Today, January 8, 2016, is the seventh anniversary of the death of Fr. Richard John Neuhaus. Six months earlier, in an address to the annual convention of the National Right To Life Committee, he gave a charge to his pro-life fellow citizens that must remain our charge:
"We shall not weary, we shall not rest, until every unborn child is protected in law and welcomed in life. We shall not weary, we shall not rest, until all the elderly who have run life’s course are protected against despair and abandonment, protected by the rule of law and the bonds of love. We shall not weary, we shall not rest, until every young woman is given the help she needs to recognize the problem of pregnancy as the gift of life. We shall not weary, we shall not rest, as we stand guard at the entrance gates and the exit gates of life, and at every step along way of life, bearing witness in word and deed to the dignity of the human person of every human person. "
Viewers of Downton Abbey may have noticed in the recently aired first episode of Season Six that Carson the Butler articulated, in a delicate but firm and unmistakable way, the truth that marriage is a conjugal union. Mrs. Patmore, the cook, is sent as an emmisary of Carson's fiance, Mrs. Hughes, the housekeeper, to inquire whether Carson expects their marriage to include "more" than "deep friendship" and "close companionship." What "wifely duties" would be expected? Might the couple live "as brother and sister"? Or was a "full marriage" expected?
Carson (brilliantly acted by Jim Carter) does not take offense at the question or at Mrs. Hughes' (via Mrs. Patmore) asking it. As an Englishman of the Edwardian era might say, he is "not unsympathetic" to why a woman, especially one of Mrs. Hughes' age, might prefer to "live as brother and sister." But his answer, given from the heart but plainly informed by an *understanding* of what marriage actually is and what true goods it embodies and makes available, is that he does indeed desire and expect a "true marriage"--one in which, as he explains "two persons become as close as two persons can possibly be." It is not lust that prompts Carson's firm insistence on a consummated bond, but rather a desire for genuine marital communion--"a true marriage, not a lie," as he finally sums up his position.
Carson, having been nurtured in a culture shaped by traditional Christianity of the sort the Church of England in his day still represented, understands that persons are not minds or spirits merely inhabiting bodies, and that therefore a truly comprehensive union of persons---i.e., marriage--cannot merely be at the affective or emotional level. Although he would not be able to articulate the point in these formal philosophical terms, he understands that the body is part of the personal reality of the human being, not a subpersonal instrument. He "gets it" that for persons fully--"truly," to use the word he insists on in the discussion---to unite in the marital way (i.e., comprehensively, meaning at every level of their being) they must unite not only at the affective level ("deep friendship") but at the bodily level too. In other words, they consummate the marriage---completing and sealing it---and they actualize, embody, and renew the marriage each time they unite as "one flesh."
Carson, of course, doesn't go any more deeply into the matter, but we might note that the necessary background premise to the understanding he holds (one that, though not invented by Christianity or unique to it, was integrated into Christian teaching, including the Anglican teaching of his day) is that true bodily union is made possible by the sexual-reproductive complementarity of the spouses. It is thus by consummation that a man and woman become a true biological unit, their biological unity being an integral aspect of the comprehensive sharing of life that their marriage uniquely is. Thus, in *true* marriage, as Carson says, "two persons become as close as two persons can possibly be." Marriage, the real thing, is not mere companionship, nor is it companionship-plus-mutually-agreeable-sex-play-if-the-partners-happen-to-go-in-for-that-sort-of-thing (which they may or may not do---Mrs. Hughes, for example, would rather not); it is, rather, truly a comprehensive sharing of life, a sharing at every level of being, a one-flesh union, a conjugal relationship.
We would do well to recover the wisdom of Carson the Butler.
Wheaton College's provost is recommending that Professor Larycia Hawkins be removed from her tenured position for having stated (as part of an expression of civil solidarity with Muslims) that Muslims and Christians worship "the same God." The matter now goes to a faculty advisory committee for its recommendation, and then to the college president.
Wheaton's website contains a set of responses to FAQs concerning the situation. They don't address what I think is the most serious challenge to Wheaton: Do the asserted reasons for saying Islam worships a different God (i.e. Islam rejects the Trinity and Christ's place in salvation) also apply to Judaism? Professor Hawkins seems to affirm (according to the Christianity Today link above) that Muslims and Christians understand God very differently. But the Jewish-Christian differences in understanding of God--many of them similar to the Muslim-Christian differences--do not stop most Christians, I think, from saying that Christians and Jews both worship the God of Abraham.
On the other hand, Wheaton also says (in its FAQ responses) that "[o]n the part of the College, further theological clarification is necessary before [a] reconciliation [with her] can take place, and unfortunately Dr. Hawkins has stated clearly her unwillingness to participate in such further clarifying conversations," which created an "impasse." So perhaps she hasn't allayed concerns that, for example, her "same God" statement might be taken to reflect a more general religious universalism, or a minimizing of the deity and central importance of Jesus, both of which would of course be inconsistent with Wheaton's evangelical commitment.
But that doesn't deal with the more specific claim that "Muslims worship the God of Abraham, albeit with very different understandings than Christians." And I can't help but think that if one is willing to apply that to Judaism but not to Islam, the reason is cultural and political distrust rather than theological distinctiveness. Thus it would be good to know what Wheaton says in this context about Christianity and Judaism.
Thanks very much to Mike for quoting the Catholic Church's position on this from Nostra Aetate. Perhaps the Catholic teaching can give evangelicals some food for thought as they grapple with this issue.
UPDATE: Here is Professor Hawkins's fuller description of her position, in a December 17 letter to Wheaton's administration. HT: Frank Beckwith (he gives his own take on the issue here, and a catalog of others' perspectives here)
I explore a few important and underappreciated aspects of the case. General-interest readers are likely to find the first two points (about Kermit Gosnell and Planned Parenthood) more interesting, while those curious about details of legal analysis should find the severability discussion worth perusing.
This recent piece, by Michelle Boorstein, might be of interest. Prof. Doug Laycock (among others) is quoted as saying:
“For the Church, they are employing this guy who flouts their teachings. His presence on the payroll undermines what the school is trying to teach the kids and what the Church is trying to preserve among the adults,” Doug Laycock, a University of Virginia law professor who specializes in religious freedom, wrote in an email. “These battles over religious doctrine should be fought out within churches, not in the secular courts.”
Unfortunately, the piece consistently frames the issue as involving a conflict between "conservative" religious groups and the antidiscrimination norm. This framing is common, and rhetorically powerful, even if not entirely accurate.
Michael Sean Winters has a long blog post about the article, and the larger issue, here. And, he provides a link to Cardinal Wuerl's statement, which is here. Among other things, Cardinal Wuerl says that "the Church . . . enjoys freedom of religion to decide who will carry out Catholic ministry. This includes the right to determine when conduct is otherwise adverse to the Church’s ability to fully pursue its mission and interests." He's right.
I agree with Winters that the Church should not "go looking for a fight" with respect to these matters. However, I think it needs to be said that (a) others are "looking for a fight" -- that is, there are highly motivated litigants and well-funded activists for whom it is important to use litigation and administrative complaints precisely in order to undercut the religious freedom of the Church's institutions -- and it is naive and hazardous to imagine otherwise and (b) it is not such a bad idea as Winters suggests for Church leaders to listen to the lawyers when it comes to writing contracts, manuals, policies, etc., that will help to protect not merely the Church's legal rights (as Winters suggests, the Church can and should do better than simply standing on her rights) but the Church's religious freedom. The "case-by-case" approach that Winters endorses has a lot to commend it but, at the same time, it can create legal difficulties in those cases where the Church has to insist on hiring-for-mission.
Samantha Godwin has posted on SSRN this article, "Against Parental Rights":
This article advances an interpretive account of parental rights and builds a normative case against them. This normative account considers how parental rights function in existing constitutional and family law, and assesses theoretical arguments that seek to justify them.
This article begins by describing the most common, child-centered justification for parental rights: that parents are empowered in order to protect children’s best interests. I argue that these child-centered accounts do not justify the current legal regime governing parental rights. Instead, current parental rights are better understood as quasi-property interests, residual from historical traditions where children were more explicitly regarded as their parents’ property.
The middle part of this article advances the thesis that the quasi-property functioning of parental rights is not a contingent feature of American law of parents and children. It is instead characteristic of granting parents separate autonomy interests in determining the path of their children’s lives. Parental autonomy rights displace and diminish consideration for children’s interests and objectify children. This article introduces the concept of “desire-contingent goods” and argues that parental autonomy rights are paradigmatically the right to choose desire contingent goods for children regardless of whether they are desired or not. This denies the equal importance of children’s desires, subjective experiences and perspectives on their own lives. As a consequence, basic doctrines in constitutional and family law cannot be reconciled with liberal and egalitarian commitments.
The second half of this article evaluates alternative theoretical justifications for parental rights. These include constitutional and philosophical arguments based on personal liberty and family privacy, as well as philosophical arguments based on relational rights, ethics of care, and the Lockean labor theory of value. These arguments all fall short and, in crucial ways, rely on denying children equal moral consideration. The article concludes with recommendations for legal reform.
If only to "stay sharp" and clear-eyed, read this piece -- especially the "recommendations for legal reform." Here's a bit from the conclusion:
An essential part of long-term reform of American family law should include eroding and ultimately overruling existing case law holding that parents have a constitutionally protected substantive due process right to the custody and control of their children.
For some different views, check out our own Michael Scaperlanda's "Producing Trousered Apes" (here) or my own "Taking Pierce Seriously" (here).
Fr. Michael Sheehan, Williams College graduate and now priest of the Franciscans of the Primitive Order in Boston, is teaching a Winter term class at Williams this month called, "Pope Francis and the Problem of Evil." Papal biographer Austen Ivereigh will teach a class via Skype early in the month, and I will visit the class to discuss the pope's views on "gender theory" (which he has called a "new sin" against the Creator). Here's the course description:
Why does the "Pope of joy" speak so often about the prince of darkness? This colloquy explores the mind and impact of Pope Francis (Jorge Mario Bergoglio), who has been called the most astutely political Argentine since Perón. Students will be encouraged to wrestle with the perennial questions of God and human suffering with the aid of Francis' perspective. Reflecting on the drama of good versus evil will shed light on how and why the Jesuit pontiff weighs in on economics, social justice, and ecology. This dialogue provides a platform for students to both express themselves and listen empathically to others. There will be three types of weekly class meetings: plenary meetings, small group discussions, and visits to the Berkshire Food Project.
I have also been invited by the Catholic Center on campus to speak in the evening on the topic: "In Search of a Pro-Woman Response to the Hook-up Culture," a reprise of my presentation at the World Meeting of Families last year. This is (apparently) noteworthy given the brouhaha at Williams last semester when speaker Suzanne Venker was disinvited from speaking on the failures of feminism, sponsored by the group, Uncomfortable Learning. The ironies are, of course, quite ripe. I too am a critic of mainstream feminism but I also find much with which to agree. Still given the climate on college campuses this academic year, I am eager to see how things shape up on January 18th.
It was a Catholic speaker I heard while I was a student at Middlebury College--a college much like Williams, though that was two decades ago now--that moved me to question my own radical feminist assumptions and open myself to the Catholic worldview. I pray that the Holy Spirit may work a similar grace at Williams this month.
I'm pleased to announce this year's AALS Law and Religion section panel, "Religious Responses to Same-Sex Marriage," to be held this Thursday, January 7, from 10:15 AM to noon (Nassau West, Second Floor, NY Hilton). The panel will be moderated by Michael Helfand (Pepperdine) (after a short introduction from me) and will include the following panelists: Erik Eckholm (New York Times), Katherine Franke (Columbia Law School), Rusty Reno (First Things), our own Kevin Walsh (University of Richmond Law School), and Robin Wilson (University of Illinois College of Law). The panel description is below.
Over the past 15 years, the United States has seen a rapid change in attitudes toward same-sex marriage. That change has raised significant questions and challenges for various religious communities in the United States. Religious communities have responded in different ways—from endorsement to ambivalence to rejection. This year’s panel will explore these various reactions, including theological changes within religious communities, legal challenges advanced by religious communities, and legislative initiatives pursued by religious communities, as well as a host of other social, political, and legal responses to same-sex marriage in the United States. It will discuss how religious communities might, or might not, adapt to continuing social changes in the United States and how the United States will maintain its constitutional and cultural commitment to the religious freedom of these different communities.
The Atlantic re-ran Charles C. Marshall's striking "Open Letter" -- written to express the author's concerns about Smith's Catholicism and its implications for his presidential campaign -- to Al Smith. (Here is Smith's response.) As a general matter, but particularly in the current situation, it's well worth a (re)read. Here are a few excerpts:
. . . The Roman Catholic Church, of course, makes no claim, and never has made any claim, to jurisdiction over matters that in her opinion are solely secular and civil. She makes the claim obviously only when the matter in question is not, in her opinion, solely secular and civil. But as determination of jurisdiction, in a conflict with the State, rests solely in her sovereign discretion, no argument is needed to show that she may in theory and effect annihilate the rights of all who are not Roman Catholics, sweeping into the jurisdiction of a single religious society the most important interests of human well-being. The education of youth, the institution of marriage, the international relations of the State, and its domestic peace, as we shall proceed to show, are, in certain exigencies, wrested from the jurisdiction of the State, in which all citizens share, and confided to the jurisdiction of a single religious society in which all citizens cannot share, great numbers being excluded by the barriers of religious belief. Do you, sir, regard such claims as tolerable in a republic that calls itself free? . . .
. . . At the present time no question assumes greater importance than the education of youth. The legislature of Tennessee, of Oregon, and of Nebraska have of late laid impious hands upon it and the judiciary has sternly curbed them. From what has been said above, it is clear that the claims of the Roman Catholic Church touch this point; more than those of any other institution, may conflict with the authority of the State.
It is true that in the famous Oregon School cases the Supreme Court of the United States held a state law unconstitutional that forbade parents to educate their children at church schools of every denomination. But there was no assertion in the law that the church schools in question gave instruction inconsistent with the peace and safety of the State and there was no allegation of that tenor in the pleadings. On the record the church schools were void of offense. But, had that feature existed in the cases, it would necessarily have led to a reversal of the decision. There would have been conflict between Church and State as to whether the instruction was consistent with the peace and safety of the State. The Roman Catholic Church, if true to her doctrine, would have had to assert excusive jurisdiction over the determination of this point. Equally the State, in self-preservation, would have had to assert exclusive jurisdiction. The conflict would have been irreconcilable. What would have been the result and what the test of a sincere and conscientious Roman Catholic in executive office on the bench? . . .
