Re the questions and observations about evangelization while aiding disaster victims, I thought this section of John Paul II’s message for World Mission Day on October 20, 2002 - Mission is Proclamation of Forgiveness might add an interesting dimension to the exchange:
5. The Risen Christ gives peace to his disciples. The Church, faithful to the Lord´s command, continues to proclaim and spread his peace. Through evangelization, believers help people to realize that we are all brothers and sisters and, as pilgrims on this earth, although on different paths, we are all on our way to the common Homeland which God, through ways known only to Him, does not cease to indicate to us. The main road of mission is sincere dialogue (see Ad Gentes 7, Nostra aetate 2); "dialogue does not originate from tactical concerns of self-interest," (Redemptoris Missio, 56) nor is it an end in itself. Dialogue, instead, speaks to others with respect and understanding, stating the principles in which we believe and proclaiming with love the most profound truths of the faith which are joy, hope, and meaning of life. In fact, dialogue is the realization of a spiritual impulse leading "to inner purification and conversion which, if pursed with docility to the Holy Spirit, will be spiritually fruitful." (ibid 56) Commitment for attentive and respectful dialogue is a conditio sine qua non for authentic witness of God´s saving love.
Re Rick’s question, is it unworthy of the Gospel to “evangelize” while aiding disaster victims? – I think it depends on how one understands evangelization.From this text and others (eg, Novo Millennio 54-56), I think John Paul II sees the potential for a profound harmony between genuine evangelization and respectful dialogue – and the hinge seems to be freeing oneself from “self-interest,” being grounded in one’s own inner purification and conversion, and asking the Holy Spirit for guidance on what words and actions are the most respectful and loving in any given circumstance.In all of these discussions, I think we also need to acknowledge the layers of misunderstanding and mistrust that surround and permeate the word “evangelization” – and that we have quite a bit of work to do to retrieve its deeper meaning.
My reaction to Rick's question is similar to Rob's response.
I assume no one is suggesting that the evangelical groups in question are using coercive tactics and denying humanitarian aid to those unwilling to proclaim acceptance with the group's religious beliefs. Rather, the suggestion of those critical of the evangelical groups seems to be that they should attempt to completely divorce their religion from their provision of material aid (and indeed, that the government ought to force them to do so).
For Christians, ministering to people's material needs is not a secular activity but is part of the core religious mission, and the charge of all Christians is to preach the Gospel in all they say and do. Ministering to material needs and ministering to spiritual needs (and surely there is a lot of spiritual healing that needs to be done here) are not segregable activities.
Rick's question prompts another question: if we would ask Christian relief agencies to refrain from presenting or talking about the truth claims of Christianity while they minister to tsunami victims, shouldn't we also have asked Mother Theresa to refrain from talking about Christ while she ministered to the Hindu poor of India? Certainly we should ask hard questions about tactics, especially in environments where overt evangelism can be mistaken for cultural imperialism, but the notion that the Gospel's call to minister to material needs can or should be segregated from the call to minister to spiritual needs strikes me as problematic.
Here is the text of a letter from Wiliam Cardinal Keeler to members of the U.S. Senate, written in anticipation of their being called upon to advise on and consent to presidential nominations for the Federal bench, including the U.S. Supreme Court:
Dear Senator,
As you begin the work of the 109th Congress, the Senate will again be called upon to advise on and consent to presidential nominations for the Federal bench, perhaps even for the U.S. Supreme Court.
As you know, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops is active in the courts on many matters, especially in cases on abortion, the death penalty, civil rights, discrimination and the role of religion in society. At the same time, it is not the practice of our Conference to take positions on particular presidential nominees. However, we want to respond to reports about the judicial confirmation process that have caused us and others serious concern.
We are troubled by reports that national abortion advocacy groups, and even some U.S. senators, view nominees who oppose the purposeful taking of innocent human life as somehow unfit for judicial office in the United States. It is further reported that attempts would be made to deny them a vote on confirmation by the full Senate.
Insisting that judicial nominees support abortion throughout pregnancy is wrong. By any measure, support for the Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade decision is an impoverished standard for assessing judicial ability. For over three decades, Roe has sparked more informed criticism and public resistance than any other court decision of the late 20th century. Even legal scholars who support abortion have criticized Roe for not being grounded in the U.S. Constitution. Further, in 2000, the Supreme Court relied on Roe to rule that the gruesome and inhumane practice of partial-birth abortion must be constitutionally protected. When considering nominees the Senate should not allow itself to be held captive to such an unfair and unreasonable standard.
There is no doubt that the Catholic Church stands out for its commitment to the right to life from conception until natural death. This ethic has profound consequences not only for abortion, but for many other areas of life, including the death penalty, the application of scientific research to human subjects, the right to adequate health care, and the role of the state in promoting the common good. Our civil society will be all the poorer if Senators, as a matter of practice, prevent a Senate vote on well-qualified judicial nominees whose consciences have been formed in this ethic.
I pray God will bless Congress' efforts to ensure that Federal judges are persons of integrity and good character who will respect the rights of all, born and unborn.
Sincerely,
Cardinal William H. Keeler Archbishop of Baltimore Chairman, Committee for Pro-Life Activities United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
The Christianity Today blog has collected several stories dealing with the story that "Evangelical aid groups have come under some criticism for preaching the gospel alongside providing aid to the survivors of the Indian Ocean tsunami." (Thanks to Amy Welborn). According to the Baltimore Sun, "some evangelical groups are mixing Christian missionary work with humanitarian aid in countries ravaged by the tsunamis and earthquake, a provocative approach shunned by the majority of faith-based relief organizations." Apparently, a story in the Philadelphia Inquirer expresses surprise that the United States -- purportedly eager to improve relations with Muslims -- has done little to stop this missionary work: "The U.S. government has said it hopes American tsunami aid improves its image abroad, particularly with Muslims. At the same time, it has not tried to impede evangelical efforts."
Here are some earlier thoughts of mine on "proselytism." What do people think? Is it unworthy of the Gospel to evangelize while aiding the victims of this disaster? And, is a government constrained by our First Amendment authorized to limit or discourage such evangelism?
I'm pleased to say that MOJ-er Rob Vischer is presenting his paper, "Tortured Ethics: Abu Ghraib and the Moral Lawyer" (link) at the Notre Dame Law School next week (Tuesday at lunch, if any Notre Dame folks are interested).
As an addendum to Michael's post on the Integral Formation of the Human Person, I'd like to recommend an excellent essay written by Bill May on The Vocation of a Catholic Teacher/Scholar. The link I provided is to an issue of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly that also contains a fine article by John Breen.
Kim Daniels of the Thomas More Law Center offers this response to my question on the right to privacy:
To my mind, after Eisenstadt the Court’s privacy jurisprudence can no longer be considered consistent with Catholic social thought. The Griswold court explicitly places the institution of marriage at the center of its holding, calling marriage “a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the point of being sacred .... an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.” 381 U.S. 479, 486. Justice Harlan’s Griswold concurrence is even more “Catholic” in its language: “Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the state forbids altogether, but the intimacy of the husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State must not only allow, but which it has always fostered and encouraged.” Id. at 553. A right to privacy so conceived is not only consistent with Catholic teaching, in the American context it’s essential to it, protecting the institutions of marriage and the family from unwarranted state intrusion.
In Eisenstadt, however, the Court explicitly moves away from such language; marriage becomes “an association of two individuals”, and “if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 405 U.S. 438, 453. From there it’s only a hop, skip, and a jump to Roe, Casey’s mystery passage, and the untethered right to privacy that exists today.
Yesterday Rob asked "where exactly does the right to privacy's development deviate from the Catholic worldview?" I look forward to hearing the responses of others (bloggers and readers).
My own response is multi-layered. At a separation of powers level, I would suggest that the Court has deviated from a Catholic worldview by creating a constitutional right to privacy in "interpreting" a Constitution that does not have one. A Catholic worldview respects the authority of various offices of power, and it seems to me that the Court in creating a right to privacy has failed to respect the authority of the people of the United States to speak through their legislators. In short, the Court has exceeded its authority from my judicial minimilist perspective. The Meyer and Pierce opinions appeal to me, and I would like to find a way to reconcile them with my understanding of the judiciary, but to date I have not been successful.
At a prudential level, only Roe and the other abortion cases deviate from a Catholic worldview. Lawmakers may decide that prudence dictates that the state not use its police powers to outlaw contraceptive use (for married couples or even unmarried individuals) or homosexual sodomy, leaving individuals as free moral agents responsible for their own moral development. A state is not free, however, to license free moral agents to intentionally kill innocent human life.
At an anthropological level, I would suggest that Griswold, Eisenstadt, Lawrence, and the abortions cases all deviate from a Catholic worldview. Griswold may be shrouded in language about the sacredness of the marital relationship, but its anthropology, which came to light in Eisenstadt, has been fully exposed in Casey and Lawrence, especially in the mystery passage. This radical autonomy of self-creation is fundamentally at odds with a Catholic worldview. As I have argued in Sex, Marriage, and Procreation: The Judicial Decimation of American Family Law, Lawrence (and Goodridge) are logical extensions of Griswold.
This semester I'm teaching Family Law, and today I devoted the first class to tracing the development of the right to privacy in the context of human relationships. When viewed as a seamless line of cases (Meyer - Pierce - Griswold - Eisenstadt - Roe - Lawrence, among others) it becomes tempting to embrace the development as a logical unfolding of family and individual autonomy. I assume that most champions of the moral anthropology applaud the holdings of Meyer (state can't forbid teaching of foreign language) and Pierce (state can't require public education), especially their framing of parental obligations and duties in terms of natural rights. Even Griswold is grounded in a conception of the marital relationship as sacred, requiring its own sphere of autonomy against state interference. The right to privacy, in many respects, is entirely consistent with the system of limited government / mediating structures envisioned by Catholic social thought.
So I have a question for co-bloggers and readers who may have devoted more thought to this area than I have: where exactly does the right to privacy's development deviate from the Catholic worldview? Is it Eisenstadt's disconnect of privacy from traditional family relationships? Or is it not until Roe elevates privacy over competing claims of personhood from another living being? Or is there a problem with the right to privacy itself?
