Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, September 23, 2004

Abu Ghraib and the Moral Lawyer

Much of my writing focuses on the relationship between a lawyer's own moral identity and her practice of law. On that theme, I have a new paper posted in the column on the right titled Tortured Ethics: Abu Ghraib and the Moral Lawyer. Here's the abstract:

By appearing to offer a legal justification of torture, attorneys at the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel stand accused of facilitating the government’s mistreatment of prisoners held in the war against terrorism. This article seeks to place attorneys’ complicity in the prisoner abuse scandal into a broader professional context, exploring the purported amorality that serves as the foundation for the infamous “torture memorandum” and, more broadly, for the ethical paradigms under which American lawyers operate every day. Specifically, the article argues that attorneys’ own moral convictions are inexorably part of the interpretive dynamic that makes the attorney-client dialogue possible, whether acknowledged by the attorney or not. When the attorney’s advice is pitched in exclusively legal terms – as was the torture memorandum – the moral component is not erased, but rather is forced into the background, where it is not susceptible to exploration by the client. As such, the lawyer’s interpretive morality is neither challenged nor endorsed by the client; it simply holds sway over the course of representation. In this regard, the amorality of legal advice is a fiction, but not a harmless fiction, for it facilitates the tendency of clients to equate legality with permissibility. This article traces the paths by which attorneys’ own moral convictions can be brought to the surface of the attorney-client dialogue.

Feedback, as always, is welcome.

Rob

Subsidiarity as Subversion

I have a new paper titled Subsidiarity as Subversion: Local Power, Legal Norms, and the Liberal State, which is posted under my name in the right-hand column. The paper starts with the observation that subsidiarity seems to be a doctrine that is endlessly moldable, depending on one's preexisting view of society's proper organization, as witnessed through its invocation by actors as diverse as Catholic social progressives, the European Union and the Bush Administration. In reality, though:

Subsidiarity’s seeming vacuity arises only when the doctrine is shorn from its surrounding web of truth claims; therein lies its vulnerability to secular domestication. This article seeks to recapture the radical edge of subsidiarity by reconnecting its localizing framework with the substantive anthropological vision of solidarity. Understood in this context, subsidiarity reveals itself as a proposition that is fundamentally subversive to the hyperindividualist norms espoused and increasingly enforced by the liberal state. Specifically, subsidiarity calls for individuals and communities to recognize the objective value of the human person as they strive to meet the needs of those around them.

This call stands in direct opposition to modern America’s brand of liberalism, which appears to value consumer autonomy above all else and increasingly seems willing to collectivize its consumerist norms by legally precluding the exercise of moral agency by providers of certain goods and services. In this regard, the maintenance of subsidiarity’s framework will require a vigorous defense of moral autonomy beyond that of the consumer. This takes us into the realm of value pluralism, for the surrounding society’s emerging conception of the common good appears unlikely to embrace such a defense. In other words, for subsidiarity to continue facilitating the common good as conceived of by Catholic social teaching, society must be persuaded to make room for multiple conceptions of the good, not simply seek to collectivize the Church’s anthropologically authentic conception.

I welcome any feedback on my argument. For those interested, I'll be presenting the paper on October 8 at Villanova's Conference on Catholic Social Thought and the Law.

Rob

Wednesday, September 22, 2004

Some interesting church-state news

Amy Welborn has several interesting and provocative posts up, including this one on a clergy-abuse lawsuit in Calfornia ("Arguing for the church, lawyer Paul Gaspari said the Constitution forbade punishing the church for the standards it sets for the ordination of priests.'), and this one, dealing with the efforts of the "Interfaith Alliance" to identify churches that, in the Alliance's view, are violating their obligations under the federal tax laws by endorsing political candidates.

Rick

K. Woodward on Cuomo and Abortion

The current issue of Commonweal includes this article, by Kenneth Woodward: "Catholics, Politics, and Abortion." Woodward notes, with respect to Gov. Mario Cuomo's famous "Notre Dame speech", that:

At this point it is worth noting what Cuomo did not say, as well as what he did. Never once did he say that abortion was evil, intrinsically or otherwise. Never once did he say-as the bishops had, as he himself could have-that opposition to abortion as a matter of public morality is a defense of the human rights of the unborn. Never once did he say the abortion dispute is a disagreement over the scope of social justice. He did not say these things, and never has, I believe, because doing so would make his position difficult if not impossible to defend. He did not say these things, and never has, because, as I think his record makes clear, he does not believe them to be true.

Here is Gov. Cuomo's response. He writes, among other things:

I am not a philosopher or theologian, or even a gifted writer on religion who can, on my own, arrive at sure conclusions about when life as a human being begins. I am an old-fashioned Catholic sinner who needs my church desperately and who chooses to live by my church’s rules because my Catholicism is based on faith and not pure intellect. That faith is strong enough to keep me Catholic, but surely a willingness to believe what I cannot myself prove is no basis on which to build a consensus of Americans (even Catholic Americans) in favor of a ban on all abortions from conception on, even to save the life of the mother.

Rick

Tuesday, September 21, 2004

Asking the State to save the Church

According to this news story, "[r]esidents eager to preserve the open space and architecture of Our Lady Help of Christians Catholic church packed the Town House Monday night in an attempt to convince the Board of Selectmen to protect the site from development." OLHC is a parish that the Archdiocese of Boston has slated for closing. As many MOJ readers likely already know, there have been movements in several Boston parishes to resist the closure decisions. I understand that the parish-closing issue is difficult and controversial, but I cannot help thinking that it is a bad idea for parishioners to turn to the State, and ask government officials to (in effect) threaten to take Church property, in an effort to try to pressure Bishop O'Malley into changing his mind about this (or any other) parish closing.

Rick

Guilt by Association

Eugene Volokh has sparked an interesting discussion (here, here and here) regarding Christians' obligation to condemn the inflammatory anti-gay rhetoric of figures like Jimmy Swaggart. (Swaggart essentially asserted that he would be justified in killing a homosexual.)

Volokh suggests that, as members of a movement built around a common set of beliefs, Christians should police their fellow members to ensure against public stances contradicting those beliefs, or at least to avoid leaving the impression that those stances are acceptable within the movement. I agree completely that Swaggart's statement is beyond the pale, and should be repeatedly and openly labeled as such by Christians. But the broader hesitation to condemn loose cannons like Swaggart, Falwell and Robertson may stem in part from the nature of the evangelical Christian movement. Evangelicals are defined in significant part by their insistence that biblical interpretation and application is properly undertaken by the individual believer within the context of her personal spiritual journey. Certainly some community standards will hold sway, to varying degrees, but their authority is secondary, especially when evangelicals are compared to other faith traditions. In this regard, many evangelicals don't voice their objections to outliers like Swaggart, not because they believe he speaks the truth, but because they defer to his individual interpretive prerogative. Disagreement among evangelicals is not generally a cause for discipline or condemnation; it's an inescapable dimension of the movement.

On an unrelated point, Swaggart may offer some insight, or at least cause for reflection, on the controversy over certain bishops' threats to deny communion to pro-choice Catholic politicians. If Swaggart were Catholic and persisted in espousing a belief that the murder of gays is justified, should he be denied communion? My tentative answer is no, but if we're concerned with sending a clear message that a Christian's willful denial of central tenets of the faith will not be ignored by the surrounding Christian community, isn't the denial of communion an effective and powerful way to communicate that disapproval? Or is it enough to voice the community's objections without calling into question the individual's standing within the community? Perhaps it's relevant that Swaggart is a minister of the faith, not a secular actor in the public sphere. But doesn't the Christian community have a pressing concern to communicate disapproval of any publicly visible Christian's open disregard of Christian beliefs? I don't pretend to have the answers to these questions, but if we expect the Christian community to take seriously its members' espousal of un-Christian positions, we can't presume to pick and choose the positions that warrant such treatment.

Rob

Monday, September 20, 2004

Nathan Hatch on "The Weight of Glory"

Notre Dame's provost, Nathan Hatch, delivered this (I thought) moving and provocative talk after the opening Mass at the University this year. Hatch's remarks built on observations by David Brooks and C.S. Lewis (!) to remind the students that:

Your identity does not derive from how successful you are. All of us, from the top of the class to the bottom, derive our tremendous worth because God, our creator, knows our name, calls us sons and daughters, and takes joy in our own unique gifts. Who you are does not rest on a fickle ability to write brilliantly, to solve the experiment correctly, or climb the organizational ladder.

My second word of advice is this: living in a pressure cooker of achievement, how do we view our neighbors. Our reactions are often twofold, to envy those who seem more gifted and to look past people who seem ordinary. In his recent book on envy, Joseph Epstein notes that envy runs high in the world of art and intellect. “How little it takes to make one academic sick with envy over the pathetically small advantages won by another: the better office, the slightly lighter teaching load, the fickle evaluation of students.”

What is the answer to resenting those who break the curve and ignoring others who seem uninteresting? In his essay, The Weight of Glory, C. S. Lewis asks us to attend to a proper theology of the human person. He challenges us with the awesome reality of the human person, bearers of the very image of God. “There are no ordinary people,” he concludes. You have never talked to a mere mortal. Nations, cultures, arts, civilization––these are mortal, and their life is to ours as the life of a gnat. But it is immortals whom we joke with, work with, marry, snub, exploit. Next to the Blessed Sacrament itself,” he continues, “your neighbor is the holiest object presented to your senses.”

In this academic community, during the coming year, may all of our work be leavened by this reality: Neither you nor your neighbor is an ordinary person.

I've always loved Lewis's "The Weight of Glory." In my view, the observations that "there are no ordinary people" and that, indeed, "your neighbor is the holiest object presented to your senses" are beautiful -- and jurisprudentially significant.

Rick

"The Marriage Shibboleth"

Here is a thought-provoking essay, by Professor Daniel Crane of Cardozo School of Law, on the "marriage debate." Crane's discussion reminds me of some of the things that Paul Griffiths has had to say on the matter (Here's an essay of Griffiths's in Commonweal). Crane (who identifies as an evanglical Christian) writes:

With same-sex marriage licenses pouring out of City Hall in San Francisco before they were declared invalid, state courts inundated with claims of entitlement to same-sex marriage, a federal constitutional amendment proposed to define marriage as a heterosexual union, and the presidential candidates trying to mollify as many constituencies as possible on this hot potato, same-sex marriage certainly has our attention. Indeed, it's becoming a shibboleth.

A shibboleth is a single issue by which a political candidate or party is judged. The word comes from the biblical story of Jephthah and the Gileadites in Judges 12:4-6. Jephthah had routed Israel's foes from Ephraim and was determined to cut them down to the last man. The Ephraimites weren't obviously distinguishable from the Gileadites by physical appearance, and some tried to sneak through Jephthah's lines. So Jephthah devised a clever test: Any man trying to ford the Jordan was required to say the Hebrew word shibboleth, which means "a torrent of water." Since the Ephraimites mispronounced the word as sibboleth, they were easily identified and slaughtered.

When it comes to politics, we evangelicals love our shibboleths. There is a certain convenience in evaluating political candidates, organizations, and movements by their stand on some discrete social issue—think abortion, creationism, and Prohibition. Though reductionist, the shibboleth approach isn't necessarily irrational. If the shibboleth follows closely from a particular worldview, then it may be a reliable predictor about how the candidate, organization, or movement will react to other issues that people haven't had time to think or ask about.

But, before using a shibboleth, we had better be certain that it accurately encapsulates our worldview. The costs of choosing an improper shibboleth are high. Since the purpose of shibboleths is to create a broad rule of action by generalizing from a narrow assumption, error on the assumption means multiplication of the error many times over.

This is why I believe same-sex marriage is a dangerous shibboleth: It reinforces the status of government as the custodian of the institution of marriage. If the church not only abets but actively furthers the notion that marriage owes its legitimacy to the state's approval, then the battle for the family is all but lost.

He concludes his discussion with the following:

None of this should be taken as an argument that the law should recognize same-sex civil unions. There may be important functional (as opposed to moral) reasons why such recognition would be unwise. Nor should a separation of civil and religious marriage lessen our concern over the recent conduct of activist judges and mayors who have tried to impose their own political vision by judicial or executive fiat, contrary to the clear rules established by state legislatures.

But neither should we escalate the culture war by making this debate into a battle for the heart and soul of marriage. If we do that, we concede that the state owns marriage and that the church's function in blessing unions is subservient to the government's. Far better to lose the battle over the legal definition of marriage than to win it and find that the government now owns one of our most sacred institutions.

Rick

The New Property?

Jessica Wilen Berg, a law prof at Case Western, has a new paper titled "Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses." (Thanks to Larry Solum's blog for the tip.) The title pretty much says it all, as confirmed by the abstract:

Embryos are all over the news. According to the New York Times there are currently 400,000 frozen embryos in storage. Headlines proclaim amazing advances in our understanding of embryonic stem cells. And legislation involving cloning and embryos continues to be hotly debated. Despite the media attention, theoretical analysis of embryos' legal status is lacking.

This article advances a number of novel arguments. First, recognition of property interests does not preclude the recognition of personhood interests. Embryos, fetuses and children may be both persons and property. Second, property law is conceptually more suited to resolving debates about embryos than procreative liberty, as the latter is strongest in those cases where procreation has not yet occurred - e.g., sterilization and contraception. Finally, this article is the first to provide a substantive evaluation of the application of property theories.

The approach is sure to challenge commentators on all sides of the debate. For those who argue that embryos and fetuses are persons, the strong property interests will likely be unpalatable. Similarly, the implications of the combined framework for limiting those property rights as the entity develops will likely be unacceptable to advocates of extensive procreative choice during pregnancy. Nevertheless, this framework provides a more accurate understanding of the legal issues, and therefore may facilitate the eventual resolution of the protracted battle regarding the legal status of embryos and fetuses.

Rob

A Shift in Journalistic Sensitivities?

Get Religion has an interesting post on the media's coverage of the death of an "unborn child" in the wake of Hurricane Ivan.

Rob