Mark Roche claimed that the Democratic Party was, in fact, the pro-life Party because the Democrats had, despite their enthusiastic embrace of abortion rights, had more success in reducing the abortion rates than had the Republicans. Readers who are interested in this issue might want to take a look at this article by Professor Michael New, or at this information on the National Right to Life Committee website. According to these articles, "the success of pro-life candidates has resulted in real reductions in the abortion rate," in the words of Professor New.
Thursday, October 28, 2004
which is the pro-life party?
Challenges to Tax-Exempt Status
The issue of tax-exempt status of religious organizations is is not one to which I've given a lot of thought, but I note that Catholics for a Free Choice has filed its second complaint asking the IRS to revoke the tax-exempt status of an archdiocese, claiming violation of public charity status based on the archdioceses' efforts to influence voters. This latest was filed against the Archdiocese of St. Louis; the first was filed against the Achdiocese of Denver. Akthough I haven't read the complaint, and as unhappy as I have been at the behavor of some bishops, it is hard for me to see how there is any merit to the claim.
--Susan
Notre Dame Erasmus Lectures
If you are near South Bend, consider attending these lectures, on "Islam and Christianity," offered by Gerhard Böwering, S.J., Professor of Islamic Studies at Yale University.
Rick
Ratzinger on Islam, Europe, and Secularism
We've talked a lot on this blog about the pluralism / democracy / religious freedom cluster of issues. In light of our conversations on these matters, I thought this story -- about Cardinal Ratzinger's recent remarks on the effort to include an explicit mention of Christianity in the constitution of the European Union -- was interesting.
Rick
Wednesday, October 27, 2004
Something to think about: Adam Smith on infanticide
When I first read this passage, a few weeks ago, I thought: Hmmm--has a contemporary relevance, doesn't it?
"[T]he murder of new-born infants was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians; and whenever the circumstance of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger, or to wild beasts, was regarded without blame or censure.... Uninterrupted custom had by this time so thoroughly authorized the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world tolerated this barbarous prerogative, but even the doctrine of philosophers, who ought to have been more just and accurate, was led away by the established custom, and upon this, as upon many other occasions, instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched consideration of public utility. Aristotle talks of it as what magistrates ought upon many occasions to encourage. Plato is of the same opinion, and, with all that love of mankind which seems to animate all his writings, no where marks this practice with disapprobation."
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (rev. ed. 1790; V.2.15; republished, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976), p. 210; quoted in Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315, 354-55 (2004).
Michael P.
This sounds like an interesting essay ...
Some readers of this blog may be interested in this essay:
"Two Concepts of Immortality: Reframing Public Debate on
Stem-Cell Research"
Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, Vol. 14, No. 73, 2004
BY: FRANK A. PASQUALE
Seton Hall University
School of Law
Paper ID: Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 14
Contact: FRANK A. PASQUALE
Email: Mailto:[email protected]
Postal: Seton Hall University
School of Law
One Newark Center
Newark, NJ 07102-5210 UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT:
Regenerative medicine seeks not only to cure disease, but also
to arrest the aging process itself. So far, public attention to
the new health care has focused on two of its methods: embryonic
stem-cell research and therapeutic cloning. Since both processes
manipulate embryos, they alarm those who believe life begins at
conception. Such religious objections have dominated headlines
on the topic, and were central to President George W. Bush's
decision to restrict stem-cell research.
Although they are now politically potent, the present
religious objections to regenerative medicine will soon become
irrelevant. Scientists are fast developing new ways of culturing
the biological materials now exclusively produced by embryos.
Given their expressed commitment to the "sanctity of life,"
religious leaders will soon find the tables turned: researchers
will accuse them of causing death if they fail to support
medicine that cures the sick without harming embryos.
Perhaps anticipating this development, those uneasy with
regenerative medicine have tried to shift the debate to focus on
its long-term effects. They believe that innovations that now
look benign might lead to an era of untrammeled biotechnological
manipulation of our lives. For example, the same technology used
to eliminate disease-causing genes or to clone embryos may
eventually be deployed to produce genetically engineered
children. That could, in turn, entrench class differences, since
only the wealthy could afford the most desirable genetic
enhancements.
Such objections may be speculative. Nevertheless, they deserve
more attention - not necessarily as predictions of the future,
but as indictments of the present. We are all disturbed by
hypothetical dystopias like Huxley's Brave New World. But their
most important flaws - the inequality, degradation, and moral
irresponsibility of their inhabitants - are already apparent in
the distribution of regenerative therapies. The world's
wealthiest nations spend hundreds of millions of dollars on
elaborate technologies of life-extension, while contributing
only trivially to efforts to assure basic medical care to the
poorest. Public debate on regenerative medicine must acknowledge
this inequality. Societies and individuals can invest in it in
good conscience only if they are seriously committed to
extending extant medicine to all.
Tuesday, October 26, 2004
Response to Russ Hittinger
Dear Russ,
I write this in some haste--and more abstractly than I would like.
Let me begin with a (perhaps needless) clarification: I have not argued that a faithful Catholic--which for present purposes I define as a Catholic who accepts the magisterium's teaching on the morality of abortion--should vote for Kerry (or for Bush). Rather, I have argued that the kindred arguments for doing so that have been made by Mark Roche, Cathy Kaveny, and Peggy Steinfels are not unreasonable arguments for faithful Catholics to make.
In particular, it is my judgment that faced with a choice between four more years of a Bush-Cheney Administration and four years of a Kerry-Edwards Administration, a faithful Catholic could reasonably decide that, all things considered, and in the longer run, the domestic and/or foreign policies of a Kerry-Edwards Administration would be less destructive to human life--to all the human life that is at stake--than would be the policies of another Bush-Cheney Administration. That is, a faithful Catholic could reasonably conclude that the most effective way to express "solidarity" with all human life--with all our brothers and sisters, born and unborn--is to vote for Kerry-Edwards. Such, at least, is my judgment. John Langan's essay, which I posted last week, is quite relevant here. I suspect that the fundamental reason why some insist that the decision/conclusion is *not* reasonable is that they evaluate the national and international policies of the Bush-Cheney Administration much less harshly--in particular, as much less hostile to human life, in the longer run--than others of us do.
(Imagine that it is a long time ago, the issue is slavery, and there are two candidates for the presidency: Candidate A opposes slavery on moral grounds and will work to abolish it. Candidate B does not oppose slavery on moral grounds and will not work to abolish it. However, B's economic policies happen to be subversive, in the longer run, of the institution of slavery, while A's economic policies happen to be, in the longer run, not at all subversive of the institution of slavery. Assume too that there is good reason to believe that notwithstanding A's moral opposition to slavery, neither A nor anyone else will be able to achieve a legal ban on slavery. (A does not plan to start a civil war over slavery.) Assume further, however, that B's economic policies will very likely result, within a generation, in the withering away of the institution of slavery. In my judgment, a faithful Catholic could reasonably decide to vote for B, notwithstanding the fact that A is morally opposed to slavery and would try to abolish it and B is not morally opposed to slavery and would not work to abolish it, as a way of expressing "solidarity" with the victims of slavery.)
I will not vote, next Tuesday, for another four years of Bush-Cheney. Between now and next Tuesday, I will decide whether to vote for Kerry-Edwards. If Kerry-Edwards prevails, faithful Catholics who voted for Kerry-Edwards will face this challenge: What to do, over the next four years, to maximize the chances that the national and international policies of the Kerry-Edwards Administration will be policies that, in the longer run, are more congenial to human life--to all human life--than the policies of another Bush-Cheney Administration would have been. In any event, my judgment is that there is room for a reasonable difference of judgments, among faithful Catholics, about how to vote next Tuesday.
Now, against the background of Vince Rougeau's posting today, let me ask readers of this blog to compare Russell Hittinger's challenging posting today with the Bradley-George piece in National Review Online. The former is an invitation--a fraternal invitation--to constructive dialogue; the latter, with its peremptory "We are reasonable and you are beyond the pale!" tone, is anything but an invitation to constructive dialogue. The latter, unlike the former, nourishes the worst features of our public discourse in this lamentable season of degraded politics.
All the best,
Michael
Papers Presented by Nicole and Rick Garnett at the University of St. Thomas
Last week, the University of St. Thomas School of Law was delighted to host Professor Nicole and Richard Garnett of Notre Dame (indeed their whole family of five joined us in Minneapolis) for a two-day visit and to hear from each of them at two faculty scholarship workshops. Although neither of their works-in-progress are yet in general circulation, I wanted to preview each of them for our Mirror of Justice audience so that we can keep an eye out for them as they come to publication in the coming months.
Nicole Garnett’s paper, “Relocating Disorder,” addresses the growing practice in metropolitan communities of relocating governmental, nonprofit, and religious organizations that serve disadvantaged communities, such as the homeless, to a concentrated area. The stated goal is to be coordinate and serve the needs of the population without providers being dispersed around the city. However, as Nicole Garnett explains, the cities also plainly hope to “relocate disorder,” that is, move the homeless away from downtown areas that are targeted for renewal. As her paper puts it, “[homeless campuses, exclusion zones and regulatory sweeps all seek to relocate urban disorder from one place (where it is perceived to be harmful) to another (where policymakers hope it will be more benign).” As local officials fear civil rights lawsuits challenging policing measures designed to control disorder, they are turning to land use policies – such as homeless campus concentrations – to acheive the same purpose while taking advantage of deferential standards of judicial review for land use planning. Nicole Garnett suggests, however, that these land use approaches may impose costs as significant as the order-maintenance policing schemes that have gone before. While it is impossible to summarize the entire comprehensive piece in a few words, her conclusion is that disorder-relocation land use policies raise serious concerns about economic and racial justice and, moreover, are not likely to be efficacious in terms of providing governmental human services. The risk, in her view, is that land use regulations may codify the very racial and economic injustices that have motivated opposition by civil libertarians and criminal procedure scholars to order maintenance policing. At the same time, Nicole Garnett also offers a caution to the other side of the debate as well. Legal advocates who have challenged police order maintenance policies may wish to consider the consequence of such lawsuits in pushing local government officials to turn to land use planning as a less-than-ideal alternative.
Rick Garnett presented a paper titled, “Religion, Division, and the First Amendment.” Nearly thirty-five years ago, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice Burger announced that state programs or policies could “excessive[ly]” – and, therefore, unconstitutionally – “entangle” government and religion, not only by requiring or allowing intrusive public monitoring of religious institutions, activities, and believers, but also through what he called their “divisive political potential.” His point was not simply that government actions burdened with such “potential” pose a “threat to the normal political process”and “divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government.” More fundamentally, the Chief Justice contended, “political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.” Chief Justice Burger's claim, as Rick Garnett clarifies it, was that the Constitution authorizes those charged with its interpretation to protect our “normal political process” from a particular kind of strife and to purge a particular kind of disagreement from our conversations about how best to achieve the common good. Rick Garnett’s paper provides a close and critical examination of the argument that observations, claims, or predictions about “political division along religious lines” should inform the Religion Clause’s interpretation, application, or enforcement. His examination is timely, because of the stark polarization that is widely said to characterize contemporary politics, and should also be helpful in understanding important developments in First Amendment law and theory more generally.
Greg Sisk
"Catholic Election Follies"
The National Catholic Reporter recently had an editorial on the election campaign and the rhetoric it has produced among some Catholics:
Issue Date: October 22, 2004
Catholic election follies continue
The election follies continue. Three cases in point:
In the opening paragraphs of his Oct. 1 pastoral letter “On Our Civic Responsibility for the Common Good,” St. Louis Archbishop Raymond Burke compares today’s United States to Nazi Germany.
Writing on the Web site of National Review magazine Oct. 12, Robert George, director of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University, and Gerard Bradley, professor of law at the University of Notre Dame, argue that “to vote for John Kerry in 2004 would be far worse … than to have voted against Lincoln and for his Democratic opponent in 1860. Stephen Douglas at least supported allowing states that opposed slavery to ban it. And he did not favor federal funding or subsidies for slavery. John Kerry takes the opposite view on both points when it comes to abortion. On the great evil of his own day, Senator Douglas was merely John Kerry-lite.”
“If you vote this way,” meaning for a pro-choice candidate, “are you cooperating in evil?” Denver Archbishop Charles Chaput asked The New York Times Oct. 9. “And if you know you are cooperating in evil, should you go to confession? The answer is yes.”
So, there you have it. Kerry-supporting Catholics are Nazi-like appeasers of evil, anti-freedom and need to go to confession on Nov. 3.
What to make of this hyperbole?
A few thoughts:
However much they stretch it (and, God knows, with the talk of Nazis and slavery and voters committing sinful acts, they are pushing the limits of civil discourse), Burke, George, Bradley and Chaput have a good point. Kerry says he “believes” that life begins at conception, but that he can’t “take what is an article of faith for me and legislate it for someone who doesn’t” agree. It’s a wholly unsatisfactory answer.
Articles of faith and matters of morality (“Thou shall not kill” and “ Love thy neighbor as thyself” being good examples) are, in fact, legislated all the time. No one is suggesting that Kerry force non-Christians to, for example, accept the doctrine of the Trinity or the incarnation. No, he’s being asked about serious public policy questions -- abortion and stem cell research -- that are also questions of morality.
You can read the rest of the article here
Vince
The Importance of Choosing Neither
Mark Noll (see below) is not alone. Another one of my favorite Christian thinkers, Alasdair MacIntyre, is also taking the "none of the above" approach, and he defends his decision in terms of obligation:
When offered a choice between two politically intolerable alternatives, it is important to choose neither. And when that choice is presented in rival arguments and debates that exclude from public consideration any other set of possibilities, it becomes a duty to withdraw from those arguments and debates, so as to resist the imposition of this false choice by those who have arrogated to themselves the power of framing the alternatives. These are propositions which in the abstract may seem to invite easy agreement. But, when they find application to the coming presidential election, they are likely to be rejected out of hand. For it has become an ingrained piece of received wisdom that voting is one mark of a good citizen, not voting a sign of irresponsibility. But the only vote worth casting in November is a vote that no one will be able to cast, a vote against a system that presents one with a choice between Bush's conservatism and Kerry's liberalism, those two partners in ideological debate, both of whom need the other as a target.Why should we reject both? Not primarily because they give us wrong answers, but because they answer the wrong questions. What then are the right political questions? One of them is: What do we owe our children? And the answer is that we owe them the best chance that we can give them of protection and fostering from the moment of conception onwards. And we can only achieve that if we give them the best chance that we can both of a flourishing family life, in which the work of their parents is fairly and adequately rewarded, and of an education which will enable them to flourish. These two sentences, if fully spelled out, amount to a politics. It is a politics that requires us to be pro-life, not only in doing whatever is most effective in reducing the number of abortions, but also in providing healthcare for expectant mothers, in facilitating adoptions, in providing aid for single-parent families and for grandparents who have taken parental responsibility for their grandchildren. And it is a politics that requires us to make as a minimal economic demand the provision of meaningful work that provides a fair and adequate wage for every working parent, a wage sufficient to keep a family well above the poverty line.
Read the rest here. (Thanks to reader Randy Heinig and Midwestern Mugwump for the lead.)
Rob