Intuitively responding to Rob's post on "Salvation as a Selective Incentive" (which I have not read) I wonder if Jonathon Klick explored the possibility that Catholics may have larger families and thus less disposable income in earlier years. Hmm! Could this explain increased giving in later years?
Thursday, February 10, 2005
Salvation as Selective Incentive
"Salvation as a Selective Incentive"
The latest confirmation that empirical analysis is taking over the world comes in the form of this new paper by Florida State law prof Jonathan Klick titled "Salvation as a Selective Incentive." Here's the abstract:
As club goods, religions face the problem of free riding. Smaller religious clubs, such as cults or sects, can often surmount this problem through communal pressures or by requiring their members to provide easily monitored signals. Generally, however, such tactics will be unavailable or too costly for large denominations, and, as such, these denominations must look for other techniques to avoid free riding. This paper argues that the Roman Catholic doctrine of justification by faith and works serves as an Olsonian selective incentive, and presents empirical evidence in support of this claim. Specifically, I show that Catholics contribute significantly more to their churches as they approach death than do members of Protestant denominations. More generally, this paper suggests that church doctrines influence behavioral incentives and religious leaders may be able to capitalize on these behavioral effects for the benefit of their church.
Rob
Wednesday, February 9, 2005
The Value of Catholic Legal Thought: Means vs. Ends
Steve asks whether we gain anything by viewing legal questions through the lens of Catholic social thought given that the range of resulting perspectives often seems to mirror the views held by those who do not bother with the CST lens in the first place. In other words, does the "Catholic legal theory" label simply provide a noble cover slogan for debates that, at their essence, can be found throughout the surrounding legal culture?
With this past election cycle still fresh in our minds, it is difficult to deny that CST sometimes seems uniquely malleable, especially when it comes to economic issues (unlike abortion, for example). I do think that, even in the economic realm, CST has a substantive spine that separates it from at least some of its competing worldviews. The key is to distinguish between means and ends. CST does not prescribe a single economic path for the modern world, but it does assert unmistakably that any chosen path must be aimed at an economic reality in which the dignity of the human person is honored. One obvious implication of this assertion is the preferential option for the poor. If someone is serious about integrating CST with economic theory, the plight of the poor must be front and center. Does this mean that the Bainbridge-Novak-Sirico approach to economics is out of step with CST? No, but it means that they must show how their approach benefits the poor, not as an afterthought, but as a primary determinant of the approach's compatibility with the Church's teaching. The same holds, of course, for those who favor a welfare state approach.
This may be an obvious attribute of CST, but I think we lose track of how distinctive it is. It also helps explain why there traditionally has tended to be resistance among proponents of CST to an economic theory grounded in tax cuts. I've never heard Reagan or Bush II lead off a tax cut speech with "We're cutting taxes to help the poor!" They might insist that the poor will benefit, but tax cuts are defended as essential to helping the taxpayer. Their impact on the poor is of secondary concern. I'm not saying that tax cuts will never help the poor -- certainly there's a case to be made, especially if the cuts trigger job creation, etc. My only point is that the impact on the poor must be central to economic policy if the vision laid out by CST is to be taken seriously. The means by which the poor can best be helped should be debated with vigor, but the plight of the poor as a foundational concern of economic policy is non-negotiable.
So if we focus only on the "how," then perhaps CST does not add much to our legal debates, as the Church does not claim to have a monopoly on technique. But if we keep in mind the "why," then we will enter the debates of our time from an entirely different angle, and Catholic legal thought will develop in a way that is counter-cultural, even revolutionary.
Rob
Ruminations on "Catholic Legal Thought" Prompted by Thoughts on Marx and CST
At a conference over the weekend, I had what one observer referred to as a "full and frank" discussion of the intellectual roots of Catholic social thought with esteemed Catholic legal scholar Tom Shaffer. As I understood Tom's claim, he argued that CST is basically Marxist in origin because it accepts virtually all of Marx's core principals excepting only such things as the claim that religion is the opiate of the masses and so on.
I will concede that elements of CST were infused with a Marxist sensibility during the heyday of liberation theology, of course, but I rather forcefully rejected Tom's apparent view that the key documents - especially the foundation stone laid by Rerum Novarum should be understood as even quasi-Marxist documents.
In doing some subsequent research on the subject, I found a very interesting essay on the historical roots of CST by Father Robert Sirico. Fr. Sirico concludes that:
Taken as a whole, and read in the context of its historical setting, Rerum Novarum provides one of the most finely honed defenses of the free market and private property order in the annals of Catholic, indeed Christian, social thought up until the appearance of Centesimus Annus, which expands Leo's notion of property beyond land ownership, to include "the possession of know-how, technology and skill." (#32)
I suspect our friend and leader Mark Sargent would add Sirico to his list of CST outliers, which as well all know includes myself and Michael Novak (at least I'm in very good company!). Yet, I thought Sirico's essay makes a very strong case that the key documents of CST in fact can be squared with a classical liberal understanding of the roles of the state and the economy. More precisely, Sirico claims:
Articulating a classically liberal view of the social crisis is obviously not what Leo had in mind when he wrote his encyclical. Yet, I would contend that classical liberal thought is at least as much in the tradition of Rerum Novarum as is the collectivist interpretation it has historically received.
Indeed, the standard interpretation given Rerum Novarum in many circles has obfuscated much of what is authentically liberal in Catholic social thought. Unfortunately, the interpretations of certain theorists have so dominated discussions on what is the proper Christian response to social, political, and economic calamities or injustices, that any classical liberal interpretation of contemporary injustices is greeted as naive, insensitive, or even heretical.
Perhaps it is precisely because CST is capable of both such an interpretation and that given it by Tom Shaffer that we end up, as Mark Sargent put it at the conference, back where we started from. In other words, it perhaps is not surprising that putting ideas through what Mark calls the "Catholic wringer" leads us back to the same place we would arrive using wholly secular precepts.
This line of analysis may call into question the enterprise to which the Mirror of Justice blog is devoted; namely, is it worth trying to figure out what a distinctively Catholic legal thought looks lie? Is CST and Catholicism generally such a big tent that there inevitably will be multiple legitimate Catholic perspectives on legal questions? If so, what do we add to the debate by invoking CST other than perhaps very useful end of insisting that faith-based discourse has a legitimate role in the public square?
Mark's remarks at the conference last Saturday raised very similar questions. (I hope Mark will print those remarks up for the blog and/or publication, as they were quite provocative.) Our post-speeches panel discussion further explored some of them. Because I'm genuinely curious about these issues, I now pose these questions to the rest of our fellow Mirror of Justice bloggers.
It would have been an honor just to have been nominated ....
Neither ProfessorBainbridge.com nor Mirror of Justice are nominated in any of the categories for the Catholic Blog of the Year Awards. It's a moral outrage, of course! One of my favorite blogs, Southern Appeal, is in the running for political blog, although it will get more than just a run for its money from Mark Shea's fine blog. Of course, Shea's on hiatus, which presumably will help SA. Plus Shea's also nominated in the best blog by a man category, while SA is also nominated in the best social commentary category, so loyal readers of both can support both in different polls. (Both are pretty conservative, so your mileage may well vary.)
Tuesday, February 8, 2005
Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy
I have just posted a few pieces at the sidebar which address many of our issues. Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, co-authored with my colleague and the founder of Fordham's Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer's Work, Russ Pearce, sets out a brief history of the “religious lawyering” movement, describes the positive contribution it brings to the legal profession, and addresses some of the challenges it poses for a culture of professionalism. Your thoughts and critique most welcome! Also up are the brief remarks from the Guild of Catholic Lawyers of the Archdiocese of New York Charles Carroll Award reception last week. The room was full of hope for bringing ahead the kind of conversation we are working on, thanks to the presence of folks like Susan Stabile and Rob Vischer. I have also posted a piece just out in Logos, the Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture published out of the University of St. Thomas - its a brief biography of Focolare founder Chiara Lubich, with some background on her approach to inter-religious dialogue. Enjoy! Amy
Balkin on Same-Sex Marriage
Yale Law School's Professor Jack Balkin has posted a lengthy discussion and examination of several different "constitutional theories of same sex marriage," including "sex equality", "sexual orientation discrimination", "irrational discrimination", the no-laws-based-on-"animus" rule of Romer v. Evans, and the "fundamental due process right to marry." Balkin evidently prefers -- or, at least, finds most plausible and likely to succeed -- the first two arguments.
Rick
Will (Should) the Pope Resign?
Vatican watchers, who resemble no one quite so much as the old Kremlinolgists in their ability to spin elaborate theories from virtually no hard evidence, are all attitter over remarks by the Vatican Secretary of State on the Pope's health. The Times of London, for example, ran the story under a headline reading:
In fact, however, as the story makes clear, the Cardinal said no such thing:
Asked whether the Pope, 84, should step down as his illness worsens, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, the Secretary of State (Prime Minister), himself the Pope’s deputy and a potential successor, said that the decision should be “left to the conscience of the Pope”. He added: “We should have faith in him. If there is one man who knows what to do, it is he.”
In other words, in response to a direct question, the Cardinal basically said "it's up to the Pope."
My guess is that some commentators are engaging more in wishful thinking rather than reasoned analysis. I doubt very much that this Pope will step down while he lives. For one thing, it hasn't been done in over 700 years. For another, this Pope's current health struggles are a living witness to the meaning of the Gospel of Life. As John Paul has taught:
"Suffering - as I wrote in the Apostolic Letter Salvifici Doloris - can be transformed and changed with a grace which is not exterior but interior…yet this interior process does not always develop in the same way…Christ responds neither directly nor abstractly to human questioning about the meaning of suffering. Human beings come to know His saving response in so far as they share in the sufferings of Christ. The response which comes from this sharing is before all else a call. It is a vocation. Christ does not explain in some abstract way the reasons for sufferings, but says first of all: "Follow me", Come, with your suffering share in this work of salvation of the world, which is realized through my suffering, by means of my Cross" (n 26). ...
Suffering is transformed when we experience in ourselves the closeness and solidarity of the living God: "I know that my Redeemer lives, and at last…I shall see God my savior" (Job 19:25-26). With this assurance comes inner peace, and from this a spiritual joy, quiet and deep, springing from the "gospel of suffering" which understands the grandeur and dignity of human beings who suffer with a generous spirit and offer their pain "as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God" (Rom 12:1). This is why those who suffer are no burden to others, but with their suffering contribute to the salvation of all.
I find it difficult to believe that the man who wrote those words will step down from the task to which he has been appointed.
In turn, for us as Catholic lawyers, the Pope's example reminds us that the Gospel of Life is concerned as much with the end of life as with its beginning. Elder law is not my vocational expertise, but it strikes me as an area ripe for being put through what our leader and friend Mark Sargent has taken to calling the "Catholic wringer."
Science Advancing the Culture of Life?
We've previously noted how recent scientific developments have impacted the abortion debate (at least in the U.K.) by expanding our knowledge of the fetus. It now seems that scientific developments stand to enrich the debate over euthanasia, given the results of this study:
Thousands of brain-damaged people who are treated as if they are almost completely unaware may in fact hear and register what is going on around them but be unable to respond, a new brain-imaging study suggests.
Rob
Monday, February 7, 2005
More on Personhood
With permission, I am posting an interesting exchange on personhood (see below) between Professor Larry Solum and Chris Green, a philosopher at Notre Dame:
Green to Solum: Your discussion of moral personhood does not explain what relationship a being must have to intelligence, autonomy, communication, and self-awareness to be a moral person. Dreamlessly-sleeping people or the reversibly comatose are certainly moral persons, but aren't presently exhibiting any of them. A duplicate of a dreamlessly-sleeping person hasn't ever exhibited any of them, but would certainly be a moral person too, I think. You have to go to capacity, or potency, or some other notion in that neighborhood to explain these sorts of cases, and if you do, it seems to me the human fetus will likely get included too.
Solum to Green: I take the point--wonderfully concise in expression, too. I wonder about the duplicate of dreamlessly sleeping person example. Suppose the duplicate pops into existence & snoozes for a while & then pops out. Is it clear that there was a moral person? I'm not sure I have any strong intuitions about that case--it is so odd. As is your duplicate case. Fetuses lack the capacity for the marks of personhood but have the potentiality--isn't that what makes the case hard?
Green to Solum: I would have pretty clear that the duplicate coming into and out of existence would be a moral person whose loss should be mourned; it seems to me that whether a being is a person at a time should depend only on the facts pertaining to the being's state at that time, so I have pretty clear intuitions that the duplicate is as much a person as the original. I'm not sure what the difference is between a capacity and a potentiality; a potentiality just seems like a relatively long-range capacity, and someone in a long-term coma could be just as far away from exhibiting the criteria.
Solum to Green: Again, wonderful points. As to the duplicate who winks in and out, I notice that you say "should be mourned," but not, I think, "would be mourned." I suspect you would agree that such entities would not be warned. If there were very many of them, I would doubt that we even should mourn them. It is far from clearl to me that such transient entities with the never realized capacity for functioning as persons would have the same moral status as those who have so functioned. Is potentiality the same as capacity? This one seems clear. No, these are two different concepts. It is possible to blur them--as it is possible to blur many concepts--by creating intermediate cases and pointing to the line drawing problem, but I am always suspicious of this move, which can be used to erase many important moral distinctions.
Rick