Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, October 7, 2004

Intrinsic Evil: Sense and Sensibility

Behind the scenes, Susan and I have continued the exchange on "intrinsic evil."

We agreed that discussion about the theological concept of intrinsic evil certainly does not preclude a prudential political analysis about the means to reduce the evil - but current political debates often skip this second step. One reason for this may be that candidates who emphasize the moral categories are significantly weaker on the more practical and prudential aspects of the political analysis.

However, there is a second element. While one side in this debate tends to emphasize moral categories and ignore practical and prudential aspects of the policy analysis, the other side tends to be unwilling to entertain the moral dimensions at all. As Susan put it so well, "I think you have to have two sides willing to discuss the issue in moral terms before the issues of effectiveness of approach will make it to the table." (On abortion, for example, if the party line is that nothing less than total free access to abortion under all circumstances can even be on the table, many are not about to engage in a discussion of effectiveness of achieving the moral aim.)

Perhaps this is, in some ways, an expression of what David Brooks in his 10/2/04 NY Times oped framed as a tension between "Sense and Sensibility." He saw in last week’s debates not so much "a clash of ideologies, or a clash of cultures. It was a clash of two different sorts of minds. . . . The atmosphere of Kerry's mind is rationalistic. He thinks about how to get things done. He talks like a manager or an engineer. The atmosphere of Bush's mind is more creedal or ethical. He talks about moral challenges. He talks about the sort of personal and national character we need in order to triumph over our enemies. His mind is less coldly secular than Kerry's, but also more abstracted from day-to-day reality."

"Each cast of mind comes with its own strengths and weaknesses. The mechanically minded Kerry is much better at talking about realities like securing the Iraqi border. On the other hand, he is unable to blend his specific proposals into guiding principles. . . . . Bush, by contrast, is steadfast and resolute. But his weakness is statecraft. That is the task of relating means to ends, of orchestrating the institutions of government to achieve your desired goals. Bush sometimes acts as if it's enough for a president to profess his faith. But a coach can't just dream up a game plan. He has to understand what his specific players can and can't do, and adapt to those realities."

Yet another example of the need for variety in political parties and political perspectives - and the potential in the course of the exchange to balance each other out?

Amy & Susan

Wednesday, October 6, 2004

"Other Moral Issues"

Although addresses matters that don't fall into the category of "intrinsic evil," this Food First factsheet comparing Kerry and Bush's position on issues of hunger, homelessness, poverty and healthcare may be of interest to MOJ readers.

--Susan

Novitiate Notes

A former student at Notre Dame Law School, Joe Koczera, nSJ, has a blog going about his experiences and reflections in the novitiate of the Chicago Province of the Society of Jesus. We explore, at Mirror of Justice, the possibility and content of Catholic Legal Theory; Joe is setting out on a far more challenging, and important, vocation. Even if you don't read the blog, keep him in your prayers.

Rick

Saint Karl, Europe, and Christianity

This column includes some interesting thoughts about the significance of the canonization on Sunday of Karl I, the last emperor of Austria-Hungary.

Karl was crowned in 1916 as his empire, in league with Germany, found itself on the losing side of World War I. His best-known act on the throne was his failed attempt to negotiate an early peace with the Allies, separate from Kaiser Wilhelm II. The effort failed and, when both states surrendered in 1918, Karl was deposed and his Hapsburg dynasty ended.

Describing Karl, a Vienna-based correspondent for the Chicago Sun-Times observed: "Some think he's already a saint for seeking a peaceful end to World War I. Others think he's a scoundrel for commanding troops who used poison gas." He died, exiled, in 1922.

The author offers some thoughts about the possible "political" motivations behind Karl's canonization, noting that "the making of saints has always been political as well as religious":

In April, a Vatican official praised Karl as a leader who "looked for peace." On Sunday, the Pope described Karl as a role model "for those who have political responsibility in Europe today." The pope, of course, has opposed the Iraq war.

But the significance of a future Saint Karl is even deeper, because it speaks to the pope's desire to retain a certain churchly influence on politics. More than any other dynasty in Europe, the Hapsburgs - who at one time ruled Spain, Italy and Germany as well as Austria - were the church's closest allies in Europe. In battles with Muslims, Protestants and secular radicals, the Hapsburgs were steadfast in their Catholicism.

The author then brings the matter back to whether the European Union should include any reference to God, let alone to Europe's Christian traditions:

The mostly secular nations of Europe, led by France, oppose such a mention. The pope, on the other hand, has lobbied for "a clear reference to God and the Christian faith." So far, the Church has been losing, but Karl's beatification is a sign that it hasn't given up. The Hapsburg name recalls the days when Europe was Christendom and Christendom was Europe.

We've talked and thought a lot, on this blog, about "religion in the public square", "public religion", and Christendom. While I tend to be disappointed -- if only for reasons of historical honesty -- by many prominent Europeans' reluctance to state the obvious, and while I tend to be (very) sympathetic with the Pope's concerns regarding the seeming loss of faith in Europe, I wonder if the Catholicism of the Hapsburgs is really the model for what we -- or the Pope -- would like to see Europe re-claim? Even if we think, during a particular period, the Empire's established Catholicism was important in protecting the Church itself, I don't think (and I don't think the Pope thinks) that it could serve as a template for the future.

So, what should a re-Christianized Europe -- a post, post-Christian Europe? -- look like, if we assume that it would and should not look like the Austria-Hungarian Empire?

Recommended Reading

Some very interesting, relevant pieces in this week's COMMONWEAL, Oct. 8, 2004.

For the editorial, "The Rich Get Richer," click here.

For "Misreading the Pope," by Daniel Finn (a long review of Is the Market Moral? by Rebecca M. Blank and William McGurn), see pp. 23-27. (Not available online.)

(I'd love to know what Steve Bainbridge thinks of those two pieces.)

Last, but certainly not least, there is a terrific article by MOJ's own Vince Rougeau: "Politics & Communion: A Bishop's Response to Segregationists," pp. 17-19. (Not available online.)

Michael P.

Welcome, Susan!

I am delighted to introduce our newest blogista, Susan Stabile of St. John's Law, who debuted this morning with a couple of thoughtful posts. Her bio can be found thru her link on the sidebar. Welcome, Susan.

PS My menial administrative duties have kept me from being able to respond to the two Mikes' contributions to the SGP thread, and to Amy's fascinating post on the intrinsic evil idea. I will try to do so today if our faculty meeting does not leave me drooling and insensate.

-Mark

Catholic Charities and Contraception Coverage

Like Rick, I think it is no surprise that the Supreme Court refused cert. in the Catholic Charities case, just as the decision of the California Supreme Court was no surprise. (Given the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, it is hard to see how the court could have come out otherwise.) Nonetheless, I agree that the decision creates difficult and important issues. I published a short essay discussing these issues at 43 Catholic Lawyer 169 (2004). My more detailed discussion of those issues will appear in a forthcoming issue of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. The current version of that piece has just been posted here.

Intrinsic Evil vs. Other Moral Issues

I agree with Amy that merely labeling something as an intrinsic evil is not helpful in terms of casting votes, precisely becuase it ignores the question of effectiveness of course of action. Labeling something intrinsically evil does not mean there are not prudential judgments involved in determining how to eradicate that evil. That a candidate agrees with me that abortion is immoral does not mean I agree with the candidate about how to address that immorality.
Still, that does not make the distinction irrelevent for voting purposes in that it at least helps establish a hierarchy of issues on which one will evaluate a candidate (which evaluation will include the candidate's means of addressing the intrincis evil) and has something to say about the strength with which one insists that the moral value be addressed in public policy debates.

Tuesday, October 5, 2004

Intrinsic Evil: Help Me Out

In response to Steve’s post, “Some things matter more than others” - let’s take as a given that “Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia” – or as some have put it, these are “intrinsic evils” – as compared with areas requiring some prudential judgment in their application (such as capital punishment and war).

It’s not crystal clear to me what this means for political life – and especially for the decision about how to cast one’s vote. To cite that abortion is an intrinsic evil, as if that then clinches the argument on how to vote, seems to skip a few steps – regarding the function of law and the formation of public policy.

In fact, it seems that the heart of voting in many ways is all about those issues which do require prudential judgment – and in choosing the person whose prudential judgment you trust more.

It’s also not clear to me that just because an issue requires some prudential judgment in its application it is therefore “less important” than other issues. For example, perhaps capital punishment is one of those areas – but it seems that the state’s execution of an innocent person, to take an extreme case, or on the basis of a system that is racially discriminatory, is not therefore “less important” – and certainly not less tragic and less disturbing than an abortion. In fact, if we consider how this example touches on the role and power of the government in ways that are more direct than the series of decisions which lead to an abortion, it could also be more disturbing. Or to take a more complex case (perhaps), I’m just not clear on how a mistaken application of the just war principles – e.g., failure to insure that war was truly a “last resort” – is any less important or less tragic than abortion.

I don’t mean to downplay the moral tragedy of abortion or the importance in political life of clearly identifying abortion as an intrinsic evil. However, translating this conviction and concern into a legal agenda and specific public policy requires a few additional steps – and these steps do seem to involve prudential judgment about what would be the most effective course of action to reduce abortion and increase respect for life in our society.

So other than insuring that we understand something is really bad, how does that fact that something is an intrinsic evil advance the political anlaysis?

These are really honest questions – does anyone know of a good analysis of how the moral category of “intrinsic evil” is connected with political judgments and voting in particular – that can answer some of these questions?

Amy

Public Religious Displays: America and France Compared

In this essay, Bishop Thomas Curry discusses the recent controversies surrounding the seal of the City of Los Angeles, drawing on the turmoil in France surrounding Muslim headscarves in schools.

These thoughts were, I thought, particularly interesting:

In America, government is mandated to stay within the bounds of its own specified secular role. As the Supreme Court has stated, it may not invade the realm of "intellect and spirit." For example, it may not sponsor prayers in public schools, but individuals or groups may engage in religious activity on public school property, just as other groups or clubs do. The government may not define what religious freedom is or what it is not, or what constitute religious values. Those are rights reserved to the people.

France gave government power to separate Church and State. America excluded power over religion from government altogether, and left people free. Until judges and other commentators return to the American model of religious freedom, the present disarray in Church-State relations will continue.

Rick