Today’s Sunday edition of the St. Paul Pi0neer Press includes a guest editorial I wrote, with a less commonly heard narrative on the subject of abortion:
Sunday, May 22, 2022
Cross-Post From Pioneer Press: When They Talk About Abortion, They’re Talking About Me
Friday, May 13, 2022
What's the ius in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization?
Sometimes the simplest questions are the easiest to answer. All federal judges take an oath to administer justice under the Constitution and laws of the United States. This is their promise, to render to each his or her lawful due. This thing lawfully due to each person in justice is his or her ius. The key question for a judge to ask in deciding any case should be: "What’s the ius?" Asking this question in every case can orient at the outset, channel throughout, and confirm at conclusion.
“What’s the ius?” is also often a simpler and easier question to answer than “what’s all the potentially applicable law?” or “what are all the material facts?” All of the law and all of the facts may sometimes be necessary to know, but other times it is unnecessary to go into all of that. In the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, for example, Marbury’s ius was his commission. The Court lacked jurisdiction to order Madison to render this ius to Marbury. It was therefore unnecessary for the Supreme Court to have gone into all that Chief Justice Marshall wrote in his opinion for the Court.
We Catholics have been invited by our bishops to pray today in a special way for the Justices of the Supreme Court as they continue their deliberations in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392.
My prayers in particular have been drawn to Chief Justice John Roberts, who is a model judge for me and for many others. The Chief Justice of the United States takes the same judicial oath as every other federal judge. I pray that he fulfills this oath. What that requires in this precise case, I do not pretend to know in all its particulars. There are many ways of going wrong, and those are to be avoided. But there are also many ways of doing right, and I pray that he is drawn to those.
I hope that Chief Justice Roberts orients his deliberations with his colleagues around the question: What’s the ius? What is the thing that we are being asked to render as lawfully due?
The ius requested by Jackson Women’s Health Organization and other plaintiffs is an immunity. More precisely, these plaintiffs’ principal prayer for relief is an order allowing them to avoid prosecution in state court for anticipated violations of a state-law prohibition against aborting an unborn baby after fifteen weeks gestational age. They claim this immunity from state law as their due under federal law.
It seems very likely that Chief Justice Roberts has already decided to order denial of the requested relief. Through his questions at oral argument, the Chief Justice signaled that the viability line on which plaintiffs rely was an invention of the Court and not well-founded. The plaintiffs need the Court to hold that line in order to win. The Court will not hold that line and they will therefore lose. That is as it should be.
The harder issue that the Chief Justice seems to be wrestling with is what to say about drawing a new line. Some have noted the Chief Justice’s apparent attraction to articulating a constitutional requirement that individuals be permitted some shorter period of time before viability to seek an abortion in a regulated but otherwise open and legally protected market for abortion services.
The Chief Justice should resist this attraction. Apart from the lack of warrant in the Fourteenth Amendment for drawing such a line, there is no warrant in this case for doing so. The plaintiffs’ claimed injury comes from the inability to perform lawful abortions after fifteen weeks. That claim lacks merit. It would be gratuitous to volunteer a new line in this case.
Justice Alito’s leaked draft does not volunteer a new line. It applies rational basis review and recognizes the legitimate interests of the state advanced by the law it has enacted. Chief Justice Roberts should do likewise.
To draw a new temporal line in pregnancy before which federal law purportedly preempts state-law protections against intentional killing would be to continue the federal judiciary’s complicity in the denial of the equal protection of the laws to prenatal persons within the jurisdiction of each state. But the rights of these prenatal persons are not directly before the Court in this case, which pits the authority of the government against the interests of abortion providers. It is enough to decide that the law does not entitle the abortion providers to a federal judicial order shielding them from the consequences of violating the state law at issue.
On the question of line drawing regarding life-and-death protections for prenatal persons more generally, the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court in Rucho v. Common Cause should be his guide. The federal judiciary may not order relief on any constitutional claim that the government has gone too far in protecting prenatal life unless that claim is grounded in judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. These standards must rest on a “limited and precise rationale,” and must be “clear, manageable, and politically neutral.” These are the criteria identified by Chief Justice Roberts in his opinion for the Court in Rucho v. Common Cause. They are taken from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer. These criteria cannot be satisfied when the question is how far along in pregnancy a prenatal person must have developed in order to be protected by the law. My prayer is that Chief Justice Roberts and his colleagues recognize that the federal courts cannot grant abortion providers’ prayers for relief from enforcement of prenatal-person-protecting laws like the one at issue in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.
Saturday, May 7, 2022
The "Black Legend" (of American constitutional law) returns
Fifteen years ago (!), when I was visiting at the University of Chicago Law School (a wonderful experience), I contributed a response to a post (on the Law School's blog . . . remember those?) by Geof Stone, in which he shared what he called a "painfully awkward observation" that the justices in the majority of the Court's Gonzales v. Carhart - in which the Court upheld a ban on partial-birth abortions -- were Catholic. "It is mortifying to have to point this out. But it is too obvious, and too telling, to ignore[,]" he said. "[T]hese justices have failed to respect the fundamental difference between religious belief and morality," he charged.
Brian Leiter recently re-upped Prof. Stone's con-law version of The Black Legend, here. He wrote (while conceding, as anyone must, the "unhappy fact is that there are clearly colorable legal arguments for overruling Roe"):
Stone's analysis generated an uproar, but it was correct then, as it would be correct now: someone with a conservative Catholic upbringing will of course regard abortion as verboten, and will thus find attractive--even without recognizing their real motivations--any colorable legal arguments that return the question of its permissibility to the legislative process (knowing full well, of course, that its availability will be restricted as a result).
As I wrote, though, in my response to Geof way-back-when, (a) there is nothing "Catholic" about the idea that the Constitution did and does not disable political majorities from enacting reasonable regulations of abortion (including, among other things, a prohibition on a procedure that involves sticking a scissor through the skull of a still-living fetus and "evacuating" his or her "cranial contents"), and (b) it is at least as likely that the non-Catholic justices' (both in Carhart and in -- it appears -- Dobbs) various commitments supplied "motivations" for disregarding what many of us think are straightforward, unremarkable analyses and arguments.
I wrote then (I still cannot get over how long ago that was!):
[I]t is not clear why the claim "human fetuses are moral subjects and this fact constrains what should be done with and to them" is any more "religious", or any less "moral", than the claim "all human beings are moral equals, regardless of race, and should be treated as such in law." What's more, even if it were true that the former claim is "religious" (certainly, for many, it is religiously motivated or grounded), it does not violate -- indeed, I do not think it even implicates -- the "separation of church and state" that our Constitution is thought to require.
It is interesting, I think, that Professor Stone invokes the example of Justice Brennan. Although I believe that Roe was wrongly decided, it is impossible not to admire the Justice. And, to me, it is clear that Justice Brennan's powerful opinions in Furman and Gregg -- with their strong and stirring invocations of "human dignity" as a limit on what governments may do the accused -- reflect views that, for Justice Brennan, were rooted in his religious faith. Was he, therefore, a "faith-based justice" when he voted to strike down every death-penalty law in the nation?
Tuesday, May 3, 2022
Statement on the leaked Alito draft opinion in Dobbs
On January 22, 1973, I was a high school student working a pro-life information table at the West Virginia University student center when we heard about the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. I recall the horror of learning that the Court had crushed the basic rights of an entire class of precious human beings—our tiny unborn brothers and sisters. I know that the horror I felt that day, and vividly remember to this day, is the horror many people who see the issue differently than I do are feeling today. These include a great many good and honorable people who deeply care about the well-being of women, especially vulnerable women, and believe that their rights are being crushed. Although I disagree with them about the rights and wrongs of abortion, and indeed applaud the reversal of Roe as a victory for justice and constitutional integrity, I feel no temptation to exult.
Roe v. Wade needed to be reversed, as I predicted it would be https://www.firstthings.com/article/2021/10/roe-will-go, not only because it was a grave injustice against the unborn, but also (and in the first place) because it was an unconstitutional decision—an act of “raw judicial power.” The right to abortion it proclaimed lacked any basis in the text, logic, structure, or historical understanding of the Constitution. To say that it was poorly reasoned is an understatement. The truth is that it wasn’t reasoned at all. This left its defenders with an impossible task—defending the literally indefensible.
That does not mean, however, that voting to reverse Roe is an easy thing for justices to do. If, as the draft opinion of Justice Samuel Alito which was leaked yesterday suggests, five or possibly even six justices are voting to reverse Roe, they merit praise for courage and fidelity to principle. The Roe decision lacked intellectual credibility but did not lack influential and powerful supporters. In fact, what sustained Roe for forty-nine years was precisely the prestige, influence, and power of people in academia, journalism, entertainment, key professions and professional associations, the great philanthropies, politics, and the corporate world who were deeply invested in maintaining it, despite its manifest lack of intellectual credibility.
In the beginning, the question of abortion and then the soundness or unsoundness of Roe were not "left" versus "right" issues. There were plenty of prolife liberals or progressives, and lots of prochoice conservatives. Jesse Jackson spoke passionately for the dignity and rights of the child in the womb. As Governor of California, Ronald Reagan supported and signed into law a statute broadly legalizing abortion. In time, though, abortion and support or opposition to Roe began coding as “liberal” and “conservative.”
The conservative legal community developed a critique of Roe that, though commendable and sound in a great many ways, was not fully adequate. That critique, championed by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, supposes that nothing in the Constitution is relevant to the question of abortion prohibition or regulation—hence the matter is left by the Constitution entirely to the judgment of state legislatures. This is incorrect—indeed demonstrably incorrect—and Professor John Finnis of Oxford University and I have demonstrated its incorrectness in among other places, a brief we submitted to the Supreme Court in the Dobbs case. (Published version and supplement here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3955231; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3973183.) Justice Alito’s leaked draft cites that brief and makes excellent, if limited, use of the evidence it provides and arguments it marshals. These establish that the term “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment—an Amendment that, among other things, imposes on States an obligation to afford to persons the equal protection of the laws (including the laws against violent assaults and homicides)—was publicly understood at the time of the framing and ratification of the Amendment as including the child in the womb. The permission by a state of elective abortion, therefore, is a violation of the Constitution and should be declared by the Supreme Court to be so. This is not, however, a claim the state of Mississippi made in defending the constitutionality of its statute and requesting the reversal of Roe, nor is it the outcome the state requested. Understandably, then, the Court did not reach the question. I hope it will do so in later litigation.
As Professor Finnis and I point out in the brief, resolving the matter in the way we argue the Constitution requires does not mean that the Supreme Court should dictate abortion policy tout court. Where pregnancy poses a grave threat to maternal life and health—that is, when we are no longer speaking of elective (or “social indication”) abortions—there are policy and policy-related questions that cannot be resolved by the straightforward application of equal protection principles. These questions are, therefore, properly in the legislative domain and judgments about them should not be imposed by the judiciary.
Two more points.
If, as the leaked draft opinion seems to suggest, the Supreme Court has decided to reverse Roe and return the question of abortion entirely to the legislative domain, then the pro-life movement faces a new set of challenges—challenges even more daunting than overturning Roe. In the face of profound opposition from the wealthiest, most powerful, and most influential forces and institutions in the country, the movement needs to extend the protections of law on terms of fairness and equality to mothers and children alike. Going still further, it needs to work in both the public and private spheres to provide necessary support for mothers and children, never allowing their interests or well-being to be pitted against each other. To its great credit, the pro-life movement has been doing this since before Roe v. Wade—again, in the face of hostility from the most powerful forces. We will need now to do more and better. We can and we will.
What about the leaking of the Alito draft? It is an outrage, of course. Even if the leaker is caught and subjected to appropriate disciplinary proceedings, the damage to the Court will be deep and abiding. Anyone who has worked in the building knows that trust is indispensable to the functioning of the institution. The leak has destroyed trust. Perhaps someday the Court will get it back. But not in my lifetime. Probably not in my students’ lifetimes. For decades—at least—there will be the mere simulacrum, a pretense, of trust; there will not be trust. Trust was shattered in what appears to have been a desperate effort to unleash forces that would bully justices into doing something other than what they regarded as their constitutional duty. In this respect, it is tragically in line with the broader trend in our culture and politics for people to get their way by bullying others. People on the left can think of the examples from the right that stand out in their minds. People on the right can think of the examples from the left that stand out in theirs. It is time—long past time—for decent and honorable people on both sides to say: “Enough! We will not tolerate bullying. We will not tolerate it from our political opponents. But we will be equally and equally vocally intolerant of it when it comes from our political allies.”
"Can We Be Human in Meatspace?"
This review essay, in The New Atlantis, connects nicely with the moral-anthropology theme that has been a part of the Mirror of Justice conversation for nearly two decades (!) now. Here's the opening:
In thinking about technology, three questions are fundamental. What is technology for? What are we for? And how is our answer to the first question related to our answer to the second?
Since the Enlightenment, we have come to take for granted that there really is no relation, because we cannot publicly agree on what humans are for. We can answer that question only privately. But technology is public, not private. We create it for common use, ostensibly in the service of the common good. If we cannot broadly agree on what we are for, then how can we reason together about what our technology is for?
It appears that we cannot.
It's a long piece, and I cannot do justice to it here. But again: We've often observed, and reflected on the observation, that one cannot really "do law" without engaging the question, "what are human persons?" Certainly, a "Catholic legal theory" must be one that gives priority to this question.
Henry Garnet, S.J., RIP
On this day, in 1606, Henry Garnet, S.J. was hanged near St. Paul's Cathedral in London. (The crowd reportedly pulled on his legs, during the hanging, so that he would die before the usual disemboweling.) He was a student of Robert Bellarmine and had been, for some time, the head of the Jesuit mission in England, and he was executed for (in addition, of course, the offense of being a Jesuit in England) failing to reveal his (alleged) knowledge of some details of the "Gunpowder Plot." (In Macbeth, Shakespeare mocks Garnet, by reference, as the "equivocator.") Ora pro nobis.
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Friday, April 29, 2022
Garnett & Graziano on the Kennedy case (and "endorsement")
I have a short piece, coauthored with my student, Joseph Graziano, up at Newsweek, on the Kennedy case (and other things). A bit:
Both Boston and Bremerton have the constitutional calculus backward. Not only do they not have to exclude religious voices from their halls; under the First Amendment, they may not. Camp Constitution and Coach Kennedy have as much right to witness to their religions as any others have to witness to their ideologies on the streets or up the flagpoles of city halls. In these two cases—Shurtleff v. Boston and Kennedy v. Bremerton School District—the justices should clarify that our Constitution demands that the religious be allowed to participate in public life on the same terms as everyone else, and that, barring actual coercion, free exercise of religious speech should be welcome in the public square.
Monday, April 25, 2022
There they go again ... Vermeule & Casey on Pryor in Ohio
There they go again. Law professors Adrian Vermeule and Conor Casey have co-authored an impressively lengthy, effectively footnoted, and aptly titled "Argument by Slogan" piece up at Harvard JLPP's Per Curiam. Its rhetorical framing brings to mind a critical and pointedly understated observation that Professor Richard Helmholz recently made in Marching Orders. In his largely positive review at First Things of Vermeule's compact call to arms, Common Good Constitutionalism, Helmholz expressed surprise at "the harshness of debate in this area of the law," and described Vermeule's outlook as that of one engaged in "a no-holds-barred sort of contest." "It does seem a shame," Helmholz observes, "that the argument about constitutionalism has become as shrill as it has."
Helmholz is likely right about the shrillness being a shame; he is definitely right about the shrillness being shrill. Consider how Vermeule and Casey frame their response to the published version of Judge William Pryor's address to the Federalist Society’s 2022 Ohio Chapters Conference, Against Living Common Goodism:
- "Judge Pryor's advocacy of public meaning originalism is infected by a horror of judgment—a deep-seated fear that absent originalism, constitutional interpretation will collapse into a moral free-for-all where judges arbitrarily inject personal preferences into law." [p. 4]
- "In the end, Judge Pryor's core commitment is no more than animus against Justice Brennan, which does not by itself yield anything close to a coherent view. Enmity is not a theory." [p. 4]
- "To understand Judge Pryor's commitments, one must begin with the animus that galvanizes his argument." [p. 5]
- "The consequence of this core enmity is simple: Judge Pryor's argument fails if, and to the extent that, it fails to advance a methodological argument that would exclude constitutional interpretation of which Brennan could heartily approve. If Pryor has failed even to exclude Brennanism, he has achieved nothing. And as we will see, his argument in fact does nothing at all to exclude Brennanism, and necessarily lacks the theoretical resources to do so. This is because Pryor's arguments suffice only to establish thin originalism, not thick originalism; and thin originalism is entirely compatible with Brennanism."
- "In the end, Judge Pryor's core commitment is no more than an ill-defined animus against a specific style of jurisprudence, Justice Brennan's style. But brooding animus does not make for clarity of thought. Indeed, as often happens, the passion overwhelms the argument and turns it into the very thing it aims to destroy. ... Enmity is not a theory. Slogans are not arguments." [p. 19]
Just so.
If one wishes to take seriously the ideas at issue instead of being distracted by the framing and motivational attributions, there's not much one can do about this rhetorical state of affairs in the short term. One can attempt to absorb or deflect, though, and then at some other time put forward a more positive vision. So for now, I'll just gesture toward that famous debater's trick from the Gipper and combine it with the professors’ favored rhetorical technique of repetition: There they go again.
Wednesday, April 13, 2022
Anyone want to teach Torts? In Minneapolis?
I apologize for bursting in after such a long absence for something with something that someone might argue has only the slightest relationship with Catholic Legal Theory, but this is urgent, and this is an audience I'd like to reach! As some of you may know, the University of St. Thomas is in the midst of some leadership changes. Our President is moving to Santa Clara University, our beloved Law School Dean, Rob Vischer, will be serving as Interim University President, our equally beloved Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Joel Nichols, will be serving as Interim Dean of the Law School, and I will be serving as Interim Associate Dean.
These rather sudden transitions are complicated by the fact that our first year Torts classes were being taught by Rob and Joel, so we are looking for Torts coverage. Here's the announcement Joel is posting: please forward to anyone you think might be interested:
The University of St. Thomas School of Law (MN) is looking to hire a visiting professor for Fall 2022 to teach Torts. The ideal candidate would have experience teaching Torts and be able to teach two sections of Torts in the fall term, due to leadership changes at the school. Torts is a 4 credit, fall-only 1L class. Courses will be taught fully in-person, unless the public health situation changes significantly.
We would consider a full year visit for 22-23 (courses in spring term TBD based on the visitor’s expertise) and would also consider a visitor who can teach one section of Torts plus another course in an area of expertise. Please send inquiries and statements of interest to Joel Nichols, incoming Interim Dean, at [email protected]. Review of applications will begin immediately.
I know the timing means that most faculty are already committed for the fall, but I would appreciate it if you would share with colleagues who might be interested and available. People should feel free to reach out to me directly at [email protected] or by phone at 651-962-4827.
Saturday, April 9, 2022
Seminar: Competing Visions of the University
I'm posting below the syllabus for a seminar I am teaching this semester with historian Allen Guelzo on competing visions of the university.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Department of Politics
Politics 491: The Politics & Principles of Higher Education: Competing Visions of the University
Instructors: Robert P. George (Politics) & Allen C. Guelzo (Humanities)
Description/Objective: This course will examine the history, contemporary reality, and likely future of higher education, especially in the United States but also abroad. We will consider the changing and often conflicting ideals and aspirations of parents, students, instructors, and administrators from classical Rome to Christian institutions in the European Middle Ages to American athletic powerhouses today, seeking answers to fundamental practical, economic, and political questions that provoke vigorous contemporary debate.
Free Speech: As set forth in Rights, Rules, Responsibilities section 1.1.3, Princeton University strictly respects the right to free speech of everyone in our community of scholars and learners. That right is sacrosanct in this seminar and is possessed by faculty and students alike. With the aim of advancing and deepening everyone’s understanding of the issues addressed in the course, students are urged to speak their minds, explore ideas and arguments, play devil’s advocate, and engage in civil but robust discussions. There is no thought or language policing. We expect students to do business in the proper currency of intellectual discourse—a currency consisting of reasons, evidence, and arguments—but no ideas or positions are out of bounds.
Texts:
Gary A. Berg, The Rise of Women in Higher Education: How, Why and What’s Next (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019)
Zena Hitz, Lost in Thought: The Hidden Pleasures of the Intellectual Life (Princeton University Press, 2020)
Anthony Abraham Jack, The Privileged Elite: How Elite Colleges Are Failing Disadvantaged Students (Harvard University Press, 2019)
Anthony Kronman, Education’s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life (Yale University Press, 2007)
John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, ed. Frank M. Turner (Yale University Press, 1997)
Keith Whittington, Speak Freely Why Universities Must Defend Free Speech (Princeton University Press, 2018)
Digital Reader:
- Mark Edmundson, “On the Uses of a Liberal Education,” Harper’s (September 1997)
- William Deresiewicz, “Don't Send Your Kid to the Ivy League,” The New Republic (July 21, 2014)
- Plato, Protagoras, 320c-328d
- Aristotle, Politics, 7.13-8
- Quintilian, Institutio oratoria (Book 10)
- Petrarch, “The Ascent of Mt. Ventoux,” ed. Henry Reeve (Edinburgh, 1878), 84-89
- Vergerio, De ingenius moribus (1472)
- John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916), chs. 6 & 7
- Clark Kerr, “The Idea of a Multiversity,” from The Uses of the University (1963)
- Lynn D. Gordon, “From Seminary to University: An Overview of Women’s Higher Education, 1870-1920,” in Wechsler, Goodchild & Eisenmann, The History of Higher Education (1997), 473-498
- Emma Whitford, There Are So Few of Us That Have Made Their Way,” Inside Higher Ed (October 28, 2020)
- Naomi Oreskes & Charlie Tyson, “Is Academe Awash in Liberal Bias?” Chronicle of Higher Education (September 14, 2020) & Phillip W. Magness, “Tenured Radicals Are Real,” Chronicle of Higher Education (September 24, 2020)
- Robert P. George, “Natural Law and Positive Law,” In Defense of Natural Law (1999)
- William E. Thro, “Embracing Constitutionalism: The Court and the Future of Higher Education Law,” University of Dayton Law Review 44 (2018-2019)
- Nat Hentoff, “Multicultural Contempt for Free Speech,” CommonQuest (Summer 1999);
- Arthur Levine & Jeanette S. Cureton, “Collegiate Life: An Obituary,” Change (May/June 1998)
- Arthur Levine & Scott Van Pelt, “5 Ways Higher Ed will be Upended,” Chronicle of Higher Education (August 25, 2021)
Online Readings:
- James Axtell, “The Death of the Liberal Arts College,” History of Education Quarterly (Winter 1971) - https://www.learningoutcomesassessment.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Axtell-1971.pdf
- Patsy Parker, “The Historical Role of Women in Higher Education” -- https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1062478.pdf
- AAUP, “Data Snapshot: Full Time Women Faculty and Faculty of Color” -- https://www.aaup.org/news/data-snapshot-full-time-women-faculty-and-faculty-color#.YZQwRL3MJVo
- C.J. Libassi, “The Neglected College Race Gap: Racial Disparities Among College Completers,” Center for American Progress (May 23, 2018) -- https://www.americanprogress.org/article/neglected-college-race-gap-racial-disparities-among-college-completers/
Weekly Schedule
- January 26 – What Is the Purpose of a University, and especially the kind of education we call “liberal arts”? This will be a general get-acquainted session, with a detailed review of the syllabus and readings, some preliminary questions about why, exactly, we’re all here at Princeton and what we expect Princeton to be, what Princeton has been in the past, and then the distribution of assignments as per above.
- February 2 -- The Ancient Model of Learning – What we call ‘higher education’ today takes its earliest form in in classical times. But what was its purpose? To whom was it addressed, and what were its ‘graduates’ expected to do with it?
Readings: Plato, Protagoras, Aristotle, Politics, Quintilian, Institutio oratoria (Book 10)
- February 9 -- The Renaissance Model of Learning – If the classical education gives us many of the questions we associate with ‘higher education,’ then the Middle Ages and Renaissance gives us its forms, in the monastery schools and then the universities. What did those universities aspire to teach, and how did the emphasis on virtue emerge in the Renaissance?
Readings: Petrarch, “Ascent of Mt. Ventoux”; Vergerio, De in genius moribus (1472)
- February 16 -- The Victorian Model of Learning – The medieval universities evolved in the 19th century into models of research, especially in Germany. That emergence was both challenged and accommodated in one of the most famous modern texts ever written on university life.
Readings: John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University (1852/58)
- February 23 -- The Progressive Model of Learning – By the turn of the 20th century, government had begin to look to higher education as a source of administrative expertise. How did this change the functioning of higher education, especially in the United States? Modern mass society has changed, not only what is taught, but also how universities are supposed to serve the public interest. It has, however, created serious questions about whether higher education has become purely instrumental.
Readings: John Dewey, Education and Democracy (1916), chs. 6 & 7; James Axtell, “The Death of the Liberal Arts College,” History of Education Quarterly (Winter 1971); Clark Kerr, “The Idea of a Multiversity,” from The Uses of the University (1963), 1-34
- March 2 -- Women in the University – Until the later 19th century, women were almost entirely absent from higher education. How have women challenged and changed university life since then?
Readings: Lynn D. Gordon, “From Seminary to University: An Overview of Women’s Higher Education, 1870-1920”; Patsy Parker, “The Historical Role of Women in Higher Education;” Gary A. Berg, The Rise of Women in Higher Education: How, Why and What’s Next (2019)
Spring break – March 5-13
- March 16 -- The Color of the University – Higher education in the United States, and at Princeton, was a closed door to people of color. This, too, has changed since the 19th century. But are its implications different than those posed by the entrance of women at the same time into American colleges and universities? What challenges do race pose today? – AAUP, “Data Snapshot: Full Time Women Faculty and Faculty of Color;” Anthony Abraham Jack, The Privileged Elite: How Elite Colleges Are Failing Disadvantaged Students (Harvard University Press, 2019); C.J. Libassi, “The Neglected College Race Gap: Racial Disparities Among College Completers,” Center for American Progress (May 23, 2018); Emma Whitford, There Are So Few of Us That Have Made Their Way,” Inside Higher Ed (October 28, 2020)
- March 23 -- What is a Curriculum?– Anthony Kronman, Education’s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life (2007), Chs 1-3; Naomi Oreskes & Charlie Tyson, “Is Academe Awash in Liberal Bias?” Chronicle of Higher Education (September 14, 2020) & Phillip W. Magness, “Tenured Radicals Are Real,” Chronicle of Higher Education (September 24, 2020)
- March 30 – What is the Purpose of an Education? -- Readings: Donald P. Verene, The Art of Humane Education (2002); Zena Hitz, Lost in Thought: The Hidden Pleasures of the Intellectual Life (Princeton University Press, 2020); Mark Edmundson, “On the Uses of a Liberal Education,” Harper’s (September 1997) Ch 1; William Deresiewicz, “Don’t Send Your Kid to the Ivy League,” The New Republic (July 21, 2014)
- April 6 -- Law and the University: Dartmouth, Gott, Dixon, Healy, Furek, Bakke, Grutter -- Robert P. George, “Natural Law and Positive Law,” In Defense of Natural Law (1999); Kronman, Education’s End, Ch 4; William E. Thro, “Embracing Constitutionalism: The Court and the Future of Higher Education Law,” U. Dayton Law Review 44 (2018-2019)
- April 13 -- Academic Freedom & Its Purpose -- Nat Hentoff, “Multicultural Contempt for Free Speech,” CommonQuest (Summer 1999); Keith Whittington, Speak Freely Why Universities Must Defend Free Speech (Princeton University Press, 2018)
- April 20 -- How Will Universities Change? -- Arthur Levine & Jeanette S. Cureton, “Collegiate Life: An Obituary,” Change (May/June 1998); Arthur Levine & Scott Van Pelt, “5 Ways Higher Ed will be Upended,” Chronicle of Higher Education (August 25, 2021); Kronman, Education’s End, Ch 5
Requirements:
In addition to regular, often substantial, reading, there will be a take-home midterm examination and a final 15-20-page paper. Each student will also be responsible for helping lead one class meeting.
Grading: Midterm Exam 20%
Paper In Lieu Of Final Exam 50%
Class/Precept Participation 20%
Oral Presentation(s) 10%
Prerequisites and Restrictions: This seminar is open to all Class years. There are no prerequisites or restrictions
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