Friday, August 6, 2004
Amy Welborn has an interesting post, and a link to a good New Republic article (requires registration), relating to the work of Evangelical mission-workers in Africa. The post and the article are relevant to a discussion we had here at MOJ, a few weeks ago, about proselytization and conversions in India.
Rick
Here is an interesting article about religious accommodations in the workplace.
A Central Florida woman was fired from her job after eating "unclean" meat and violating a reported company policy that pork and pork products are not permissible on company premises[.] Lina Morales was hired as an administrative assistant at Rising Star -- a Central Florida telecommunications company with strong Muslim ties[.] However, 10 months after being hired by Rising Star, religious differences led to her termination. Morales, who is Catholic, was warned about eating pizza with meat the Muslim faith considered "unclean”[.] She was then fired for eating a bacon, lettuce and tomato sandwich, according to the report.
Evidently, Morales was fired “for refusing to comply with company policy that pork and pork products are not permissible on company premises.”
According to Morales’s lawyer, her firing is “just un-American. . . . It’s a classic case of religious discrimination[.] They have not articulated a single reason other than [a] religious reason behind the policy.”
Putting aside the legal merits of this particular case, the more question I would pose is, “why should ‘they’ have to articulate a ‘single reason other than a religious reason’”? What would be so wrong – so “un-American” – with a regime that permitted Muslim-owned or Muslim-related businesses to require employees – Muslim or not – to respect Muslim dietary laws?
Rick
Thursday, August 5, 2004
I agree with Rick's central point.
It is correct for a court to say the following: "That the political majority's morality supports challenged legislation does not entail that the legislation is constitutional." This proposition may be what O'Connor was trying to articulate in Lawrence. (Is that too charitable?) In any event, the truth of the proposition is easy to discern. For example, that the political majority's morality condemns interracial marriage does not entail that antimiscegenation legislation is constitutional. The point here is that the political majority's morality may itself be constitutionally offensive.
By contrast, it is incorrect for a court to say the following: "That the political majority's morality is the sole support for challenged legislation entails that the legislation is unconstitutional." I agree with Rick that a court should be embarassed to affirm that proposition.
Michael
MOJ readers are probably aware that a trial judge in the State of Washington has ruled that the State must, in accord with its own constitution, recognize same-sex marriages. The trial court's opinion tracks, in many ways, the recent same-sex-marriage decision in Massachusetts. The judge observes, among other things, that prohibiting same-sex marriage does not advance -- but in fact probably undermines -- the State's asserted (and clearly valid) interest in encouraging procreation, promoting stable families, and the "nurturance" of children.
The portion of the opinion that might be of particular interest to MOJ readers rejects the idea that "morality requires it" as a basis for prohibiting same-sex marriage:
"In our pluralistic society, in which church and state are kept scrupulously separate, the moral views of the majority can never provide the sole basis for legislation. [Citing and quoting Justice O'Connor in Lawrence]. [I]t is clear that Americans have differing views as to what morality requires in the definition of marriage. It is not for our secular government to choose between religions and take moral or religious sides in such a debate."
Whatever one thinks about the advisability or morality of same-sex marriage, or even about the legal validity of States' refusal to sanction it, this sort of reasoning is, in my view, depressing, or embarassing, or both. It strikes me as quite mistaken to claim either that (a) the First Amendment means that "the moral views of the majority can never provide the sole basis for legislation" (unless one believes that "moral views" and "religion" are identical) or (b) "secular governments" do not "take sides" in debates about matters about which "Americans have differing views."
Now, I am inclined to think that, given the Supreme Court's recent work, a result like the one reached in this case might be defensible. However, this particular opinion, in my view, is regrettably tedious, ponderous, and self-congratulatory -- but I'd welcome others' views.
I should add, by the way, that I do not understand the trial-court judge to be making anything like the quite different, and much more persuasive, argument that Michael Perry has made, namely, that religious believers sometimes ought to avoid -- for faith-based reasons -- relying on faith-based claims on matters of public policy.
Rick
Wednesday, August 4, 2004
Steve et al.,
Sorry, I should have done this to begin with.
Click here:
(Given the sideways appearance of the article, you'll need to print it before you read it.)
The issue, of course, is of great importance--and the article, not long.
I feared that if I tried to summarize the argument, I would not do it justice--and might even mislead.
Thanks.
Michael
Michael:
A fair point. I was hoping, however, that you would summarize Outka's argument for the benefit of those of us - and our readers - who are curious (as I genuinely am) but no more.
Steve
Thanks, Steve. I was hoping that those of you who are interested in this issue would read Outka's piece and comment on his argument--and, if you are so inclined, point out where, in your judgment, the argument doesn't work. After all, the point you make in your posting below is not one that Outka has overlooked.
Michael
Tuesday, August 3, 2004
Michael:
If one believes that life begins at conception, does that not imply that the so-called "excess" embryos are living human beings with souls upon whom experimentation would violate the gospel of life? Conversely, if one does not believe that life begins at conception, then why draw a line between creating embryos for the purpose of harvesting stem cells and using "excess" embryos? I realize that this probably won't help sort out the problem, but I am genuinely curious as to why the difference in source matters.
Steve
PS: The Pontifical Academy for Life refers "to the enormous number of human embryos that are lost or destroyed following these [fertility] procedures - a real "slaughter of the innocents" of our times." As I understand it, the harvesting of stem cells from the excess embryos entails the destruction of those embryos, so it does not solvge the problem (in my view).
I am attracted by the position of Gene Outka, Dwight Professor of Philosophy and Christian Ethics at Yale University. Outka "take[s] conception and all that it alone makes possible as *the* point at which one should ascribe a judgment of irreducible value." Outka opposes the creation of embryos for use in stem cell research. But Outka would permit the use of "excess" embryos, i.e., embryos that are left over after fertility treatments have been completed. I would appreciate some help in thinking further about Outka's argument. See Gene Outka, "The Ethics of Human Stem Cell Research," in Brent Waters & Ronald Cole-Turner, eds., God and the Embryo: Religious Voices on Stem Cells and Cloning 29 (2003).
Michael
Monday, August 2, 2004
Steve, thanks for pointing out the LA times piece – in response to the piece and to your post, I was wondering, does anyone else find it incredibly reductive to describe faithfulness to the teachings of Pope John Paul II as resistance to the short list of “optional celibacy, women priests, the democratic elections of bishops and greater lay leadership” – and in an affection for somewhat exterior “Latin prayers, special vestments, bells and other traditional touches”?
John Paul II’s own description of the kind of “communion” which should set the tone for relationships between bishops, priests, and the laity, seems to articulate a much more complex (and inviting) vision. Take a look at John Paul II's map for the Church in the new millenium, Novo Millennio Ineunte n.45:
Communion must be cultivated and extended day by day and at every level in the structures of each Church's life. There, relations between Bishops, priests and deacons, between Pastors and the entire People of God, between clergy and Religious, between associations and ecclesial movements must all be clearly characterized by communion. To this end, the structures of participation envisaged by Canon Law, such as the Council of Priests and the Pastoral Council, must be ever more highly valued. These of course are not governed by the rules of parliamentary democracy, because they are consultative rather than deliberative; yet this does not mean that they are less meaningful and relevant. The theology and spirituality of communion encourage a fruitful dialogue between Pastors and faithful: on the one hand uniting them a priori in all that is essential, and on the other leading them to pondered agreement in matters open to discussion. To this end, we need to make our own the ancient pastoral wisdom which, without prejudice to their authority, encouraged Pastors to listen more widely to the entire People of God. Significant is Saint Benedict's reminder to the Abbot of a monastery, inviting him to consult even the youngest members of the community: "By the Lord's inspiration, it is often a younger person who knows what is best". And Saint Paulinus of Nola urges: "Let us listen to what all the faithful say, because in every one of them the Spirit of God breathes".
The LA Times piece also highlights the tension between the new generation (faithful to John Paul II / attracted by his vision for the Church) and an older generation of priests more focused on ecumenism and social justice. Read on, in Novo Millennio Ineuente, about John Paul II's profound commitments to ecumenism, inter-faith dialogue - and at least in my read, social justice... It seems like there's something much more complex going on than the LA times article suggests.
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