Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, March 20, 2015

Saturday is World Down Syndrome Day!

Tomorrow (3/21) is World Down Syndrome Day. 
 
Celebrate by watching this great video put out by the Jerome LeJeune Foundation (named after the geneticist who discovered that Down Syndrome was caused by trisomy 21 (3 copies of the 21st chromosome), currently on the road to canonization.
 
Or this inspirational story about the basketball team of at Lincoln Middle School in Wisconsin defending one of their cheerleaders with Down Syndrome.
 
Or do yourself a real favor spend some time celebrating with a person with Down Syndrome!
 

Thursday, March 19, 2015

Baude's "flouting the rule of law" critics should explain precisely which rule of law his proposal flouts

In the dust-up over Will Baude's op-ed proposal for plaintiff-specific compliance in King v. Burwell, one peculiar feature stands out. Some of Baude's legal critics contend that the Obama Administration's adoption of his proposal would flout the rule of law even while they do not identify any particular rule of law that the Administration would be violating. As far as I have been able to discern to this point, there is none.     

The opening paragraph of Noah Feldman's Bloomberg View commentary contends that "[o]beying the court only with respect to the plaintiffs in this case would be a flagrant violation of the rule of law." But one reads that essay in vain for an identification of which specific rule of law would be violated, flagrantly or not. Feldman's opening sentence asks: "Could the Barack Obama administration really ignore an adverse Supreme Court judgment in the King v. Burwell health-care litigation, as a University of Chicago law professor has proposed?" The problem with this sentence--as we know Feldman knows from elsewhere in his commentary--is that Baude makes no such proposal. Baude's proposal is not to ignore the Supreme Court's judgment, but to obey the Court only with respect to the plaintiffs in the case. 

Relatedly, Josh Blackman's commentary at National Review Online describes Baude's proposal as a "procedural putsch" (though it is probably more precisely pegged only as "precedential parsimony").  Blackman accuses the Obama Administration of making "unprecedented assertions of power" that "have flouted the rule of law," but he ultimately differentiates the question of legal correctness from the rule of law. "Even if legally correct," he writes of plaintiff-specific compliance,"this practice should be emphatically rejected." 

I understand the political and practical difficulties posed by plaintiff-specific compliance in King v. Burwell. And I understand why some others of Baude's critics disagree with his proposal even while acknowledging that he is right about its legal permissibility. But the "rule of law" criticisms are of a different sort, and they remain puzzling insofar as they are untethered from what one might call "the law of law." 

In the United States, there are three ways that a court's judgment can have binding legal effect: the law of preclusion, the law of precedent, and the law of remedies.

Of these three types of "law of law," both the law of preclusion and the law of precedent operate primarily in other, later cases. If the government were to lose in King v. Burwell, a non-party to that case could almost certainly use non-mutual offensive issue preclusion to win another challenge to the subsidies in a later case. [UPDATE: D'oh! Shouldn't have needed to be reminded, as I was shortly after posting, about United States v. Mendoza. Non-mutual offensive issue preclusion is unavailable against the federal government.] But it would not even be necessary to rely on preclusion, for every court would be bound as a matter of precedent to hold the subsidies illegal. To the extent that the doctrines of preclusion and precedent operate only in other, later cases, however, their reach extends only to whichever other, later cases there happen to be. Given the nature of the relief sought in King v. Burwell, there may not be very many such cases.

By contrast with the law of preclusion and the law of precedent, the law of remedies at least has the potential to provide for broader binding effect in King v. Burwell itself. If legally authorized, a nationwide injunction against the responsible government officials would authoritatively forbid any further implementation of the challenged subsidies. But the legal propriety of a nationwide injunction is far from clear.

Josh Blackman addressed some of the issues relevant to nationwide injunctive relief in two earlier posts criticizing Baude's proposal, ultimately suggesting that "unusual factors" in this case would allow for a nationwide injunction. But the reason that he had to rely on "unusual factors" is that the usual approach toward injunctive relief would require that the injunction should only be as broad as necessary to give the plaintiffs relief from their injury, and the King plaintiffs do not advance nationwide injury requiring nationwide relief. (It might also be worth noting that Blackman discusses D.C. Circuit precedent about nationwide injunctions, but not the seemingly more confining Fourth Circuit precedent that would govern in King if the Supreme Court itself does not specify the scope of injunctive relief. See, e.g., Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 434-36 (4th Cir. 2003) (reversing nationwide injunction that was "broader in scope than that necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff" and that "did not carefully address only the circumstances of the case").)

Another way of coming at the scope-of-injunctive-relief issue is to imagine that the King plaintiffs had sought to represent a class of all subsidy-eligible plaintiffs and asked a court to certify that class under Rule 23(b)(2). Would it have been proper to certify the King plaintiffs as representatives of such a class? Not a chance. Why, then, should they be able to secure an injunction that would accomplish the same result?

The reason this all seems confounding is that it would usually be foolish to engage only in plaintiff-specific compliance with a Supreme Court ruling. But that is largely because of all the court losses that would follow in later cases. Those losses would be attributable, however, to the law of precedent and the law of preclusion, not to a nationwide remedy. And it would be a mistake to treat the potential absence of enough later cases in which precedent or preclusion would compel practical nationwide compliance as an argument for authorizing nationwide injunctive relief.

Perhaps I am missing something. But until Baude's "flouting the rule of law" critics explain which particular rule of law would be violated by adoption of his proposal, I don't know how to find my way to agree with them on this point. 

To say that plaintiff-specific compliance is legally permissible is far from suggesting it would be advisable for the Obama Administration to follow that course. There is much that is legally permissible that is inadvisable for any number of reasons. And I would not advise being so grudging in King v. Burwell.

It is nonetheless important to acknowledge the legal permissibility of plaintiff-specific compliance. Not only is casual acceptance of judicial supremacy undesirable but clear appreciation for the legal limits of judicial authority can also usefully inform the Supreme Court's crafting of interim relief such as a temporary stay like the one issued after Northern Pipeline. If the Court declines to grant such relief to ease the transition, but the Obama Administration deems some transitional relief necessary, the Administration can lawfully rely on the legal limits on judicial relief when deciding how to proceed.

Archbishop Chaput on Human Dignity and Dignitatis Humanae

Over at First Things, you can read Archbishop Chaput's March 17 lecture, "Of Human Dignity:  The Declaration of Religious Liberty at 50."  In his address, "outline[s] what the Church teaches about religious freedom"; "list[s] some of the key religious liberty challenges heading our way"; and "talk[s] about why the Council was right."  Like the man says, "highly recommended."

Here's a bit:

In the mind of the Council, religious liberty means much more than the freedom to believe whatever you like at home, and pray however you like in your church. It means the right to preach, teach and worship in public and in private. It means a parent’s right to protect his or her children from harmful teaching. It means the right to engage the public square with moral debate and works of social ministry. It means the freedom to do all of this without negative interference from the government, direct or indirect, except within the limits of “just public order.”

And, in his discussion of threats and challenges, there's this:

The biggest problem we face as a culture isn’t gay marriage or global warming. It’s not abortion funding or the federal debt. These are vital issues, clearly. But the deeper problem, the one that’s crippling us, is that we use words like justice, rights, freedom and dignity without any commonly shared meaning to their content.

We speak the same language, but the words don’t mean the same thing. Our public discourse never gets down to what’s true and what isn’t, because it can’t. Our most important debates boil out to who can deploy the best words in the best way to get power.

And he concludes, quoting St. John Paul II's "be not afraid!", with this:

There’s too much beauty in the world to lose hope; too many people searching for something more than themselves; too many people who comfort the suffering; too many people who serve the poor; too many people who seek and teach the truth; too much history that witnesses, again and again, to the mercy of God, incarnate in the course of human affairs. In the end, there’s too much evidence that God loves us, with a passion that is totally unreasonable and completely redemptive, to everstop trusting in God’s purpose for the world, and for our lives.

I must admit -- or confess -- to an increasing inability to really embrace and express the hope that Archbishop Chaput holds up.  As my friend and colleague, Bob Rodes (RIP), put it:

Gods plan made a hopeful beginning 
man spoiled its chances by sinning
we hope that this story
will end in Gods glory
but at present the other sides winning.

 

Wednesday, March 18, 2015

Notre Dame's excellent Laetare Medal selection

I am delighted by the news that the University of Notre Dame will award this year's Laetare Medal to Aaron Neville.  (I admit, I have nominated Neville several times, including this year.)  Although I'm not a huge fan of some of his biggest pop hits, the Neville Brothers are, in my view, one of the country's all around best bands.  Take a few minutes to read this nice piece about Neville's faith.   Then go listen to his Ave Maria.  And then -- why not? -- kick out the jams with "Fiyo on the Bayou" (here).

Sunday, March 15, 2015

Two Virginia governors with different estimations of various things Catholic

As a Catholic Virginian, it was somewhat jarring to read in the same sitting Thomas Jefferson's correspondence from approximately two hundred years ago and a statement of Terry McAuliffe's spokesman reported in Friday's Richmond Times-Dispatch. From Jefferson there was condemnation of various dogmas of the Catholic faith, while from McAuliffe's spokesman there was confusion about Catholic teaching.

Governor McAuliffe's spokesman publicly professed him to embrace what Jefferson privately condemns-- Catholic faith. But it remains unclear what the governor's professed faith has to do with his actions in office. The spokesman portrays Catholic teaching on the protection of unborn human life and the definition of marriage to require a man and a woman as improper for implementation in public law: "The governor is a lifelong Catholic who takes his faith very seriously. . . . He also believes in keeping government out of decisions that should be left to women and their doctors, or to consenting adults who love each other.” 

As for Jefferson, it is difficult to know which of his many expressions on matters of false faith would be the best to quote for a flavor of his thinking. But an aside in his Halloween 1819 letter to William Short includes a helpful list of examples of the "imputation of imposture, resulting from artificial systems, invented by ultra-Christian sects, unauthorized by a single word ever uttered by [Jesus]," from which Jefferson believed it desirable to rescue the enlightened teachings of Jesus (whom Jefferson described in the same letter as the "greatest of all reformers of the depraved religion of his own country").

Jefferson's list of imputations of imposture contains "[t]he immaculate conception of Jesus, his deification, the creation of the world by him, his miraculous powers, his resurrection and visible ascension, his corporeal presence in the Eucharist, the Trinity; original sin, atonement, regeneration, election, orders of Hierarchy, &c."

Given this list, Jefferson would presumably be disappointed to find the spokesman of the present governor of Virginia professing Governor McAuliffe a "lifelong Catholic who takes his faith very seriously." But this disappointment would probably be offset by attention to Governor McAuliffe's public actions with respect to the law over his spokesman's public words with respect to the governor's faith. 

Thursday, March 12, 2015

Amicus Brief in Marriage Cases: Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty

Doug Laycock and I have filed an amicus brief in the same-sex-marriage cases on behalf of ourselves, David Blankenhorn of the Institute for American Values, and Professors Marie Failinger and Edward Gaffney. It argues that the Court can and should protect both the right to civil marriage for same-sex couples and strong rights to religious liberty for religious objectors. From the summary of argument:

       The proper response to the mostly avoidable conflict between gay rights and religious liberty is to protect the liberty of both sides. Both sexual minorities and religious minorities make essentially parallel claims on the larger society. Both sexual orientation and religious faith, and the conduct that follows from each, are fundamental to human identity. Both same-sex couples, and religious organizations and believers committed to traditional understandings of marriage, face hostile regulation that condemns their most cherished commitments as evil.
       The American solution to this conflict is to protect the liberty of both sides. Same-sex couples must be permitted to marry, and religious dissenters must be permitted to refuse to recognize those marriages.

Tom B.

If There Is Room for Zaytuna College, Is There Room for Gordon College and Authentic Catholic Universities?

 

Zaytuna College

Word comes that Zaytuna College, an Islamic institution located in Berkley, California, has received initial accreditation from the Western Association of Schools and Colleges, the same body from which UC Berkley and Stanford University receive their accreditation.  Some on the political right (Breitbart) are not happy about this development, in part because of the anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli statements of some individuals involved in founding Zaytuna.  In addition, they report that Hazam Yusuf, the College's president, signed a much publicized letter condemning ISIS but supporting the establishment of a caliphate and the imposition of the death penalty under sharia law for Muslims who openly renounce Islam.

Plainly, the views of at least some Zaytuna administrators represent something out of the mainstream relative to the views of most college administrators.  Although it is unlikely that such views will be greeted by shouts of "Je Suis Charlie!" (and putting to one side the merits of such views), there can be no doubt that they constitute a contribution to the plurality of views that the First Amendment was designed to foster and protect.  (Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" includes the souk).

Of greater importance is the pluralism in higher education that Zaytuna College itself represents.  Zaytuna expressly identifies itself as a "Muslim liberal arts college" and forthrightly states that its "aim and ambition is to fully participate in a renewal of the teachings embedded in the Islamic religious tradition so that students may grasp their relevance to the present world" (see here).  Zaytuna's mission is "to educate and prepare morally committed, professional, intellectual, and spiritual leaders who are grounded in the Islamic scholarly tradition and conversant with the cultural currents and critical ideas shaping modern society" (Id.).

One might ask what sort of "moral commitment" Zaytuna is seeking in its students?  Here, the College makes clear that "[s]tudents, faculty, staff and visitors are strictly forbidden" from using or promoting the use of tobacco, alcohol and "illegal or controlled drugs or intoxicants" (here p. 49).  Violation of this policy may be grounds for expulsion.  Men and women must dress modestly and in a way "consistent with the dignity adherent to representing a Muslim institution of higher education" (Id. at 48).  "Clothing is inappropriate when it is sleeveless, revealing, or form fitting" and women's skirts and trousers "must be full length" (Id.).  Moreover, "Muslim students should not visit bars, discos, casinos, or other places where actions prohibited in Islam (e.g. drinking alcohol) are the primary activity" (Id. at 49).

With respect to housing, all student housing is single-sex and "students of opposite gender are not permitted to visit each other in student housing" (Id. at 66).  Violation of this policy may be grounds for expulsion.  Beyond this, in order to foster "spiritual growth" and "moral formation" consistent with "Islamic norms," when outside of class "students should study and socialize with members of their own gender" (Id. at 49).

Most significantly, Zaytuna's student catalogue provides that "[d]ating, sexual activity, or romantic relationships among unmarried Muslim students are not allowed either on campus or off campus" (Id.).  Violations of this policy "are deemed serious and will result in disciplinary action, which may include expulsion" (Id.).  The catalogue expressly provides that "[s]tudents of other faiths are also expected to abide by the Honor Code, although they are not required to attend extracurricular religious services and prayers and are free to practice their own faith or philosophy" (Id. at 37).  The Honor Code does not specifically prohibit "dating" or "sexual activity" but these prohibitions, which  do expressly apply to Muslim students, could be applied to non-Muslims under the Honor Code's general principles of "Propriety and Modesty" and "Sobriety and Restraint," and as the Dean of Student Life may provide (Id.).  The catalogue does not specifically mention homosexuality, and I suppose it is possible to interpret Zaytuna's catalogue as not prohibiting "sexual activity" between two students of the same sex who are married under state law, but I somehow doubt that administrators at Zaytuna would subscribe to such a reading.

In previous posts on MOJ Rick Garnett has commented on the current threat to Gordon College's accreditation, and by implication, the threat to institutional pluralism and the religious liberty of other religiously affiliated colleges and universities foreshadowed by this incident (see here, here, and here). 

Gordon is a Christian college that expects its students, faculty and staff to abide by Scriptural standards of conduct and refrain from "blasphemy, profanity, dishonesty, theft, drunkenness, sexual relations outside marriage, and homosexual practice."   Gordon makes clear that these actions "will not be tolerated in the lives of Gordon community members, either on or off campus" (see here).  

Gordon's accrediting body, the New England Association of Schools and Colleges' Commission on Institutions of Higher Education initiated a process to determine "whether Gordon College's traditional inclusion of 'homosexual practice' as a forbidden activity . . . [is] contrary to the Commission's Standards for Accreditation," a process that now requires a the College to submit a report in September 2015 (see here).

Why the difference?  Why is the Islamic college granted accreditation and the Christian college threatened with revocation of its accreditation?  It may be a difference in standards between the NEASC and the WASC.   There doesn't appear to be the equivalent of NEASC's non-discrimination norm in Standard 11.5 (here) in the WASC  standards (here) although WASC's diversity policy (here) would seem to allow for the application similar regulatory pressure.  Or it may be a difference in the relative zeal of the enforcers.

Or the difference may due to a desire on the part of accrediting bodies to appear to be open and welcoming to those who are deemed appropriately "diverse" -- a category that does not include traditional Christianity.  Is it due to a fear of Islam or of appearing Islamaphobic and of reprisals that would ensue following a denial of accreditation?  Whereas religious identity can be discounted and treated as an empty remnant where Christianity is involved?

If this is not the case -- if the decision to grant accreditation to a college like Zaytuna is in fact principled, based on a genuine respect for diversity and institutional autonomy in higher education as it relates to religious identity -- then surely a similar decision can encompass a Christian college like Gordon.

Presently, there is no threat to Catholic colleges and universities that express their identity in similar policies regarding the behavior of students, faculty and staff (Catholic elementary and secondary schools are, of course, another matter, see here).  This may be due to the fact only a handful of Catholic colleges and universities maintain standards regarding student sexual conduct beyond sexual activity that is non-consensual (compare the standards at Notre Dame and Franciscan-Steubenville with those at Marquette and Loyola-Chicago).  But if the accrediting bodies are allowed to bludgeon small Christian colleges like Gordon in the name of an intolerant tolerance, does anyone really believe that that will be the end of it?

 

 

 

 

 

Religious Freedom "against" Civil Rights

This piece, by Profs. Sarah Barringer Gordon and Nomi Stolzenberg, presents what I think is an inaccurate account of the current efforts to secure religious exemptions and accommodations in various states.  Now, authors rarely get to pick the titles of their pieces (in my experience, anyway), and so I don't think Profs. Gordon and Barringer should be blamed for the headline, "State Legislatures Pit Religious Freedom Against Civil Rights."  Still, as I tried to set out, in this forthcoming essay

the right to religious freedom is a basic civil right, the increased appreciation of which is said to characterize our “age.” Accordingly, I push back against scholars’ and commentators’ increasing tendency to regard and present religious accommodations and exemptions as obstacles to the civil-rights enterprise and ask instead if our religious-accommodation practices are all that they should be. Are accommodations and exemptions being extended prudently but generously, in as many cases and to as many persons and entities as possible, in a sincere effort to welcome religious minorities, objectors, and dissenters as fully as we can into what Justice Harlan called “the dignity and glory of American citizenship”? What barriers exist to the promotion and achievement of civil-rights goals through religious accommodations and how might these barriers be overcome? Are civil-rights laws being designed and enforced in ways that guard against unintended or unjustified disregard for or sacrifices of the civil (and human) right to religious liberty?

 

 

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

On Remembering and Forgetting

A worthwhile reflection at the always interesting Hedgehog Review by Wilfred McClay. Here's an interesting bit on the difference between memory and unfiltered, endlessly accreting deposits of historical data:

Memory is the very core of our personal identity, and it is most powerful when it is purposeful, and selective. Above all, it requires that we possess stories and narratives—contexts—that link facts in ways that are both meaningful and true, rather than treat them as a mass of disaggregated data, to be exploited as we, or others, might wish. What makes for intelligent and discerning memory is not the mere capacity for massive retention, but a certain balance and order in the mental economy of remembering and forgetting. In other words, memory takes an active role in thinning out the mental trees so that the forests can be discerned. We need to retain less if we are to remember more. In so doing, we may rediscover the enduring virtues of ink on paper, of scripta that remain in one place, as the vehicle for a new kind of samizdat, one that eschews the digital grid altogether.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015

"Room for Debate" on religious accommodations, health, and children

I'm one of the contributors to today's "Room for Debate" feature at the New York Times.  The theme is "Parents' Beliefs vs. Their Children's Health" (which, in my view, might be a bit question-begging, but anyway .  . .).  My contribution, "Parents' Beliefs Should Be Honored, Within Reason," is here (and has a title that I did not select).   A bit:

If a regulation – even a sensible one that serves well the public good – imposes a significant burden on someone’s religious practice or conscience, we are willing to consider an accommodation if, all things considered, it would not undermine our ability to promote important government interests and public goals. Religious beliefs and objections do not and should not supply an absolute license to violate general laws, but they do and should deserve special care and consideration by policymakers. . . .