A while ago one of my colleagues in our Center for Peace and Justice Education at Villanova asked me to speak in a series the Center was presenting on issues for Catholics in the current election. I was naive enough to think that I could toss something off quickly on the issue I was aked to discuss: respect for life. Between the time I was asked to speak and my presentation last Tuesday, this topic began to fill not only MOJ but the op ed pages and other parts of the blogosphere. So, my goal became to summarize for our primarily undergraduate audience the many arguments that have surfaced here in all of their variety and sophistication. The resulting paper is posted in the side bar under my name and the title "Election 2004: Respect for Life issues." Because my goal was to provoke discussion in the audience, I did not propose a resolution at the end of my presentation, although I think you will see where I am heading. I do, however, try to make some points. Here's a summary:
1. The disagreements among Catholics (particularly Catholic intellectuals) reflect a growing fissure in the Church, paricularly over the understanding of Bernardin's image of the Seamless Garment and the consistent ethic of life, with one side bitterly rejecting the "moral equivalence" of abortion and the other concerns, and with the other seeing the notion of the consistent ethic as more fully expressing the Catholic commitment to life.
2. This election has forced this conflict to the fore because the two candidates pose the dilemma so starkly: Kerry, with a reprehensible record on abortion and no capacity for dialogue or moderation on the issue; Bush with a record on almost everything else equally reprehesible on Catholic grounds. The two candidates thus leave us with no choice but to confront the question of whether it is possible to support a candidate like Kerry whose record on life is beyond the pale because his opponent's record on everything else shows a disregard for the consistent ethic of life.
3. Kerry's attempt to elide the issue thru invoking what Ken Woodward recently called Mario Cuomo's "ancient sophistry", the private belief/public responsibilty dichotomy, does not bear serious scrutiny.
4. One answer to this question insists that the intrinsic evil of abortion cannot be put into the balancing scales with merely prudential concerns regarding other issues about which reasonable people might disagree. This argument, disarming in its simplicity, has been met by a variety of arguments that contest on both principled and pragmatic grounds the conclusion that a faithful Catholic has no choice but to vote for Bush. These arguments cannot be easily dismissed simply by invoking Kerry's terrible record on abortion.
My paper does not offer the depth, subtlety or detail of many of our posts, but I hope you will find it a useful summary.
I’ve refrained from posting anything on the Mirror of Justice during the past twenty-four hours, wanting to think carefully about the double-barreled complaint that my prior “screed” (Professor Kaveny) tended to “cross[] over into a kind of partisanship” (Dean Sargent). Given my respect for both complainants, and especially my admiration of Mark Sargent as our moderator, I have thought it wise to allow the matter to subside for a while, to permit others to offer their assessments (both through other postings to the blog and the numerous e-mails I’ve received), and to re-read my posts and those of my interlocutors. I do appreciate the encouraging messages I’ve received from so many quarters, even from those not fully persuaded by my words.
Having now taken stock, certainly I am disappointed and saddened that some have taken offense. I want to be liked as much as anyone. Running so badly afoul of a prominent law professor and theologian at perhaps the leading Catholic academy in the nation, such that the expression of my thoughts is termed a mere "screed," is most distressing. Nonetheless, reviewing all of these messages in context, I find it difficult to see where I did anything other than to speak uncomfortable truths and do so emphatically, for which I should not be be chastised. And, without meaning to say that such was the design or intent here, I do worry that the accusation of divisiveness can too readily be invoked to avoid continued engagement with those with whom with we disagree, especially when they confront us with difficult questions.
Importantly, I have never questioned anyone’s character or integrity (other than of course that of John Kerry, who has placed his character directly at issue by seeking public endorsement and by a two-decade record of promoting abortion as his favorite cause). Furthermore, I have not maintained that anyone who cast a vote Kerry’s way was either irrational or manifestly sinful, confessing to Michael Perry that I could not in the end make that definitive and uncharitable judgment. But those concessions and qualifications seem to count for naught to my detractors.
Yes, as Professor Kaveny objects, I have described those making the opposing argument as “Catholic apologists for Kerry.” To me, the description seemed apt, given that it was applied only to those who do not merely cast a private vote in secret but instead have broadcast a public message advocating the election of John Kerry. The messages I’ve received indicate the description resonated as accurate for many others, especially those who in the pro-life movement within the Democratic Party who have felt betrayed by Catholic endorsements of Kerry (“betrayal” is their word and expresses their feelings, not mine, as I have no investment in the Democratic Party). And the Kerry campaign certainly has found reason to be cheered by these affirmations by prominent Catholics, however much that support may have been rhetorically hedged. But perhaps the label is not altogether fair, given that the authors of these messages have expressed chagrin about John Kerry’s position on abortion and the sanctity of life, an acknowledgment that ought to be given credit. In the hope that those expressions of unhappiness by the "hold-the-nose-Kerry-voters" will only grow in number and intensity should he be elected, I will avoid using the label in the future.
Still, in reviewing my posts and the responses to it, the primary basis for the charge of incivility focuses upon my insistence, admittedly with vigor, emphasis, and repetition, that John Kerry’s record not be soft-pedaled or passed over lightly. For that reason, far from concentrating my fire against my interlocutors on this forum, I have devoted most of my attention to exposing that record. I cannot apologize for doing so, especially when others have appeared reluctant to examine it closely. Indeed, I have submitted that those making the case for a vote John Kerry appear less than willing to fully engage with the repulsive details of his record of pro-abortion extremism. Has that sugestion really been wide of the mark?
Admittedly, the truth about John Kerry’s record on abortion is brutal, but it is so precisely because of the ugliness which is unveiled. I acknowledge it is not a pleasant subject. But am I unreasonable to insist that those who seek to justify a vote for John Kerry are obliged to forthrightly acknowledge and engage with that pernicious record? Have I been unfair in perceiving those on the other side as wanting to avert their eyes and speak of that stark record only in generalities (and, if so, I must say that perception is widely shared, at least if my correspondents are any indication)? Especially when the assertion is made that a vote for John Kerry could be justified in terms of his comparatively superior political character and leadership capacity, is it not appropriate to highlight those inconvenient and devastating facts that contradict that evaluation? When I’ve also complained that those who make the case for Kerry too often fail to acknowledge the peculiar harm and painful scandal to the Church’s teaching and witness that would be occasioned by electing a Catholic to the presidency with such despicable views and record, where in their statements was that acknowlegment and evaluation?
In closing this posting, which will probably be my last for awhile, I observe that the Catholic Encyclopedia lays out these facts on its web site masthead: "In the past sixteen months capital punishment killed 98 Americans; the War in Iraq killed 100,000 people; and abortionists murdered 1,750,656 American infants." Even assuming the accuracy of the 100,000 figure, which is contested, a simple comparison leaves no question as to which is the greatest and continuing evil that we confront as a nation. I hope no one will find it divisive or inflammatory for me to highlight these cold, hard, and damning facts. But if so, then I have to think that the fault lies in our discourse as incapable of encompassing and confronting difficult truths, rather than with me.
I guess the role of a moderator is quite literally to "moderate" things, ie to calm passionate discussion when it gets too passionate, and to help antagonists find common ground. One of the things that I like best about MOJ, and am proudest of, is that I have had to do virtually no moderating. Our blogistas and guest blogistas have debated with a civility unusual in the blogosphere. Non of the characteristics of that world I find so tiresome -- snarkiness, flaming, pointless monologues on trivial points, bad writing, impulsive and poorly-thought-through posts -- have been present here. Even more important, our blog group includes Catholics of widely different stripes. Such diversity of opinion is very unusual in the blog world, and also not the norm in Catholic journals and organiztions. I think the fact that MOJ is a place where Catholics who disagree with each other about something as important as this election can confront each others arguments intelligently and without rancor is one of the reasons why our average daily hits went last week from about 250 to over 2600. I thus have encouraged my fellow blogistas to continue this discussion over the election because the issues are of historical importance and we are doing as good a job of covering them as anyone. I thus regret that Cathy feels compelled to leave this discussion. I agree with Cathy that Greg's last post, at least in tone, crossed over into a kind of partisanship inconsistent with the tenor of his prior posts. On the other hand, Cathy has tossed down the occasional rhetorical gauntlet herself. I hope we can all put bad feelings aside and continue this important discussion remembering that as Catholics there is far more that links us than sets us apart.
The current issue of Commonweal includes, among other things, a review by Paul Griffiths of Michael Novak's new book, "The Universal Hunger for Liberty: Why the Clash of Civilizations is Not Inevitable." (It also includes a good review of Professor Griffith's own new book, "Lying").
Here is a link to an American Enterprise Institute event, at which Novak presented his arguments. Here is an on-line discussion of the book, hosted by the Carnegie Council.
I wonder if our fellow MOJ blogger Steve Bainbridge has had a chance to read the book yet? I'd appreciate his "take."
This new paper, by Bernard Jacob of Hofstra School of Law, looks interesting:
This paper is a reading of Aristotle's book on justice (Book V of the Ethics) as what he says it is, a study of the disposition or inclination towards doing just (or unjust) acts. In that light, the content of Aristotle's famous treatments of distributive and corrective justice are only incidental, for their true role is as clues to a meaningful picture of the Just and the Unjust person.
Aristotle's treatment of Being Just as a specific virtue is the most detailed treatment he offers of any moral virtue. Being Just as distributive justice emerges as a commitment to the equal treatment of all citizens, but to an equality tempered by always contentious considerations of merited reward. Being Just as corrective justice is a commitment to protecting and repairing the sphere of each person's dignity and opportunity from damaging and sometimes malicious interactions.
But more is required. For Being Just means overcoming the disordered and misdirected desire that both Aristotle and Plato call "pleonexia", wanting - tyrant-like - more-of-and-more-than. If that is overcome by re-directed libido, the virtuous will then have to integrate more subtle elements if they are to achieve an inclination to this tempered, but real equality.
These elements are two. One is present only implicitly, the passion Aristotle calls nemesis, a demand that the world – and justice within the world – must never permit an evil person to go unpunished or a good one, to suffer harm. That passion cannot be admitted, but at best can only be temporarily stilled.
The second impediment arises from the dynamic of human communities that are made up of diverse and actively striving individuals: such citizens, haunted by suspicion grounded in their own pleonexia, demand that the community be one of laws. That creates a true dilemma, for in Aristotle's estimation, no set of rules can cabin any virtue. The Rule of Law is in tension with the particularity of justice in real life, and that tension is ultimately only bearable through the invention of equity, the trusted deviation from the law to preserve the law.
In making this abstract I have had to leave untouched the subject matter of the first and two last chapters, but in my paper I do treat these. More importantly, I also show how all political community and the inclination to seek to be a Just Person rests on a gracious act of reciprocal commitment.
The Intercultural Forum for Studies in Faith and Culture, at the Pope John Paul II Cultural Center in Washington, D.C., is hosting the "Culture of Law" lecture series. (The series is co-sponsored by the Terrence J. Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law, and Public Policy at the University of St Thomas, Minnesota). Speakers so far have included Patrick Brennan, John Witte, Harold Berman, Kent Greenawalt, and Bob Destro. On Nov. 4, Tom Berg (of St. Thomas University School of Law) will be speaking on "Christianity and the Secular in Modern Public Life" and, on Nov. 18, Steven Smith (University of San Diego) will deliver a lecture called "Hollow Men: Law and the Declension of Belief."
Here's a link for the series. If you are in or near Washington D.C., check it out.
A few weeks ago, in Washington, D.C., the Ave Maria School of Law presented "Public Witness/Public Scandal: Faith, Politics, and Life Issues in the Catholic Church." Presenters included Notre Dame Law School's Gerry Bradley and John Coughlin, OFM; and also Princeton's Robert George, John Langan, S.J., of Georgetown University, and Monika Hellwig, executive director of the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities. The conference papers are available here.
Cathy Kaveny observed in her last post that Greg's rhetoric is not productive of discussion and suggests he does little more than tell her that Kerry is evil. I disagree.
I doubt that Greg's postings over the last two weeks will sway my vote on Tuesday. As I have told him in off-MOJ e-mail, I think four more years of Bush is too disasterous on too many grounds to contemplate. Thus, my only option is to vote for Kerry or not vote for President. I suspect I will be one of the hold-my-nose-and-vote-for-Kerry voters.
But I take an important part of what Greg is trying to do here is to make those who are going to take that option think a little about the consequences of what they are doing. Both Greg and William McGurn (in his powerful Casey lecture posted a couple of days ago) fairly suggest that the silence of Catholics who can be counted on to vote Democrat no matter what has helped contribute to a Democratic party that has completely silenced any pro-life sentiment. Perhaps it is not enough for those who are opposed to abortion on moral grounds to silently hold their noses and vote for Kerry. Doesn't some attempt have to be made by those who believe abortion is wrong, but who otherwise prefer the Democratic agenda to the Republican one, to demand that some anti-abortion sentiment be expressed within the Democratic party? (Or, do we just all bail and join Mark's Seamless Garment party).
This has to be my last guest-post. But I'd like to say, first, that I find the
tone taken by Russ Hittinger to be much more productive of discussion than the
rhetoric of Greg Sisk. But here goes:
1. I believe I said that I recognized the intersection of assessment of a
candidate's character and assessment of issues is intertwined. I grant that
Catholics have assessed character in terms of the candidate's stand on
abortion--but it seems almost exclusively in terms of a candidate's stand on
abortion--as Greg's response does almost exclusively. What I was pointing to
was the failure to address broader questions of character in terms of
possession of the political virtues, such as prudentia, and its subvirtues. I
frankly don't see how this wasn't apparent from reading my response, and its
invocation of Aquinas's Treatise on Prudence and Justice.
2. I agree Kerry's stand on abortion is extreme. But despite the difference
in Democratic and Republican platform positions on abortion, I don't think it
will make much difference in the legal structure anytime soon. As I think I
said, I don't believe that there is any chance that the Supreme Court will be
so constituted as to overrule Roe anytime soon. I think the only confirmable
people will be like O'Connor and Kennedy--both Republican nominees, and both
unwilling to overrule Roe. I think that on balance, in the reall world, a
Democratic administration is likely to result in fewer abortions.
3. I'm just not an apologist for Kerry as Greg Sisk describes me--I certainly
don't think my position --described as "holding my nose and voting for Kerry"
counts as apologetics.
4. I have to say that I'm a bit discouraged with this conversation--I thought
my post provided a) a moral analysis of the act of voting; b) a set of criteria
according to which candidates could be assessed, which partly drew upon the
Catholic tradition in virtue theory, as applied to the virtue of politics; c) a
way of morally accounting for a vote that will further, unintentionally but
foreseeably, unjust policies rooted in Catholic casuistry (i.e., the concept of
cooperaton), d) a defense of why I thought I had proportionate reason to vote
for Kerry here, given my beliefs about Bush and my background belief that I
have a moral obligation to vote; and e) a few reflections on the puzzling
question of what solidarity consists in. Greg didn't engage any of that. And
as I read his well, screed, it simply says to me, "YOU IDIOT DON'T YOU SEE THAT
KERRY IS EVIL EVIL EVIL ?"
So , honestly, I just don't see this conversation as having any future point.
I'm happy to talk with Russ off-line (on the meaning of solidarity), but I
guess I'll exit this discussion where I began: worrying about the state of
the rhetoric in the Church.
I meant by solidarity (as you correctly perceived) making the plight of
those excluded from the protection of law something “first” in one’s
public actions. I spoke of actions, not just symbols. I cannot
quarrel with your suggestion that “solidarity” with an excluded class
of human persons can be maintained at levels besides acts of voting,
legislating, and creating public laws and policies. Indeed, we have to
do this all of time, even with regard to persons who are not, strictly
speaking, excluded from the protections of law. Decent people reorder
their priorities and resources to succor needy neighbors, and they do
so without waiting for the state to act or even to recognize the
problem. Sometimes, these private acts of justice and social charity
turn out to be more efficacious than what can be furnished by law. But
I was trying to throw light on the public dimension, consisting of the
choices we make as citizens (by voting, legislating, etc.) – choices
that have a distinct kind of causality. At this level, the moral
question is not merely how to deploy forces to fix a problem, but
whether those who suffer the injustice have a claim upon the public
sphere. For me, this is not an abstract issue, although, to be sure,
it is tricky.
You and I agree that unborn human persons have a legitimate claim on us
at other levels. I am insisting that the deadly sin of the political
order is not merely its contingent inability or slowness in correcting
an injustice, but rather the use of law to rule out the claim of the
victims, to deny it access to public consideration and remedy, and to
cast the class of unprotected human persons into a status of being
merely private neighbors. Now, it could happen that once these persons
are thrown beyond the pale of law their lives will turn out okay. I am
dubious. Given all of the other things that warrant your dubiety (the
practical wisdom of the candidates, the war policies of the Bush
administration, the belligerent rationalism that overestimates what is
amenable to legal and political remedy), you should at least be dubious
about the prospect of justice when the equal protection principle is
set aside. I was disappointed that your Augustinian sensibilities,
which I share, seem to evaporate once we get to the problem of the
powerful consigning the weak to the contingencies of cultural
persuasion. On my view, this sounds too much like free-marketeers who
find every solution to distributive and legal justice in the
spontaneous hand of the market.
I contend that one ought not to vote for a candidate who, as a matter
of principle, would create or maintain the exclusion of unborn persons
from the protection of law; indeed who would go further, by using the
powers of his or her office not only to prevent a constitutional
solution, but to knock down ordinary legislation protecting some unborn
human persons. The net result of Kerry’s position is that there can be
no public prudence about this issue. It is the severity and totality
of the principle that alert us to the fact that we are not dealing with
tough issues of prudence. Rather, we are dealing with a canceling-out
of the principle that makes prudence possible, at least in this
particular case. I agree that there are other issues of justice that
demand our attention, including the torture and abuse of prisoners,
derogation from the international law of war, the poverty of families,
just for starters. The point that I am making is that these kinds of
injustice are not excluded from the common law of our society. Each
one can be addressed and remedied on the basis our corporate moral and
legal order. We might disagree about the facts, but no one believes
that we are not entitled to deliver judgment in these matters that
binds everyone.
Perhaps you and I are considering two very different examples of how a
problem of justice gets opened-up or closed-off. You are worried about
the long-range pattern of social legislation, which, if prudently
framed and pursued would tend to ameliorate the situation of the weak
and vulnerable. As you can see, I have emphasized the use of the most
public of things, equal rights under law, to insure that rightful
claims can be heard and that public business can be conducted on the
matter. Anyone who holds the latter should hold the former.
International instruments and covenants of human rights hold both
principles. They belong together. In moral logic there is an order of
priority between the two. I won’t insist on this entailment right
here, because I am willing to admit that in working for certain good
consequences one can find himself implicitly affirming the suppressed
principle.
Yet, I keep waiting to hear from the party of long-term amelioration
some recognition (let it be highly coded, and let it be a velleity
aimed at the future) that the well-being of unborn persons is truly a
matter of public business – just for who they are, and not merely as
potential, if not anonymous, beneficiaries of social policy designed
for other people. After all, what it means to be in a community of
justice is not just bringing about good external consequences, but also
affirming the good of the persons to whom these other things accrue.
So, I look for the party of amelioration to make a more generous
gesture in the direction of the personal good of the unborn and their
equality before the law, and to show that the social policies are not
reinforcing the position that one class of human persons are only
incidentally factored into the justice of the city. Once the principle
is admitted, then we can debate time-tables and the plethora of issues
that legitimately fall to the order of prudence.
Concerning all of the other issues you raise about Bush versus Kerry, I
think you are right about some and not so right about others. But I am
not entirely sure.
