engraved on my memory.” A trained doctor, Father Arrupe helped to care for the wounded and dying transforming the Jesuit novitiate into a make-shift hospital.
Today is the anniversary of that cataclysmic event. As such, it is an appropriate time to reflect upon the death and misery that it caused, and on the moral calculus that led to the fateful decision to use so indiscriminate a weapon.
It is also an appropriate time to reflect upon the death and misery wrought by the scandal of abortion. Of course abortion is not a single event, but one that occurs millions of times in a single year. And unlike the bomb, abortion is not indiscriminate. Each time it takes place its aim is the death of a particular child. In the United States alone, over 55 million abortions have taken place since 1973. What is the moral calculus behind this staggering death toll and the law that makes it possible?
Some may think there is no connection between abortion and the dropping of the atom bomb?
Pedro Arrupe had no trouble discerning a connection, a fact I recently discovered in the course of some of my research on the history of abortion.
As reported in the Chicago Tribune (August 3, 1970), Father Arrupe gave a radio interview in Rome to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. He said that the bombing “looks like a symbol of another kind of explosion, which is much more dangerous. Nobody raises his voice for the hundreds of thousands, even millions of innocent lives that are doomed . . . I refer to planned and legalized abortion.”
Since the tumultuous years that followed in the wake of the Council many Jesuits, as well as many other Catholics, have not seen the “promotion of justice” as including the cause of the unborn. This fact is reflected at the parish level in the separation of “peace and justice” ministries from “respect life” ministries. In some instances there is even an understated hostility between the two groups.
Let us pray for the followers of St. Ignatius including all those who see in Pedro Arrupe the model of a “a man for others.” Let us pray that all the followers of Jesus will be more faithful to the promotion of justice of which the Gospel of Life is “an absolute requirement.” Let us pray that, in promoting the justice that is indispensible to proclaiming and living the faith, the Society of Jesus (as well as its students and other collaborators) will take up the cause of the unborn with renewed vigor.
Monday, August 5, 2013
Robert Bellah, RIP
As noted here in a tribute by Kieran Healy, the eminent sociologist Robert Bellah died last week. Bellah's most recent book, Religion in Human Evolution, was the subject of an interesting First Things symposium, including some tough criticism from Paul Griffiths and the faint praise from Thomas Joseph White that Bellah's book is "arguably the greatest work of liberal Protestant theology ever." But as Healy notes, Bellah's enduring intellectual influence was in his articulation of the idea of "civil religion" in American public life and--more profoundly, I think--in Habits of the Heart, which still often seems fresh and insightful almost three decades on. Along with such modern classics as Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue and Charles Taylor's The Sources of the Self, Habits of the Heart began the reappropriation of what was (reductively then) styled "communitarianism" but, at its best, was a grand (and Catholic) alternative to the torpor of 1970s liberal political theory. Here is a lovely post by Margarita Mooney on a recent conversation with Bellah, including this bit of reflection from her:
How do we recover a vision of the common good? Bellah told me he had just started reading Catholic teachings on human rights and the common good, beginning with one of the foundational documents of Vatican II, Gaudium et spes. Bellah was “utterly blown away” by the Gaudium et spes’s unflinching defense of human dignity combined with a robust vision of social justice. It’s hard, Bellah said, to avoid an individualistic or utilitarian vision of human rights, but Guadium et spes articulates how human rights and the common good reinforce each other. What do I think of Benedict XVI’s social encyclical Caritas in veritate, Bellah asked me?
Since I had previously read numerous of Benedict XVI’s books on Christology, theology, and secularization, I was already familiar with various themes of his thought which appear in Caritas in veritate: that truth is objective rather than relative, and that virtue must be both in the heart and in action. As such, the church’s mission of charity can never be private; the church’s mission of charity is public—it is oriented to the greater good of all, regardless of religious creed. Hence, the state and church are inter-dependent in their work for the common good, something that is hard for people to understand if they think religion must only be a private matter.
Sunday, August 4, 2013
"Critiques of the New Natural Law Theory"
The most recent issue of the National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly (Spring 2013) is devoted to critiques of the new natural law theory (NNLT). The issue contains articles by Father Kevin Flannery SJ, Steven Long, and John Goyette and shorter essays by Fulvio Di Blasi, Matthew O'Brien, Michael Pakaluk, and Edward Feser. Many of the pieces focus on the NNLT's understanding of intention, an issue that has been featured in earlier discussions on Mirror of Justice of issues such as craniotomy and the treatment of ectopic pregnancies.
Richard M.
Thursday, August 1, 2013
Dane on the Deep Structure of Conflict Reflected in the Mandate
Professor Perry Dane has a thoughtful comment on the competing positions in the contraception mandate controversy. As someone who is partial to an analysis that emphasizes irreconcilable conflict in religious freedom disputes, I found Perry's short piece useful. But I wonder whether, in light of the fragment that I've quoted from his conclusion below, one could argue that "wholesale" conflicts about the Free Exercise Clause and religious exemption more broadly have become more common in part because the "wholesale" conflicts pertaining to the Establishment Clause have been steadily but inexorably increasing. Wholesale, not retail, conflict seems to be the order of the day in religion clause law:
I have written elsewhere that defining the relationship between religion and the civil state has both a “wholesale” and a “retail” component. The Establishment Clause defines general, wholesale, boundaries between church and state. Religion-based exemptions can then adjust those lines in specific, retail, cases to take into account the convictions of specific religious traditions. The “wholesale” work in defining the church-state dispensation goes beyond the Establishment Clause, though. It also has important political and cultural pieces, and, as here, can find its way into arguments over specific claims of religious liberty. Thus, both sides in the contraceptive mandate are venting wholesale grievances, suggesting that the other side has simply overreached beyond its proper competence or domain.
The truth, though, is that this controversy is not amenable to wholesale treatment. In this and many other areas, there are no sharp boundaries between the proper spheres of activity of church and state. Though we can and must draw certain lines, particularly where the work of the Establishment Clause is concerned, in many contexts the competencies of church and state simply overlap. And that leaves only the mundane, steady work of trying to accommodate each to the other as best, and as fairly, as we can.
Tuesday, July 30, 2013
The Feast of Saint Ignatius of Loyola Redux
Readers of the Mirror of Justice may recall that two years ago on the Feast of Saint Ignatius of Loyola I posted at this site a pivotal segment of the Formula of the Institute by which the Society of Jesus was recognized by the Holy See back in the mid-sixteenth century. The link to my previous posting is HERE. A principal reason for posting then was to help readers understand why there is a Society of Jesus. The myths abound, but it is good to know the reality.
Since July of 2011 when I last posted on the subject of the feast, some things relevant to this memorial which the Church celebrates on July 31 and to the role of the Society of Jesus in the world (including the realm of education) have changed—whether for the better or not, I shall leave for another day. But one major change is clear as we have our first Jesuit pope, who is and remains a son of Father Ignatius. In spite of what others may argue or suggest, he remains a Jesuit until he is dismissed from the Society. I do not see any reason to justify this.
Still, I am asked by the curious, the faithful, and the skeptical a similar question: “So, what do you think of the Jesuit pope?” I think the intention underlying this question is to extract my impression of what the pope will do. My fundamental answer is based on the reason why Father Ignatius established a religious institute which was approved by Pope Julius III in 1550 under the Formula of the Institute. Here are some of the critical details that go into the formulation of my answer.
1. A man enters the Society of his own free will—because he desires to serve and follow Christ as a Soldier of God beneath the banner of the Cross. Once a member, regardless of his grade within the order, a Jesuit must continue to serve God and the Church with fidelity. Because he is a soldier, he may well face hostility from those forces pitted against God and the Church, but still he must serve the Triune God and the Church.
2. In particular, the Jesuit’s service to God and the Church is under the direction of the Roman Pontiff or whoever the pope appoints as his delegate. Since the current pope is a Jesuit, it is clear that this pledge of service which follows Pope Francis is not to serve himself personally but to attend with diligence and fidelity the office he holds which necessitates aiding God and the Church in whatever way he can.
3. The pope’s Jesuit service (and this applies to all members of the Society) can manifest itself in a multitude of contexts; however, there is one central objective of the order, i.e., to strive (a strong transitive verb) for two things: (a) the defense and propagation of the Catholic faith, and (b) the progress of souls in Christian life and doctrine. The tenets of the Catholic faith which Jesuits are called to defend and propagate (not sacrifice and frustrate) are revealed by God’s truth and the long history of teachings that the Church has established upon God’s truth. The progression of a person’s Christian life is to be accord with God’s truth as contained in the doctrines the Church has recognized over two thousand years. In this fashion, souls make progress by avoiding sin and seeking Christian virtue.
4. While the particular ministries for achieving the objectives of the Society of Jesus are diverse (education is a principal one), it is clear that another element of what the pope must do is to preserve, protect, and offer vigorously the sacraments of the Church. One of the sacraments is confession (the sacrament of reconciliation). It is through this sacrament that a penitent expresses his or her responsibility for offending God and the neighbor by freely choosing to sin. Yet, sin can be forgiven if the penitent seeks God’s mercy and forgiveness through the Church’s ministers who are competent to offer this sacrament. Pope Francis surely is a member of this group of ministers of this sacrament as he has already demonstrated on numerous occasions.
5. The sacrament of reconciliation is crucial the Church, her members, and the Society of Jesus because, as the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus note, the end of the Society is directed toward the salvation of souls—not only of the subject Jesuit but also of our fellow human beings whom we serve in many ways. The sinner is and must be loved; however, this does not translate into loving the sin as well. To the contrary, the sin must be identified and explanation offered as to why it thwarts God’s plan for human salvation. The reason why salvation is necessary is because of the existence of Original Sin and the commission of our own sins. Sadly, with our free will, sin is not a relic of the past, and this is something that Pope Francis has not forgotten and will continue to teach us even as he continues to reach out to all of us who sin. The sinner is not identified by who he or she is; the sinner is identified by what he or she does; what he or she fails to do; or, what he or she thinks of doing.
So, when the media, Jesuits, Catholics, and anyone else offer opinions about what the pope will do or what he should do, the authentic answer to this and related issues must be viewed through the lens of why the Society of Jesus exists. It does not exist to agree with popular culture; it does not exist to confirm the opinions of any elite; it does not exist to rationalize the license of freedom untethered by the responsibility for the common good and obeying God and His laws which is a duty of all Christians. The Society of Jesus does exist for the salvation of souls and saving the human person from sin. That is what Pope Francis is about because that is what a Jesuit is about.
RJA sj
Walsh on the Third Circuit's Contraception Mandate Decision
Mirror of Justice friend and University of Richmond law professor Kevin Walsh has a thoughtful and informative post about the Third Circuit's recent decision in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. US Department of Health and Human Services, which I noted and discussed here. One thing that Kevin's post makes me think is that given the nature of the legislative purpose for enacting RFRA, it is probable that the meaning of "exercise" was intended to be close to the constitutional meaning (pre-Smith). It would have been useful to have more statutory analysis of this type from the Third Circuit. From Kevin's post:
Consider the facts of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), one of the two cases singled out in RFRA. The exercise of religion in that case was Adele Sherbert’s religion-based refusal to work on Saturday. See id. at 403 (describing the relevant conduct as “appellant’s conscientious objection to Saturday work”).
A corporation can engage in this kind of “exercise of religion” if a corporation can refuse, for religious reasons, to do something otherwise required by law. And it plainly can. Suppose a federal law requiring fast-food restaurants located near interstate highways to be open seven days a week. Chick-fil-A’s religion-based refusal to operate on Sundays in violation of this law would surely be an “exercise of religion” akin to Ms. Sherbert’s refusal to work on Saturdays.
The profit-making character of the corporation does not change the analysis of whether the corporation can make a religion-based decision. Chick-fil-A is a profit-making business. Yet it foregoes the profits it would otherwise make through Sunday operation because its religion-based corporate policy controls the manner in which it seeks to make a profit. Similarly, Ms. Sherbert was working for money (and later seeking unemployment benefits). Yet her religious obligation not to work on Saturday conditioned the manner in which she could go about earning money.
The panel majority opinion simply does not address this line of argument. One way in which its failure to address RFRA independently may have contributed to this failure to analyze what counts as a protected “exercise of religion” emerges from a word search for that phrase. It does not appear until page 28, after the majority has already concluded its Free Exercise analysis. In the course of its Free Exercise analysis, the Third Circuit panel majority does not ask whether a corporation can engage in the “exercise of religion” (RFRA’s words), but rather whether corporations can “engage in religious exercise” [11] or whether corporations can “exercise religion” [15]. The wording shift is subtle and almost certainly unintentional, but it nevertheless tends to lead analysis in the wrong direction. For the panel majority’s rephrasing suggests asking whether a corporation can engage in religious exercises like prayer, worship, participation in sacraments, and so on. But that is not what the governing law requires.
Response to Marc About Reciprocity and the Political "Middle"
Because of vacation travel, I've been delayed in responding to Marc's good questions about my suggestions that religious-liberty claims for traditionalist believers need to appeal to "reciprocity" (accompanied by recognition of others' claims) and need to seek to reach the political/ideological "middle." Marc asks "why--on what grounds--[Tom] holds (or seems to hold) to the comparatively sunny view of [the effectiveness of] sympathetic reciprocity in politics," compared with a view that "the acceptance of a 'live and let live' ethic [is] more dependent on considerations of public salience, political prestige and influence, effective rhetoric, cost, the vagaries of public opinion, cultural trends--in sum, is it far more dependent on considerations of cultural and political power?" He also asks on what basis I might say "that the middle's opinion of the strength and importance of the rights in conflict"--same-sex marriage and traditionalist beliefs--will lead them "to believe that trade-offs of rights are warranted, and that a policy of 'live and let live' is justified."
First, I think my advice about same-sex marriage and religious liberty rests as much on a realistic judgment as on a general "sunny" judgment (that opposing views easily and quickly reciprocate in politics). I'm looking to the cultural and political context of this issue, and saying (in part) something closer to "Reciprocity here is the worst strategy, except for all the others." I just don't see what's going to turn around the march toward increasing acceptance/endorsement of same-sex marriage. I'm not sure I need to rehash the strength of that shift (from 39 to 50 percent over 2008-2013, a move of "quite unique" speed, according to a Pew researcher quoted in this Wall Street Journal commentary piece), or the heightened support among young vs. older Americans that means the shift will likely continue (70 percent support among 18-29-year-olds compared with 41 percent among those 65+ and 46 percent among those 50-64, according to Gallup). And while I acknowledge (happily) that opinion has halted on, even turned away from, endorsement/approval of abortion, the evidence of which I'm aware suggests that this stems from factors, like ultrasound images, that have made the unborn visible and thus elicited sympathy for them. I see no parallel factor concerning same-sex marriage. The visible cases that move people all involve gay couples, and the children they are raising, who are harmed by an inability to marry. (The exceptions are impositions on potentially sympathetic religious objectors, but sympathy there leads to protecting objectors' religious liberty, not denying same-sex marriage.) In this context, I judge, the strategy of stopping the recognition of same-sex marriage is likely to make traditionalists, and their own claims to liberty, unsympathetic to an increasingly number of people--again, people in the middle whose views will be crucial. And when stopping recognition is the main issue, appeals to traditionalists' religious liberty are easily dismissed as mere ploys for that purpose (I've seen this reaction in states where I've worked for stronger religious liberty protections). These dynamics, it seems to me, make prioritizing opposition to same-sex marriage recognition a much less promising strategy for traditionalist terms, in practical terms, than is appealing to reciprocal recognition of rights.
With all that said, I do believe that reciprocity is, not infrequently, effective in strengthening liberties. One example is the easing of intolerance against American Catholics in the mid-20th century. Many things caused that, but among them (as I've described here, echoing many other scholars) was that the Church announced its commitment to religious liberty in principle, moving away from doctrines that treated religious liberty for non-Catholics--or could reasonably be seen to treat it--as merely a prudential matter, applicable only when Catholics weren't a majority. (To be clear, my piece argues that the anti-Catholicism was always unwarranted, an overreaction, given American Catholics' actual longstanding support for religious freedom; nevertheless, the official doctrines gave even reasonable people pause.) Today's situation seems analogous. A significant religious group (Catholics then, traditionalists today) is capable at some times and places of restricting or disfavoring others' important interests (religious liberty then, marriage today), but is itself subjected to restriction and intolerance (anti-Catholicism, coercion of objectors to gay marriage), in part because of its attempts (or perceived attempts) to disfavor/restrict others. In the mid-20th century, Catholicism's increasingly explicit affirmance of others' liberty (culminating in Dignitatis Humanae) contributed to reciprocal responses: the end of the "no Catholic president" rule, acceptance of Catholics in other parts of public life, etc.
(I concede that the story above is complicated--the price that society imposed for increased tolerance in the mid-20th century arguably included some weakening of Catholic identity, and things have taken other negative turns since then--but still, I think, the advance at mid-century was real and good for the Church in many respects. My argument also doesn't depend on equating the two situations in every way: I understand that many will argue the principled embrace of religious liberty was consistent with deepest Christian principles while acceptance of same-sex marriage is not. The point of analogy is simply that greater recognition of others' rights and interests can help increase reciprocal recognition of one's own.) own's one.)
More generally, many of our liberties rest in part on commitments of reciprocity. We accept the protection of rights of free speech and religious exercise, even for views with which we (deeply) disagree, in part because we expect return commitments that our own speech will be protected. Historically, disestablishment of religion happened partly as a matter of reciprocity: churches decided to give up seeking legal supremacy or favoritism based on the expectation that other churches could not get those goodies either. It's true that such decisions were partly pragmatic: with increasing pluralism, each church came to realize it might be in the minority. But reciprocity as an operative principle can be triggered by pragmatic considerations and still have moral meaning and force (principle and pragmatics often coexist and interact in complex ways). Marc, you include "effective rhetoric" among the "considerations of cultural and political power" that might determine things. Reciprocity can be both a fair principle and (because it is fair) "effective rhetoric"--and, for reasons I've already given, the best (least imperfect) strategy for traditionalists today.
Finally, Marc asks how we know what the political "middle" thinks, both about same-sex marriage and about religious liberty. I've already said why I think the increase in support for the former will continue. As to religious liberty, there are reasons to think it has appeal (not unlimited, but still meaningful) to many people in the middle even if they disagree with the particular religious view claiming the freedom. Let me give one example, if I can indulge myself with a quote from my article on why progressives should support freedom for religious organizations (an article that makes the bet to which Marc is asserting his friendly challenge):
Quite a few liberal Catholics, it appears, care about the religious-liberty issues. The Pew Center in 2012 found that 56 percent of Catholics agreed with the bishops’ concerns about religious liberty—on which the [HHS] mandate was the key issue—versus 41 percent of Americans overall. The 56 percent must include many Catholics who dissent from the bishops on contraception itself, since we know that large majorities so dissent, and since in the Pew poll 51 percent of Catholics “sa[id] Barack Obama best reflects their views on [other] social issues such as abortion and gay rights.”
[*] Catholics Share Bishops’ Concerns About Religious Liberty (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Catholics-Share-Bishops-Concerns-about-Religious-Liberty.aspx. A June 2012 poll showed that 57 percent of Americans, and a higher percentage of Catholics, favored exempting religious organizations. See New Poll: HHS Mandate Hurts Obama with Women, Catholics, Life News (June 19, 2012), http://www.lifenews.com/2012/06/19/new-poll-hhs-mandate-hurts-obama-with-women-catholics/.
I include liberal Catholics among the center-left many of whom who are reachable on religious-liberty issues (it also obviously includes non-Catholics and some non-believers). Appealing to reciprocity and aiming to reach moderate supporters of same-sex marriage are a bet, I'll admit. But I think they're the best bet for traditionalists' religious liberty under the circumstances today and in the foreseeable future.
I should be straightforward and acknowledge my own view on merits of these matters: I'm ultimately not convinced by the arguments against same-sex marriage, and I think the better prospects for reaffirming the value of marriage as an institution for social stability lie in including same-sex couples in the institution. But I think my strategic advice still holds up independent of my own views on the merits. Marriage traditionalists will have to be able to assert, credibly, arguments for reciprocity of rights, in a society that increasingly disagrees with them on the matter of same-sex marriage.
Monday, July 29, 2013
Pope Francis Indicates a Possible Shift in View Toward Homosexuality
The Wall Street Journal has reported that when asked about the Church's position on gay priests, he responded, "Who am I to judge a gay person of goodwill who seeks the Lord? [...] You can't marginalize these people." In the wake of the sexual abuse scandals, many gay priests and seminarians felt judgment and pressure to leave on the basis of orientation. To the extent that such judgment and pressure comes from bishops and those responsible for priestly formation, it would seem that Pope Francis is likely to find it problematic.
Gray on Machiavelli and the Weakness of Law
This is a bracing essay by the skeptical philosopher John Gray about legal scholar Philip Bobbitt's new book on Machiavelli. Way back in the stone age, I studied Machiavelli and Guicciardini (whose immense Storia d'Italia is a relatively unknown masterpiece) in graduate school and wrote my master's thesis about contemporary misinterpretations of Machiavelli's writing (I called this "Machiavellianism," and I argued that the aristocrat Guicciardini had a much more acute understanding of Machiavelli than did most contemporary commenters). But Gray's piece actually says something larger about the comparative weakness of law as against politics. And what he says has direct application to the way in which it is fashionable to discuss many legal issues--from religious freedom to international human rights. Here is a fragment of the essay:
One of the peculiarities of political thought at the present time is that it is fundamentally hostile to politics. Bismarck may have opined that laws are like sausages – it’s best not to inquire too closely into how they are made – but for many, the law has an austere authority that stands far above any grubby political compromise. In the view of most liberal thinkers today, basic liberties and equalities should be embedded in law, interpreted by judges and enforced as a matter of principle. A world in which little or nothing of importance is left to the contingencies of politics is the implicit ideal of the age.
The trouble is that politics can’t be swept to one side in this way. The law these liberals venerate isn’t a free-standing institution towering majestically above the chaos of human conflict. Instead – and this is where the Florentine diplomat and historian Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) comes in – modern law is an artefact of state power. Probably nothing is more important for the protection of freedom than the independence of the judiciary from the executive; but this independence (which can never be complete) is possible only when the state is strong and secure. Western governments blunder around the world gibbering about human rights; but there can be no rights without the rule of law and no rule of law in a fractured or failed state, which is the usual result of western sponsored regime change. In many cases geopolitical calculations may lie behind the decision to intervene; yet it is a fantasy about the nature of rights that is the public rationale, and there is every sign that our leaders take the fantasy for real . . . .
If Bobbitt misreads Machiavelli, it is because Machiavelli is as much of a heretic today as he ever was. Resistance to his thought comes now not from Christian divines but from liberal thinkers. According to the prevailing philosophy of liberal legalism, political conflict can be averted by a well-designed constitution and freedoms enshrined in a regime of rights. In reality, as Machiavelli well knew, constitutions and legal systems come and go. According to Bobbitt, “The lesson of Machiavelli’s advice to statesmen is: don’t kid yourself. What annoyed . . . Machiavelli was the willingness of his contemporaries to pretend that quite simple formulations were adequate to the task of governing in the common interest.” Plainly, the market state is a formula of precisely this kind.
The true lesson of Machiavelli is that the alternative to politics is not law but unending war. When they topple tyrants for the sake of faddish visions of rights, western governments enmesh themselves in intractable conflicts they do not understand and cannot hope to control. Yet if Machiavelli could return from the grave, he would hardly be annoyed or frustrated by such folly. Ever aware of the incurable human habit of mistaking fancy for reality, he would simply respond with a Florentine smile.
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