Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, September 22, 2016

Great opportunity at the Becket Fund

Check out the information, here, about the Constitutional Law Fellowship with the merry band of happy warriors at the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty:

The Becket Fund’s Constitutional Law Fellowship gives exceptional recent law clerks or law school graduates immediate, hands-on experience litigating cutting-edge constitutional cases. Under the mentorship of experienced Becket attorneys, fellows will participate in all aspects of trial and appellate litigation, gaining valuable experience in litigation strategy, research, writing, and oral advocacy. The fellowship is also an excellent stepping stone to a judicial clerkship, private practice, academia, or a permanent position with the Becket Fund.

Wednesday, September 21, 2016

My Take on "Religious Exemptions and Third-Party Harms"

Scholarship about religious-freedom exemptions from laws has increasingly focused on whether the existence of any "harms to third parties" is a ground for holding that an exemption is not required by religious freedom principles, or is perhaps even forbidden by the Establishment Clause. I've just published my analysis of the question, in the Federalist Society Review. A couple of excerpts:

The chief assertion of this article is that harms to others should not be conclusive against religious exemptions under either free exercise or nonestablishment principles. Such harms can certainly be a reason to deny exemption, but they are not the end of the inquiry: a number of factors must be considered. In particular, I argue, Establishment Clause limits on religious exemptions should not be strict. An exemption is not unconstitutional merely because it has negative effects on others: the burdens on others must be significantly disproportionate to the burdens that it removes from religion....

Under post-1937 constitutional jurisprudence, government has broad prima facie power to define, declare, and prohibit [legal] harms. The modern state is not limited to imposing liability for actual harmful effects; it may declare legal rights designed to head off such effects. And it may frame them as benefits or rights for individual third parties. For example, to prevent the ultimate material harms of labor strife and unfair treatment of employees, government can declare rights of employees to unionize and can allow individuals to sue to enforce the right.

But just because government can prima facie regulate does not mean it can do so in ways that substantially burden religious exercise. The very point of the freedoms listed in the Bill of Rights, including religious freedom, is to place limits on actions otherwise within the government’s power. If religious freedom confers no right to harm others, and the government can define anything it wishes as a harm, then the regulatory state will severely constrict religious freedom. For example, once Title VII and analogous laws defined various forms of discrimination as a legal harm to employees, religious organizations faced lawsuits triggering civil court review of their employment decisions concerning their clergy and other leaders. Their ability to choose their leaders was preserved only by a court-ordered religious exemption: the ministerial exception, affirmed in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC....

 If religious freedom is to continue receiving strong weight in an era of greatly expanded government, the existence of some harm to other individuals cannot be enough in itself to deny exemption or accommodation. On the other hand, harms to others certainly are grounds for limiting religious freedom in a number of circumstances.

... And then you read the rest to find out when. (I've done a longer version of the arguments here.)

Monday, September 19, 2016

A "Consistent Ethic of Life" Party

At Crux, Charlie Camosy has some thoughts about, and is developing a proposal regarding, a Consistent Ethic of Life (CLE) political party.  Way, way back, in the early days of MOJ, Dean Mark Sargent and others also speculated/hypothesized/ruminated about such a party.  He points out, among other things, that "we consistent ethic folks have a problem: there is no agreement about what a pro-life party with a consistent ethic should look like."  I agree.  (Like Charlie, but for some different reasons, I don't regard the American Solidarity Party as a promising venture or alternative to our current situation.)

(At least) two questions, it seems to me, would have to be "on the table":  One would be "what positions and policies would such a party have to address specifically, and what would it need to say about them?"  Another would be, "what positions, if taken or endorsed by another party, would preclude -- or, maybe, weigh heavily against -- an endorsement by the CLE party?"

I'm pretty sure the two-party system is here to stay, in the U.S., so this might all be, as they say, "academic"; still, its interesting to think about.  And, who knows:  I was pretty sure a year ago that the two major parties' nominees would be Joe Biden and Jeb Bush . . .       

Archbishop Chaput and Tocqueville

Perhaps this is very old news in our 24 hour news cycle, but MOJ readers who haven't yet read Archbishop Chaput Tocqueville Lecture at Notre Dame last week, should do so. It's a quick read but worth it-- and really, who would want to skip a lecture so named at a time in our nation's history when the great Frenchman's insights are so desperately needed? Democracy in America should be required reading these days -- or, if the tome is just too vast, maybe this forthcoming book would do? 

My favorite paragraph of Chaput's is this one -- really the Tocquevillian hermeneutic through which one can understand this election cycle, and really the ever-present threat to American democracy: 

People unwilling to rule their appetites will inevitably be ruled by them — and eventually, they’ll be ruled by someone else.  People too weak to sustain faithful relationships are also too weak to be free.  Sooner or later they surrender themselves to a state that compensates for their narcissism and immaturity with its own forms of social control.

 

Friday, September 16, 2016

Torts and Causation in the Right Way

As I write, first-year torts students across the country are learning that much of the law of negligence isn’t really “law” but is instead an accumulation of judgments about something called “policy” (often based on cost-benefit analysis) by courts about whether liability is appropriate. To think about, for example, whether a duty of care existed between this defendant and this plaintiff in any other way is a hopelessly naïve harkening back to the bad old days of privity and other retrograde concepts in cases like Winterbottom v. Wright (1842).

That all seems to me badly mistaken. It’s a legacy of the moral skepticism of Oliver Wendell Holmes and William Prosser to reject any vestige of formalism and regard torts as basically a utilitarian regulatory body of law. (That’s a rough characterization, but the details are persuasively spelled out by John Goldberg and Ben Zipurksy in The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733 (1998)). The great merit, among others, of the civil recourse view of Goldberg and Zipurksy is to rebut that skepticism and bring some legal structure back into the discussion of duties of care.

The same kind of argument can, I think, also be brought to bear on the element of proximate causation, though proximate cause is probably trickier than duty. I started thinking about this when I read a blog post from a while ago by Alexander Pruss on “causation in the right way:"

It's a medieval dictum that causes contain their effects. But that needs qualification. Causes in a sense contain their proper effects. They contain those proper effects as telê, and then some aspect of the effect--perhaps with cooperation or thwarting from other causes--just is an actualization of the cause with that telos. When all goes well, the whole of the teleologically specified effect is an actualization of the cause, but in aberrant cases, very little is....

....

[W]e could say that when x causes y in the right way, then being-an-actualization-of-x is an intrinsic feature of y, a feature that is causally involved in everything y does, and so when y causes z in the right way, z has the intrinsic feature of being-an-actualization-of-y, and we can go back down the chain to x. Perhaps this is what Aquinas means by per se ordered causal series.

This isn't the place for a complete account of how to map "causation in the right way" onto the element of proximate cause in torts, but I think that account would be a helpful corrective to so much blather in torts casebooks about proximate cause as a free-for-all policy judgment. And most importantly, as Pruss notes, such an account would "require[] a fairly non-reductive metaphysics of human beings."

Bernard Williams against "the efficient organization of happiness"

I’ve been reading a lot of Bernard Williams lately—partly for some professional reasons, partly out of sheer enjoyment and admiration for his bracing arguments. His critique of utilitarianism seems to me still underappreciated by legal scholars, but why that might be so and its importance are topics for another time. Here is a little bit from his essay “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” (from his 1973 collection Problems of the Self) discussing the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno--and with perhaps some important implications for law:

Unamuno reveals himself at equal removes from Manicheanism and from Utilitarianism; and that is correct, for the one is only the one-legged descendant of the other. That tradition – Manichean, Orphic, Platonic, Augustinian* – which contrasts the spirit and the body in such a sense that the spiritual aims at eternity, truth and salvation, while the body is adjusted to pleasure, the temporary, and eventual dissolution, is still represented, as to fifty per cent, by secular Utilitarianism: it is just one of the original pair of boots left by itself and better regarded now that the other has fallen into disrepair. Bodies are all that we have or are: hence for Utilitarianism it follows that the only focus of our arrangements can be the efficient organisation of happiness. Immortality, certainly, is out, and so life here should last as long as we determine – or eventually, one may suspect, others will determine – that it is pleasant for us to be around.

Unamuno’s outlook is at the opposite pole to this and whatever else may be wrong with it, it salutes the true idea that the meaning of life does not consist either in the management of satisfactions in a body or in an abstract immortality without one. On the one hand he had no time for Manicheanism, and admired the rather brutal Catholic faith which could express its hopes for a future life in the words which he knew on a tombstone in Bilbao:

Aunque estamos in polvo convertidos

zen Ti, Señor, nuestra esperanza fía,

que tomaremos a vivir vestidos

con la carne y la piel que nos cubria.**

Notes:

*I don’t think it's quite accurate to lump “Augustinian” into this set of views given Augustine's break (how much so is a long-running debate) from Manichaeism.

**Though we are become dust,

In thee, O Lord, our hope confides,

That we shall live again clad

In the flesh and skin that once covered us.

(Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life (1921), trans. J.E. Crawford Flitch)

Thursday, September 15, 2016

Secularism as Religion - Kirsanow and Eberstadt

The introductory pages of Commissioner Peter Kirsanow's important statement in the Peaceful Coexistence Report  resound in themes taken up by Mary Eberstadt in her new book, It's Dangerous to Believe: Religious Freedom and Its Enemies. Both Kirsanow and Eberstadt suggest that the difficult cultural and legal impasse we've reached between SOGI laws and religious liberty is so fraught because, at base, the conflict concerns competing "religious" beliefs, one secularist, the other Judeo-Christian. And as such, both are fundamentally identity-forming, especially as regards sexuality.

Kirsanow's statement at pages 43-4 of the report: 

The tension between religious liberty and nondiscrimination principles appears most acute when religious liberty and sexual liberty conflict....It is a conflict between two worldviews, both held with the intensity generally associated with religious belief. The first, which is secularism, holds an individual’s unfettered sexual self-expression as a preeminent concern because it is an aspect of their self-creation. This interest in the individual is now construed as a positive responsibility to ensure that everyone has the ability to engage in sexual conduct without cost or consequence, whether in money, unwanted children, or hurt feelings. An individual’s sexual behavior is considered an act of self-creation and something that goes to the deepest level of their identity. Criticism of an individual’s behavior is considered an attack on the dignity of the person. Naturally, this worldview is at odds with many aspects of traditional morality grounded in sexual restraint. 

Eberstadt makes the claim as to the religious character of the conflict more unequivocally: 

[I]t seems beyond dispute that progressive ideology shares recognizable features with Judeo-Christianity, even as it repudiates all traditionalists tenets that threaten its substitute theology. The bedrock of contemporary progressivism can only be described as quasi-religious. In sum, secularist progressivism today is less a political movement than a church....The so-called culture war...is [] a content of competing faiths: one in the Good Book, and the other in the more newly written figurative book of secularist orthodoxy about the sexual revolution.

And here, Kirsanow could be quoting Eberstadt (who, for example, compares embattled Christians to the victims of the Salem witch trials): "One reason for the bitterness surrounding the debate is that the secularists tend to make their interpretation mandatory for society. Because they consider the providentialist view a heresy, and often regard the non-elite adherents of the providentialist view with disdain, they are unwilling to allow different views to exist in different places." 

Kirsanow concludes his lengthy statement with the question Eberstadt suggests animates her book:  But why should secularists care about threats to religious freedom? 

Kirsanow's answer (read Eberstadt's book for hers!):  

Because if they destroy the moral and religious assumptions underpinning the idea of human dignity, they may accidentally destroy the idea of human dignity itself....As discussed earlier in this statement, the effort to force traditional religious believers to bow to certain sexual mores is really an attempt to replace the old faith with the new. But if the old faith is destroyed, and with it the idea of human dignity, the adherents of the new faith may rue the day they did so. Secularists may believe that they are simply expanding the idea of human dignity to encompass various important facets of human behavior, but in so doing they are destroying the foundation of the idea and are unlikely to find a similarly compelling basis. Revolutions often turn on their instigators. The Judeo Christian belief that man is created in the image of God, the imago Dei, undergirds Jefferson’s proclamation that “all men are created equal”. Despite the failures of its adherents, as is the case with any set of principles, this concept is the root of the traditional Christian belief that people are ends, not means, and that therefore every person - male, female, black, white, disabled, gay, straight - is inherently dignified, despite his undoubted sins and perhaps seemingly dubious prospect of salvation. Without that foundation, the idea that everyone has equal dignity is little more than a polite fiction to be brushed aside for greater convenience.

As perhaps an example of the transformative influence of imago Dei in Christian sensibilities, Kirsanow offers the Christian response to slavery in a later rebuttal statement in the report. It too is well worth quoting: 

Of course, there were Christian slave owners in America. That is indeed a repugnant period in American and Christian history but, unfortunately, unremarkable when viewed in the context of history as a whole. Slavery has been an almost universal institution. It is the abolition of slavery, largely because of individuals motivated by their Christianity, that is unusual. So, it is peculiar that the Chairman singles out Christianity for opprobrium in regard to slavery. Slavery has existed in almost every society and among the adherents of almost every major religion. But it was only in the Christian world that a serious critique of slavery arose. Those Christians who supported slavery were utterly unremarkable in the sweep of human affairs, no better or worse than millions of others throughout history. In contrast, it is remarkable, perhaps even astonishing, that there were Christians who rose far above the historical propensities of humankind to call for abolition as a religious and moral imperative. 

 

It was the self-avowed Christian British Empire that initially ended its own involvement in the international slave trade and then acted to curtail the slave trade within the Muslim world. As the Middle Eastern scholar J.B. Kelley wrote: "No movement of any consequence towards abolition ever arose of its own accord in the Muslim world; it was the reproach of Muslim slavery, not Christian, that men and boys were castrated for service in the harim; and it was a Christian nation, Britain, which led the campaign to end the Arab slave trade and to compel Muslim rulers to forbid it to their subjects. . . . It was [British officials], after all, who led the Arab tribes of the Persian Gulf to cease trading in their fellow Muslims, the Somalis."

 

Religious believers were also in the forefront of the civil rights movement. Of course, the most prominent leaders of the civil rights movement were disproportionately Christian ministers - Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, Rev. Ralph David Abernathy, Rev. C.K. Steele. Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, perhaps our own Commission’s most renowned member, was among them. “More than 900 Catholics participated in the Selma protests” and a log of out of town participants in the Selma protests included “140 priests, 50 sisters, 29 ministers, four rabbis” [footnote omitted.] 

He concludes his statement quite gracefully, and for those of us living in this post-Roe era, most presciently, one thinks: 

A sense of modesty, humility, and perspective should temper our remarks about those who lived before us. We are all creatures of our own time, our minds and attitudes shaped by influences and assumptions of which we are largely unaware, our actions constrained by weighty responsibilities and unacknowledged self-interest. We all like to think that had we lived in the past we would be among the few righteous. But history is plain - the visionary righteous are few. Most of us are far more likely to have subscribed to the conventional wisdom of our time, or in good faith to have been unable to see our way clear to what is now considered self-evident. We cannot know the reasons future generations will condemn us. All we can know is that they will indeed condemn us, and hope that they judge us with more charity than the Chairman does our predecessors. 

 

Saint John Paul II . . . patron of alpinists?

I love this . . . 

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Bruce Frohnen on "Constitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law"

I invited Prof. Bruce Frohnen to write up a few words about his and George Carey's new bookConstitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law, which I think might be of interest to MOJ readers:

For decades I argued with my late friend and colleague, Georgetown political scientist George Carey, over whether the American Constitution is a dead letter. George thought it was dead. I still believe it is not quite dead. This limited disagreement rests on a more fundamental shared understanding that is at the heart of our recently released book: American political actors no longer respect their Constitution or the institutions, beliefs, and practices that until recently supported it and were supported by it in turn.

The theme of our book is that America’s unwritten constitution—that combination of traditions, legal structures, and political customs that shape a people’s public life—no longer fits the Constitution as written. This will come as no surprise to most students of constitutional government, but its implications have long been minimized or ignored. Our Constitution was designed for a free and virtuous people leading their lives within largely self-governing families, churches, and various local associations. Our national government now is run by and for elites committed to transforming society through mechanisms intrinsically hostile to the limited government dictated by the Constitution’s plain language.

Defenders of the current regime habitually dismiss defenders of our constitutional republic as retrograde yokels pining for a bygone era of horses, buggies, and institutionalized oppression. It is time to look beyond such self-serving obfuscations to the source and effects of the hostility toward constitutional, procedural, and legal restraints on which our current regime is based.

From Woodrow Wilson, through Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and to this day, Progressives have demanded that the “deadlock of democracy” be broken. They have sought to undermine constitutional restraints on centralized power in the name of “doing the people’s business.” That “business” has been establishing a new order under which administrative experts will protect individuals from want, prejudice, and disapproved hierarchies.

The Framers’ Constitution aims to provide specific, limited public goods, most especially the mediation of disputes among more fundamental associations and political units—those associations and units within which people may pursue good lives in common as self-governing, free people. That Constitution maintained the rule of law and ordered liberty through formal structures and procedures requiring development of supermajority support for most significant policy changes. As the Framers knew, the Constitution’s formal structures cannot function without a supporting constitutional morality emphasizing restraint and acceptance of formal limitations on power. Checks and balances limited arbitrary power only to the extent they were applied moderately and for limited, moderate goals.

Progressivism delegitimized this constitutional morality by presenting the people’s will as the sole source of political legitimacy and by propagating the myth of a “living constitution.” Living constitutionalists claim to seek the best in our Constitution by deriving abstract principles (equality and popular sovereignty) from it, then re-defining constitutional, legal, and governmental practice accordingly. Missing in this rosy picture is the rule of law essential for popular self-government. Progressives’ hostility toward constitutional restraint has produced a system in which Congress no longer makes laws, instead “enabling” executive agencies to do so. Their judges no longer adjudicate under law, instead approving or nullifying laws, institutions, and entire traditions according to their own ideological prejudices. Progressive and even putatively conservative Presidents no longer execute laws, instead ruling by decrees including executive orders suspending immigration laws and legislative signing statements establishing new federal agencies.

The result is a regime of quasi-law. Ignoring the essential nature of a constitution as rules for the making of rules, dispensing with the separation of powers as inconvenient, and rejecting their duty to restrain both their institutional rivals and themselves from overreaching, political actors today issue directives, from whatever branch of government, that have the form and effect of law, but lack essential legal characteristics. We examine these directives in terms of Lon Fuller’s elements necessary for law’s internal morality. They lack generality, being crafted for individuals or interest groups. They fail to provide notice to the ruled because they may come from any (or all) sources of political power. They lack clarity because they allow administrators largely unlimited discretion. They are inconsistent with one another and change radically over time. And they are administered in a manner that differs wildly from that in which they are declared. Consequently, we or our associations must “plea bargain” if charged with violations; we must seek waivers from unworkable regulatory schemes; and we must appeal to the political prejudices of particular judges to defend rights (including that to self-government) guaranteed by the Constitution. From citizens we quickly are becoming subjects of a lawless regime.

This electoral season gives scant reason to hope for re-establishing a genuine rule of law. But it is important to note that we have slid this far into a regime ruled by decree through decades of misunderstanding and constitutional corruption. At root the problem is that we demand too much from our central government and too little from ourselves, as individual persons and as members of more local, fundamental associations. Lawyers and political scientists bear particular responsibility for our dilemma because they have cast aside the model of constitutionalism on which our political tradition was built in favor of one that flatters their view of themselves as experts capable of designing a more fair and just society. But just order cannot be commanded from the political center; it must grow from people’s more natural associations. The character of a people is rooted in its culture, not its politics. And if politics is made the master of culture, our political leaders will become our masters, and our freedom will disappear. Specific reforms are simple to find, for they entail use of the tools (especially the powers of veto, impeachment, and removal from office) already provided by our Constitution as written. But any possibility of improvement requires acceptance of the fact that free governments can only exist within constitutional orders that limit, separate, and aim political power in the interests of associations more natural and fundamental than the central government.

Thanks, and congrats, Bruce!

Wednesday, September 14, 2016

McGurn responds to the (really bad) USCCR report

Here.  A taste:

The commission report is called “Peaceful Coexistence: Reconciling nondiscrimination principles with civil liberties.” Its top finding is this: “Civil rights protections ensuring nondiscrimination, as embodied in the Constitution, laws, and policies, are of pre-eminent importance in American jurisprudence.”

Translation: Nuisances including the First Amendment’s “free exercise” of religion guarantee take a back seat to the rapidly multiplying non-discrimination causes such as the “right” to coerce any baker you want into baking the cake you want for your same-sex wedding.

In her own submission to the report, the commission’s Gail Heriot pinpoints the flaw in the finding. A University of San Diego law professor, Ms. Heriot says she could easily imagine a case for Mr. Castro’s position. But instead of an argument, she says, the commission offers a decree.

“By starting with an assertion that antidiscrimination laws are ‘pre-eminent,’ she writes, “the Commission’s analysis essentially begins with its conclusion. Why should anyone accept it? The Commission said so.”

I recommend readers take a look at the excellent dissenting statements from Commissioners Kirsanow and Heriot, and also the expert statements that were submitted by, among others, Prof. Michael Helfand and Prof. John Inazu.