A few days ago, Michael Perry linked to a recent review, by Villanova's Brett Wilmot, of Michael's latest book, "Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy." The review (and Michael's book) are worth reading. I particularly liked the opening line of Wilmot's review:
Change is afoot in the contemporary debate abou the proper role of religion in democratic politics. The ascendancy of Rawlsian liberalism may have finally passed its apex, and this has opened up the discussion considerably.
Amen.
Toward the end of his (generally enthusiastic) review, Wilmot voices his disagreement with Michael's view that not every liberal democracy has to have a non-establishment-of-religion requirement. Wilmot rejects the view that "non- or disestablishment of religion is not essential to the ideal of democracy." Wilmot believes that even a mild, Church-of-England-type establishment effectively sets up a "religious test on membership in the political community", and is therefore incompatible with liberal ideals of political deliberation and community. Wilmot expresses similar concerns about (what he takes to be) Michael's belief that even "the explicit affirmation of theism on the part of our government does not represent cause for concern." Wilmot insists that "government must not express its own legitimacy or the legitimacy of its laws and policies on sectarian grounds, and this precludes . . . even fairly generic references to God and religion as a basis for such legitimacy."
Now, in Michael's response to Wilmot's review, he takes care to emphasize their common ground, and does not elaborate on his own claims about liberalism, legitimacy, theism, etc., that cause Wilmot concern. Michael does insist, though, that -- in his view -- there can be "no religious test on membership in the political community."
I wonder if Michael would mind providing, for MOJ readers and bloggers, a bit more about how it is that a liberal state may speak about its own legitimacy and fundamental norms in religious terms (something that Michael's book on Human Rights discussed in detail), and may even authorize mild "establishments" of religion, without setting up what Wilmot fears, namely, a "religious test on membership in the political community."
Rick
Thursday, August 26, 2004
I think that many readers of this blog will be interested in the following essay--which, in my view, is excellent:
Stephen J. Pope, The Magisterium's Arguments Against "Same-Sex Marriage": An Ethical Analysis and Critique, Theological Studies, vol. 65, no. 3, September 2004, pp. 530-565.
Theological Studies, as many of you know, is published by Theological Studies, Inc., for the Society of Jesus in the United States. Stephen Pope is associate professor of theology at Boston College.
Michael
Many thanks to Greg for his reply (below). I agree that "in light of the uncertainties that surround the prospects for . . . doctrinal change [i.e., change in the constitutional law of abortion] anytime soon, . . . it's crucial to think about what it means to be a pro-life public official in a broader moral-political-legal context." And, I think that Greg's work is going a long way toward helping us do just that.
But again, the kind of reasoned-dialogue-in-pluralism that Greg discussed in his paper (and about which Murray wrote) -- a dialogue that aims at achieving a moral consensus that, at present, does not exist -- can never be truly realized if a mis-shapen constitutional law precludes, from the outset, the end-game desired by half of that dialogue's participants. In other words, this "reasoned dialogue" requires, in a strong sense, significant, democracy-enhancing revisions to our constitutional law and, therefore, careful attention to the judicial-selection process.
On another front, I received an e-mail from a friend, in response to Greg's essay and my own earlier post, that raised the following points:
I find that a lot of confusion, especially among Catholics, is caused by a failure to see that the law's refusal of protection to unborn human beings is a grave injustice analytically distinct from acts of abortion. Let me put it another way: A legislator who voted to allow slavery is committing an injustice even if this law results in no actual slavery; a permissive abortion regime is unjust in its treatment of the unborn even if there are no abortions in our society. So it is not the case that the pro-life movement should focus exclusively on reducing the incidence of abortion. The twin goals should be "welcomed in life" and "protected in law."
Second, . . . it would be appropriate for a politician who believes that a flat ban on abortion would be imprudent--a conclusion that itself has to be evaluated in light of the above imperative--to insist on getting better judges. But he could also support prudent pro-life legislation such as the partial-birth abortion ban (assuming he considers it prudent). The assumption here seems to be either that the Constitution protects a right to abortion or that legislators are bound by some legal or moral duty to act as though erroneous judicial findings to this effect were true. Neither is the case.
More food for thought . . .
Rick
I'm grateful to Rick for his thoughtful comments on my recent America essay. I'm in fundamental agreement with everything that he's said in his posting. My reference to abortion as a matter of constitutional right was meant only to note the current state of constitutional doctrine and the limits it places on what pro-life public officials are capable of doing through legislative efforts. As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, I would agree with Rick that our current constitutional law on abortion is a profound mistake, and, given the gravity of the moral issue involved, it is a profoundly tragic mistake. I would certainly welcome the appointment of judges who are open to permitting legislatures to meaningfully regulate abortion. Our hope for such a doctrinal development, though, has to be tempered by the recognition that predicting what judges will do once they are appointed to the federal bench is not an exact science. Moreover, I think the way in which both parties at the national level can make a judge's position on Roe a litmus test can itself polarize and paralyze the appointment process in ways that may have detrimental implications for the common good. In a related vein, central as the abortion issue no doubt is, it is only one aspect of the courts' business, and it's possible that a judge who might look like a sure vote to correct the Court's mistakes in Roe and Casey might distort other areas of doctrine. Working for a change in constitutional doctrine is certainly an essential part of a pro-life jurisprudential strategy, but in light of the uncertainties that surround the prospects for such doctrinal change anytime soon, I simply think it's crucial to think about what it means to be a pro-life public official in a broader moral-political-legal context.
