Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

Neglect of Foreign Policy is Never Benign: A Lesson From Iraq

On the Mirror of Justice, we will never reach common ground on whether the invasion of Iraq under President George W. Bush was a terrible mistake or a difficult necessity.  We will not agree about whether the exit of troops from Iraq according to a timetable set by President Barack Obama was a welcome end to combat (for Americans anyway) or a reckless step that risked reversal of any progress that had been achieved in that country.  And we certainly will not reach anything approaching a consensus about what the United States should do now, if anything, by way of military, diplomatic, and international measures, while more and more of Iraq falls under the dominion of brutal terrorists.

Iraq-CIA_WFB_MapLet us, however, pause for a moment in our debates about general Iraq policy in the past and specific policy responses to the current crisis.  Surely as Catholic thinkers, we can jointly reaffirm that benign neglect in foreign policy is not an option.  Indeed, neglect is never truly benign.

Yes, we will continue to disagree among ourselves on what form of engagement is most consistent with our values and most prudential in operation.  But we can and should endorse affirmative, meaningful, and continuous engagement by the United States in some way with the rest of the world, most definitively including troubled regions.  As a matter of national self-interest, dedicated attention to events beyond our borders is crucial.  But it is also demanded by our moral commitment to the greater good and to the dignity of every person across the globe.

Those of us privileged to participate on the Mirror of Justice are all over the map on questions of foreign policy.  We hold a wide range of views on whether and when the United States should intervene with military power in troubled regions around the world.  We do not share a common belief in the wisdom or efficacy of international institutions on matters of world and regional security.

But I believe I can say with confidence that none of us advocates a withdrawal into isolationism or would accept an “America First” attitude, in which we would avert our eyes to the suffering of those afflicted by unrest or oppression in faraway places.  “Live and Let Die” was a catchy title for a James Bond film (and the accompanying Paul McCartney song).  Catholic concepts of public responsibility and human dignity leave no room for such abdication.

Now Barack Obama is hardly the first President to appreciate that foreign affairs do not top the list of concerns for most Americans, who will always put bread-and-butter issues first (for good or ill).  And seldom do events overseas prove to be decisive in American elections.  While public dissatisfaction with President George W. Bush’s handling of the war in Iraq played a minor role in President Obama’s election victory in 2008, the financial crisis and economic collapse were the deciding factors.  As the 2012 campaign demonstrated, the Obama team understood that domestic matters usually will lead in political calculations.  Moreover, then-state-Senator Obama had consistently opposed the war in the Iraq and called for early withdrawal, an opposition that was a more significant element in his nomination victory over Hillary Clinton.

In sum, President Obama’s “eager[ness] to put Iraq in America’s rearview mirror,” as Peter Beinart puts it, was understandable.

Fatigue, however, is not a policy.  Believing that a particular policy of engagement was a mistake does not justify substituting a new policy of non-engagement.  While weariness about a nagging problem naturally leads to avoidance, disregard usually proves counterproductive or even dangerous.  More often than not, we'll find the ignored problem thrust back into our faces, at a most inopportune time and more bothersome than before.

As Peter Beinart explains in a pointed but well-balanced analysis in The Atlantic today (here), President Obama has largely ignored Iraq, not only in military terms but also in diplomatic and other ways.  Beyond withdrawal of troops, he has been delinquent in setting and energetically pursuing a positive Iraq policy.  Importantly, the issue is not whether the policy is right but whether there really was any policy at all.  Those responsible for foreign policy within the administration, and especially those in the diplomatic corps, have warned repeatedly that indifference and diplomatic apathy could bring deterioration in Iraq.  But to do something more concerted would have “meant investing time and energy in Iraq, a country [the Obama Administration] desperately wanted to pivot away from.”  And so we arrived where we are today.

The unraveling situation in Iraq proves once again that neglecting troubles is likely to produce the opposite of what we desire — a crisis that cannot be ignored.  And if the unfolding human tragedy were not enough to demand our attention, the rise in power and resources of an organized terrorist bloc is unlikely to be confined to the region of Syria and Iraq.  If we were to suffer another horrific terrorist attack on American soil, traced back to the terrorist forces rising in Iraq, a future President may have to consider sending American troops back into the deserts of Mesopatamia.  Let us pray that day does not come.

Again, like the American people generally, the Mirror of Justice community remains sharply divided on questions about the wisdom of military policies inIraq under the last two administrations.  But that disagreement should not overshadow an agreement on the need for vigilance and perseverance, whatever may be the policy formulation.  We surely have learned again the lesson that withdrawal and inattention leave us in a world of hurt.  At the very least, let us hope the lesson of neglect in foreign policy learned in Iraq does not come too late for the future of Afghanistan.

Congratulations!

Hearty congratulations to Mark Movsesian and our own Marc DeGirolami on their success in creating at St. John's University a center that would go on, in a very short time from its founding, to host a rich conference on law and religion at Rome, indeed in the Vatican. Wow!  It's amazing what a Catholic educational institution can do when its members are given the freedom institutionally to raise and address the serious questions that actually matter for the salvation of souls.  

Turning to the particulars of the event itself, I do wonder how to resolve the ambiguities in the following quoted words spoken by Pope Francis in introducing the conference:

He called religious freedom “a fundamental right of man.” It is “not simply freedom of thought or private worship,” but “the freedom to live according to ethical principles, both privately and publicly, consequent to the truth one has found.”

As I say, there are ambiguities in the quoted words.  Is it in fact morally required -- or even allowed -- of states that they permit or facilitate the "public[]" exercise of "the truth one has found"?  Of course not.  Because a soul, even an earnest seeker, might have "found" "truth" that is in fact a dangerous falsehood, even on Mill's account.  So, is the Pope asserting that the *public* "freedom" he mentions is in fact limited to *true* "ethical principles"?  Okay, then, but what gloss does the Pope intend, if any, on Dignitatis and the Catechism on "public order" and the "common good," respectively?     

Reflections on "International Religious Freedom and the Global Clash of Values"

Following up on my post below, I thought to add a few thoughts about some of the themes that emerged from the presentations on international religious freedom at our conference in Rome.

The keynote address was delivered by the Berkley Center’s Tom Farr, whose primary claim was that in order for international religious freedom to thrive as a human right, we need a deeper grounding--both principled and pragmatic--of the importance of the right of religious freedom as both an anthropological reality and as a practical necessity. I had the honor of moderating Tom’s talk and asked him whether in this particular climate what was needed was a thicker account of religious freedom or instead an (even) thinner account. He gave a thoughtful answer reflecting both the need for deep structures of justification and the difficulty of achieving consensus about them.

The first panel concerned the politics of international religious freedom and included the United States Ambassador to the Holy See, Ken Hackett, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, and Pasquale Annicchino of the European University Institute. It was in Dr. Bielefeldt’s talk that a useful tension began to emerge among some of the speakers--between those who were bullish or optimistic about the prospect that international law can effectively promote religious freedom and those who were a little more skeptical. Dr. Bielefeldt falls into the more optimistic camp--a good thing indeed, given his position. He emphasized the difference between the promotion of religious freedom in order to advance civic peace, on the one hand, and its promotion in order to vindicate a basic human right, on the other. Here I was reminded of the controversial “civic peace” justification in the American law of religious freedom and that Rick has written about so well.

The second panel dealt with comparative perspectives on international religious freedom. The perspectives compared included those of the member states of the Council of Europe and of Italy specifically. I was particularly interested in Marco Ventura’s lucid presentation about the difference between divergent and convergent approaches to religious freedom among and across European member states. Professor Ventura described the move toward convergence and argued for even greater convergence than has already been achieved. I had some questions about this coming from a country that has also struggled with the issue of convergence and divergence in the constitutional law of religious freedom. Again, the tension between globalism and regionalism was in evidence in a slightly different way.

The third panel concerned Islamic and Christian perspectives on international religious freedom, and included presentations by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Olivier Roy, and Nina Shea. Here the primary point of tension involved the causes or roots of religious persecution of these two major religious groups. And here, too, there was skepticism, principally from Professor An-Na’im, about the efficacy of human rights regimes to protect religious freedom. “There was a world before international human rights, and there will be a world after international human rights,” he said.

In all, a very rewarding set of presentations.

Pope Francis Opens Our Conference With Remarks on Religious Freedom

My colleague, Mark Movsesian, has the report. I will have a bit more on the substance of the conference shortly (and then on to Tom!).

Suffice it to say that it was a great honor to meet Pope Francis and to hear his thoughts about the condition of religious liberty around the world. When the Pope's talk is translated, I will make it available here. And here is an English-language video report on our audience and the Pope's statement about religious freedom and our conference.

Monday, June 23, 2014

Tragedy, Irony, and Religious Freedom

For several years Marc and I have had occasional discussions about whether the conflicts in religious liberty—and perhaps in many other areas of constitutional law or public policy—are best perceived through the lens of a “tragic vision.” Marc’s excellent book argues that judges should have a sense of tragedy in that they recognize that state-religion disputes involve incommensurable values all of some worth, meaning that decisions in many cases unavoidably require the sacrifice of some goods. Continuing the analogy to dramatic genres, he contrasts the tragic sense with the comic sense, in which there is one metric of good by which outcomes and resolutions can be judged (and in a comedy things come out harmoniously in the end). Marc reacts, rightly I think, against the tendency of many church-state analysis to make tough questions seem simple, which inevitably involves giving short shrift to valid interests and claims on the other side.

Let me suggest, as I have to Marc over the years, that the sense of irony is as important as, or maybe more important than, the sense of tragedy. I don’t mean “irony” in the current sense of smirk, snark, detachment, or hipness. I loved David Letterman from the beginning, but this is more serious business. I mean it in the sense developed by Reinhold Niebuhr in The Irony of American History (1952), in which he argued that America, although in the moral right overall in fighting against Communism, would fall (indeed, had already fallen) into some of the same vices at its foes, because it did not practice humility and self-examination. Niebuhr described the biblical vision in which human “pretensions [to goodness] are the source of the ironic contrasts of strength leading to weakness, of wisdom issuing in foolishness,” and “virtue turning into vice”:

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Reese and Winters on the upcoming ENDA-type executive order

The White House is, according to reports, working on an executive order that would ban sexual-orientation discrimination by federal contractors.  Fr. Tom Reese and Michael Sean Winters have detailed posts at NCR discussing the matter.  

Jonathan Cohn on Work/Family Policies

Jonathan Cohn (almost the only serious/nuanced regular analyst at the New Republic these days) has a piece on the state of parental-leave laws, child-care support, and other work-family initiatives. Apparently the White House is hosting a meeting of academics, policy sorts, and business leaders on these issues next Monday.

Policies that allow parents to spend more time with young children and get better day care have clear, quantifiable costs. They also have clear, quantifiable benefits—not just in the form of better child and maternal health, but also in the form of better retention and possibly higher productivity.  As a matter of fact, there’s reason to think that America’s retrograde treatment of working families doesn’t help the economy at all. It might actually be hurting it....

The case for more generous parental leave laws begins with the cost—and the fact it's one that most of the rest of world happily bears. Among developed nations, the U.S. is now the only one that doesn’t guarantee some kind of paid employee leave available for new parents. In these countries, firms don’t typically bear the costs directly. Instead, governments set up funds that work the way unemployment and disability insurance do—workers and employers pay into the funds, through some kind of payroll contribution, and then take money out of it when they become parents.

Whatever is the right amount of government encouragement on this question, isn't it substantially more than our country is doing? Would love to hear Lisa Schiltz's latest thoughts (following on these), and the thoughts of others.

So You Want Comments Back at MOJ?

Read this.  [1], [2], [3

    [1] Don't read the full set of comments that it links to and summarizes. Don't.

    [2] I'm pretty sure the original post with comment thread is real (impossible to imagine someone constructing it); but just in case, I am hereby covering myself.

    [3] Way to go, everyone, warm up for Hobby Lobby!

Sunday, June 22, 2014

St. John Fisher, pray for us

Here's the scene, from "The Tudors", of the execution of St. John Fisher.  And, a prayer he wrote:

A prayer by St John Fisher

Good Lord, set in thy Church
strong and mightly pillars
that may suffer and endure great labours,
which also shall not fear persecution,
neither death,
but always suffer with a good will,
slanders, shame and all kinds of torments,
for the glory and praise of thy holy Name.

By this manner, good Lord,
the truth of thy Gospel
shall be preached throughout the world.

Therefor, merciful Lord,
exercise thy mercy,
show it indeed upon thy Church.

Amen.

Friday, June 20, 2014

The Distinctions of: Good Interpretation, Bad Interpretation, and Not Reading the Text

 

Upon reading Kevin Walsh’s posting yesterday on Constitutional and scriptural interpretation and mystic writing, I revisited work that I have done with the interpretation of legal, scriptural, and ecclesiastical texts over the past four decades. My interest in careful legal interpretation began during my time as a young lawyer working for a Federal regulatory agency. The horizon of interpretation expanded when I changed gears and entered the Jesuit order. My theology studies necessitated careful parsing of scripture and ecclesiastical documents. My graduate legal studies and subsequent teaching enabled me to return my love of legal interpretation. When the opportunity arose to pursue graduate legal studies, I chose to write my dissertation on developing a coherent method of using and evaluating legislative history in statutory interpretation. I realized that most textual interpretation, regardless of the genre of writing, has certain common denominators. One of them is that words are important because they convey important meanings; therefore, relating the words of a text or communication to one another is critical to the interpretative enterprise. Another one is to be familiar with the entire corpus of texts that has a bearing on the issue under examination—for all the ideas conveyed in all the relevant documents’ words again mean something that is essential to good interpretation. If the reader/interpreter is only familiar with a portion rather than the entirety of applicable texts, the interpretation can very well be incomplete. If, on the other hand, one fails to read any of the relevant texts but assumes the nature and, therefore, the meaning of their content, the interpretation of the texts and their application to human existence will be flawed.

In addition to Kevin’s posting, some of my other reading yesterday included the June 13, 2014 issue of Commonweal magazine. Of the many interesting articles published in this edition, the one written by Mollie Wilson O’Reilly entitled “The U.S. Sisters & the Holy See: A Culture of Encounter in Action?” (HERE) has a bearing on my present posting’s theme.

Ms. O’Reilly rhetorically asks why the Holy Father hasn’t intervened in the CDF’s doctrinal assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious—or, as she presents the issue, “Why hasn’t Pope Francis stepped in to get the Vatican of the nuns’ backs?” Of course, no one is on the “nuns’ backs” literally or figuratively. It is easy to reach certain conclusions that every member of the Church is the same in the eyes of God. After all, each is a sinner but loved by God nonetheless. All that the sinner needs to do in his or her life is to reciprocate that love by acknowledging one’s own sins and sinful tendencies and asking for God’s mercy and forgiveness. But does this mean that everyone is equal in all other respects that concern the nature of the Church? Are we not different in some fundamental ways whether we are bishops, clerics, religious, or lay? Today, largely based on a false understanding of equality, many think that the Council established and promulgated norms which empower the faithful to minimize or ignore the teachings of the Church as reflected in the hierarchical offices of the Church. Is this in fact what the Council concluded? After all, the Council emphasized the notions and subsequent doctrines of dialogue and conversation of peers, did it not? Or did the Council conclude that the relationships amongst the People of God are different? Would the Council’s documents help answer these and related questions raised by Ms. O’Reilly? Would these texts also address concerns about the propriety of the doctrinal assessment? My point for today focuses on Ms. O’Reilly’s twice-made assertion that the LCWR’s actions which are the subject of the doctrinal assessment are consistent with the Second Vatican Council—or, as she says, “the vision” of the Council. Ms. O’Reilly’s article argues that the LCWR is in keeping with “the vision of Vatican II.” But is this a proper and correct claim? How and where do we find “the vision” of the Council? From my point of view, this issue is akin to that of the legal interpreter who is in search of the intent and purpose of the legislator.

In responding to the issues I have just raised, I should be obliged to answer them. In doing so, I am further obliged to conduct a careful reading of the applicable texts of the Second Vatican Council so that solid answers about the conclusions—“the vision”—of the Council may be ascertained as it pertains to the doctrinal assessment.

Among its many tasks and accomplishments, the Council acknowledged the importance and renewal of religious life for men and women who are members of the many and diverse religious communities that observe the evangelical councils of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Through its own citation of elements of the conciliar texts, the CDF, in its 2012 Doctrinal Assessment published on the LCWR, acknowledges and relies upon the work of the Council regarding religious and consecrated life in the Church.

What the Council concluded about religious life and any other matter falling within its work cannot be assumed—for any assumption about the Council’s conclusions can be filled with peril if the conciliar texts are not carefully examined. By reading the crucial texts judiciously, any reader can understand what the Council said and why the Pope, bishops, the CDF, and many of the faithful had and continue to have concerns about the LCWR. Whether there were and remain grounds for the assessment of the LCWR and who has the legitimate authority to conduct the assessment can be verified by ecclesial texts that are the record of our faith. When “the vision of Vatican II” as it applies to the deposit of faith is at stake, the relevant conciliar documents should contain and express “the vision.” This is the only way in which anyone can come to distinguish between the authentic vision of the Council and a mirage of the Council.

So, what do the texts of the Council say about the matters at the heart of the LCWR doctrinal assessment and of the related concerns of the pope and bishops, the faithful, and the LCWR about the assessment? To understand “the vision” of the Council as applicable to the LCWR/CDF issues and CDF doctrinal assessment, one should be familiar with the relevant documents on authority in the Church and on religious life which include: the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium (LG) and the documents on bishops (Christus Dominus) (CD) and religious life (Perfectae Caritatis) (PC).

Chapter III of LG discusses the hierarchical structure of the Church with a special emphasis on the bishops. There has been much discussion, debate, and criticism about the Church’s hierarchical nature, the Petrine Office, the collegiality of the bishops, and the primacy of Peter (the pope). The Council reiterates that all the Church’s bishops are the successors of the Apostles and, therefore, are the shepherds of the Church. But they are not shepherds alone for their vital unifying force is the Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, the permanent and visible source and foundation of the unity of faith and communion. The pope is fortified in his office and primacy by the teachings of the Church as formulated by LG, N. 22.

In the twenty-first century, we witness on several fronts—those of clerics, the members of religious congregations, and the laity—sources of error which become the specific responsibility of bishops to address with charity, wisdom, and authority. A source of recent error, contested by the LCWR, is some of the activities of the LCWR and particular members of the organization. In this regard, a critical passage of Lumen Gentium needs to be recalled:

In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent. This religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a special way to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking ex cathedra; that is, it must be shown in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence, the judgments made by him are sincerely adhered to, according to his manifest mind and will. His mind and will in the matter may be known either from the character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking. LG, N. 25.

The clarifications offered by LG about matters intersecting the LCWR doctrinal assessment are complemented by the Decree Concerning the Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church (Christus Dominus, or CD). The first chapter of this decree speaks directly to the issues about which this posting is concerned. The Council recalls how Jesus sent the apostles into the world to glorify God and to build up the Body of Christ, the Church. As St. Peter’s successor, the pope is charged with the overarching duty of protecting the faithful who are Christ’s people. With this commission comes “supreme, full, immediate, and universal authority over the care of souls by divine institution.” CD, N. 2. As the first bishop, the pope is solemnly charged with the care of and the common good of the universal Church and of all the churches within it. In essence, the primacy of Peter is the primacy of the pope. This primacy belongs to no one else.

A principal duty of each bishop is to be a teacher of the Gospel to all within his territorial jurisdiction—“let them teach with what seriousness the Church believes these realities should be regarded.” CD, N. 12. The responsibilities of the episcopal teaching office cannot be taken lightly nor should it be ignored.

Good teaching is an acquired skill necessitating patience, diligence, and perseverance. Every bishop is primarily responsible for ensuring that the faithful and all others understand the doctrine of the Church—especially on those matters dealing with “the human person with his freedom and bodily life, the family and its unity and stability, the procreation and education of children, civil society with its laws and professions, labor and leisure, the arts and technical inventions, poverty and affluence.” CD, N. 12.

But the Pope and the bishops are not the only ones who labor for Christendom and the Church; after all, they require helpers in the furtherance of the work entrusted to them by Christ. The group of workers relevant to my discussion in this posting is the LCWR. Two texts of the Council quickly apply to this group of the faithful. The first is, once again, LG which addresses the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience that have long been the cornerstone of religious life in the Church. The counsels are instruments which make the men and women religious effective collaborators of those to whom hierarchical office has been entrusted. LG, NN. 44-45. The evangelical counsels also provide the structure for vigorous apostolic or contemplative life that serves the welfare of the entire Body of Christ, the Church. Through the fraternal association that is inherent in the counsels, the “militia of Christ” is reinforced. LG, N. 43.

The Council fathers expressed with clarity that religious life is not some middle ground or hybrid entity between lay and clerical life; rather, it draws from both of these groups to serve as witness of the gift of the evangelical counsels in the prayer and work of the Church and by a special bond to God through the exercise of the gifts of apostolic or contemplative life as overseen by the competent authorities of the Church. LG, N.43. Hence, it is the duty of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to regulate the practice of the evangelical counsels for they have a momentous bearing on the Church and her welfare. LG, N. 45. In short, the life of the evangelical counsels consecrates the person fully in service to and for the welfare of the Church and God’s people in diverse but rich ways. LG, N. 44. Moreover, the counsels are a means to ensure that men and women religious maintain their dedication to their vocations and to those individuals who are competent ecclesiastical authorities. LG, N. 45.

Today there is evidence, some of it cited by the CDF doctrinal assessment, that some members of the LCWR, by word or by deed, distance themselves and their activities from these competent ecclesiastical authorities. The potential for this happening was recognized by the Council fathers who emphasized that it is the proper duty of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to regulate the practice of the evangelical counsels and those who profess vows or in some other fashion follow the evangelical counsels. LG, N. 45. Thus, members of the religious institutes are obliged to “show reverence and obedience to bishops” because of their pastoral authority in the local churches where the religious institutes work and pray for the “need for unity and harmony in the apostolate.” LG, N. 45. To claim that “conscience” entitles anyone to depart from the Church’s authentic teachings that are essential to following Christ is a perilous course that hinders the work to which men and women religious are called to perform in fulfillment of their individual and corporate ministry.

The Decree on Religious Life, PC, acknowledges how the Church profits from the diversity of experiences, charisms, and talents which each of the religious institutes presents to the People of God. PC, N. 1. But if these gifts are to flourish, it is essential that men and women religious remain uniformly faithful to the original spirit of their institutes as appropriately adapted to the “changed conditions” of the modern world. PC, N. 2. Otherwise the justification for their existence becomes ambiguous or, worse yet, irrelevant.

Although the Council urged renewal of religious institutes that would include the abandonment of outdated laws and customs, PC, N. 3, it was simultaneously noted that the approval of the Holy See to the renewal process is essential due to the nature of its office. PC, N. 4. This principle is consistent with both the hierarchical structure of the Church and the Church’s need for universality. Renewal does not mean reinventing or compromising the faith and the moral life that must accompany the faith. By living, working, and praying in fidelity to the Church and the charism of their respective institutes, men and women religious are able to serve the Church with their entire selfless being by a vigorous practice of particular virtues that include obedience, humility, fortitude, and chastity. PC, N. 5. Daily prayer and the Eucharist are therefore essential to the vitality of religious life as they cultivate a stronger bond with the universal Church’s mission. PC, N. 6. As with priestly formation, religious formation must be accomplished by selecting directors, spiritual fathers, and instructors who “are carefully chosen and thoroughly trained.” PC, N. 18.

While this is a bird’s eye view of the relevant conciliar texts that have a bearing on “the vision” of the Council as it applies to the LCWR doctrinal assessment, my presentation, first and last, takes account of what the Council actually said about the pope, the bishops, and religious institutes and their organs regarding the issues presented and charges made in Ms. O’Reilly’s article. The relationship of the persons who hold the offices and statuses discussed here are a part of “the vision” of the Second Vatican Council. Indeed, if “American women religious draw their remarkable strength in part from a half-century’s experience living out the vision of Vatican II” as the O’Reilly article contends, the authenticity and durability of this strength must be established on what the Council actually said and not what it did not.

 

RJA sj